Archive for the ‘Iraq’ Category

Iraq Has the ‘Highest Negative Experiences Worldwide’ (Gallup) – Modern Diplomacy

The nuclear problem of Iran is once again becoming the focus of global media attention, and there are several reasons for this.

First, US President-elect Joe Biden (although no official results of the November 3 vote have been announced yet), who generally rejects the foreign policy of the current President Donald Trump, said that he will make Americas return to the landmark Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), also known as the Iran nuclear deal, one of his administrations main priorities. The announcement was certainly not lost on political scientists, analysts and journalists, who started actively discussing the new situation around the Iranian nuclear problem.

Second, this renewed interest in the future of the 2015 accord is also explained by the persistence of the Trump administration, which, 60 days now left before it will be moving out of the White House, is ramping up its traditional maximum pressure on Iran by introducing a new set of sanctions

Third, this is the internal political struggle in Iran, now that President Hassan Rouhani one of the main authors of the JCPOA is due to step down when his second term in office expires in 2021.

Rouhanis upcoming departure has been a boost to the conservative radicals predominant in the government, who are all set to step up their fight against the JCPOA. Indeed, their discontent was directed not so much at Washington, as at President Rouhani, who in their opinion, which has been gaining popularity at home, made a mistake by joining President Barack Obama in creating the JCPOA. This means that Rouhanis successor may be less open to communication with the West, and, to a certain extent, unwilling to abide by the terms of the agreement.

Throughout Donald Trumps four years in the White House, President Rouhani has been trying hard to keep the JCPOA alive and give diplomacy a chance even though Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei has increasingly warned against contacts with Washington, especially since President Trump unilaterally withdrew from the nuclear accord in 2018.

However, mindful of the Trump administrations aggressive policy towards the Islamic Republic, exactly a year after the US pullout from the JCPOA, the Iranian leadership began to gradually scale backits commitments underthenuclear deal.

Meanwhile, the nuclear situation in Iran now looks rather alarming and even dangerous.

In a confidential report circulated to member states on November 10, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) said that, as of November 2, Irans stockpile of low-enriched uranium had reached 2,442.9 kilograms, which is 12 times the amount allowed under the JCPOA. Under the agreement, Iran is only allowed to produce up to 300kg of enriched uranium in a particular compound form (UF6), which is the equivalent of 202.8kg of uranium.

The IAEA added that Iran was continuing to enrich uranium to a purity of up to 4.5% in violation of the 3.67% threshold agreed under the 2015 deal.

According to the UN nuclear watchdogs latest quarterly report, Iran has completed the deployment of the first set of advanced uranium enrichment centrifuges at an underground facility in Natanz. Tehran had earlier informed the IAEA of its intention to transfer three cascades of advanced centrifuges to Natanz. The first cascade of IR-2m centrifuges, has already been installed and connected, but is not yet operational, since gaseous uranium hexafluoride, the feedstock for the production of enriched uranium, is not yet supplied to the system. The Iranians are also installing a second cascade of more efficient IR-4 centrifuges. A third cascade of IR-6 centrifuges is now in the pipeline.

Moving underground equipment previously located on the surface, and using more advanced centrifuges than the first generation IR-1 units is a violation of Tehrans obligations under the JCPOA.

The Natanz nuclear facility, located about 200 kilometers south of Tehran, is an advanced complex, consisting of two main facilities the Experimental Plant, commissioned in 2003, and the Industrial Plant, commissioned in 2007. The latter consists of two underground reinforced concrete buildings, each divided into eight workshops. The plant is well protected against air strikes with an almost eight-meter-thick high-strength concrete roof, covered with a 22-meter layer of earth.

In late October, IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi confirmed that Iran is also building an underground facility in Natanz to assemble centrifuges of a new generation, more productive and efficient. This is equally at variance with the terms of the JCPOA accord, which has suffered erosion and destabilization since the US withdrawal.

Just as Academician Alexey Arbatov very aptly noted in his article Iranian Nuclear Perspective: There is no reason for such underground structures and, accordingly, for colossal additional costs if, as Tehran says, they are for peaceful nuclear energy generation. References to the threat of an Israeli air strike are equally unconvincing, since what we are talking about is peaceful atom. Indeed, all other elements of the nuclear industry are not protected from an airstrike and can be destroyed if the enemy seeks to prevent the development of peaceful, rather than military, nuclear energy in Iran. History knows only two examples of similar underground nuclear power projects: an underground nuclear power plant (Atomgrad) built by the Soviet Union near Krasnoyarsk to produce weapons-grade plutonium, and a uranium enrichment complex, apparently being built in the mountains of North Korea. Both of a military nature, of course, meant to produce weapons-grade nuclear materials even during the war, despite air strikes.

