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CRISIS IMPACT OVERVIEW

In October 2020, the federal Government of Iraq (GoI) and the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) signed an agreement on the status of Sinjar district, in Ninewa governorate. The agreement details and organises aspects of administration, security, and reconstruction in Sinjar, and aims to restore security and stability in preparation for the return of the displaced populations originating from the district. As there is an upward trend in the number of returnees to Sinjar district, this anal - ysis aims to help inform the humanitarian community about the current and expected living conditions and humanitarian needs of both residents and returnees. The intention is to support evidence-based decision-making around the safe return of and response efforts for the Yazidis and other communities from Sinjar. Main needs identified include social reconciliation, education, health, WASH, protection, and livelihoods.

HUMANITARIAN CONSTRAINTS

Sinjar district falls within the disputed territories of northern Iraq. Although the October 2020 agreement is meant to re - solve tensions between the GoI and KRG in relation to Sinjar, organisations are likely to continue to face administrative and bureaucratic constraints, as access will be coordinated between the two bodies. Ongoing insecurity in the governorate is also likely to limit ther - esponse capacity of some organisations.

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ACAPS Briefing Note: Iraq - The return to Sinjar (20 November 2020) - Iraq - ReliefWeb

Three UN Special Rapporteurs expressed alarm Friday at reports that approximately 50 prisoners convicted of terrorism-related crimes in Iraq would be executed on Monday.

This planned mass execution is not the first occurrence. Last month 21 prisoners on death row at Nasiriyah central prison were executed. On November 16 an additional 21 prisoners were executed. According to the UN experts, hundreds of deaths are now imminent after [the prisoners] execution orders had been signed-off.

The UN experts worry that the mass executions are part of a plan to execute all prisoners currently on death row in Iraq, which amounts to approximately 4,000 people.

According to the UN Office of the High Commissioner (OHCHR), the Iraqi Anti-Terrorism Law no.13 raises serious human rights concerns due to its vague and overly broad definition of terrorism. The OHCHR states that under the law, an individual can be charged with terrorism and sentenced to death for a non-violent crime committed without intent to terrorize the population. Additionally, the law does not distinguish between different levels of participation, involvement and responsibility in terrorist acts, nor is any assessment made based on the severity of the act.

The UN experts state that under this law, trials have been marked with alarming irregularities. The UN experts noted that defendants are often denied adequate legal representation. Additionally, the UN experts state that defendants have alleged torture and ill-treatment during interrogations, which has not yet been investigated.

Due to these irregularities and the overly broad application of the law, the UN experts strongly urge the Iraqi Government to respect its international legal obligations and to immediately halt further plans to execute prisoners.

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UN rights experts urge Iraq to halt mass executions - JURIST

Overview

With the suspension of household visits in 2020 as a result of COVID-19 movement restrictions and preventative measures, UNHCR initiated the remote protection monitoring exercise as an alternate modality for UNHCR and partners* to conduct targeted, systemized protection monitoring for the refugee and asylumseeker population in Iraq. The survey was designed to provide an overview of how COVID and COVIDrelated measures have affected protection concerns of refugees and asylum-seekers over time and the continued impact on their access to rights, services, and coping mechanisms during the course of the year.

The exercise was initiated in August 2020, covering all governorates of Iraq and surveying Syrian households (HH) and HH of other nationalities. A total 1,605 HH were interviewed in Round 2 (1-28 October 2020), complementing the 1,653 HH interviewed for Round 1 (August-September 2020).

This report is a summary of Round 2 findings, highlighting the impact of COVID on the protection situation of refugees and asylum-seekers across Iraq.

Round 1 findings are available at: https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/details/82842.

Most HH surveyed continue to feel well informed about COVID, sourcing information from media andclose acquaintances, with the highest degree of trust resting in government sources.

Consistent with Round 1, nearly all HH (94%) surveyed own at least one smart device, with slightlyfewer able to access internet (84%). Nevertheless, access to smart devices within a HH is restrictedto just over half of spouses, and fewer than a quarter of children.

Overall evictions and impacts of movement restrictions remained low, with 27 total evictions in Round2 and 86 in Round 1, due largely to the inability to pay rent.

