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To understand the likely and unlikely outcomes of Iraqs early parliamentary elections, scheduled for October, we need to understand both who is running and who is voting. Although these early elections were an answer to thedemandsof the October 2019 protest movement, they are likely to be boycotted by the same activists who demanded them due to an inhospitable pre-electoral environment. The impact of the boycotts will be tempered by the formal and informal coalitions being formed among established political parties but will likely result in outcomessimilar to the previous elections in 2018.

Among the established party leaders in Iraq, only former Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi and Ammar al-Hakim have formally formed a coalition, the Power of the National State Coalition. Al-Hakim, who is both a cleric and a politician, formerly headed the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq before breaking away from it to establish the National Wisdom Movement (al-Hikma), claiming to be a civic rather than Islamist party.

The informal coalitions, expected to form post-hoc, arebetweenMuqtada al-Sadrs movement and Massoud Barzanis Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) andbetweenHadi al-Ameris Fateh coalition and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), co-led by Lahur and Bafel Talabani. While the former may style themselves as the anti-Iran coalition, both al-Sadr and the Barzanis enjoy close ties to Iran. Al-Sadr is a populist cleric with a cult-like following and a reputation for being politically inconsistent. In Iraqs 2018 elections, his Sairoon alliance won the most seats, largely due to low voter turnout as a result of the boycott movement. Mohammed al-Halbousi, the current speaker of parliament, is expected to align with them. Such a coalition would be disastrous for the already waning freedom of speech in Iraq, as both theSadristsand the KDP have been known tocurtail freedoms.

For these established parties and big-name politicians, Iraqs new and smallerelectoral districts a demand of the 2019 protests means that they are less inclined to run many candidates, but rather to focus on the districts in which they can win. This has resulted in aprecipitous dropin the number of candidates registered from 7,178 candidates in 2018 down to 3,532 parties in 2021. The ability to win at the provincial level, but not district level, will deter some party leaders from running for office. Though this is a positive development, it comes with repercussions including the fear amongst activists that they are easier to target when running in smaller communities.

Indeed, Iraqs current security environment presents one of the greatest obstacles to political participation. Since the end of the October 2019 protest movement,violenceagainst activists has gone from indiscriminate killings to targeted assassinations. One of the key unmet demands of the protest movement has been justice for killed protestors and activists. Prime Minister Mustafa al-Kadhimis failure to provide justice triggered nation-wide protests under the slogan of Who Killed Me? The death of Kerbala-based activist, Ihab al-Wazni inspired many of Iraqs new protest political parties to declare a boycott of the elections. Conceivably, these aspiring politicians may fear aMexico-like situation, where candidates are killed ahead of elections with impunity.

The Iraqi Communist Party (ICP) has joined the ranks of the boycotters, despite running alongside the Sadrists in the 2018 elections. In an article, the head of the ICP hasexplainedthat the elections are being boycotted to strip the government of legitimacy. He writes that the scheduled elections do not reflect the demands of the protestors, particularly not the legal changes required, nor the appropriate security environment, nor the independence of the electoral commission. Many of the protest-based partiesagreed with his argument, though some are still debating the merits of boycott and considering running for office.

Protest by parties must be distinguished from public boycott. Of course, protest-based parties and elite activists have a role to play in setting public discourse, but they are not the only molders of public opinion. A key player is Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, who may issue a statement on the elections that may encourage people to vote (as in2005) or may leave the choice to them and thereby create space for boycott (as in2018). It will take extreme public unrest for al-Sistani to issue such a statement and he will do it while balancing his own credibility with his dedication to protecting the existing legal and constitutional mechanisms. In addition to al-Sistani, the United Nations has unexpectedly agreedto the Iraqi governments request for further electoral assistance by providing election-day monitoring. They have expressed their intention to communicate their role with the Iraqi public, which is crucial as many activists have expressed a demand forinternational oversightto ensure electoral integrity.

In a scenario where the public and protest-parties both boycott, the likely outcome is a division between the two major Shia parties the Sadrists and Fateh and their respective Kurdish party allies. This will lead to familiar negotiations on a compromise candidate as prime minister, which can result in either a weak independent (like Adil Abd al-Mahdi or Mustafa al-Kadhimi) or a politically-backed one who is viewed as being too implicated in the political order. The presidency, as it often has, will likely go to the PUK whose co-president has recently announced hissupport for the reelection of President Barham Salih, arguably the candidate with the most political leverage in Baghdad. Despite al-Halbousis expected electoral success in a district in Anbar, no speaker of parliament has had more than a term and his predecessor, Salim al-Jibouri, was not even able to hold his seat in parliament after.

