Archive for the ‘Iraq’ Category

Rare and Complex Liver Transplant by Indian Surgeons, 9-month-old Baby From Iraq Gets a New Life – PRNewswire

Baby Hamad was a known case of Progressive Familial Intrahepatic Cholestasis Type II (PFIC TYPE 2). He had jaundice since birth and had multiple hospitalizations in Iraq for jaundice and recurrent cholangitis. Given the history, clinical condition, and pathological diagnosis patient was referred for a liver transplant.

"Hamad was having infection with cholangitis for which he was admitted and treated. Apart from recurrent cholangitis, the patient was having marked ascites and growth failure with a bodyweight of 6.1 kg. He underwent evaluation for a living donor liver transplant and his mother was evaluated as a prospective donor. During an evaluation, CT scan showed cirrhotic changes, hepatosplenomegaly with attenuated portal vein with no portal flow with significant ascites and significant portosystemic collaterals,"said Dr. Lalawani

On 3rd January 2021, the baby underwent a transplant. "There was no flow in the portal vein. We placed the interposition vein graft to give inflow to the liver. It took around 9 hours to complete the transplant and baby was shifted to ICU on a ventilator,"said Dr. Lalwani.

The baby was off the ventilator the next morning and gradually in the next few days, he started accepting oral feed, tolerating well, and gaining weight. Finally, after 20 days of surgery baby was discharged from the hospital. The family plans to go back to Iraq.

About Manipal Hospitals:Manipal Hospitals is among the largest hospital network inIndiaserving over 2million patients annually. It is first inIndiato be awarded accreditation by the AAHRPP for ethical standards in clinical research activities. It is also NABL, NABH and ISO certified.

For more details contact:

Manish Bakshi +91-7014677837[emailprotected][emailprotected]

SOURCE Manipal Hospitals

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Rare and Complex Liver Transplant by Indian Surgeons, 9-month-old Baby From Iraq Gets a New Life - PRNewswire

Iraq, coalition partners had been on trail of IS commander …

Jan 30, 2021

BAGHDAD Iraqs prime minister announced Jan. 28 that a military operation launched after a double suicide bombing claimed by the Islamic State (IS) a week before had killed the top-ranked IS commander in the country.

IS"wali"for Iraq, known as Abu Yasser al-Issawi, was shot in the head. Photos of his dead body circulated shortly after the announcement in WhatsApp groups, blurred on a tweet by the Counterterrorism Services (CTS), which was responsible for the operation in coordination with the national intelligence services.

Prime Minister Mustafa al-Kadhimi, who was sworn in last May, has led the intelligence services since June 2016, the year the monthslong battle against IS for Mosul began. Iraq declared victory over IS in Mosul in July 2017 and at the country-wide level in December 2017.

Abu Yasser al-Issawi was reportedly the nom de guerre of Jabbar Salman Ali al-Issawi, a 39-year-old native of Fallujah in Anbar province. The city, some 60 kilometers (37 miles)west of Baghdad, has long been known for its large number of mosques, religious conservatismand tough insurgency following the 2003 US invasion of Iraq.

Ramadi, the regional capital further west, is known instead for tribe-based ties and was at the center of what became known as the Sahwa, or Sunni tribal awakening, that was key to the defeat of ISpredecessor, al-Qaeda in Iraq, beginning in 2006.

Al-Monitor was told by an Iraqi security official that Issawi had been put in charge of the northern Baghdad area prior to becoming country-wide IS commander and that security forces had tracked down 17 of his associates in the Kirkuk and adjacent Salahuddin provinces over the previous five months.

He was killed in the Wadi al-Shay area of southern Kirkuk province. In reporting from the southern and western areas of Kirkuk province over the past few years, the western border that is marked by the Hamrin Mountains stretching east to the Iranian border, this journalist was repeatedly told that this particular valley was insurgent-infested.

In May 2020, Sunni tribal fighters in southern Kirkuk put on a show of unity with other Iraqi forces including Shiite-led Popular Mobilization Units (PMU) after a spate of attacks on them by IS cells operating in the area.