Judging by the latest IAEA report, the agency is also unsatisfied with Tehrans explanations about the presence of nuclear materials at an undeclared facility in the village of Turkuzabad (about 20 km south of Tehran), where man-made uranium particles were found last year, and continues to consider the Iranian response technically unreliable.

In his November 13, 2020 report about the agencys work to the UN General Assembly, IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi said that the IAEA continues to verify the non-proliferation of nuclear materials pledged by Iran in keeping with the terms of its Safeguards Agreement. In August, Grossi visited Tehran and met with President Rouhani and other senior Iranian officials. During the visit, the sides agreed to settle certain issues pertaining to the implementation of safeguards, including IAEA inspectors access to two facilities in Iran. Inspections have since been carried out at both locations and environmental samples taken by inspectors are being analyzed.

I welcome the agreement between the agency and Iran, which I hope will reinforce cooperation and enhance mutual trust, Rafael Grossi summed up.

Even though Iran is formally de jure involved in the nuclear deal, the hardline conservative majority in the countrys political elite opposed to the JCPOA has taken a new step towards Irans withdrawal from the NPT.

In a statement issued on November 11, 2020, Khojat-ol-eslam Mojtaba Zonnour, chairman of the National Security and Foreign Policy Committee of the Mejlis (Iranian parliament), said that the MPs had approved (but not yet passed as law) a Strategic Plan for Countering Anti-Iranian Sanctions.

According to the Plan, upon its approval in parliament, the government shall suspend within the next two months any access by IAEA inspectors outside the provisions of the Additional Protocol. And also, if Irans banking relations with Europe and Iranian oil sales do not return to normal within three months after the adoption of the law, the government is to stop voluntary implementation of the Additional Protocol.

The Iranians insist that the level of cooperation that has in recent years been going on between Tehran and the IAEA in monitoring the countrys nuclear program was even higher than what is envisaged by the Additional Protocol, including their introduction of a special checkup regime for IAEA inspectors. Moreover, Tehran never misses a chance to remind that before the JCPOA, Europe was buying between 700,000 and one million barrels of Iranian oil a day, and that economic and banking relations were normal.

Mojtaba Zonnour emphasized that the United States walked out of the JCPOA in order to impose new sanctions on the Islamic Republic, adding that the Europeans had failed to meet their obligations under the JCPOA and had been cheating Iran for several years. He also noted that in keeping with the Strategic Plan for Countering Anti-Iranian Sanctions the IAEA will only be allowed to monitor the implementation of the Safeguards Agreement and the NPT requirements.

Upon its approval by the Mejlis, the Plan envisions a radical refusal by Iran to comply with a number of key obligations under the JCPOA.

Thus, the Fordow nuclear fuel enrichment plant, redesigned in line with the JCPOA requirements into a research center, will again become a plant for the production of enriched uranium. The number of new IR-6 centrifuges there will be increased to 1,000 by the end of the Iranian calendar year (March 20, 2021) to turn out up to 120 kg of uranium enriched to 20% a year.

The Iranians are also going to expand their enrichment capacities and bring the production of uranium enriched to 5% up to at least 500 kg per month, compared to just 300 kg allowed by the JCPOA.

Within four months from the date of the Strategic Plans entry into force, Tehran intends to restore the 40 megawatt heavy water reactor in Arak to the level it operated at prior to the conclusion of the JCPOA accord, which had it redesigned so that it would not be able to produce weapons-grade plutonium. In January 2016, the reactor core was dismantled.

As Mojtaba Zonnour quite frankly explained in his statement, In the above-mentioned Plan, we determined the extent to which our nuclear activities would intensify and stated that we had abandoned the measures taken in accordance with the requirements of the JCPOA. For example, we decided to increase the level of uranium enrichment, increase the amount of uranium accumulation, bring the 40 megawatt heavy-water reactor in Arak to its pre-JCPOA state, install modern centrifuges, and the like. <> The Plan singles out two very important points: one is that if, after we enact the law on the Strategic Plan for Countering Anti-Iranian Sanctions, the Europeans change their behavior and resume their commitments under the JCPOA, of if the US wants to return to the JCPOA, the Iranian government will no longer have the authority to unilaterally suspend the implementation of this law. It will need permission from parliament it is the Majlis that makes the final decision.