Consistent with Round 1, over half of HH reported reducing overall consumption of food, taking onfurther debt, and/or restricting movement in response to COVID, thus impacting access to livelihoods.

From Round 1 to Round 2, there was a sharp increase in the percentage of HHs reporting turning tochild marriage (42%), child labor (17%), and/or selling household items (17%) to generate funds.

Consistent with Round 1, of boys and girls enrolled in formal primary and secondary school prior toCOVID, fewer than half continued schooling at home after physical school closures, with most parentsstill feeling unable to support childrens at-home learning as the 2020-2021 academic year begins.

Hesitations accessing non-COVID related healthcare persist. Of PwSN requiring care, an increasingpercentage (nearly 40%) had not received any. Financial constraints and pre-existing issuesaccessing care superseded discontinuation of care as primary reasons in Round 2.

Compared to Round 1, the percentage of respondents reporting feeling anxious due to the situationdropped below 50%, while one-fifth reported their psychological state impeded their daily routine ascompared to one-third in Round 1, suggesting general improvement in adaptation and coping.

From Round 1 to Round 2, there was no significant change in intentions to return to country of origin(CoO) in the next 12 months, with most HHs (85%) reporting no intent

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Iraq: Protection Monitoring of Refugees in Response to COVID-19 Round 2 (October 2020) - Iraq - ReliefWeb

The projected election of Joe Biden as the 46th president of the United States has been met with mixed reactions in war-torn Iraq, where nearly 3,000 American troops remain to help the country's forces fight the remnants of the Islamic State terror group.

While Iraqi leaders from across the political spectrum have welcomed Biden's victory, some Iraqis fear the return of the Democrats to power may translate into greater influence for Iran and its violent proxy groups in the oil-rich country.

"Some welcome the end of the disruptive and unpredictable policies and tactics of the past four years," Bilal Wahab, an Iraq expert at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, told VOA. "Others fear that Biden would ease the pressures on Iran and its proxies in Iraq to the detriment of gains made by last year's protest movement."

Anti-IS operations

Following a visit to Washington by Iraqi Prime Minister Mustafa al-Kadhimi, the Trump administration in September lowered the number of U.S. troops in the country from 5,000 to 3,000.

The Pentagon says the job of the remaining American military personnel is not to engage in combat operations but to train and advise Iraqi forces to destroy IS sleeper cells, a policy that is expected to continue under the Biden administration.

"In the war against ISIS, the U.S. has found a new formula to fight terrorism that does not involve U.S. boots on the ground. I expect the alliances with local partners in this fight to continue," Wahab said, using another acronym for Islamic State.

Pro-Iran militias

Under the current circumstances, observers say, the incoming administration is unlikely to increase U.S. troop levels in the country, where opposition to foreign troops appears to have increased following recent military moves by the Trump administration.

In addition to being accused of involvement in bloody crackdowns on Iraq's peaceful anti-government protesters, pro-Iran militia groups, including most notably the Kataib Hezbollah (KH), have been viewed as the primary suspect in attacks on U.S. bases in the country resulting in the death of at least one American.

In January, the U.S. responded forcefully by killing Iran's powerful military general, Qassem Soleimani, in a drone strike near the Baghdad airport. KHleader Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis also was killed in the attack. Subsequently, the Iraqi parliament passed a nonbinding resolution to expel all U.S. troops from the country.

"Trump's era was a very negative one, a period of demolition," said KH spokesman Mohammad Mohyi in a recent interview with Agence France-Presse. "We hope the new administration will resolve this, by ending the crisis and withdrawing its troops."

The militiaman's hopefulness is largely caused by the belief the U.S. will rejoin the 2015 Iran nuclear deal, which could, in turn, mean less confrontation with the Islamic Republic and its proxies throughout the wider Middle East, according to experts. In May 2018, the Trump administration withdrew from the deal.

"This optimism voiced by the militia groups that are linked and loyal to Iran comes from Iran's optimism in the first place," Hussein Ali Allawi, a professor of national security at Nahrain University in Baghdad, told VOA by phone.