A mullahwho later turned to fighting ISpreviously interviewed in his native area near Hawija by Al-Monitor told Al-Monitormore recently that Wadi al-Shay was still problematic for its presence of IS fighters.

The valleys, mountainsand vast desert areas of the country have long been difficult for Iraqi security forces to fully secure.

The cultivating of local sources, as well as intelligence and airstrikes provided by the international coalition, have played a key role in many major operations against IS in this area.

Questioned about whether he could confirm the news of Issawis killing, a coalition source who asked not to be named told Al-Monitor that it was probably true. We were on his trail for a long time.The source noted that the US-led body had been tracking his movements and capturing his associates, getting them to provide information.

In response to a request for comment, international anti-IS coalition spokesman Col. Wayne Marotto told Al-Monitor in a Jan. 28 WhatsApp message,Yesterday the CTS and CJTF-OIR conducted an operation near Kirkuk resulting in the deaths of 9 Daesh terrorists and the arrest of 1 Daesh terrorist,using a term frequently employed to refer to IS. I dont have information on the identity of the dead terrorists.

The spokesman confirmed in a Jan. 29 tweet that Issawi had been killed on Jan. 27.

The CTS were trained by the United States. Collaboration between them and the US forces against IS in such key areas as the HamrinMountains continued in early 2020, even after other cooperation was temporarily officially suspended following the USkilling by drone strike of Iranian Gen.Qasem Soleimani and Iraqi former PMU deputy commander Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis on Jan. 3, 2020.

This part of the armed forces, which answer directly to the prime minister, have taken on an ever greater role in key operations since Kadhimi took office. They were the ones tasked with a somewhat controversial arrest of members of Kataib Hezbollah in June 2020. Though proximity in any form to US forces often leads to backlash from Shiite-led militias operating in the country, the reputation gained by the CTS in the 2014-17 war against IS has largely spared them direct targeting.

The operation that killed Issawi was declaredly one in revenge for the martyrs of aJan. 21 attack in a central, working-class market of Baghdad that killed 32 people and injured over 100 others. The attack was later claimed by IS.

Serious concerns were voiced about the apparent ability for some to enter the capital with explosives and conduct such a major attack, leading Iraqs prime minister to swiftly dismiss several high-ranking Interior Ministry and intelligence officials from their positions.

The head of the federal police was replaced by Lt. Gen.Raed Jawdat Shaker, who had been federal police commander during the battle for Mosul in 2017.Abu Ali al-Basri, head of the Interior Ministrys Falcon Intelligence Cell, was also initially removed from his position.

Gaps in security in the territory disputed between the Iraqi central government and the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) are also often seen as problematic, giving space for insurgents to move and potentially reorganize.

Kirkuk province, in which the operation that killed Issawi was conducted, is one of the disputed areas. Parts of it were under the control of peshmerga forces until a referendum on KRG independence was held and Iraq sent in troops to forcibly take over the oil-rich province in October 2017.

This led to major grievancesamong the Kurdish population. Disputes continue between the KRG and the central government over both territory and oil, resulting in a lack of trust and what many see as insufficient sharing of intelligence.

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Iraq, coalition partners had been on trail of IS commander ...

In Iraq’s ‘Dire’ Economy, Poverty Is Rising And So Are Fears Of Instability – NPR

"Now, because of the rise of the dollar and the pensions people aren't receiving, there are two classes of people," says Saad Salman, the owner of a Baghdad sweet shop. "A poor class and a rich class." Alice Fordham/NPR hide caption

"Now, because of the rise of the dollar and the pensions people aren't receiving, there are two classes of people," says Saad Salman, the owner of a Baghdad sweet shop. "A poor class and a rich class."

With the gold domes of the famed Kadhimiya shrine as a backdrop, nearby streets full of shops, markets and tea-sellers in Baghdad look bustling and vibrant, even at night. Tempting windows display sparkly clothes and cascades of candy in rainbow colors.

