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Social cohesion is fundamental to the successful functioning of societies, especially diverse ones such as Iraq. A lack of social cohesion can increase tensions among different social groups, enhance the likelihood of conflict and undermine trust in the State. This report examines the impact of COVID-19 on social cohesion in Iraq. Research conducted between July and September 2020 included a comprehensive literature review and 22 interviews with key stakeholders comprising members of the Government at the national and local levels, international organizations, donors and civil society organizations from different parts of the country.Without social cohesion, it will be difficult to attain the SDGs or reach the objective of leaving no one behind. In practice, this means taking explicit action to end extreme poverty, curb inequalities, confront discrimination and fast-track progress for the furthest behind. Social cohesion is also vital for achieving SDG 16, with its commitments to building peaceful and inclusive societies, realizing access to justice for all, and establishing effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels.2Enhancing social relations among different groups and strengthening the social contract between citizens and the State are prerequisites for all of these ends, especially in post-conflict Iraq.

Definitions of social cohesion

Social cohesion is an elusive and contested concept. Analysts generally identify it as having horizontal and vertical dimensions. The horizontal dimension describes the trust, relationships and interactions among people in a society across divisions such as identity or other social constructs, including race or class. Vertical cohesion entails trust between a government and society. This includes trust in political, economic or social leaders, institutions and processes such as elections, access to justice, taxation, budgeting and the delivery of public services. It is generally agreed that social cohesion has political, economic, social and security aspects.

Social cohesion in Iraq and the impact of COVID-19

Many challenges have disrupted social cohesion in Iraq over the last 20 years. The pandemic came at a time when public trust in the Government was low, the economy was weakened through reductions in revenues from oil sales, protests across the country were a regular occurrence and violent extremist attacks were resurging. COVID-19 has exacerbated existing and sometimes deeply rooted political, economic, social and security challenges.Its impact on social cohesion represents another point of stress on top of many others afflicting communities across the country.

Political

Popular discontent with the muhasasa system of government and corruption, compounded by high unemployment levels, often poor service delivery, and a lack of social protection and rule of law meant that vertical social cohesion was fragile prior to COVID-19. Prime Minister Mustafa al-Kadhimi came into power in May. Bridging longfestering gaps has been among his top priorities.

But he has faced numerous challenges, and has thus far only been able to take small and largely symbolic steps. Despite the willingness of the new Government to improve social cohesion, the challenges remain significant, with COVID-19 entrenching old problems even as it creates additional ones. The Government faces a daunting task in addressing structural reform issues while tackling the pandemic.

Economic

Prior to COVID-19, 4.1 million people in Iraq required humanitarian support. Extreme poverty and inequality have meant that significant portions of the population are in urgent need of employment, health care, education, sanitation, hygiene and access to justice. Shortfalls have worsened with the oil price drop, which has had a major effect on government revenues and fiscal space. Thousands of jobs are at risk, and while food prices have remained relatively stable, continued reliance on imported food makes the country vulnerable to shortages or major price increases.The economic impacts of the pandemic have disproportionately affected marginalized groups.

Over 66 percent of people are employed in the informal sector; they were deeply affected by lockdown measures and restrictions on movement.

The IOM reports that between March and April 2020, the number of paid people working in the private sector fell by approximately 40 percent.

Social

Iraq is a diverse country with highly complex and multidimensional social divides spanning generations, religions, rural and urban groups, internally displaced people (IDPs) and host communities, and political interests. Youth activism in different governorates indicates that the new generation is increasingly seeking to break away from the sectarian group thinking of the past, and embrace a citizenship model that is not only more inclusive, but allows greater rights and responsibilities of citizens vis--vis the State.

Despite this, sectarian identities still damage social cohesion in specific locations. COVID-19s effect on these tensions appears mixed. Existing grievances could be further aggravated, as pressure on services, the economy and communal relations intensifies. At the same time, COVID-19 has fostered a common narrative that could unite the population, in a way similar to Iraqs response to the Islamic State in the Levant (ISIL).

COVID-19 has disproportionately affected marginalized and vulnerable groups, including women, IDPs and young people. Cases of genderbased violence have reportedly increased in many locations. Restrictions on movement have hampered the return of IDPs. Many tribal councils and local fora for dialogue between returnees and host communities have been unable to meet, and key partners could not support such processes. As a result, reconciliation activities have paused.

Security

The multiplicity of armed groups in Iraq poses significant challenges to social cohesion, both horizontally between different communities, and vertically between citizens and the State. Trust in the Iraqi security sector was low in the lead up to COVID-19, in part due to violent responses to the popular protests. There was also evidence of an increase in ISIL-associated threats. The security situation has further deteriorated under COVID-19 as tension has at times escalated between security forces and the population, particularly regarding the implementation of lockdowns.

