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Baghdad, Iraq, 31 May 2020 Since the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic, the World Health Organization (WHO) has fought the pandemic with every tool at its disposal to save lives and support countries with limited COVID-19 response capacity, including Iraq.

WHO and Iraqi health authorities proactively coordinated a comprehensive response to the pandemic as early as January 2020. WHO Iraq scaled up the countrys readiness and response operations mechanism, as well as its pandemic preparedness plan of action.

The Government of Iraq, with the full support of WHO, mobilized resources at an early stage of the pandemic to contain its transmission, said Dr Adham R. Ismail, WHO Representative in Iraq. National, regional and local authorities implemented strong measures to reduce the number of cases and suppress the rapid spread of the virus.

Before Iraqs first COVID-19 case was reported on 24 February 2020, WHO coordinated with several important actions taken by the Ministry of Health at both central and regional level. These early actions included enhancing coordination and planning among all stakeholders and partners at national and international levels, communicating with communities about the risks and how people could protect themselves, and ensuring capacity was in place to find, isolate, test, trace every contact, and treat every case.

On 9 March, a joint technical team from the WHO Regional Office and WHO headquarters arrived in Iraq to assess the capacity of the Iraqi Ministry of Health and health facilities on disease detection and case management. The team provided guidance to address gaps and improve the health measures taken by the government. Designated hospitals were prepared to respond to a potential spike in cases, and health workers were trained on infection prevention and case management.

WHO support to the national health authorities also included active surveillance, situation assessment and analysis, and awareness-raising sessions targeting first-line staff at border points and airports. 1800 Ministry of Health mobile teams carried out social mobilization campaigns and distributed WHO awareness material all over Iraq.

Rapid response teams were mobilized to carry out country-wide awareness raising, contact tracing, and testing activities, including disseminating infection prevention and control messages and guidelines.

Case management and continuity of essential services, in addition to logistics, procurement and supply management were among the priority actions.

The provision of laboratory services was also a focus. Direct cooperation between WHO and the COVID-19 Crisis Cell of Basra University succeeded in April 2020 in producing urgently-needed laboratory supplies to speed up the testing of suspected cases. This significant achievement was later replicated by other countries in the Region.

WHO lead a series of activities encouraging adherence to the lockdown and avoidance of mass gatherings that could lead to an increase in the numbers of cases. In March, the WHO Representative visited the religious Supreme Seminary in Najaf and recommended the postponement of religious gatherings. WHO commends the stance of the Supreme Seminary in support of WHO and Ministry of Health recommendations and commends its positive response in encouraging the people of Iraq people to follow health preventive measures and recommendations, said Dr Ismail.

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Early COVID-19 preparation saved lives in Iraq - Iraq - ReliefWeb

After five months and two failed attempts, Iraq has a new prime minister. Mustafa al-Kadhimis appointment offers the country the prospect of some respite after months of political paralysis and mass social unrest since October 2019. The unrest has rocked the political class, and has been compounded by the COVID-19 pandemic, the dramatic decline in oil prices, and tensions between the U.S. and Iran.

Tensions between the U.S. and Iraq have simmered since Americas assassination of Iranian commander Qassem Soleimani and Iraqi commander Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis on Iraqi soil in January. The U.S. has become increasingly frustrated with Baghdads failure to control militia groups that answer to Iran, and Irans use of Iraq as a conduit to circumvent or mitigate the economic impact of Washingtons maximum pressure campaign. Washington upped the pressure on Iraq by reducing the duration of sanctions waivers that allow Iraq to import electricity from Iran. President Trump even threatened to impose sanctions on Baghdad and withhold access to Iraqi reserve funds if Irans proxies continue to attack U.S. forces with impunity.

Amidst these tensions, Washington and Baghdad have an opportunity to reset their relationship via a U.S.-Iraq strategic dialogue next month. Here is how the U.S. should approach it:

1Cultivate long-term relations with certain key components of the PMF, rather than ask Iraq to disband it altogether.

The Popular Mobilization Force (PMF) is a 100,000-strong umbrella militia organization. It is dominated and commanded by Irans proxies, but comprised of disparate factions and its ascendance has frustrated Washington. The fight against ISIS brought a sense of unity and purpose to the PMF, but it is now in disarray following the withdrawal of factions aligned with Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, Iraqs leading Shiite clergyman. Like Sistani, these groups have lamented that Irans proxies have effectively used the PMF as a front to further their own ambitions.

Their withdrawal presents an opening for the U.S. to cultivate closer ties to the Sistani-aligned factions. Washington should not ask Iraq to disband the PMF wholesale a demand Baghdad couldnt satisfy given the PMFs power in Iraqi institutions and politics. Instead, Washington should work with the prime minister to provide direct military support and training to more preferred groups to help shift the balance of power in their favor. Providing these weapons should be conditional on not letting them end up in the hands of Iran-aligned factions and, critically, on them not being used against U.S. allies in the future. The now-open splits suggest that state-aligned PMF factions could be amenable to developing closer ties to outside actors like the U.S., either through direct bilateral engagements or indirectly through Kadhimi. Elevating and empowering them will provide Kadhimi with a much-needed buffer against Iran-aligned groups who would otherwise be too powerful to contain. The U.S. could help Kadhimi leverage divisions to re-balance the relationship between the state and Irans proxies.