But shopkeepers say no one has been buying much since Iraq devalued its dinar against the dollar last year.

"Regarding the economic situation and the rise of the dollar it destroyed the people," says Saad Salman, the owner of one of the sweet shops. "Purchasing power has fallen. Someone who used to buy a kilogram, now they buy half a kilogram, you know?"

Around the world, economies have been crushed by the pandemic. The International Monetary Fund reported in October that most Mideast economies plunged into recession. But some places are especially vulnerable, among them Iraq. Its economy depends overwhelmingly on oil exports, and as travel halted and demand for fuel dwindled, government revenues tumbled along with oil prices.

Protesters block a road leading to an oil complex during anti-government protests in Basra in December. Nabil al-Jurani/AP hide caption

Protesters block a road leading to an oil complex during anti-government protests in Basra in December.

The finance ministry estimates 7 million Iraqis (out of about 40 million citizens) receive government salaries or pensions. But government revenues plummeted by 47.5% in the first eight months of last year, the World Bank reports. With drastically less oil revenue, the government has been paying its salaries and pensions intermittently or not at all. Economists say Iraq's poverty rate may have shot up from 20% in 2018 to 30% or more last year.

To try to make it easier to pay those salaries, as well to encourage people to buy domestically instead of relying on imports, the government devalued the dinar against the dollar by about 20% in December. But as Iraq produces very little, people have little choice but to buy imported goods which are only more expensive now.

In the sweet shop, Salman gestures around the store. The price of a bag of sugar has gone up by a third, walnuts have almost doubled in price. As the millions who depend on government salaries and pensions have seen their income become precarious or nonexistent, he says inequality is on the rise.

"Now, because of the rise of the dollar and the pensions people aren't receiving, there are two classes of people," he says. "A poor class and a rich class."

Iraq's burdens

"Iraq's economic situation can probably best be described as being dire," says Ali al-Saffar of the International Energy Agency.

He covers the whole region, and finds the situation in Iraq "the one that really is probably most alarming" in terms of its potential for destabilization.

"The roots are that the structure of the economy has been wonky for decades," he says. Iraq depends on oil for as much as 98% of its revenue, he explains, almost all of which goes to the state. "It basically means that the state has grown larger than it needs to be, that the private sector hasn't grown as large as it should be, and that the government is relied upon for creating jobs."

People shop in October for used clothes at the Baghdad market selling them. Khalid Mohammed/AP hide caption

People shop in October for used clothes at the Baghdad market selling them.

Iraq is not unique in this respect. Many oil-exporting countries have been bruised by low oil prices, and many have centralized economies with lots of state employees.

But some, like the United Arab Emirates, have diversified their economies with manufacturing, travel or tourism sectors. Others, like Saudi Arabia, have vast reserves.

Iraq, on the other hand, is depleted by burdens including rebuilding cities ruined by its shattering fight against the Islamic State.

For years, if not decades, economists have insisted it is imperative for Iraq to have a more diverse economy and a larger private sector, so that so many people's livelihoods do not depend on a high oil price. But despite international development initiatives large and small, the private sector is still dwarfed by the state economy.

The government's reform plan

Finance Minister Ali Allawi does have a plan. "There has to be really an entirely different approach to the way that the government funds itself and the way that resources are allocated between various sectors," he tells NPR.

His ministry unveiled a white paper last year to do things like encourage investment by improving Iraq's infrastructure, bump up tax revenues, stimulate agriculture and manufacturing and tailor young Iraqis' education to the global labor market.

Allawi concedes that many of these ideas are not new. In the past, he says, "most of these plans foundered because there wasn't the will to sustain them." Oil money was flowing, and the government "chose the line of least resistance."

Now, he says, there is political and popular recognition that reform is necessary. The white paper contains hundreds of concrete steps to be enacted over three to five years the first being the currency devaluation.

"There'll be a number of people who will lose and a much greater number who will benefit," he says of the disruption.

But the benefits will take time to materialize. Meantime, Iraq is seeking billions of dollars in loans from the International Monetary Fund to soften the present pain and avert political challenges.