Policy recommendations

Without social cohesion, it will be difficult to attain the Sustainable Development Goals or achieve the central objective of leaving no one behind.

With evidence that the pandemic is exacerbating a number of existing political, economic, social and security issues key to social cohesion, it is vital to identify mitigating measures to prevent further negative effects. There are also opportunities to develop a more comprehensive approach to social cohesion that acts on both horizontal and vertical challenges. The report makes several policy recommendations to the Government, civil society and international partners.

At the national level, a more strategic national approach to social cohesion should be developed alongside immediate and short-term responses to COVID-19 and its effects on relations within society. Long-term strategic partnerships between the Government of Iraq and the international community could cultivate an environment enabling an inclusive national approach to social cohesion.

A strategic approach requires covering all parts of the country and leaving no one behind, as well as maintaining special attention to areas formerly occupied by ISIL.

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Impact of COVID-19 on social cohesion in Iraq - Iraq - ReliefWeb

At the onset of the coronavirus pandemic, with travel restrictions in place worldwide, we launched a new series The World Through a Lens in which photojournalists help transport you, virtually, to some of our planets most beautiful and intriguing places. This week, Andrea DiCenzo shares a collection of images from central Iraq, taken in 2019.

The walls of the Imam Abbas shrine in Iraqs holy city of Karbala seemed to heave and sway with the boisterous, devoted crowd. By holding onto a rope, ushers partitioned a makeshift runway from one entrance of the mosque to another. This was the stage where a parade of religious men and women would perform latom, or ritual chest-beating, and other forms of ceremonial mourning.

The first group was understated: Dressed in black outfits that were deliberately muddied and torn, the group of Iraqi pilgrims beat their chests in unison. They cried out in grief Oh, Hussein! they shouted, in reference to a 7th-century Islamic leader so loudly that they cut through the music blaring from the speakers dragged behind them. The next group was younger and rowdier. In an explosion of chaotic energy, these young devotees struck at themselves and at each other with abandon.

This wasnt a normal day at the Imam Abbas shrine. This was Arbaeen, and the shrine would see some 15 million visitors and thousands of religious performances pass through its red glow before the two-day event concluded.

Every year, millions of pilgrims descend on the central Iraqi city of Karbala, a usually quiet desert city, to commemorate the religious holiday of Arbaeen, one of the largest organized gatherings of people in the world. The events center on two adjacent mosques: the Imam Hussein and Imam Abbas shrines.

The event is a spectacular display of grief, mourning and religious ecstasy. It commemorates the death of one of Shiite Islams most important leaders, Imam Hussein, a grandson of the Prophet Muhammad. Hussein is said to have died 1340 years ago in the dusty plains of Karbala. A grave was established to commemorate his death, and the city of Karbala, in what is now modern-day Iraq, slowly built around it over time.

In 2019, when a colleague told me the Imam Abbas shrine was inviting a small group of journalists to visit during Arbaeen, I jumped at the chance to go. The shrine was instrumental in organizing my stay in Karbala; they arranged my tourist visa and helped me negotiate travel both within Iraq and among the massive crowds in Karbala. (I paid my own travel expenses but was given a room at a modest hotel owned by the Imam Abbas shrine.)

My only moment of uncertainty came shortly before heading inside the Imam Abbas shrine. A group of clerics at the shrine queried whether it would be appropriate for me, a woman, to rove around and take photographs. After deliberating for 15 minutes, they permitted me to enter. It was hard to tell if I had fallen on the winning side of a religious debate, or if the rightly famous Iraqi sense of hospitality had simply won out.

Tradition holds that, in A.D. 680, Hussein and his followers were on their way to challenge the succession of Caliph Yazid, whom they saw as an illegitimate successor after the death of Prophet Muhammad, the founder of Islam. Yazid responded by sending a massive army to intercept Hussein, who continued to refuse allegiances with the Caliph. A battle ensued, and Hussein and all his followers were massacred. To this day, Husseins death is a defining drama of the Shiite faith and, in Christ-like fashion, remains powerfully resonant.

Nowhere is this more visible than in Karbala during Arbaeen.

Every year after the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003 until 2020 millions of pilgrims have traveled to Karbala, 60 miles southwest of the capital Baghdad. In the years of relative calm since 2010, the city of Karbala, together with its sister holy city of Najaf, the seat of Iraqs pre-eminent Shiite clerical establishment, have become major centers of economic power and theological influence. This was unthinkable under the dictatorship of Saddam Hussein, when Shiite religious events were banned, and clerics were hounded from Iraq.