2Dont expect Baghdad to rein in Irans proxies (yet).

The good news for the U.S. is that Irans proxies have suffered a number of chinks in their armour since the protest movement emerged and since the assassination of Soleimani and al-Muhandis, which has resulted in a leadership void that has thrown Irans proxy network into disarray. Irans proxies have been implicated in the violence against protesters, which has diminished their social legitimacy and popular support. This could have a far-reaching impact, since their ascendancy is linked to their ability to attract popular support. The withdrawal of the Sistani factions from the PMF also diminishes the power of Iran-aligned factions.

However, the Iraqi armed forces are stretched and focused on containing the resurgence of ISIS and other militant groups, in addition to curtailing tribal and other local conflicts. Kadhimi, meanwhile, is still new and does not yet have a strong political base. At this point, attempting to rein in resource-rich and battle-hardened militias with strong backing from Iran will bring more costs than benefits to a war-fatigued country.

3Help Kadhimi on governance issues, but dont try to rebuild the Iraqi state.

The U.S. has to come to terms with the reality that rebuilding Iraqs institutions in the current environment would likely benefit Iran. Washington has traditionally preferred to play the long game, adopting a comprehensive approach to rebuilding Iraqs institutions. But that poses difficulties in the current political environment, in light of Irans influence and the fact that Iraqi politicians must first get their own house in order i.e. establish a consensus on critical and domestic foreign policy decisions, like whether they want the U.S. in the country.

Instead, Washington could focus on nearer-term opportunities. One possible win which could ultimately help prop up the Iraqi economy and state-building projects in the longer-term could be achieved within the Iraqi Ministry of Finance. It is led by a capable Iraqi technocrat and statesman, Ali Allawi, who appreciates the necessity of continued U.S. support. Washington should work to empower him, by helping to establish a modern banking and finance infrastructure, continuing to extend Iraqs sanctions waiver, and enabling increased financial assistance from the International Monetary Fund and World Bank and help Iraq restructure its debts.

4Leverage the Kurdistan region

The longer Kadhimi is able to keep his head above the water over the coming months, the greater his prospects of protecting U.S. interests. But he cannot do it alone. Baghdad has multiple centers of power that constrain his ability to forge and enforce policies, especially where these are at odds with the policies of the array of powerful political blocs and militia leaders.

Washington should work to enhance the political influence of the Kurds in Baghdad and the stability in the Kurdistan region, where the U.S. has a sizable presence. The U.S. should empower the Kurds on the assumption that it may have to one day withdraw from Iraq before it has secured key U.S. interests, after which it would need to turn to the Kurds to either relocate its forces to the Kurdistan region or use it as a conduit through which to secure vital U.S. interests in other parts of Iraq. In the nearer term, the U.S. can ensure the Kurdistan Regional Government does not succumb to its financial crisis and disputes with Baghdad. That will preserve and reinforce one of the very few cards the U.S. has in Baghdad.

5and dont ignore your friends.

Since 2011, the U.S. has been its own worst enemy in Iraq. It has been a bystander as U.S.-aligned Arab Sunni factions have been marginalized and suppressed. Components of the Shiite political class, historically averse to closer ties with Iran, have had no choice but to embrace Tehran as it filled a void. In 2017, the U.S. opposed the Kurdish independence referendum but then stood by as Irans proxies, armed with U.S. weapons supplied to the Iraqi government, fought and defeated the Peshmerga in Kirkuk.

The U.S. and its allies do not have to agree on everything, but Washington should avoid steps that significantly weaken the standing of its allies or enable pathways for expanded influence of its rivals. Irans partners prosper because Tehran treats attacks on its allies as attacks on Iran, and mediates disputes between them. The U.S. should do the same for its own allies.

6Cultivate relationships with the next generation of Iraqi leaders.

Iraqs current crop of political leaders largely lack a sense of purpose, unity, and urgency to address the countrys long-term challenges. The current government is effectively a transitional government, a crisis government with two key objectives: steer the country away from the abyss and hold elections that can restore its legitimacy.

Washington should focus and encourage leaders in Baghdad to focus on engaging and enabling the next generation of capable, reform-minded Iraqi leaders (including those who are currently in government and those who are engaged in grassroots politics). Opening opportunities for grassroots actors and encouraging the development of a reform-minded political class could help drive Iraqs rival camps that either want to maintain the existing political order or see it overhauled in its entirety toward compromise.

The U.S.-Iraq strategic dialogue is part of a broader process aimed at settling a series of longstanding issues. But Iraqs crises and structural challenges will outlast both the current Iraqi and U.S. administrations. Expectations should not be set too high, but as the above indicates, Washington does have options. It is possible to develop a mutually beneficial and functioning relationship, one that can also yield much needed reprieve and results for the Iraqi population.

