Mediaboss Marketing

Joe Biden has an issue that hasnt played out yet in this election: his role in the launch of the Iraq war.

The Iraq war has been a prominent, even decisive issue, in some recent US presidential elections. It played a significant role in the surprise presidential primary victory won by a freshman senator from Illinois named Barack Obama in 2008. His heavily favored Democratic primary opponent, Hillary Clinton, had voted in the US Senate to authorize the war, and Obama didnt let her forget it during that contest.

In 2016, Donald Trump invoked the Iraq war against opponents in his own surprise victory in the Republican primary. And then he used it against Clinton, most likely with significant effect, in the general election that followed.

Biden did vastly more than just vote for the war. Yet his role in bringing about that war remains mostly unknown or misunderstood by the public. When the war was debated and then authorized by the US Congress in 2002, Democrats controlled the Senate and Biden was chair of the Senate committee on foreign relations. Biden himself had enormous influence as chair and argued strongly in favor of the 2002 resolution granting President Bush the authority to invade Iraq.

I do not believe this is a rush to war, Biden said a few days before the vote. I believe it is a march to peace and security. I believe that failure to overwhelmingly support this resolution is likely to enhance the prospects that war will occur

But he had a power much greater than his own words. He was able to choose all 18 witnesses in the main Senate hearings on Iraq. And he mainly chose people who supported a pro-war position. They argued in favor of regime change as the stated US policy and warned of a nuclear-armed Saddam sometime in this decade. That Iraqis would welcome the United States as liberators And that Iraq permits known al-Qaida members to live and move freely about in Iraq and that they are being supported.

The lies about al-Qaida were perhaps the most transparently obvious of the falsehoods created to justify the Iraq war. As anyone familiar with the subject matter could testify, Saddam Hussein ran a secular government and had a hatred, which was mutual, for religious extremists like al-Qaida. But Biden did not choose from among the many expert witnesses who would have explained that to the Senate, and to the media.

Bidens selling points as a candidate often lead with his reputation for foreign policy experience and knowledge. But Iraq in 2002 was devastated by economic sanctions, had no weapons of mass destruction, and was known by even the most pro-war experts to have no missiles that could come close to the United States. The idea that this country on the other side of the world posed a security threat to America was more than far-fetched. The idea that the US could simply invade, topple the government, and take over the country without provoking enormous violence was also implausible. Its not clear how anyone with foreign policy experience and expertise could have believed these ideas.

Senator Dick Durbin, who sat on the Senate intelligence committee at the time, was astounded by the difference between what he was hearing there and what was being fed to the public. The American people were deceived into this war, he said.

Regardless of Bidens intentions which I make no claim to know or understand the resolution granting President Bush the authority to start that war, which Biden pushed through the Senate, was a major part of that deception. So, too, was the restricted testimony that Biden allowed. The resolution itself contained deceptive language about a number of pretexts for the war, including al-Qaida and weapons of mass destruction that Iraq did not have.

The Iraq war has generally been seen as one of the worst US foreign policy blunders in decades. It fueled the spread of terrorism and destabilized the Middle East and parts of north Africa. Isil is a direct outgrowth of al-Qaida in Iraq, that grew out of our invasion, noted President Obama.

More than 4,500 US soldiers, and nearly as many US military contractors, lost their lives; tens of thousands were wounded, with hundreds of thousands more suffering from post-traumatic stress disorder. Estimates of Iraqi deaths run as high as 1 million.

At the very least, Biden should explain why he played such a major role in winning the authorization from Congress for President Bush to wage this disastrous war.

Excerpt from:
Joe Biden championed the Iraq war. Will that come back to haunt him now? - The Guardian

Key point: Hindsight is 20/20, but Washington should have known that the invasion was a mistake. The conflict would (and still does) claim many lives.

Every player of the popular video game Civilization knows to hit the save button before engaging in the risky, stupid invasion of foreign country. In the case of the 2003 invasion of Iraq, it became apparent after the first few months that the war was not working out as its framers had envisioned. The failure to find weapons of mass destruction was only the icing, so to speak, on the disaster of failed reconciliation, state collapse, and executive incompetence.