Last year saw the shrines at their peak. Once inside, pilgrims offered a religious and cultural demonstration to express their love for Imam Hussein, often through choreographed chanting and flag twirling, but sometimes through violent (and less choreographed) flagellation, like the intense display I witnessed on the first day. In either case, nearly everyone was in tears, grieving. An astonishing number of people passed out from the emotional intensity of the experience.

Many of the pilgrims within Iraq and from neighboring Iran make the journey by foot, trekking and camping for hundreds of miles along routes lined with stalls that dispense hot meals and encouragement. In recent years, Iraqis and Iranians have been joined by hundreds of thousands of religious tourists from a growing number of countries outside the Middle East, including the United Kingdom, Bosnia, Pakistan, Malaysia and Australia.

Most foreigners come as groups organized by Iraqi travel agencies specializing in pilgrim tours. Individual visas are by invitation from one of the citys two shrines. But, in comparison to Hajj, a similarly significant pilgrimage in Mecca, Saudi Arabia, what makes Arbaeen unique is the fact that the shrines actively invite leaders and people of other faiths.

Of course, this year has proved to be anything but ordinary. Iraqs religious tourism industry which, until 2020, was the countrys largest non-oil economic sector has been decimated. And for Arbaeen, which began on Oct. 7 and ended on Oct. 8, the government issued only a few thousand religious tourism visas. Clerical and health authorities are worried that continuing rites at the holy cities might become super-spreader events.

This year, as a result, Arbaeen was once again mostly for Iraqis.

Andrea DiCenzo is an American photojournalist whose work focuses on armed conflict and humanitarian crises throughout the Middle East. You can follow her work on Instagram.

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From Iraq, an Intimate Glimpse of the Religious Holiday of Arbaeen - The New York Times

Ahead of the election, the US presidential candidates were vocal on important foreign policy issues in the Middle East including Iran, Saudi Arabia and Israel-Palestine, but debate was visibly absent on one critical issue Iraq.

Many observers believe the silence is because Iraq is a secondary foreign policy issue for the US, that other Middle East affairs including the Iran nuclear deal and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict present more pressing concerns.

It remains unclear the kind of approach the new US administration will adopt in the Middle East, and more particularly on Iraq. But president-elect Joe Biden has a long history of involvement in the oil-rich country and a controversial track record since the early 2000s.

And so, while Iraqi leaders including Iraqi President Barham Salih and Prime Minister Mustafa al-Kadhimi congratulated Joe Biden soon after the announcement of his victory, Baghdad remains cautious but hopeful of prosperous relations ahead.

Biden is well known to all the major Iraqi leaders who have met with him many times, said Michael Knights, a fellow at The Washington Institute.

This is reassuring for them and indicates that Iraq will get good attention in the Biden White House, added Knights, who specialises in the military and security affairs of Iraq and Iran.

Washingtons approach towards Baghdad gradually lost its clarity after the Iraq War wound down during the Barack Obama presidency. Although an Iraq policy remained vital for the US, its focus has centred on Iran and, in more recent years, on the fight against the armed group ISIL (ISIS).

As Iraq continues to be caught in a tug of war between Tehran and Washington, American policies on Iran tend to spill into its Arab neighbour.

When Washington ordered an air strike against Iranian military commander Qassem Soleimani in January, the drone also killed Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, deputy commander of Iraqs Hashd al-Shaabi, an Iran-backed umbrella organisation of militias.

The incident pushed Iran-US relations onto a collision course that played out on Iraqi soil. Washington targeted Iran-backed militias while they ramped up a campaign of attacks on US interests in Iraq.

Similarly, when the US slapped sanctions on Iran, the pressure was felt in Iraq and several pro-Iran militia figures were targeted.

Speaking from Baghdad, a senior government official told Al Jazeera he hoped Bidens administration would not only be more engaged with Iraq but also have a distinct Iraq policy rather than view Iraq as an appendage of their Iran policy.

Still, the official who asked to remain anonymous said if the Biden administration were to return to negotiations and diplomacy with Iran, this would be good for Iraq given that Iraq is inescapably stuck between the two.

Even if Washingtons Iraq policy remains closely tied to Iran, some analysts say a potential rollback in Donald Trumps hawkish approach towards Tehran which saw Washington pull out of the Iran nuclear deal, also known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), and impose unforgiving economic sanctions as part of a maximum pressure campaign would benefit Baghdad as well.