If there are no boycotts, the pieces of the pie for these established parties will be smaller and the negotiations for the premiership may take longer. The results, unfortunately, will not likely be different for the three high offices. Where things will change will be in parliament, where new parties may be able to negotiate more. But the most we can hope for in such a scenario is incremental change, over years, through parliament.

Until then, there is always the chance of protests in Iraq. So long as old underlying grievances (poor service, unemployment, corruption) and new grievances (no justice for the killed and a decline in freedom of speech) exist, any match may ignite protests.

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Iraqs upcoming elections: Voters and likely winners - Brookings Institution

On June 17, after almost a decade of trying, the U.S. House of Representatives voted by a substantial bipartisan margin to repeal the 2002 Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF), which permitted the invasion of Iraq, the ouster of Saddam Hussein, and subsequent multiyear operations to stabilize the country. For some, the repeal (which still requires Senate action) will fulfill a long-sought desire to reduce commitments to an Iraq that they see as a lost cause. For others, it will be the final nail in the coffin of a feckless effort to transform Iraq into a functional and prosperous democracy.

Common as these beliefs may be, they do not reflect the reality on the ground. Repealing the AUMF is little more than a symbolic stepbut Americans should be careful not to misinterpret its practical meaning. Iraq is not lost. At least not yet.

On June 17, after almost a decade of trying, the U.S. House of Representatives voted by a substantial bipartisan margin to repeal the 2002 Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF), which permitted the invasion of Iraq, the ouster of Saddam Hussein, and subsequent multiyear operations to stabilize the country. For some, the repeal (which still requires Senate action) will fulfill a long-sought desire to reduce commitments to an Iraq that they see as a lost cause. For others, it will be the final nail in the coffin of a feckless effort to transform Iraq into a functional and prosperous democracy.

Common as these beliefs may be, they do not reflect the reality on the ground. Repealing the AUMF is little more than a symbolic stepbut Americans should be careful not to misinterpret its practical meaning. Iraq is not lost. At least not yet.

Neither the bravery of Iraqs protesters seeking political and economic reform nor the gambits of the countrys handful of well-meaning leaders have righted Iraqs course. Corruption is too pervasive. Iraqs nominal allies are too capricious. And as always, Irans minions are too powerful, so much so that even the best of Iraqs leaders, judges, soldiers, and police officers are frightened of personal retribution for merely doing their jobs. Outside actorsmostly in Iran, some in Turkeyare intent on ensuring that Iraqis always walk a tightrope, afraid a misstep will be their last, doubtful that even the promised safety nets will be there. The only entity that might conceivably turn Iraq around is the United States, but both the costs of COVID-19 and the pervasiveness of an Iraq-as-latter-day-Vietnam narrative seem likely to drain any appetite in the Biden administration to reinforce Iraqs foundations.

Fortunately, the United States can count on Iraqis bearing most of the burden themselves. Indeed, the AUMF on its way to repeal is no longer relevant to the work needed of Washington in Iraq. Any necessary U.S. military operations would likely fall under the 2001 AUMF, which governs al Qaeda and thus the Islamic State and related groups. (No president has invoked the Iraq AUMF for operations in more than a decade.)

Rather, there is yet another path forwardpatient, light-footed, and constantthat could mean a better Iraq for Iraqis and for the United States in the future. It would be an Iraq that could benefit the long-term bipartisan goalas reflected in the push to repeal the AUMFof ending the perennial U.S. wars in the Middle East and stabilizing or even neutralizing the regions most entropic forces.

For its part, the Biden administration insists that it will not repeat either of its predecessors foreign-policy errors and that, on Iraq, it has learned the lesson that unilateral retreat is a mistake. Indeed, it was Joe Biden himself as Barack Obamas vice president who oversaw the disastrous 2011 withdrawal that laid the groundwork for the rise of the Islamic State. And at the very least, it appears clear that Bidens own administration doesnt hope for a replay. As a result, Bidens national security team has already taken some important steps to cooperate closely with Baghdad: The first Middle East leader that Biden called as president was Iraqi Prime Minister Mustafa al-Kadhimi, and the administration has already held a meeting of the U.S.-Iraq Strategic Dialogue in Washington, where Biden put in an appearance. Another session is already in the works.