Following continued rocket attacks on U.S. bases in Iraq, media reports suggested U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, in a phone call with Iraqi President Barham Salih, had recently threatened to close his country's large embassy in Iraq if the country failed to rein in the militia groups. Subsequently, Iraqi leaders reportedly pressured KH to end its attacks on U.S. interests.

Hours after Biden's projection as the winner Saturday, Iraq's prime minister went on Twitter to send his congratulations.

"I look forward to working with you on strengthening the strategic ties that bind Iraq and the United States, building on common values between our nations to overcome challenges together," Kadhimi posted.

The Kurds and the mountains

Biden's victory is particularly welcomed by Iraqi Kurds, who see him as a longtime friend of their people who suffered a genocide under Saddam Hussein. A 2002 video of then-Senator Biden addressing the autonomous Kurdistan Region's parliament has resurfaced on social media.

"The mountains are not your only friends," Biden reassures the Kurds in the video.

Prominent Kurdish leaderMasoud Barzani, who served as the region's president until 2017, called Biden a friend.

"I express my heartfelt congratulations to you, my friend, President-elect @JoeBiden, for your victory," Barzani tweeted.

What made Biden more popular among Kurds was his 2006 proposal to divide Iraq into three autonomous regions for the country's main components, namely, the Kurds, the Sunnis and the Shiites. The Kurds, however, appeared to be the only group to welcome his controversial plan.

Biden later explained his proposal had been misinterpreted as it had never called for the partition of the country into three independent states but saw decentralization of power in the multiethnic country as the answer to instability.

One of Iraq's prominent Sunni leaders, who vehemently opposed Biden's plan when it was announced, was Misha'an al-Juburi. In a tweet welcoming Biden's election, Juburi announced that he has now changed his mind about the notion.

"We congratulate the American people for their choice, and President[-elect]Biden on his victory and all those who are happy with this victory, ourselves included," al-Juburi said.

He added that after the destruction by Iran-backed militias in his country, "we now look forward to implementing his plan on Iraq, which we opposed previously."

Even though Wahab, the Iraq scholar, does not expect Iraq to be a centerpiece of Biden's foreign policy, he says the incoming administration's approach might be a reason for celebration by pro-democracy forces in the country.

"The change might be in Biden's approach to Iraq, who promised to reinject values into U.S. foreign policy and lead with diplomacy. For the youth movement that wants to make inroads in Iraq's next elections, this might be good news," he added.

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Iraqis Voice Mixed Reactions to Biden's Election - Voice of America

Social cohesion is fundamental to the successful functioning of societies, especially diverse ones such as Iraq. A lack of social cohesion can increase tensions among different social groups, enhance the likelihood of conflict and undermine trust in the State. This report examines the impact of COVID-19 on social cohesion in Iraq. Research conducted between July and September 2020 included a comprehensive literature review and 22 interviews with key stakeholders comprising members of the Government at the national and local levels, international organizations, donors and civil society organizations from different parts of the country.Without social cohesion, it will be difficult to attain the SDGs or reach the objective of leaving no one behind. In practice, this means taking explicit action to end extreme poverty, curb inequalities, confront discrimination and fast-track progress for the furthest behind. Social cohesion is also vital for achieving SDG 16, with its commitments to building peaceful and inclusive societies, realizing access to justice for all, and establishing effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels.2Enhancing social relations among different groups and strengthening the social contract between citizens and the State are prerequisites for all of these ends, especially in post-conflict Iraq.

Definitions of social cohesion

Social cohesion is an elusive and contested concept. Analysts generally identify it as having horizontal and vertical dimensions. The horizontal dimension describes the trust, relationships and interactions among people in a society across divisions such as identity or other social constructs, including race or class. Vertical cohesion entails trust between a government and society. This includes trust in political, economic or social leaders, institutions and processes such as elections, access to justice, taxation, budgeting and the delivery of public services. It is generally agreed that social cohesion has political, economic, social and security aspects.