It is worth mentioning here that in its draft law the Mejlis provides for criminal responsibility for non-compliance by individuals and legal entities with the provisions of the law on the Strategic Plan with violators facing punishment of up to 20 years behind bars.

Enactment of the law on the Strategic Plan for Countering Anti-Iranian Sanctions and its implementation by the government is tantamount to Irans withdrawal from the JCPOA. Moreover, Mojtaba Zonnour said that the government could fast-track the adoption of the law on the Plan, as there is an administrative and legal opportunity for it to be formally considered by the parliamentary Commission on National Security and Foreign Policy within 10 days, and subsequently adopted by an open session of the Majlis.

This means that by the time US President-elect Joe Biden takes office on January 20, 2021, the Plan may have already been adopted. The Iranian authorities obviously had this date very much in mind when unveiling the Plan to the general public.

On the one hand, the draft law on the Strategic Plan for Countering Anti-Iranian Sanctions can be seen as an attempt by Tehran to blackmail the new US administration, as well as Britain and the European Union, in order to achieve the main goal of lifting the sanctions even by restoring in some form the JCPOA accord (or drawing up JCPO-2), but on Iranian terms. On the other to get a bargaining chip for a future dialogue, possibly with the very same P5+1 group of world powers (Russia, US, Britain, France, China and Germany), but now a dialogue from a position of strength.

No wonder the already familiar Khojat-ol-eslam Zonnour said: In fact, the nature of [US] arrogance is such that when they see you weak, they put more pressure on you, and if our position against the system of domination and arrogance is weak, this does not serve our interests. Consequently, the Iranian people have the right to respond to questions from a position of dignity and strength.

As for Khojat-al-eslam Zonnour, he is a radical politician and the fiercest opponent of the JCPOA and a rapprochement with the West in parliament. The following statement tells it all: Unfortunately, today some of our statesmen use expressions that are contrary to the dignity of the Iranian people, our authority and self-respect. The fact that in their tweets and comments our president and first vice president say that God willing, the new US administration will return to the law and fulfill its obligations these are not correct or noble things to say. Such words encourage the enemy to defy its commitments, and when it doesnt see our resolve and thinks we are passive and asking for a favor, it raises the bar and tries to score more points.

Mojtaba Zonnours activity can certainly be viewed as an example of a tough internal political struggle, but this way or another his views resonate with the overwhelming majority of members of the current parliament. And the issues of the JCPOA and general opposition to the United States and Europe were not invented by Zonnour alone.

Thus, we can state that the future of the JCPOA is now hanging in the balance as there are powerful forces in both Iran and the US opposed to nuclear deals between the Islamic Republic and the rest of the world. There is still hope, however, that the economic crisis and the threat of social protests will eventually force Tehran to resume contacts with the United States and the other signatories to the JCPOA accord in order to work out conditions for lifting the sanctions.

In turn, as is evident from statements coming from US President-elect Joe Biden, his administration will be ready for a dialogue with Iran on the nuclear issue, and here the positions of Russia, China, the European Union and the UK are no less important for resolving the newly emerged Iranian nuclear problem.

Just how this negotiation process will be carried out and on what conditions is hard to say now, but there is absolutely no doubt that it is going to be extremely difficult, dramatic, contradictory and protracted. The stakes are too high, it is too important for Iran, its neighbors, the entire Near and Middle East, as well as for preserving the nuclear nonproliferation regime.

From our partner International Affairs

Related

See the rest here:
Iraq Has the 'Highest Negative Experiences Worldwide' (Gallup) - Modern Diplomacy

U.S. troops in Iraq and Syria celebrate Thanksgiving under the shadow of COVID-19 – Yahoo News