"If the current situation continues," warns Sajad Jiyad of the Century Foundation, "and if oil prices are low, there is a real possibility that more and more people will go on strikes or protests, and things could become more difficult."

Protests have rocked Iraq over the past year and a half. The largest have been in Baghdad, but the southern city of Nasiriyah has also seen large demonstrations and a months-long sit-in. A forceful crackdown has dampened the protests, but anger continues to simmer and activists say growing poverty is one factor that keeps it going.

"The economic situation of all of the people in Nasiriyah and Iraq is getting worse day after day. We will see more demonstrations," says Ziyad al Asaad, who has participated in many demonstrations against the government. "More protests in the streets, in the square."

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In Iraq's 'Dire' Economy, Poverty Is Rising And So Are Fears Of Instability - NPR

Aiming Big by Thinking Small: A New US Policy for Iraq – War on the Rocks

Iraq today is not the country it was four years ago. Senior officials in the incoming Biden administration, many of whom like the president are familiar with the country from their days in the Obama administration, will find a much-changed country. Many of the key Iraqi faces are the same, but the country itself has endured a sustained period of domestic turmoil that has altered the dynamics of power, deepened domestic fissures, and eroded the sovereignty of the state. Popular protests have rocked the political system and called into question the legitimacy of the political elite; armed groups, many of which came to the fore in the fight against the Islamic State, have become quasi-state actors that have sought to strengthen their independent political and economic power at the expense of government authority; and the Iraqi economy stands on the brink of financial collapse, with a massive budget deficit and insufficient oil revenues.

These changes, and the legacy of the Trump administrations Iran-centric Iraq policy, have combined to erode the United States credibility and influence in Baghdad. Nowadays, U.S. policymakers increasingly struggle to get a serious hearing in Iraqi political debates, and the return of many familiar faces from the Obama days is not going to change that. Washington still has friends at the highest levels of government in Baghdad, but the numbers are fewer, and their ability to promote policies that align with U.S. interests is weaker.

If the United States is to restore some of its influence as a first step towards a sustained and mutually beneficial alliance with Iraq, it needs to become a credible partner again beyond the security sector. In policy terms, the Biden administrations immediate focus will need to be on stabilizing the Iraqi economy and helping the country through elections. But more broadly, the United States needs to deepen its influence in Iraq from the bottom up and needs to reset U.S. ambitions. Security cooperation will remain a priority, but U.S. policymakers should also consider economic and institution-building initiatives that, while less grandiose than some past efforts to fix Iraq, actually address crisis areas that matter to everyday Iraqis and which have been the source of their discontent. The United States also needs to hold its erstwhile Iraqi allies to account, making sure that their agenda is aligned to U.S. interests rather than simply using U.S. support for their own narrow ends. In other words, to promote its national interests successfully, Washington needs to think smaller, and it needs to be much more conditional in its financial, institutional, and security support.

Were Not in Kansas Anymore, Toto!

The domestic changes that Iraq has witnessed over the past four years have been profound. The most obvious difference is that Iraq is no longer at war with the Islamic State. Since that conflict was won, Iraq has undergone internal political turmoil. Beginning with the independence referendum in Kurdistan in 2018, and the subsequent protests in central and southern Iraq, the very basis of the 2003 political compact that has underpinned the Iraqi state has been tested and found wanting. The Kurdistan plebiscite, in which Iraqi Kurds voted overwhelmingly for independence in a vote that the federal government and most of the rest of the world refused to recognize, illustrated the corrosive impact of not resolving Iraqs federalism dispute. The Tishreen protests of 2019, meanwhile, represented a breaking point for young Iraqis frustrated with the unyielding corruption, kleptocracy, and maladministration of Iraqs political elite.

The elites refusal to change, and the violent repression of the protests by a murky mixture of armed groups, some part of the Iraqi security forces, has deepened the divide between citizens and their government. So has the rise of Islamist Shia militias, many of which are linked to Iran. Over the past four years, these groups have become perhaps the biggest barrier to political and economic reform. They have challenged state sovereignty and the governments management of security affairs within Iraqs borders.