Social cohesion in Iraq and the impact of COVID-19

Many challenges have disrupted social cohesion in Iraq over the last 20 years. The pandemic came at a time when public trust in the Government was low, the economy was weakened through reductions in revenues from oil sales, protests across the country were a regular occurrence and violent extremist attacks were resurging. COVID-19 has exacerbated existing and sometimes deeply rooted political, economic, social and security challenges.Its impact on social cohesion represents another point of stress on top of many others afflicting communities across the country.

Political

Popular discontent with the muhasasa system of government and corruption, compounded by high unemployment levels, often poor service delivery, and a lack of social protection and rule of law meant that vertical social cohesion was fragile prior to COVID-19. Prime Minister Mustafa al-Kadhimi came into power in May. Bridging longfestering gaps has been among his top priorities.

But he has faced numerous challenges, and has thus far only been able to take small and largely symbolic steps. Despite the willingness of the new Government to improve social cohesion, the challenges remain significant, with COVID-19 entrenching old problems even as it creates additional ones. The Government faces a daunting task in addressing structural reform issues while tackling the pandemic.

Economic

Prior to COVID-19, 4.1 million people in Iraq required humanitarian support. Extreme poverty and inequality have meant that significant portions of the population are in urgent need of employment, health care, education, sanitation, hygiene and access to justice. Shortfalls have worsened with the oil price drop, which has had a major effect on government revenues and fiscal space. Thousands of jobs are at risk, and while food prices have remained relatively stable, continued reliance on imported food makes the country vulnerable to shortages or major price increases.The economic impacts of the pandemic have disproportionately affected marginalized groups.

Over 66 percent of people are employed in the informal sector; they were deeply affected by lockdown measures and restrictions on movement.

The IOM reports that between March and April 2020, the number of paid people working in the private sector fell by approximately 40 percent.

Social

Iraq is a diverse country with highly complex and multidimensional social divides spanning generations, religions, rural and urban groups, internally displaced people (IDPs) and host communities, and political interests. Youth activism in different governorates indicates that the new generation is increasingly seeking to break away from the sectarian group thinking of the past, and embrace a citizenship model that is not only more inclusive, but allows greater rights and responsibilities of citizens vis--vis the State.

Despite this, sectarian identities still damage social cohesion in specific locations. COVID-19s effect on these tensions appears mixed. Existing grievances could be further aggravated, as pressure on services, the economy and communal relations intensifies. At the same time, COVID-19 has fostered a common narrative that could unite the population, in a way similar to Iraqs response to the Islamic State in the Levant (ISIL).

COVID-19 has disproportionately affected marginalized and vulnerable groups, including women, IDPs and young people. Cases of genderbased violence have reportedly increased in many locations. Restrictions on movement have hampered the return of IDPs. Many tribal councils and local fora for dialogue between returnees and host communities have been unable to meet, and key partners could not support such processes. As a result, reconciliation activities have paused.

Security

The multiplicity of armed groups in Iraq poses significant challenges to social cohesion, both horizontally between different communities, and vertically between citizens and the State. Trust in the Iraqi security sector was low in the lead up to COVID-19, in part due to violent responses to the popular protests. There was also evidence of an increase in ISIL-associated threats. The security situation has further deteriorated under COVID-19 as tension has at times escalated between security forces and the population, particularly regarding the implementation of lockdowns.

Policy recommendations

Without social cohesion, it will be difficult to attain the Sustainable Development Goals or achieve the central objective of leaving no one behind.

With evidence that the pandemic is exacerbating a number of existing political, economic, social and security issues key to social cohesion, it is vital to identify mitigating measures to prevent further negative effects. There are also opportunities to develop a more comprehensive approach to social cohesion that acts on both horizontal and vertical challenges. The report makes several policy recommendations to the Government, civil society and international partners.

At the national level, a more strategic national approach to social cohesion should be developed alongside immediate and short-term responses to COVID-19 and its effects on relations within society. Long-term strategic partnerships between the Government of Iraq and the international community could cultivate an environment enabling an inclusive national approach to social cohesion.

A strategic approach requires covering all parts of the country and leaving no one behind, as well as maintaining special attention to areas formerly occupied by ISIL.

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Impact of COVID-19 on social cohesion in Iraq - Iraq - ReliefWeb