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Since 2003, Iraqi Kurds have played a significant role in shaping successive Iraqi governments. Over the years, they successfully attained semi-autonomy and economic independence. However, their progress has steadily declined due to a series of federal policies and decisions.

In February 2022, Iraq's Federal Supreme Court invalidated the Kurdistan Region's oil sales by ruling that only the federal government has the constitutional authority to export crude oil and enter international agreements.

The Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) experienced another setback in generating revenue last March when Ankara was found to have broken a 1973 bilateral agreement with Baghdad (renewed in 2010), which gave the Iraqi federal government complete control over Iraq's oil sales through the pipeline to Turkey.

A complaint was taken to the International Chamber of Commerce, which ordered Turkey to pay Iraqi central authorities $1.47bn for violating the agreement and purchasing directly from the Kurds without permission.

Internal strife within the Kurdish political scene has also contributed to the region's declining influence and authority. Legal disputes between the Kurdish opposition and the two main ruling parties, the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), gave rise to Iraq's top court becoming the ultimate authority in resolving partisan conflict.

With federal authorities assuming control over the region, the future of the divided Kurdish entity remains uncertain.

In 2017, the Kurdistan region held a referendum on secession upon the request of its main partners within the Iraqi Kurdistan National Union, with more than 90 percent of voters supporting independence.

This move triggered a series of retaliatory measures that precipitated the region's political and economic downturn. The federal government of Iraq, along with neighbouring Iran and Turkey, imposed sanctions on the Kurds.

Iraq's restrictions on oil exports led to the KRG's administrative and military withdrawal from large areas comprising territories disputed between the Kurds and Baghdad, most notably the oil-rich Kirkuk Governorate. This continued for more than a year, until the two parties reached a temporary understanding in 2018 to export Kirkuk oil through the KRG's pipeline to Turkey.

The Kurdistan Region's 2017 referendum on secession triggered a series of retaliatory measures that precipitated the region's political and economic downturn

Iraq's Federal Supreme Court subsequently issued its decision to stop exporting the KRG's oil through Turkey, barring the region from exporting its oil independently. The top court then ruled against the extension of the Kurdistan Region's parliament, declaring it unconstitutional following a lawsuit by opposition parties in Erbil.

The decision was preceded by days of sudden changes to the draft budget, which the KDP considered a "coup against the political agreements" entered into as part of the State Administration Coalition forming the government of Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani.

The KRG argued that the changes made to the draft budget by members of the finance committee of the parliament were unconstitutional and inconsistent with the agreement signed between the regional and federal governments.

The imposed amendments to the federal budget, in place for the next three years, are the last-but-not-least push to squeeze the Kurdistan Region and undermine the authority and independence that it once enjoyed.

The KRG has been further weakened by internal political division, allowing the Iraqi federal government to swiftly regain control of Kurdistan's liquid gold and its revenues. This represented a glaring setback for the region, which was free to export its own oil since 2013.

Meanwhile, the Kurdish opposition parties posed legal challenges to the vote by the Kurdistan Region's parliament to extend the term of the legislature, arguing that the extension would nullify one of the region's three pillars - presidential, parliament, and government. Yet the extension itself came about due to disagreements between the ruling parties over a new electoral law and subsequent delays in holding elections.

The lawsuit resulted in a Federal Supreme Court decision declaring the extension unconstitutional.

Given these critical losses, many are now questioning whether the region has lost its bargaining power with Baghdad.

There are several factors that contributed to the decline of the KRG's authority, including a preference for partisan gains over national interests by the main Kurdish parties and wide political differences between them.

Thechronic division between the rival parties, especially since the referendum for statehood in 2017, has contributed to the Kurdistan Region's loss of political influence. Both in Baghdad and on the regional and international stage, opponents and even some close allies have perceived the region as weak and on the brink of civil war.

The region is divided on matters of security, finances and governance as the result of internal tensions that have long been criticised by external powers.

The relative failure of the KRG's oil policy also played a significant role in weakening the region. Despite the many contracts, foreign investment and job creation, the region still accumulated a$3.348bndebt to oil companies.

Random appointments to the heavily partisan KRG institutions also paved the way to systemic corruption that placed political parties over people. It culminated in the government's inability to pay salaries regularly and fully, even after years of daily oil sales and deferred payments on export expenses.

The government's failure to invest in centres for strategic studies has also led to the absence of a prudent strategic policy that would address rising geopolitical issues. The existing Kurdish institutions are run by unqualified individuals who are hired along partisan lines.