The Daily Beast

In a surprise news conference on Thanksgiving Day, President Trump took questions from the press for the first time since losing re-electionbut he doubled down on his rigged election claims and appeared to deny the reality that his presidency is ending, saying it will be very hard for him to concede to Joe Biden.I think its not right hes trying to pick a Cabinet, Trump complained after railing against the supposed massive fraud that he claims gave Biden victory.Reiterating his claims of voter fraud in Michigan, Pennsylvania, and Georgia despite the fact that state authorities have already certified the election results in those states, Trump appeared to become combative when asked if he would concede if the Electoral College votes for Biden on Dec. 14. Although he eventually did say he would exit the White House if the vote were not in his favor, that answer came after he first repeatedly cast doubt on the Electoral College and election in general. Its going to be a very hard thing to concede. Because we know there was massive fraud, he said when first asked if he would concede. Pennsylvania Certifies Biden as Winner, Driving Stake in Trumps Legal EffortTime isnt on our side this was a massive fraud, this should never take place in this country, were like a third-world country, he said, suggesting that faulty vote-counting machines gave Biden millions of extra votes.Asked a second time if he would concede if the Electoral College votes for Biden, Trump responded, Well if they do they made a mistake, before saying its a possibility and scolding a reporter who pressed him on the issue: Dont talk to me that way, youre just a lightweight.Asked by another reporter if he would leave this building if the Electoral College elects Biden, he said, Certainly, I will.While Trump and his legal team have repeatedly looked to throw out votes in states that Joe Biden carried, none of their challenges have proved successful.Key states such as Michigan, Pennsylvania and Georgiaall of which Trump carried in 2016, before flipping blue this yearcertified their results this week, ensuring they will send a Democratic slate of voters to the Electoral College. Wisconsin and Arizona, two more states that flipped to Biden, are set to certify their results next week.Massive fraud has been found. Were like a third world country, Trump said, before launching back into allegations of voter fraud that have been repeatedly rebuffed in court and by state election officials of both parties.I did so well ... that they didnt know what to do, he said at one point of election results in Georgia, claiming that ballots for him were thrown away.I dont know what is going to happen. I know one thing, Joe Biden did not get 80 million votes. And I got 74 million but there were many ballots thrown away, so I got much more than that. But I got 74 million, 74 million is 11 million more than I got last time. And its millions more than Hillary Clinton got.Underneath all of the bravado, Trump at one point slipped up and blasted the Biden administration, apparently inadvertently recognizing Bidens win.While Trump has refused to concede and maintained that somehow, he would win states he had already lost, his administration has relented behind the scenes.Earlier this week, Emily Murphy, the head of the General Services Administrationsa Trump appointeesigned off on a letter officially allowing the presidential transition to begin. Murphy had previously refused to do so, a partisan move from a historically non-partisan agency.Even Trump appeared to have a moment of clarity Thursday regarding a potential COVID-19 cure and his future (or lack thereof) in the White House.Dont let Joe Biden take credit for the vaccine, he said.Read more at The Daily Beast.Get our top stories in your inbox every day. Sign up now!Daily Beast Membership: Beast Inside goes deeper on the stories that matter to you. Learn more.

Go here to see the original:
U.S. troops in Iraq and Syria celebrate Thanksgiving under the shadow of COVID-19 - Yahoo News

ACAPS Briefing Note: Iraq – The return to Sinjar (20 November 2020) – Iraq – ReliefWeb

CRISIS IMPACT OVERVIEW

In October 2020, the federal Government of Iraq (GoI) and the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) signed an agreement on the status of Sinjar district, in Ninewa governorate. The agreement details and organises aspects of administration, security, and reconstruction in Sinjar, and aims to restore security and stability in preparation for the return of the displaced populations originating from the district. As there is an upward trend in the number of returnees to Sinjar district, this anal - ysis aims to help inform the humanitarian community about the current and expected living conditions and humanitarian needs of both residents and returnees. The intention is to support evidence-based decision-making around the safe return of and response efforts for the Yazidis and other communities from Sinjar. Main needs identified include social reconciliation, education, health, WASH, protection, and livelihoods.

HUMANITARIAN CONSTRAINTS

Sinjar district falls within the disputed territories of northern Iraq. Although the October 2020 agreement is meant to re - solve tensions between the GoI and KRG in relation to Sinjar, organisations are likely to continue to face administrative and bureaucratic constraints, as access will be coordinated between the two bodies. Ongoing insecurity in the governorate is also likely to limit ther - esponse capacity of some organisations.

Continued here:
ACAPS Briefing Note: Iraq - The return to Sinjar (20 November 2020) - Iraq - ReliefWeb

UN rights experts urge Iraq to halt mass executions – JURIST

Three UN Special Rapporteurs expressed alarm Friday at reports that approximately 50 prisoners convicted of terrorism-related crimes in Iraq would be executed on Monday.