What if we had saved game before we invaded Iraq? What would Americas strategic options look like today?

The Middle East

In 2003, we spoke of the policy of dual containment as a problem that needed a solution. How could the United States manage a pair of hostile countries right next to one another? Today, the wiser among us recognize that dual containment was, in large part, a solution to its own problem. The animosity of the Hussein regime and the Islamic Republic of Iran meant that neither could achieve overarching influence in the Gulf.

In the wake of the Iraq War, dual containment has become basket case management, as Iraq has ceased to exist as a relevant strategic actor, and Iranian influence has grown in Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon. While the U.S. no longer has to worry about Hussein, it has been forced to devote its military and political attention not only to the maintenance of the shaky Baghdad government, but also to the resistance of Iranian power in the region.

(Recommended: 5 ISIS Weapons of War America Should Fear)

The impact of the Iraq War on the Arab Spring is more difficult to sort out. The framers of the war hoped that the establishment of a democratic Iraq would spur anti-authoritarian reactions around the region, although they also hoped that U.S. clients (including Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the Gulf states) would be spared. Something along these lines did indeed happen in 2011, but only well after most in the region had concluded that the invasion of Iraq was a disastrous failure.

And indeed, the fruits of the Arab Spring have been limited at best. Tunisia represents the clearest case of success, while Libya has fallen into chaos, authoritarian forces have reasserted themselves in Egypt, and Syria has become an unending cauldron of violence and brutality. In Iraq itself, the legacy of the invasion of 2003 seems to be an inability to escape obligations to the new Iraqi government; the United States continues to act as the Iraqi air force, and continues to struggle to train reliable Iraqi army forces.

(Recommended: 5 Israeli Weapons of War ISIS Should Fear)

Was dual containment manageable in the long run? The U.S. has spent far more in blood and treasure since 2003 than it did between 1991 and 2003, so from a purely military and financial standpoint the answer is clearly yes. And while dual containment would have left the dreadful Hussein regime in power, it likely would have avoided the worst of the several civil wars that Iraq has endured in the past twelve years.

Russia and China:

Did Russia or China take advantage of the U.S. invasion of Iraq to advance their interests? This question demands the follow up How would Russian or Chinese behavior have changed if the U.S. had avoided the Iraqi quagmire? The answer, probably, is not much.

(Recommended: 5 Russian Weapons of War NATO Should Fear)

The Iraqi campaign surely occupied U.S. attention and used up American capabilities, but the likelihood of U.S. military intervention in a campaign involving either Russia or China was vanishingly small in any case. The only conflict of note that the U.S. might have played a part in was the 2008 South Ossetia War. Although the Georgians desperately sought American intervention, the Bush administration wisely limited its support to rhetoric.

The rise of China and the increased belligerence of Russia owe more to geopolitical factors than to anything specifically associated with the Iraq War. At best, we might find some association between the rise of oil prices in the wake of the invasion of Iraq and the strength of the Russian state (China did not benefit from higher oil prices. However, the increase in oil prices after 2003 owes at least as much to the growth of the Chinese and Indian economies as it does to the decision to invade.)

Russia and China have surely enjoyed soft power benefits from the U.S. invasion of Iraq. Moscow regularly responds to U.S. criticism of its actions in Ukraine by referring to the 2003 invasion, although it also points to the 1999 Kosovo War and the 2011 Libya intervention. Beijing regularly questions American pretensions to maritime husbandry in the South China Sea, fueled to some extent by lingering unhappiness about the invasion of Iraq. But the long-term impact of this soft power boost is uncertain.

Afghanistan:

The invasion of Iraq affected Afghanistan in two ways. First, it diverted U.S. government resources away from Afghanistan at a time when the Taliban was clearly suffering from a devastating defeat. Second, it undermined the legitimacy of the Afghanistan war by presenting the operation merely as one of (potentially) several invasions of Muslim countries, rather than as a uniquely necessary effort to destroy a uniquely horrible regime.