All of this is taking place amidst the worst financial crisis that Iraq has faced since the 1990s, when it was subject to crippling U.N. sanctions. A fall in oil prices and production has left the government facing a growing fiscal deficit that has so far proved insurmountable. Prime Minister Mustafa al-Kadhimi and his team have preached reform, but they have yet to introduce meaningful change, raising the specter of eventual catastrophic financial collapse in the absence of external assistance.

Shaping a New U.S. Policy for Iraq

In the past, the United States might have sought to fix both the political and financial crises through direct intervention. But the days of imperial policy are behind us. Washington is no longer in a position to dictate to Iraqi leaders. The legacy of the 2003 invasion, military withdrawal, disengagement, and, latterly, disinterest have robbed the United States of the credibility and influence it once had in the country.

While Iraq does not seem likely to be a priority for the incoming administration, Washington cannot simply ignore the country. The Middle East remains important to U.S. economic and security interests. Iraq occupies a major strategic place in the region, straddling important fault lines, including the United States tense relationship with Iran, which will be a top priority for the Biden team; counter-terrorism; and the stability of global energy markets. Chaos or collapse in the country are bound to suck its neighbors into conflict, and the United States and its local allies will feel the ripple effects on a security and economic level.

Moreover, parts of the Iraqi political oligarchy and its population continue to look for U.S. assistance and partnership. Figures such as Kadhimi and the Iraqi President, Barham Salih, share aspirational goals with the United States for the type of country they want Iraq to be but face ever stronger headwinds domestically from opponents of political and economic reform. Meanwhile, parts of Iraqi society, including elements of the Iraqi protest movement, also look to the United States and other like-minded countries to support their causes more actively, help provide them with protection, and give tangible backing to their calls for change.

From the Ground Up

If the Biden administration wants to reengage the United States meaningfully in Iraq, it needs to establish much stronger local networks, including adopting some of the strategies that have served Tehran so well. In parallel to security sector support, pushing back on militias, and containing Iranian influence in Iraq, which have been Washingtons priorities for the past four years, it needs to adopt a coordinated policy that aims to establish the U.S. relationship with Iraq from the ground up and which gives Washington a better chance of helping to shape the political and economic evolution in Iraq in the direction it wants to see it go.

A first, and powerful, step would be restructuring the U.S. diplomatic presence in Iraq. A skeleton staff behind the protective walls of an embassy has become a barrier, not a bridge, to the Iraqi people. To make U.S. influence felt, Washington needs to allow its experienced political, economic, and public affairs professionals to do their jobs, building local networks, providing effective channels of communications, and delivering workable economic and institution-building solutions to their Iraqi counterparts. Flying officials in with lists of demands and then flying them out again smacks of a lack of commitment, and Iraqi leaders will not take Washingtons views seriously.

Instead, the United States should aim to build a sophisticated web of influence across Iraq, as Iran has done. The approach needs to be top-down and bottom-up, working with like-minded partners at a senior level to facilitate policy measures while establishing the grassroots relationships that will make technical and capacity-building programs work. In doing so, Washington also has to become much more selective and conditional, holding its Iraqi counterparts to real account. Often in the past, U.S. administrations have allied with politically powerful individuals and groups, both in the federal and Kurdistan regional governments, whose behavior has weakened the institutions and mechanisms of Iraqi state and society, served the interests of Iran and other disruptive players in Iraq, and worked directly against U.S. (and Iraqi) interests and policy goals. Washington has consistently turned a blind eye to Iraqi officials and groups who are guilty of promoting authoritarianism and corruption, and who have sustained the dysfunctional, and sometimes violent, status quo for their own benefit.

Focus on Practical Initiatives

The two most immediate policy areas where the Biden administration can engage Iraq are stabilizing Iraqi finances and providing electoral support (if and when elections happen). Neither will be an easy task.