These are good steps, but they are only a beginning. Winning the long game in Iraq comes down to three simple propositions: It means building up Americas influence over time to bolster U.S. leverage. It means weakening Iran in Iraq as much as possible to increase the cost of Iranian interference, eventually making it difficult to resist Iraqi, and eventually U.S., efforts to rebuff Iranian rule. And it means patiently waiting and taking advantage of opportunitiesseizing them to strengthen indigenous Iraqi forces.

To make those propositions work, however, the United States has to be prepared to stay in the game. Iran has proved an ability to play even a weak hand well, but what has given Tehran that edge is that its agents come to work every day. Thus, the entire U.S. national security apparatus must steel itself to remain engaged in Iraq come what may, including whenever the United States inevitably loses tactical battles to Iran or corrupt Iraqis. At present, there are only a few thousand U.S. troops in country, virtually all of them training, advising, and providing logistical and intelligence support to the Iraqi security forces. Another contingent provides security for the rest, while only a tiny fraction supports direct action against the remnants of the Islamic State.

Since former U.S. President Donald Trump ordered the killing of Iranian paramilitary leader Qassem Suleimani and his principal Iraqi cats-paw, Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, Iran has made it a priority to force U.S. troops out of Iraq. Yet it is clear that the ousting of U.S. troops is an Iranian, not an Iraqi, priority. Most Iraqis support U.S. troops remaining, whether because they see them as a path to a more professional Iraqi military or because they are viewed as a critical check on Irans free rein.

Except for Irans most servile lackeys, Iraqis uniformly suggest that rebranding the U.S. military mission is all they need to justify retaining it despite the Iraqi parliaments vote to expel U.S. forces last year. This should be easy and even easier if the AUMF is ultimately repealed. It will mean stating that no U.S. troops have a combat mission in Iraq. It might also mean forgoing operations against the Islamic State from Iraqi soil, but that is a small price to pay. At this point, chasing down the dregs of the Islamic State can be the lowest priority for U.S. troops in Iraq given that terrorist organizations currently fragmented and weak state.

What must become a higher priority for U.S. military forces, by contrast, is the basic protection of Iraqi political leaders. One of the hardest problems that well-intentioned Iraqi leaders like Kadhimi, President Barham Salih, and others have faced when trying to curtail corruption and the Iranian-backed militias is the threat of violent retaliation against them and their families. Iraqi security force commanders are under similar threat, aimed at dissuading them from discharging their constitutionally mandated responsibilities to protect the government, following legitimate orders, and arresting Iranian proxies or other criminals. Washington has assured Baghdad that it would provide military supportif requestedin precisely these instances. That is important, and that commitment needs to be resourced and maintained, but it is not enough.

Iraqi leaders need for protection isnt an easy problem to solve. Because U.S. forces are not present in Iraqs cities anymore, militias, criminals, and foreign proxies have a clearer path to strike independent politicians. Greater intelligence cooperation can always help (though the United States is already anteing up what it knows), but real progress may require a greater show of force by U.S. security forces and closer cooperation with Iraqi leaders. In Lebanon, leaders have been killed with impunity for decades without fear of justice or retribution, and that has consistently undermined any revival of democracy or the rule of law; the United States has an interest in ensuring this pattern is not repeated in Iraq.

One of the most useful ways that the United States could expand its outreach to Iraq and build on its comparative advantage is to put greater emphasis on economic ties. Iraqis routinely complain that the United States is too focused on security issues and not enough on economic matters. Washington provides almost half a billion dollars annually in various forms of assistance critical to Iraqi defense and development. But Iraqis also want more trade, technical expertise, and other forms of purely economic aid. In short, many seek not handouts but deeper economic engagement, and there are numerous ways the United States could show that it recognizes this.

For instance, although the current strategic dialogue between Washington and Baghdad includes economic considerations, the name implies a security preoccupation. One easy fix would be to hive off the economic elements into a separate U.S.-Iraq Economic Dialogue. More useful still would be to create a standing U.S.-Iraq Joint Commission on Economic Cooperation modeled on the U.S.-Saudi committee of the same name. The latter was established in the 1970s to enable American economic and financial experts to help Riyadh effectively use its oil wealth to modernize. The money was all Saudi; what the United States brought was its know-how, its connections, and its integrity. The commission was instrumental in building roads, airports, factories, petrochemical facilities, and even entire cities like Yanbu and Jubayl.