It goes too far to claim that more attention to Afghanistan in the middle of the last decade would have led to the complete destruction of the Taliban, and an end to the war. The roots of the Talibans survival are more complex, and more difficult to dig out, than a simple diversion of resources would suggest. At the same time, it is equally hard to argue that additional attention would not have made Afghanistan at least somewhat more secure. In particular, a strong U.S. commitment to Afghanistan (made impossible by the Iraq War) could have limited the degree to which Pakistan sought to make mischief in the region.

Domestic:

The biggest effects of the Iraq War, and the most enduring limitations, may have come in how the conflict affected the U.S. military, and changed the attitudes of Americans toward the use of force.

With respect to the former, the Iraq War undoubtedly slowed research and development of advanced weapon systems within the U.S. Department of Defense. Without Iraq, the United States might have a much larger fleet of F-22s, for example. The U.S. Navy might expect additional Zumwalt class destroyers, and the Armys Future Combat Systems might never have died an ignominious death. In addition to specific platforms, DoD might have taken advantage of the 2000s to pursue a variety of disruptive technologies that would have left it farther ahead of Russia and China than it now sits. Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld certainly made pursuit of such technologies a priority, at least before Iraq derailed his plans.

But available technology rarely dominates strategic decision-making. Extra Raptors and Zumwalts could enhance American freedom of action at the margins, but would hardly have changed the trend lines of relative power in East Asia. Similarly, Future Combat Systems would not have given the United States much more in the way of political options for resisting Russian encroachment into Ukraine. And it is clearly wrong to believe that the money and attention devoted to Iraq would unproblematically have shifted over to research and development if the Bush administration had decided against intervention.

Moreover, the demands of the Iraq War (as well as the Afghanistan conflict) undoubtedly drove some technological development. The Iraq War revealed significant problems with how the Army and Air Force, in particular, viewed the future of warfare, leading to technological and doctrinal innovations that have improved U.S. warfighting capabilities.

The bigger domestic change may have come in terms of the publics attitude towards war. In the fifteen years after the end of the Cold War, the U.S. public became more tolerant towards the use of force than it had been in the post-Vietnam era. The Iraq War changed that, dramatically; today, few serious candidates for President support even a limited land war against ISIS.

President Obama won the 2008 Democratic primary because of his opposition to the Iraq War in 2003, and whatever ones attitude towards the drone war, the Obama administration clearly favors a less interventionist policy than its predecessors. This preference seems to accord with public and elite opinion about the use of force.

Does this reticence limit U.S. strategic options? America assisted France, the United Kingdom, and Libyan rebel forces with the deposition of the Gaddafi regime in 2011, notwithstanding any reluctance to use force. The U.S. continues to carry out a drone-and-special-forces war against Al Qaeda, across the Middle East. However, the reluctance to use force has surely played some role in the Obama administrations reaction to the Syria conflict, which has raged with minimal American intervention for the last four years.

Continued here:
What If the Iraq War Had Never Happened and America's Military Stayed Home? - The National Interest Online

The joint study by the UN Assistance Mission forIraq (UNAMI) and the UN human rights office, OHCHR, is based on interviews and group consultations with 237 children, young people and teachers at six camps for displaced persons (IDPs) in Ninewa governorate and in the cities of Mosul and Erbil.

Several interviewees reported thatrestrictions on their movementmeant they could not move freely in and out of the camps, thus preventing them from attending school and other daily activities.

Many children who were in school when living under ISIL control are now young adults, making them too old to attend mainstream schools and are left with no alternative options.

These challenges are creating a marginalized generation of children and young adults, many of whom are or will be entering adulthood without any post-primary schooling, according to the report titled The Right to Education in Iraq: Part One - The legacy of ISIL territorial control on access to education.

As one boy told the authors: There is no future in the camp anyway, what am I going to do here? Why do I need an education for this life? It has been so long since we were at school, our minds feel closed to learning, some of us can no longer even read and write. We have no support to overcome these things. Even if I could take the exams, I would not pass them. I dont see a future for myself.

The activities of ISIL, also known as Daesh, have been well-documented.

Since 2014, fighters carried out a campaign of violence, oppression and systematic human rights violations, leaving behind death, destruction and displacement.

Of the approximately 1.4 million people uprooted by the crisis, 658,000 are children, almost half of whom are not in school.