The persistent political, administrative and financial corruption in the region, similar to the situation in Iraq, has further contributed to the region's declining stature. The appointment of unfit candidates to official posts in the federal government - whether as parliamentarians, ministers or negotiators with the federal government - has always undermined the interests of the Kurdish people.

To regain its influence and secure its constitutional rights fully, the region must prioritise self-organisation, including legitimate institution building and the strengthening of its relationships with neighbouring countries and the international community at large.

Yet the best remaining means to regain the Kurdistan Region's stature is by ending the rift between the main forces, the KDP and the PUK, and creating a unified position on national interests while dealing with the federal government.

In recent years, the Federal Supreme Court has become a refuge for opposition groups, such as the Islamic parties and the New Generation Movement, seeking to obstruct the authority of the two ruling parties and extract gains.

Why Iraqis are still searching for a 'homeland' 20 years after US invasion

The use of the court to invalidate the agreements, settlements and customs established by the political process will inevitably have repercussions that may prompt the two main parties to follow a new path.

This path may require passing laws that establish certain concessions for the region and formulating new agreements that would enable them to confront the growing opposition parties within the region.

For sure, the court judgments may limit the power of the two parties, but not to the extent that it would result in major changes.

The Kurdistan Region is confronting a well-planned campaign to undermine its authority by the Iraqi federal government and neighbouring states, Turkey and Iran, through sanctions and other measures.

Above all, Kurdish unity is the foundation for keeping the region intact, especially when it comes to negotiating their rights with the federal government. Any internal disputes between the main parties should be settled and not come at the cost of national interests.

The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Eye.

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Iraq: After years of setbacks, what the Kurds need most is unity - Middle East Eye

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(New York, 17 August 2023): Ahead of World Humanitarian Day on 19 August, the United Nations today warned that 2023 is set to become another year of high numbers of aid worker casualties.

So far this year, 62 humanitarian workers have been killed in crises around the world, 84 have been wounded and 34 kidnapped, according to provisional data from the Aid Worker Security Database research team at Humanitarian Outcomes. Last years annual death toll reached 116.

South Sudan has ranked highest in insecurity for several consecutive years. Forty attacks on aid workers and 22 fatalities have been reported as of 16 August.

Sudan is a close second, with 17 attacks on humanitarians and 19 fatalities reported so far this year. This toll surpasses numbers not seen since the height of the Darfur conflict between 2006 and 2009.

Other aid worker casualties have been recorded in the Central African Republic, Mali, Somalia and Ukraine. Last year, 444 aid workers were attacked. The previous year, 460 humanitarians were attacked, resulting in 141 deaths.

This years World Humanitarian Day also marks 20 years since the 2003 suicide bomb attack on the UN headquarters in the Canal Hotel in Baghdad, Iraq, which killed 22 UN staff. Some 150 more people local and international aid workers helping to reconstruct Iraq were also injured on that dark day.

World Humanitarian Day and the Canal Hotel bombing will always be an occasion of mixed and still raw emotions for me and many others, said the UNs humanitarian chief, Martin Griffiths.

Every year, nearly six times more aid workers are killed in the line of duty than were killed on that dark day in Baghdad, and they are overwhelmingly local aid workers. Impunity for these crimes is a scar on our collective conscience. It is time we walk the talk on upholding international humanitarian law and tackle impunity for violations.

Despite the security and access challenges, humanitarians of all stripes are campaigning this year to highlight their continuing commitment to deliver for the communities they serve, no matter who, no matter where and #NoMatterWhat.

In the face of skyrocketing humanitarian needs, the UN and its partners aim to help almost 250 million people in crises around the world 10 times more people than in 2003.

Note to editors

The Aid Worker Security Database team at Humanitarian Outcomes notes that all 2023 numbers are subject to change following a verification process.

Resources

Aid worker security data Advancing the protection of humanitarian and health workers #NoMatterWhat campaign Photos are here

Media contacts:

In New York: Jaspreet Kindra, kindra@un.org, + 1 929 273 8109 In Geneva: Jens Laerke, laerke@un.org, +41 79 472 9750

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20 years after deadly attack on UN in Iraq, humanitarian workers ... - ReliefWeb

Al-Hakim Foundation, 19 August 2023

Ladies and Gentlemen,

Honorable guests,

I am honored to be at the 15th Annual Conference to Address Violence Against Women and Girls, marking the Islamic Day for the Elimination of Violence Against Women, speaking on behalf of the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq.

Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General (SRSG) Jeanine Hennis-Plasschaert sends her greetings. She apologizes for not being able to participate, as she is presiding over a ceremony marking the 20th anniversary of the attack on the United Nations headquarters in Baghdad. Twenty-two lives were lost in the blast, including that of then SRSG Srgio Vieira de Mello. Many others were injured, including Iraqi staff who are still serving with UNAMI, and we pay tribute to all of them.

Ladies and gentlemen,

We applaud the efforts of the al-Hakim Foundation for convening this annual event. We commend the personal commitment and efforts of His Eminence Sayyid al-Hakim in defence of human rights in general and specifically on those of women and girls subject of this conference.

We wish to welcome the Government Programme and the Ministerial Programme Paper Agreed upon by Political Blocs, which include provisions on the empowerment, support, and protection of women, and the commitment to sending relevant draft laws to the Council of Representatives. We welcome in particular the commitment to address violence against women.

The Government Programme is in line with the 2016 Joint Communique of the Republic of Iraq and the United Nations on Prevention and Response to Conflict-Related Sexual Violence, which included commitments to support survivors and ensure accountability.

Within this context, and as we commemorated on 3 August the Yazidi genocide, we wish to stress once again the importance of bringing to justice the members of Daesh responsible for abhorrent crimes of sexual violence. I am glad that the UN, through UNITAD and other UN entities, is assisting this endeavour.

In the same vein, we wish to highlight the importance of the 2021 Yazidi Survivors Law, which recognizes the critical role of reparations in helping survivors to rebuild their lives. And I would like to take this opportunity to call for its implementation at greater speed, without unnecessary obstacles, and for its expansion to cover victims from all communities, including women forced into marriage by Daesh, as well as children born of rape.

Still in terms of laws, we must also express our concerns regarding the lack of adoption of a law against domestic violence. Not only women, but also children, the elderly and other family members at risk of such violence deserve to be fully protected by the law, and in accordance with the best Iraqi traditions, religious and cultural values.

We wonder, candidly, what person, regardless of affiliation, cultural identity or religion, would defend the use of violence against family members? In other words, why this continued reluctance to debate and adopt this important law? The responsibility of leadership cannot be overstated. We therefore call again upon politicians and legislators to address this issue by looking into existing drafts, including with respect to the issue of shelters for persons at risk of such violence.

Ladies and gentlemen,

As we move towards holding elections on 18 December, we would like to commend the Government for establishing the High Committee to Support Womens Political Participation in the forthcoming Provincial Council elections. We look forward to working with the High Committee, in close coordination with the Independent High Electoral Commission. These institutions, together with other state institutions and all political parties, shoulder an important responsibility in addressing any form of hate speech, harassment, intimidation and violence against women candidates and voters. Transparent and credible elections require a conducive environment for the participation of all Iraqis.

Ladies and gentlemen,

Before concluding, we must mention the current public debate on the use of universally accepted terms. Regrettably, this debate has been characterized by wrong information and misconceptions, including about the role of the UN, which may impact negatively on activities within the context of womens rights or even lead to intimidation, harassment and threats. As the SRSG explained on previous occasions, all of us value and appreciate religious beliefs, local contexts, cultures and traditions, as we promote the rights of everyone. We hope that rational, informed and respectful debate will prevail.

In closing, as many of you will know, this year we mark the 75th anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted in 1948 with the vote of Iraq. The Declaration is very much relevant today for any democracy, including Iraq. Let us honour the Declarations promise of human rights for all.

Thank you.

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Remarks by Claudio Cordone, Deputy Special Representative of the ... - ReliefWeb