It would be up to the Iraqi government to bring project proposals to such a Joint Commission on Economic Cooperation. From the U.S. perspective, the ideal system would simply require all projects referred to the Joint Commission to comply with American anti-corruption regulations.

Finally, the United States must overcome its usual reticence in managing democratic backsliding among aid recipients and allies and aggressively call out Iraqi violations of democratic norms. The United States midwifed Iraqi democracy, such as it is, and cannot wholly abdicate its responsibility. Indeed, one of Americas worst moments came in 2010, when Washington failed to call out the theft of Iraqs national elections. The catastrophic slide of Iraqi politics into renewed sectarian civil war in 2014 was in part an outcome of that mistake.

Washingtons historic role still carries weight with Iraqs public and politicians. The United States should also be willing to suspend various forms of economic and diplomatic support when Iraqi leaders undermine their own democracy. By the same token, when Iraq takes positive steps that foster good governance, the United States should stand ready to increase aid, even by small amounts. Iraqis need to believe that taking the risks to do the right things will be recognized and rewarded, especially by the United States.

All of this together can slow Iraqs decline, but it is unlikely to reverse it. As has remained true over the last 18 years, Iraq has the elements of a workable democratic state and a prosperous economy. American mistakes and Iranian malevolence have made those goals far more difficult to reach. But they are not unattainable if the United States works with honorable Iraqis to steady its course forward.

This may not seem a rousing call to arms, but it is a realistic path forward through the difficult circumstances that the United States and its Iraqi allies now find themselves in. More importantly, it will advance the Middle East to a place where military intervention is not the sole hope for freedom and prosperity.

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Biden Is Midwife of the Next Iraq - Foreign Policy

Just when it looked like Iraq was becoming a regional leader it decided to halt a $2 billion pre-paid oil supply deal with China's state-owned Zhenhua Oil Co. despite aims to strengthen ties with China.

Iraq decided to end a deal with Zhenhua and sell its crude supply to other customers as oil prices continue to rise. The deal with the Chinese company, that was agreed upon earlier this year, would have seen 4 billion bpd of oil supplied each month. The oil was expected to be destination free, meaning Zhenhua could sell it to other companies.

However, government officials in Iraq are making the countrys budget priority clear as the State Organization for Marketing of Oil (SOMO) deputy director-general Ali al-Shatari stated, "For the time being we may say it is not applicable at this stage because of oil prices, which are high and we are in a better position and we are even generating additional profits in excess of what the Iraqi budget needs."

The end of the Zhenhua deal follows recent announcements of big oil backing away from Iraq. Earlier this month, oil super-major, BP, said it wanted to change its operations in Iraqs supergiant Rumaila oil field, to create a stand-alone company.

U.S. super-major ExxonMobilannounced its intention to withdraw from Iraqs West Qurna 1 oil field. And Royal Dutch Shell got out long ago, ceasing operations in Iraqs supergiant Majnoon oil field in 2017 and West Qurna 1 in 2018.

Related: U.S. Agrees To Lift Iran Oil Sanctions There are several reasons for the Western supermajors exit from Iraq, including the movement away from traditional oil and gas towards low-carbon projects, persistent corruption in Iraqs oil industry, and Chinas dominance of Iraqi oil.

However, we mustnt overlook the fact that oil prices in Iraq have been steadily increasing since the beginning of the year, as the government promises higher export levels. SOMOs crude was going for $65.842 a barrel in May, up 23.5% from January. And now Iraq is expecting as much as $80 a barrel, although no timeframe has been given for this confident prediction.

Iraqs oil exports have been strong in 2021, as the third-largest oil exporter to China, after Saudi Arabia and Russia, and the top supplier to India last month. Iraq has been setting its sights on China and India, as oil demand from the two Asian giants looks set to continue well into the next decade.

As the countrys Basrah Medium crude grows in popularity and production picks up after a recent agreement with OPEC+ on supply, export levels will steadily increase throughout the rest of the year. Iraq exported 1.013 million bpd of Basrah Medium in May, up from 891,000 bpd exported in January, around a 14% increase.