Although ISIL sustained military defeat in Iraq in 2017, some counter-insurgency operations continue. Additionally, families perceived as having affiliations with the group have had wider restrictions imposed on them.

UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Michelle Bachelet said the importance of the right to education for children and young people cannot be overstated.

Inclusive, quality education is not just a right in itself but it is essential for the full realization of a range of other human rights. Education literally has the power to transform lives and make dreams come true, she said.

IOM/Muse Mohammed

Mohammed, 10, sits on the staircase of the former house he used to hide with his family in Mosul.

Education can also protect young people when they are at a particularly vulnerable age, the authors added.

Children and young adults who are unable to attend school are especially at risk, leaving them on the margins of society and open to radicalization or other criminal activity, they said.

The loss of childhood during the ISIL years, including the lack of educational opportunities and the limited access to mental health and psychosocial support, can result in cycles of violence, both in public and private sphere, that directly prevent youth from reaching their full potential.

The report concludes with recommendations for the Iraqi authorities.

While acknowledging Government efforts to ensure access to education, measures should be implemented to allow people to obtain civil documentation.

The Government should also provide accessible primary and secondary education to all Iraqis, including those in IDP camps.

Measures can include increasing the number of schools and teaching hours, and expanding alternative education programmes. Teachers can also be trained in how to teach students who have suffered trauma.

The report was shared with the Government and integrates comments received from the Ministry of Education.

Read more:
Iraq: Education access still a challenge in former ISIL-controlled areas - UN News

Its been six weeks since Rosalind Williams 30-year-old son, Army veteran Michael Corey Hadley, took his own life.

When grieving the death of a child, thats a moment. A blink of an eye, a flip of a calendar. Barely enough time for Williams to pick herself up and return to the Philadelphia high school where she teaches science.

And yet in that small window, 900 other military parents have been dealt the same blow left behind to try and find the rhythm of a life that theyve lost after losing their children to suicide. According to the most recent data from the Department of Veterans Affairs, about 20 veterans, active-duty service members and members of the National Guard and Reserve die by their own hands every day.

In the quiet that followed the initial flurry of collective shock and grief after his death on Jan 2, Williams sat with her anguish. She went through old photographs, collected new ones from his funeral and military interment. She read, and reread, the numerous news stories written about her son after the family spoke unsparingly about his death.

His wounds were slow-acting and invisible, but nonetheless crippling and fatal, the family said in a statement that spoke of his struggles with depression and PTSD after six years and three tours of duty in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Just as she did when she and the family struggled to find the right way and words to describe the loss of her son, Williams has continued to consider the cause of his death. His PTSD and the mental health issues that medicines and other interventions failed to help those were merely symptoms, torturous as they were, of what really ailed him. Instead, his mother believed: What finally cost him his life was the traumatic brain injury he suffered after the Army sharpshooters multiple deployments. Even in his final letter to his family, which she read aloud to me at her dining room table, he spoke about it.

Im so sorry for doing this to you, Hadley wrote. I am so grateful to have been born into a loving, strong family.

Sadly Im not as strong as you may think I am. I have endured for as long as I could. My brain feels as though its swelling within my head. My ankles do not support my weight causing me to lose balance often and my heart my heart feels as though there is a black hole in the center of it sucking in all positive emotions allowing them to never leave and me never truly feeling happiness.

Hadleys family knew his mental health had deteriorated after the infantryman and sharpshooter returned home in 2013. But the wounds he and so many others experience remain invisible to many, including the president of the United States.

In January, Trump announced that no Americans were harmed when Iran fired over a dozen ballistic missiles at U.S. and coalition forces in Iraq. Even after the Pentagon said 34 U.S. troops were diagnosed with concussions or traumatic brain injury following the attack, he downplayed the injuries and said compared with people with no legs and no arms, they were not very serious injuries. He only doubled down after it was recently announced that 109 U.S. troops were diagnosed with mild traumatic brain injury from the attack.

I wont be changing my mind on that, he said during an interview with Fox Business.

Veterans advocates, led by the 1.6 million member Veterans of Foreign Wars, demanded a presidential apology.