If Iran and the US move towards negotiations, that will be important for Iraq, especially that problems in US-Iraqi relations relate to an Iranian dimension, said Abbas Kadhim, director of the Iraq Initiative at the Atlantic Council, adding that de-escalation between Tehran and Washington could bring more stability to the country.

According to Knights, while Biden will have to hold a detailed review concerning how to prevent re-engagement from encouraging Iranian bad behaviour, Tehran and its allies in Iraq are unlikely to antagonise the US in the coming period.

Iran would be hesitant to take any action that might disrupt US willingness to re-enter the JCPOA, so Iran-backed militias would need to be cautious in Iraq not to hurt Americans or Washingtons international partners, he said.

As chair of the US Senate in 2002, Biden voted for a resolution that led to the US invasion of Iraq a year later. He also served as vice president to Obama, playing a key role in the drawdown of 150,000 American troops from the country in 2011.

Although many supported the move at the time, it created a security vacuum amid a sectarian crisis in Iraq that paved the way for the rise of ISIL. By 2014, the armed group occupied large swathes of Iraqi territory a development that brought US forces back to the country as part of an international coalition to fight ISIL.

Biden is also known for co-authoring a controversial 2006 article that called for the decentralisation of Iraq along ethnic and religious lines, giving the Kurds, Sunnis and Shia, room to run their own affairs, while leaving the central government in charge of common interests.

Seen as a plan to divide and further deepen sectarian divisions in Iraq, the proposal was badly received in Baghdad.

But analysts say a Biden administration will likely forge a wholly new approach to Iraq.

Biden hasnt in the past been on the right side. He has some pretty serious errors and lapses in judgement, said Renad Mansour, head of the Iraq Initiative at Londons Chatham House.

[But] people close to Bidens team are aware of these past mistakes and look to move forward with a new approach.

Ihsan al-Shammari, head of the Baghdad-based Iraqi Centre for Political Thought, agreed: There may be some residue from his previous approach, but that doesnt mean Biden will have the same recommendations for Iraq.

Biden will draw a new policy to what hed envisioned during the Obama administration or before that.

With 10 weeks still to go before the inauguration of the new president, the impact of Trumps policies in the Middle East are expected to continue for a while.

There may be even more of an escalation in the final months of this administration in Washington particularly by those in the Trump administration who are ideologically quite anti-Iran and anti-Iran in Iraq, said Mansour.

Recent reports suggest the Trump administration plans to slap a list of new sanctions on Iran a move that could exacerbate tensions in Iraq.

Still, analysts expect US-Iraq relations to remain within the standard protocol, at least in the short term, as a strategic dialogue launched in June continues to address economic engagement and security cooperation, among other topics.

Knights said security is the heart of the strategic dialogue.

Biden has vowed to bring US combat troops home from Iraq and Afghanistan, leaving only a small number of counterterrorism forces. The US is therefore expected to remain on course with withdrawing more than one-third of its 5,200 troops in Iraq to bring the level down to 3,000 by the end of the year.

The sway of ISIL has been largely contained compared with the period between 2014 and 2017, allowing foreign troops to gradually withdraw from a handful of bases over recent months a move accelerated by Iranian-backed armed groups targeting US positions.

Still, a complete withdrawal of US forces from Iraq remains unlikely.

US participating forces in the coalition are scheduled to remain in Iraq under the Biden administration, which is a strong supporter of US support to Iraqs military against Daesh, said Knights, using the Arabic acronym for ISIL.

Although ISIL has not claimed responsibility for a deadly attack by gunmen west of Baghdad on Sunday night, the incident was a strong reminder that armed groups still pose a threat to Iraq, and the presence of some US troops even if for advisory purposes might be necessary.

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Joe Biden and the future of Iraq-US relations - Aljazeera.com

GENEVA, SWITZERLAND - Aid agencies warn the November 8 decision by Iraqs government to rapidly close camps for Iraqis who have fled the conflict with the Islamic State group in the midst of the COVID-19 pandemic and near the onset of winter will expose thousands of people to a dangerous and uncertain future.

Iraqs imminent camp closures leave tens of thousands of displaced people in limbo. Babar Baloch, a spokesman for UNHCR, the U.N. Refugee Agency, says his agency has raised its concerns with the government.

We are particularly worried about the displaced people who say they are unable to return in absence of an organized dialogue with the communities and local authorities in their return areas in central and western Iraq which were heavily affected by the years of terror and fighting, he said.

The UNHCR says around 48,000 residents have been told their camps will be closed before the end of this month. Baloch said people have been given little notice they soon would be forced to leave their shelters, creating uncertainty for many families.

Many have objected to leaving camps now over concerns about conditions and destruction, tensions and insecurity in the areas of return. Some displaced people say they were given only two days notice to leave their shelters, he said.