A burgeoning public sector and low oil prices have left Iraq facing a fiscal emergency that threatens to bankrupt the country. Convincing Iraqi political leaders to implement reforms, principally cutting public sector spending and laying the foundations for private sector and non-oil sector growth to ease the burden on the state, will be critical to avoiding a fiscal catastrophe. The country also needs to commit to these and other painful structural adjustment measures before it can get desperately needed assistance from the International Monetary Fund and other international financial institutions to see it through its financial dire straits. It will also likely need bilateral financial and technical help. Some analysts have called on the Biden administration to take direct action, which may help. But cajoling and incentivizing Iraqi leaders in the right policy direction during an election year something the United States lacks the diplomatic wherewithal to do at present will be as important as the assistance itself.

The Biden administration should also do its best to ensure Iraqi elections are secure, free, fair, and inclusive. Being willing to condemn election violence or voter intimidation will be important, and Washington could also achieve a lot by working to ensure the independence and effectiveness of the Independent High Electoral Commission and providing electoral assistance at a grassroots level. The United States needs to be more than an election monitor: It needs to offer technical assistance to nascent groups that are organizing to contest the poll under a banner that aligns with U.S. interests in Iraq, namely a representative Iraq with effective institutions, rule of law, an open society, a strong economy, and a vibrant private sector.

In the longer term, Biden administration policy should be focused on programs and sectors that reinforce this vision. In addition to security assistance, education, banking, and law reform are areas that would contribute to long-term Iraqi stability and where the United States is well placed to help.

Helping Iraq to build a 21st-century workforce to staff a competitive private sector through education-to-employment programs is one such initiative. The public sector, which has grown three-fold in size since 2004, now employs over three million Iraqis (more than 30 percent of the workforce). Iraq has a massive youth bulge 60 percent of the population is under 25 youth unemployment is officially estimated at 36 percent, and up to a million people are forecast to join the workforce each year by the end of the decade. The country desperately needs to educate young Iraqis for employment in the private sector, by providing them with the English language, professional, and sector-specific skills they need to succeed.

U.S. policy could help in two areas. One is helping to devise, fund, and possibly administer education-to-employment initiatives designed to provide young Iraqis with these basic skills. A recent small-scale initiative of this type one of us started in Iraq illustrates the local appetite for such programs, and it has already been considered by the Iraqi government as a blueprint that could easily be built upon. Short-term vocational and graduate training, with English and academic-cum-professional skills like reading, writing, and research at the core, and specialized programs in business administration, public policy, information technology, and other deficit areas could be supported. These programs could be extended beyond Iraqi youth to provide retraining for government employees, either to prepare them for private sector jobs as the government downsizes, or to improve government administration.

The United States could also help Iraq to revive its foreign scholarship program to send undergraduates and graduates to study abroad. A previous program, the Higher Committee for Education Development, set up after 2003 and managed by the prime ministers office, sent hundreds of Iraqis to graduate school overseas, many of whom are now in government, the private sector, or academia. The committee was forced to shut down in 2015, though, due to a lack of funding.

The second area is banking-sector reform. Iraqi banks are, for the most part, undercapitalized, risk averse, and burdened with government lending. Credit to grow new business is simply unavailable to most private sector companies and nascent start-ups. The Biden administration could use government aid and lending institutions to provide the basis for new credit facilities, along with international financial institutions, or the United States could implement a targeted educational campaign to advise the Iraqi government on the reform steps it urgently needs to pursue.

U.S. support should also focus on programs designed to enhance the professionalism of Iraqs legal profession. Direct collaboration between U.S. state bar associations and their Iraqi counterparts, for example, would provide quick and effective benefits. More broadly, helping to improve the quality of legal education in Iraq through partnerships with U.S. law schools would provide a powerful boost and would nudge the country toward developing a new, potentially more politically independent, legal culture. Emphasis could be put on areas such as international commercial and contractual law, where there is a dearth of Iraqi expertise. Online learning would provide a powerful educational tool, avoiding the need to take Iraqis out of the country and allowing a greater number to benefit from such initiatives.