Editorial boards called Trumps comments a cruel reflection of lingering ignorance on how to treat service members of the signature wound of Americas 21st century wars. Since 2000, more than 400,000 troops have been diagnosed with versions of traumatic brain injury, many of them as a result to being exposed to blasts.

The father of Ryan Larkin, a Navy SEAL in Iraq and Afghanistan who took his life at 29 at his parents home in 2017, wrote a letter to Trump about the invisible wounds his son sustained. Frank Larkin stood beside Trump last year when the president signed an executive order to prevent veteran suicides.

He called the presidents comments a hard hit to the gut.

Williams has some choice words, too. But her focus now is on honoring her son by trying to save other men and women who so valiantly fight and die for a country that mostly just gives lip service to supporting its troops.

Leaving you for the fourth and final time is incredibly hard, Hadley wrote in that final letter to his family. Know that at my end I am finally able to find peace.

Helen Ubinas is a columnist for the Philadelphia Inquirer.

Read the original here:
Helen Ubinas: Trump insists no troops were injured in Iraq, but one vet's final words show the true cost of war - Richmond County Daily Journal

What will this reorganization of tasks in Iraq mean?

The ministers decided that the NATO mission will expand, mainly in the form of taking over training missions. NATO is currently training Iraqi soldiers and advising security and defense ministry structures. These mandates will be revisited to determine what else NATO could take over that would fit inside its current mandate.

Strictly training?

Yes, strictly just training, an advisory role. All of it should reinforce Iraq's ability to ensure its own security.

It still seems like just a flag change. Why is it necessary? U.S. President Donald Trump wanted NATO to play a bigger role. Is that the reason? Or perhaps it's tied to Iraq's reactions following events in January, the drone strike?

It has been said for a while that the U.S.-led mission should change because the fight against Daesh (ISIS) is constantly changing. Such plans have existed for some time. I believe that it was simply found now that NATO should do a little more. NATO ministers agreed and also found that threats emanating from the south are considerable and should be addressed to a greater degree.

To what extent could the wish of the U.S. president have been a factor?

I believe it was definitely a factor. USA clearly wants to reshape these things a little, its participation in various operations, missions. It might not mean they want to do less. I believe they just want to reshape things to have a more sensible system.

Is it true the NATO mission is only possible because of the U.S. mission that ensures the safety of all these advisers?

Yes, that's just how it is. The American-led mission that goes well beyond the scope of the NATO mission ensures security, with the Iraqi security forces also contributing, and NATO cannot remain there alone, nor has it been discussed. Whenever we've talked to Iraq, it has always been clear that the U.S. coalition must remain together with the NATO coalition they are either together in Iraq or they leave together. NATO could not handle it alone as its role is that of training and advise, not combat activity.

During the defense ministerial, it was also said that we will remain in Iraq only for as long as they want us there. At the same time, the Iraqi parliament has voted and sought the departure of the U.S.-led coalition. How welcome are the coalition and NATO in Iraq really?

The secretary general [of NATO] has spoken to the Iraqi PM on a couple of occasions and the Iraqi side has said very clearly that they want NATO to remain in Iraq and continue training because they realize that they can never ensure their own security otherwise. Today, we have confirmation that NATO is very welcome.

What does all of this hold for Estonia, both in the broader sense and for our Defense Forces members participating in these missions?

Estonia is participating in both Iraq missions the U.S.-led Inherent Resolve and the NATO training mission. It has been said that we will be continuing in both missions this year. But time will tell. It is impossible to say today which functions will be transferred and how. It might affect us, while it also might not.

But I think we are not an exception here. All other allies are in more or less the same situation today. We must simply wait for the military analysis by local defense forces. NATO structures are also analyzing would be feasible and what not. We must exhibit some patience and see.

Do we have any idea when NATO will be able to continue its mission the one that is currently on hold?

We also don't know that for the time being. // Everyone agreed to temporarily pulling out from there, while everyone is also saying it's temporary. But when exactly will the commanders there be certain everyone can return, that it's safer now even though the situation is always unstable there we cannot say today.

--

Download the ERR News app for Android and iOS now and never miss an update!

Follow this link:
Estonian ambassador to NATO: Alliance in Iraq not feasible without USA - ERR News