This planned mass execution is not the first occurrence. Last month 21 prisoners on death row at Nasiriyah central prison were executed. On November 16 an additional 21 prisoners were executed. According to the UN experts, hundreds of deaths are now imminent after [the prisoners] execution orders had been signed-off.

The UN experts worry that the mass executions are part of a plan to execute all prisoners currently on death row in Iraq, which amounts to approximately 4,000 people.

According to the UN Office of the High Commissioner (OHCHR), the Iraqi Anti-Terrorism Law no.13 raises serious human rights concerns due to its vague and overly broad definition of terrorism. The OHCHR states that under the law, an individual can be charged with terrorism and sentenced to death for a non-violent crime committed without intent to terrorize the population. Additionally, the law does not distinguish between different levels of participation, involvement and responsibility in terrorist acts, nor is any assessment made based on the severity of the act.

The UN experts state that under this law, trials have been marked with alarming irregularities. The UN experts noted that defendants are often denied adequate legal representation. Additionally, the UN experts state that defendants have alleged torture and ill-treatment during interrogations, which has not yet been investigated.

Due to these irregularities and the overly broad application of the law, the UN experts strongly urge the Iraqi Government to respect its international legal obligations and to immediately halt further plans to execute prisoners.

View original post here:
UN rights experts urge Iraq to halt mass executions - JURIST

Iraq: Protection Monitoring of Refugees in Response to COVID-19 Round 2 (October 2020) – Iraq – ReliefWeb

Overview

With the suspension of household visits in 2020 as a result of COVID-19 movement restrictions and preventative measures, UNHCR initiated the remote protection monitoring exercise as an alternate modality for UNHCR and partners* to conduct targeted, systemized protection monitoring for the refugee and asylumseeker population in Iraq. The survey was designed to provide an overview of how COVID and COVIDrelated measures have affected protection concerns of refugees and asylum-seekers over time and the continued impact on their access to rights, services, and coping mechanisms during the course of the year.

The exercise was initiated in August 2020, covering all governorates of Iraq and surveying Syrian households (HH) and HH of other nationalities. A total 1,605 HH were interviewed in Round 2 (1-28 October 2020), complementing the 1,653 HH interviewed for Round 1 (August-September 2020).

This report is a summary of Round 2 findings, highlighting the impact of COVID on the protection situation of refugees and asylum-seekers across Iraq.

Round 1 findings are available at: https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/details/82842.

Most HH surveyed continue to feel well informed about COVID, sourcing information from media andclose acquaintances, with the highest degree of trust resting in government sources.

Consistent with Round 1, nearly all HH (94%) surveyed own at least one smart device, with slightlyfewer able to access internet (84%). Nevertheless, access to smart devices within a HH is restrictedto just over half of spouses, and fewer than a quarter of children.

Overall evictions and impacts of movement restrictions remained low, with 27 total evictions in Round2 and 86 in Round 1, due largely to the inability to pay rent.

Consistent with Round 1, over half of HH reported reducing overall consumption of food, taking onfurther debt, and/or restricting movement in response to COVID, thus impacting access to livelihoods.

From Round 1 to Round 2, there was a sharp increase in the percentage of HHs reporting turning tochild marriage (42%), child labor (17%), and/or selling household items (17%) to generate funds.

Consistent with Round 1, of boys and girls enrolled in formal primary and secondary school prior toCOVID, fewer than half continued schooling at home after physical school closures, with most parentsstill feeling unable to support childrens at-home learning as the 2020-2021 academic year begins.

Hesitations accessing non-COVID related healthcare persist. Of PwSN requiring care, an increasingpercentage (nearly 40%) had not received any. Financial constraints and pre-existing issuesaccessing care superseded discontinuation of care as primary reasons in Round 2.

Compared to Round 1, the percentage of respondents reporting feeling anxious due to the situationdropped below 50%, while one-fifth reported their psychological state impeded their daily routine ascompared to one-third in Round 1, suggesting general improvement in adaptation and coping.

From Round 1 to Round 2, there was no significant change in intentions to return to country of origin(CoO) in the next 12 months, with most HHs (85%) reporting no intent

Continued here:
Iraq: Protection Monitoring of Refugees in Response to COVID-19 Round 2 (October 2020) - Iraq - ReliefWeb