These initiatives will only succeed if the United States has an effective partner on the Iraqi side. Too often, initiatives disappear into the black hole of Iraqi bureaucracy, their value undermined and their impact neutralized. The process also gets corrupted by interference from political factions that have developed fiefdoms at different levels in different ministries, and which see capacity-building programs either as an opportunity to be plundered or a threat to be blocked.

Consequently, U.S. technical and capacity-building programs need to be managed on the Iraqi side by a senior-level coordinating body that has the authority to reach down into individual ministries and departments to implement these initiatives. The Biden administration should therefore demand as a price of its assistance the establishment of a politically independent body within the current Iraqi presidency and/or the prime ministers office to be the initial touchpoint for U.S. initiatives and to ensure coordinated management on the Iraqi side. A move in this direction would also potentially bolster senior Iraqi officials who share Washingtons vision for Iraqs future.

Readjusting Focus

Recalibrating U.S. policy to focus on technical assistance and capacity-building in specific sectors in Iraq stands in contrast to Washingtons imperial fix the country mentality of the 2000s and the disregard of the Trump years, two extremes that were equally unsuccessful at promoting U.S. interests. The goal would be to establish a new basis for expanded U.S. influence by focusing on areas of low politics and to seek to nudge Iraq in the direction of a stable, representative state with the foundations for economic growth and long-term prosperity.

By laying out a strategic plan for technical assistance in select economic areas, and by linking it to tangible metrics of progress, the United States can limit the costs of its policy initiatives and provide itself with clear indicators of success or failure that can be used to determine future policy steps. Top-down policy by dmarche is no longer a viable option, if indeed it ever was. But mixing more active diplomacy with more targeted initiatives may be a workable approach that eventually leaves the United States with deeper and more lasting influence in the country than its current policies will bring.

Raad Alkadiri is a non-resident senior associate with the Energy Security and Climate Change Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.

Christine M. van den Toorn is founder and president of the Iraq Fund for Higher Education.

Image: Mustafa Nader

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Aiming Big by Thinking Small: A New US Policy for Iraq - War on the Rocks

Water, conservation and human rights are inseparable in the Iraq’s marshlands: A call for action on World Wetlands Day [EN/AR/KU] – Iraq – ReliefWeb

Baghdad, 02 February 2021 Today marks the 50th anniversary of the Ramsar Convention on Wetlands, which aims to protect water, livelihoods and wetlands. In 2008, Iraq ratified the Convention designating four wetlands of international importance in southern Iraq: Central Marshes (Dhi Qar and Basra governorates), Hammar Marsh (Dhi Qar and Basra governorates), Hawizeh Marsh (Basra, Missan governorates and Iran) and Sawa Lake (Muthanna Governorate). Wetlands are land areas that are saturated or flooded with water either permanently or seasonally. The Iraqi Marshlands used to be one of the largest wetland ecosystems. A rare aquatic landscape in the desert, the Iraqi marshlands were listed in 2016 by UNESCO as a World Heritage Site.

In Iraqs wetlands, the lives of the marsh dwellers, including a small Sabbean Mandean community, are intertwined with the natural environment: harvesting reeds; weaving mats; building reed houses; fishing; herding water buffalo; making cheese; and running small fish restaurants and boat tours for tourists. During her recent visit to the Hammar Marshes in Thi-Qar governorate in Southern Iraq, Danielle Bell, Representative of the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights in Iraq noted that: Conservation and protection of Iraqs magnificent marshlands not only promotes biodiversity and sustainability but is intricately linked to the realization of many human rights concerning environment, health and livelihoods. Thus, the marshes are a critical resource of great economic, cultural, scientific, and recreational value, the loss of which would be irreparable.

This years theme, Wetlands and Water, sheds light on the contribution of wetlands to the quantity and quality of freshwater on our planet.

Dr. Salah ElHajj Hassan, FAO Representative in Iraq highlighted the significance of the wetlands in Iraq by saying The wetlands in Iraq has been inhabited by rural families for centuries, diverse communities have been living and practicing traditional methods of agriculture, and it is critical to address challenges faced in these areas.