The ISIS group still commands between 5,000 and 7,000 members across its former stronghold in Syria and Iraq and its fighters pose the most serious terrorist threat in Afghanistan today, UN experts said in a report circulated Monday. The experts monitoring sanctions against the militant group, also known by its Arab acronym Daesh, said that during the first half of 2023 the threat posed by ISIS remained mostly high in conflict zones and low in non-conflict areas. But the panel said in a report to the UN Security Council that the overall situation is dynamic, and despite significant losses in the group's leadership and reduced activity in Syria and Iraq, the risk of its resurgence remains, reported The Associated Press. The group has adapted its strategy, embedding itself with local populations, and has exercised caution in choosing battles that are likely to result in limited losses, while rebuilding and recruiting from camps in the northeast of the Syrian Arab Republic and from vulnerable communities, including in neighboring countries, the experts said. ISIS declared a self-styled caliphate in a large swath of territory in Syria and Iraq that it seized in 2014. It was declared defeated in Iraq in 2017 following a three-year battle that left tens of thousands of people dead and cities in ruins, but its sleeper cells remain in both countries. Despite sustained counter-terrorism operations, ISIS continues to command between 5,000 and 7,000 members across Iraq and Syria, most of whom are fighters, though it has reduced its attacks deliberately to facilitate recruiting and reorganization, the experts said. In northeast Syria, approximately 11,000 suspected Daesh fighters are being held in facilities of the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces, which have played a prominent role in the fight against ISIS, the panel said. The fighters include more than 3,500 Iraqis and approximately 2,000 from almost 70 nationalities, it said. Northeast Syria is also the site of two closed camps al-Hol and Roj where the experts said some 55,000 people with alleged links or family ties to ISIS are living in dire conditions and significant humanitarian hardship. Approximately two-thirds of the population are children including over 11,800 Iraqis, nearly 16,000 Syrians and over 6,700 youngsters from more than 60 other countries, the experts said. The panel quoted one unnamed country as saying Daesh has maintained its Cubs of the Caliphate program, recruiting children in the overcrowded al-Hol camp. In addition, more than 850 boys, some as young as 10, were in detention and rehabilitation centers in the northeast, the experts said. In Afghanistan, the panel said UN members assess the ISIS group poses the most serious terrorist threat to the country and the wider region. ISIS has reportedly increased its operational capabilities and now has an estimated 4,000 to 6,000 fighters and family members in Afghanistan, it said. In Africa, on a positive note, the experts said the deployment of regional forces in Mozambiques Cabo Delgado province disrupted the ISIS affiliate, and regional countries estimate it now has 180-220 male fighters with battlefield experience, down from 280 previously. In the east, the experts said several countries expressed concern that terrorist groups like Daesh could exploit political violence and instability in conflict-wracked Sudan. And some countries assess that the Daesh affiliate in Africa's Sahel has become increasingly autonomous and had played a significant role in the escalation of violence in the region, alongside other terrorist groups, they said, pointing to increased ISIS attacks on several fronts in Mali and to a lesser extent in Burkina Faso and Niger.

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UN Experts: ISIS Group Still Has Thousands in Syria and Iraq and Poses Afghan Threat - Asharq Al-awsat - English

Recent research from ASPI finds that Philip Floods 2004 inquiry into Australian intelligence agencies proved an inflection point in the national intelligence communitys development. In addition, the Flood report grappled with a matter at the heart of the intelligence failure on Iraqi weapons of mass destruction, and one of significant contemporary relevance: public presentation of intelligence for policy purposes.

Flood laid out cons, including risks to intelligence sources and methods, sensitivities of intelligence-sharing arrangements and partnerships, and the possibility that public exposure could distort the intelligence-assessment process by making analysts more risk-averse. He might have added a few other negatives to the list:

Nonetheless, Flood acknowledged circumstances in which democratic policy decisions (especially about going to war) necessitated some form of suitable public release of intelligence. He pointed out a common-place precedent: use of sanitised intelligence to inform threat warnings to the Australian public (in the form of travel advisories).

Today, release of intelligence for statecraft purposes remains highly relevant, as evident from attempts by the US and UK governments in early 2022 to deter Russia from invading Ukraine by publicly revealing their intelligence about Moscows intentions and issuing regular intelligence-based updates.

Of course, the Iraq and Ukraine instances are not unique. Cold War governments on both sides of the iron curtain were prepared to leverage intelligence publicly for policy purposes or simply one-upmanship. Witness duelling defector statements and press conferences, the Kennedy administrations public messaging during the Cuban missile crisis (including hitherto sensitive aerial imagery) and later the US declassification of satellite images highlighting Soviet violations of nuclear test bans and continuing bioweapons capability.

This continued in the 21st century. The UK publicly confirmed intelligence in November 2001 indicating al-Qaedas responsibility for the 9/11 terror attacks, and the Obama administration released intelligence obtained during the raid on Osama bin Ladins hideout. The UK would also issue a public statement on Syrian chemical weapons use, sourced to intelligence, in 2013 (including release of a complete Joint Intelligence Committee assessment). There are also regular references to intelligence-based conclusions without necessarily releasing intelligence itselfsuch as Russian culpability for the Salisbury poisonings. And there have been various US government indictments of hostile cyber operations (Chinese, Russian, Iranian, North Korean), in addition to cyberattack attribution by governments more generally.