The U.N.s International Organization for Migration has been tracking the movement of people who have been forced to leave camps in Baghdad and Kerbala in the past weeks. The agency says nearly half have been unable to return to their areas of origin and are living precariously on the edges of towns in damaged or unsafe buildings without basic necessities.

Iraq has announced its intention to quickly find solutions for more than 250,000 people currently sheltering in camps. In mid-October, it began shutting down 10 sites in six governorates across the country and says there will be more closures before the end of the year.

Humanitarian organizations say they will support government efforts to find solutions for those being evicted from the camps. They say those who are able to return to their homes should be provided with a means of livelihood. In cases where people are unable to return safely, they say other options for integration and resettlement should be found.

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Aid Agencies Blast Iraqi Decision to Close IDP Camps During Pandemic - Voice of America

Would it comfort you, in this moment of an unconceded election and unprecedented legal challenges, to know that an earlier regime did some wildly irresponsible stuff, too? And would you like various C.I.A. agents to sing about it? Then consider a ticket to Whos Your Baghdaddy, or How I Started the Iraq War, a smarty pants musical satire with an excruciating title and a mostly true story based on what The Guardian once called one of the greatest confidence tricks in the history of modern intelligence.

Baghdaddy began at the DC Fringe Festival, then went on to a couple of Off Broadway runs in 2015 and 2017. A show about failures of intelligence on multiple levels, it has now reappeared in canny digital form, produced with the assistance of BroadwayHD, where it streams starting Wednesday. An Australian cast, under the direction of Neil Gooding, gathered in a shared house in a Sydney suburb. Following a 20-page Covid safety plan, they performed the show live, then recorded it. (Stay for the credits if you want to see how.) The musical cavorts atop your screen as a short course in digital ingenuity and a hectic sprint through a major government screw-up less deep state than dope state.

Some facts: In 1999, an Iraqi man, claiming to be a chemical engineer, arrived in Germany seeking asylum. An official from Germanys intelligence service, the BND, interviewed him about chemical weapons in Iraq. The man, given the code name Curveball, supplied spurious information, which made its way to the C.I.A. Though the BND raised questions about the sources credibility, George W. Bushs administration ran with the intel. In 2003, Congress declared war on Iraq with Curveballs sham weapons-of-mass-destruction the casus belli, a catastrophic whoopsie that would lead to more than 4,000 American combat deaths.

Baghdaddy, with music and book by Marshall Pailet and lyrics and book by A.D. Penedo, based on an unproduced screenplay by J.T. Allen, tells this tale with an antic disposition, like a Le Carr novel sent skidding on a banana peel. It reframes an espionage snafu as a story of bureaucracy gone wrong and the dumb things C.I.A. spooks do when theyre angling for praise or dodging blame.

The show begins in what might be the present day with a support-group meeting for the agents and experts who championed Curveballs intel. (What was once a church basement meetup has been seamlessly reimagined as a Zoom conference.) Flashbacks and some fudging of timelines and personnel track Curveballs arrival and the rolling snowball of terrible choices that afforded him credibility.

Theres a fierce if occasionally goofy intelligence animating the piece, which focuses on five main characters, Martin (Doug Hansell), a weapons inspector; Richart (Matthew Predny), a BND detective; Nelson (Philip Lowe), a C.I.A. higher up; and Berry (Laura Murphy) and Jerry (Adam Rennie), two of his analysts. In their individual squares they sing a mixture of backpack rap, pop balladry and Sinatra-esque swing. The cunning multisyllabic rhymes (hurt ya/ Goethe, analysis/ paralysis) cant stop, wont stop. If video swallows a lot of the actors choreography, the web team has made the Zoom lozenges shimmy all around the screen, like Scrabble tiles with ants in their pants.

Online, the show has the passionate enthusiasm that only a house full of musical-theater types afforded gainful employment can generate. Which means that theyre playing to the balcony when a screen gives you a better-than-front-row seat. So the enterprise, even with the volume turned way, way down, can feel a little exhausting. It improves in the second half, when the comeuppances arrive and the mood and lighting darken. Do you feel like this has gotten less funny? Jerry asks. It has.

Thats the awful moral of Baghdaddy: Its all fun and geopolitical games until somebody sends in the troops.

Whos Your Baghdaddy, or How I Started the Iraq WarAvailable on demand at curveballcreative.com.au; also available on demand on BroadwayHD from Nov. 11. Running time: 1 hour 50 minutes.

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Whos Your Baghdaddy Review: The Iraq War Set to Backpack Rap - The New York Times