FAO is committed to achieve a more resilient food system and support the efforts of the Iraqi Government to improve food security and nutrition and increase the resilient livelihoods for Iraqs rural population in South of Iraq including the marshlands. This is achieved through improving sustainable local agricultural productivity and income generation in strategic priority value chains for the rural poor while enhancing land and water resources and biodiversity.

The Marshlands of Mesopotamia are a rare aquatic landscape; a biodiversity hotspot for key migratory birds and once the largest wetland in the Middle East. UNEP has been supporting the Government of Iraq since 2004 in its efforts to manage key biodiversity areas in Iraq from the inscription of the Iraqi Marshlands as a World Heritage Site and the development of an Environmental Management Plan for the area. Today, UNEP is working closely with the Ministry of Health and Environment and other key stakeholders on the establishment of a network of Protected Areas in the country with the declaration of two key biodiversity areas as protected sites Dalmaj, a natural wetland rich in biodiversity, and Teeb. The establishment of a network of Protected Areas in Iraq is a key step towards meeting obligations and targets of biodiversity conservation notwithstanding the positive impact of such a network on livelihoods and human well-being, said Sami Dimassi, Regional Director for UNEP Regional Office for West Asia.

Resident Representative of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in Iraq, Zena Ali Ahmad, said: Historically, these diverse wetlands have played a key role in urban development and the emergence of societies. Preserving this rich part of Iraq's natural biodiversity and cultural history is essential to building forward better. At UNDP, we stand committed to working with local communities in the wetlands to build resilience and adapt to climate change challenges, while also creating sustainable livelihood opportunities for communities.

With appropriate support the marshes can become a source of development of a tertiary sector based on site management, tourism and hospitality, which in the longer term will contribute to protection and sustainability of ecosystems and the landscape of the marshlands. UN-Habitat will soon be launching a two-pronged initiative: on the one hand it will closely collaborate with UNDP to build community infrastructure and facilities that will improve the accessibility of tourists to the Hawizeh and Eastern Hammar Marshes and provide basic facilities for the marketing of local goods. On the other hand, it will work with local authorities to develop a Strategic Spatial Plan for the socio-economic revitalization of communities living in the marshlands in Maysan Governorate, aimed at increasing the number of visitors to religious and nature sites located south of the city of Amarah and enhance livelihood opportunities in tourism and service sectors.

Climate change in Iraq is expected to reduce annual rainfall and increase water salination by rising sea levels, which will lead to a surge in dust storms, a reduction in agricultural productivity, and increased water scarcity. All of these challenges will have severe implications for the preservation of the marshlands. The Iraqi marshes are of fundamental importance and their unique environmental space combined with their biodiversity, an international treasure. Without increasing efforts to preserve this UNESCO World Heritage Site, we would be at risk of losing the marshes during our lifetime. says Resident Coordinator for Iraq, Ms. Irena Vojackova-Sollorano. She urged for more protective measures to ensure the sustainability of the marshes and increased efforts to fight the climate crisis overall.

Media contacts:

OHCHR: Ali Omran Saidi, Human Rights Officer | saidi1@un.org| +964-(0)790-1947425

UNESCO: Husamaldeen El-Zubi, Public Information Officer | h.el-zubi@unesco.org

UNDP: Mohammed Al-Bahbahanee, Communications Specialist | mohammed.al-bahbahanee@undp.org |+964 770 439 9222

UNHABITAT: Aryan Star Muheddin, Communication Specialist | aryan.al-jammoor@un.org |+964 (0)751 103 9494

FAO: Lubna AlTarabishi, Program Support Specialist | lubna.altarabishi@fao.org | +964 (0) 774 080 4002

Office of the DSRSG/RC/HC for Iraq, Zainab Salih, Communications Officer, zainab.salih@un.org

More here:
Water, conservation and human rights are inseparable in the Iraq's marshlands: A call for action on World Wetlands Day [EN/AR/KU] - Iraq - ReliefWeb