Confronted in August 2021 with Russias worrying military build-up and hostile intent towards its neighbour, the US government first sought to leverage its intelligence knowledge behind closed doors. So, in mid-November 2021, CIA Director Bill Burns was sent to confront Moscow with what the US knew about its plans for an invasion. But, as Burns has since commented: I found Putin and his senior advisers unmoved by the clarity of our understanding of what he was planning, convinced that the window was closing for his opportunity to dominate Ukraine. I left even more troubled than when I arrived.

The Biden administration changed tack, to what Dan Lomas has termed pre-buttal, beginning in mid-January 2022 when the White House press secretary openly briefed the media on a Russian plot to manufacture a pretext for invasion, using a false-flag sabotage team. A fortnight later, in response to a press question, the Pentagon acknowledged that it knew the Russians had already prepared a propaganda video supporting this invasion pretext, for broadcast once an invasion commenced. Then, on 15 and 18 February, President Joe Biden revealed that US intelligence was now aware that more than 150,000 troops were assembled on Ukraines border awaiting an order to move. These efforts were buttressed by the UKs public reference to Russian plans to install a friendly regime in Kyiv via a coup prior to the planned invasion.

Yet, as we know, the Russian invasion of Ukraine commenced on 24 February.

So, were these efforts a success or a failure? The obvious answer is they failed: Russia wasnt deterred. But was deterrence actually possible? And the public release of intelligence did complicate and disrupt Moscows invasion plans and arguably contributed somewhat to the Russian militarys poor performance in the early stages of the conflict. Whats more, the audience wasnt just Russia. Public release, beyond traditional intelligence sharing in classified channels, had the effect of alerting and cuing Ukraine. Perhaps most materially, the approach galvanised third parties post-invasion, especially in Europe. This involved overcoming some lingering distrust associated with the disastrous efforts to leverage intelligence diplomatically in 200203 over Iraq.

The US government has since explicitly laid out its strategy for what it calls strategic downgrades. It is an increasingly proactive approach to public disclosures aided by the opportunities presented by an overwhelming volume of available open-source intelligence that allows for effective obfuscation of the actual sensitive sources of the material disclosed.

Last month, Principal Deputy National Security Adviser Jon Finer detailed this strategy in a speech:

The delivered and authorized public release of intelligence, what we now refer to as strategic downgrades, has become an important tool of the Biden administrations foreign policy. This is a tool that we have found to be highly effective, but also one that we believe must be wielded carefully within strict parameters and oversight.

This speech was itself a form of public release of intelligenceand presumably was targeted again at both allies and adversaries.

The US has deployed this approach beyond just attempts to deter the Russians. For example, it has applied strategic downgrades in relation to Chinese arms supplies to Russia, Wagner Group activities in Mali, and its own findings in relation to Chinese spy balloons.

The approach is underpinned by a formalised framework developed by US policymakers. Related decision-making is centralised in the National Security Council and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence. And its application is apparently limited to select situationsfor example, when civilian lives or infrastructure are at risk, or to counter disinformation or false-flag operations.

Guidelines require that downgrades be accurate, be based on verifiable reporting, and be part of a broader plan that includes diplomacy as well as security and economic assistance. According to Finer: It should always be in service of clear policy objectives. Its not like you just get a piece of very interesting information that could sort of damage one of your adversaries and you decide that could be embarrassing to them, lets put it out.

Strategic downgrades are a potentially important tool for democratic governments, and US formalisation of the related strategy is a welcome development.

But public presentation of intelligence for policy effect deserves careful consideration and risk management. The landscape is complicated by the marked decline in public trust across the Western world and the emergence of a more uncertain strategic environment since 2003. Notably, invocation of intelligence in the political sphereas with, inter alia, Iraq WMD, the course of the global war on terror and Russias attempted election interferencenecessarily politicises that same intelligence. Perhaps the most alarming example is the degree to which circulation of US intelligence on Russian interference in an increasingly toxic US political environment has effectively tarred US intelligence agencies with the same toxic politics.

And, as Finer observed: Youve got to be right, because if you go out alarming the world that something terrible is going to happen and you have it wrong, it will be much harder to use the tool effectively the next time.

I think Flood would have agreed.

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Presenting intelligence: from Iraq WMD to the new era of 'strategic downgrades' | The Strategist - The Strategist