OPEC restrictions on output had limited Iraqs oil exports, but the easing of these constraints will allow Iraq to produce 4.016 million bpd in July, an increase from 3.954 million bpd in June and 3.905 million bpd in May.

Related: Rising Demand Closes The Gap Between WTI And Brent Prices

But Iraq will have to maintain its competitive position in the market if it wants to maintain its regional reputation as a key oil and gas exporter, with neighboring Iran expected to take center stage upon a nuclear agreement with the U.S.

Just this week, Iran announced that the U.S. had agreed to remove all oil sanctions on Iran, although Washington has not yet confirmed this move. If this were true, it would unlock Irans 208.6 billion barrels of proven oil reserves, allowing it to become a major international player once again.

As Iraq focuses its exports on China and India, following the distancing of Western supermajors from the country, it will have to foster these relationships well if it wants to maintain its competitive edge in the region before Irans oil operations get back into full swing.

By Felicity Bradstock for Oilprice.com

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Why Did Iraq Pull The Plug On Its $2 Billion Oil Deal With China - OilPrice.com

A bomb-laden drone" attacked US forces at a base near Baghdad International Airport, according to sources in Iraq. This area is called Victory Base and has been targeted in the past. Official disputed the pro-Iranian claims, saying news of the attack was disinformation. The area allegedly targeted is called "Victory Base" by pro-Iranian groups and media, and has been targeted in the past. In fact Camp Victory closed down in December 2011 when Operation Iraqi Freedom ended. What is now at the Baghdad airport is the Department of State operated Baghdad Diplomatic Support Center (BDSC). Hundreds of US and coalition troops are co located at the BDSC.

Drone attacks on US forces in Iraq have been rapidly increasing over the last months. There are believed to have been 45 attacks this year on US forces in Iraq, and around seven of them have involved drones.

On Sunday, rockets were reportedly fired at US forces at Ain al-Asad Airbase in Iraq.

Sabereen News, a Telegram news channel associated with the Iraqi Popular Mobilization Units, better known as Hashd al-Shaabi, reported that two fixed-wing combat drones laden with explosives had struck targets inside Victory base early on Tuesday, Irans Press TV reported.

The report added that C-RAM systems as well as AN/TWQ-1 Avenger missile systems deployed at the base were not able to intercept the aircraft, Press TV reported.

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Press TV reported the attack on Tuesday, when it appears it happened on Monday.

The development came less than two days after an unnamed Iraqi security force said a Katyusha rocket had landed at Ain al-Asad Airbase in Iraqs western province of Anbar, located about 160 km. west of the capital Baghdad, without causing casualties, the report said.

The drone attack is the latest use of drones, which pro-Iranian militias have increasingly displayed at military parades. A drone was used to attack a secret CIA hangar at an airport in Erbil, according to reports in April. There have been numerous other attacks.

The US has reduced its footprint in Iraq in the last year and a half, with US forces only at a few locations, such as Victory and Union III in Baghdad, near the US Embassy, and at al-Asad and Erbil. All these locations have come under attack, as well as US contractors at Balad Air Base.

The US returned to Iraq in 2014 to help fight ISIS. However, tensions with Iran have led to calls for the US to leave. Those calls began to increase in 2017 and have rapidly grown.

Iran has moved drones and ballistic missiles to Iraq in recent years. Drones have been flown from Iraq to attack Saudi Arabia, and Iraq is a conduit for weapons trafficking to Syria and then on to Hezbollah.

During Operation Guardian of the Walls, the May conflict between Israel and Hamas, a drone piloted from Iraq or Syria flew into Israeli airspace. Hamas used Iranian-style drones to try to attack Israel. The Iron Dome air-defense system shot at least one of them down.

On Monday, Israel showcased a new laser that can be used to shoot down drones, although it will take years for it to become operational.

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Drone attack said to target US forces in Iraq - The Jerusalem Post

WASHINGTON (AP) The Democratic-led House, with President Joe Biden's backing, passed legislation Thursday to repeal the 2002 authorization for use of military force in Iraq, a step that supporters said was necessary for Congress to reassert its constitutional duty to weigh in on matters of war. Detractors worried it would embolden militias or terrorist groups.

The repeal was passed overwhelmingly, 268-161. Forty-nine Republicans voted for the bill. Only one Democrat, Rep. Elaine Luria of Virginia, voted against it. In the Senate, Majority Leader Chuck Schumer, D-N.Y., intends to bring the measure to the floor this year.

Supporters said repeal would not affect U.S. military operations around the world, but could prevent a president from relying on the 2002 authorization to conduct unrelated military actions. The White House says there are no ongoing military activities reliant solely upon that authorization.

The authorization was directed against the government of Iraq's Saddam Hussein, authorizing the necessary and appropriate use of force to defend U.S. national security against the continuing threat posed by Iraq and to enforce all relevant" U.N. Security Council resolutions regarding Iraq.

Repeal is crucial because the executive branch has a history of stretching" the authorization's legal authority, said Democratic Rep. Gregory Meeks of New York, chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee. It has already been used as justification for military actions against entities that had nothing to do with Saddam Hussein's Baathist dictatorship simply because such entities were operating in Iraq."

Rep. Michael McCaul, R-Texas, said he agreed the authorization was outdated, but he argued that Congress should not repeal it without also approving a replacement.

We should not encourage any president to go it alone without Article I congressional authorization," McCaul said.

The action follows years of debate over whether Congress has ceded too much of its war-making authority to the White House. Many lawmakers, particularly Democrats, say passage of the 2002 authorization was a mistake, and some Republicans agree the authority should be taken off the books. Some lawmakers say the 2001 resolution to fight terrorism, passed after the attacks of Sept. 11, 2001, should be reexamined as well.

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As a senator in 2002, Biden voted for the resolution that President George W. Bush used to invade Iraq the following year. Biden was not considered a leading critic of that 2003 military operation at the time, despite his claims as a presidential candidate in 2020.

Biden faced considerable criticism for the vote during the Democratic primary campaign. He and his aides, including now-Secretary of State Tony Blinken, initially defended the vote by saying the Bush administration wanted more leverage against Hussein and that Biden hadnt intended his vote as a blank check. Biden eventually called the resolution a mistake.

Democratic Rep. Barbara Lee of California, the bills sponsor, said that 87% of the current members of the House were not in Congress in 2002 and that the authorization for military force passed at that time bears no correlation to the threats the nation faces today. She also was the lone vote against the 2001 auhtorization following Sept. 11.

To this day, our endless war continues costing trillions of dollars and thousands of lives in a war that goes way beyond any scope that Congress conceived or intended, Lee said.

Schumer had said on Wednesday that the Iraq War has been over for nearly a decade and that the authorization passed in 2002 is no longer necessary in 2021.

The White House said Biden is committed to working with Congress to update the authorization with a narrow and specific framework appropriate to ensure that we can continue to protect Americans from terrorist threats."

Schumer said he wanted to be clear that legislation terminating the use of force in Iraq does not mean the U.S. is abandoning the country and the shared fight against the Islamic State group. He said the measure would eliminate the possibility of a future administration reaching back into the legal dustbin to use it as a justification for military adventurism.

He cited the Washington-directed drone strike that killed Iranian Gen. Qassim Soleimani in January 2020 as an example.

The Trump administration said Soleimani was plotting a series of attacks that endangered many American troops and officials across the Middle East. The national security adviser at the time, Robert OBrien, told reporters that President Donald Trump exercised Americas right to self-defense and that the strike was a fully authorized action under the 2002 authorization to use military force.

There is no good reason to allow this legal authority to persist in case another reckless commander in chief tries the same trick in the future, Schumer said.

In the Senate, key lawmakers are working on a bill that would repeal not only the 2002 authorization, but also the 1991 authorization for use of force in Iraq, which remains on the books. The 1991 authorization gave President George H.W. Bush the authority to use force against Iraq to enforce a series of Security Council resolutions passed in response to Iraqs invasion of Kuwait.

The Senate and House would have to work out any differences in their bills and vote on a final product before it can go to Biden's desk to be signed into law.

In the end, legislation terminating the 2002 authorization will need 60 votes in an evenly divided Senate to overcome procedural hurdles. Sen. James Inhofe, R-Okla., the ranking Republican on the Senate Armed Services Committee, said he opposes the effort to terminate the authorization.

We used it to get Soleimani and there might be another Soleimani out there," Inhofe said.

___

Associated Press writer Bill Barrow in Atlanta contributed to this report.

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House votes to repeal 2002 Iraq War authorization