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How the US should approach the strategic dialogue with Iraq - Brookings Institution

Mustafa al-Kadhimi, Iraqs new prime minister as of May 12, has already announced a bold intention. In a short government manifesto he submitted to the Iraqi Parliament, Kadhimi emphasized his plans to impose the states prestige by bringing armed groups under government control. To observers of post-Saddam Hussein Iraq, the manifestos meaning is clear: the damage to the states prestige has, after all, come mainly from pro-Iranian militant groups who answer to the commanders of the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), rather than to Iraqs commander in chief.

Iranian-backed Iraqi militias such as Kataib Hezbollah, Asaib Ahl al-Haq, and Kataib Sayyid al-Shuhada, among others, operate outside the jurisdiction of the Iraqi state. They are part of the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), an umbrella military organization that is nominally under Iraqi command but that in fact plays an integral part in projecting Iranian power throughout the region.

Previous Iraqi administrations tried, but ultimately failed, to limit the influence of the armed militias. Iraq's prime minister from 2014 to 2018, Haider al-Abadi, sought to bring the militias under the control of the state and to limit their political ambitions. He demanded that the militias make their spending transparent and separate their military and political wings. But in the end, Iranian-backed politicians outmaneuvered Abadi and backed his much friendlier replacement, Adel Abdul-Mahdi, who became prime minister in October 2018. Abdul-Mahdi increased the PMFs budget by 20 percent in 2019 and enabled the Iranian-backed militias to expand their presence in strategic regions, including along the Iraqi-Syrian border, across which they have moved almost freely.

Kadhimi has indicated that he has plans to end this state of affairs. Recent developments in Iraq and in the wider region suggest that the new prime minister has a much better chance than his predecessors did of curbing the militias influence and consequently, that of Iran.

A popular uprising has wracked Iraq since October 2019one that even a brutal crackdown did not manage to quell and that persisted until the spread of the novel coronavirus quieted the streets. The protesters were predominantly Shiite, and they vehemently objected to Irans meddling in their county. To show the bitter resentment that they felt toward Iran, in November 2019, some slapped their shoes against banners of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Irans supreme leader. Many did not even bother to cover their faces. Major General Qasem Soleimani, then the commander of the IRGCs expeditionary Quds Force, came in for his fair share of insults from the demonstrators, too.

The demonstrations led to the resignation of Abdul-Mahdi and, for the first time since the overthrow of Saddam Hussein in 2003, put an anti-Iranian, Shiite, national current at the center of Iraqs political landscape. The protesters demanded a sovereign state free from Iranian interference, and Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, the highest Shiite authority in the country, supported them.

Khadimi takes the reins following directly on these eventsand because of them, the new prime minister may see his way clear to limit Irans influence in the country.

Sistanis role is particularly important. Back in 2014, the Islamic State (or ISIS) wrested vast swaths of Iraqi territory from the Baghdad government, and Sistani issued a fatwa calling on all able men to take up arms and join the fight under the states security institutions. Instead, militias aligned with Iran took the opportunity to create the PMFa parallel military organization with a budget of $2.16 billion and 135,000 armed fighters. The organization has been a key element in the IRGCs plans to exert influence in Iraq and beyond.

Sistani is now actively seeking to strip militias aligned with Iran of their religious legitimacy.

Sistani is now actively seeking to strip these militias of their religious legitimacy. Under the supervision of one of the clerics close confidants, four Shiite paramilitary factions affiliated with Sistanithe Abbas Combat Division, the Imam Ali Combat Division, the Ali Akbar Brigade, and the Ansar al-Marjaiya Brigadedefected from the PMF in April and expressed their intention to help others do the same. By giving his affiliated factions the nod to secede from the PMF, Sistani is effectively withdrawing his endorsement from the factions that remain loyal to the IRGCa snub that could seriously damage the religious legitimacy of the Iranian-backed factions.

Those factions were already reeling from the U.S. airstrike that assassinated Soleimani and the PMF leader Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis in early January. The two charismatic commanders were instrumental in consolidating Irans influence in Iraq and in unifying the countrys Shiite factions. Their loss has left a void that Brigadier General Esmail Qaani, Soleimanis successor, has not been able to fill. As a result, Iraqs pro-Iranian factions occupy their weakest position in yearsjust in time for the new prime minister to begin bringing the militias under state control.

President Barham Salih can be a powerful ally to Kadhimi in this endeavor. He has taken a more active role in politics than did his predecessor, Fuad Masum, the president when Abadi attempted to bring the militas to heel. Salih even played a major part in selecting Kadhimi, enraging the pro-Iranian factions in late March when he refused to nominate their candidate for the premiership. Salih said that he would rather resign than appoint someone to the position who would be rejected by the protesters.

If there were ever a moment for Iraq to shake off Iranian influence, the time is nownot only because conditions are ripe in Iraq but because they are ripe in Iran. The administration of U.S. President Donald Trump has pursued a policy of maximum pressure against Iran that has taken a toll on the countrys ability to support its regional proxies. According to Brian Hook, U.S. Special Representative for Iran, the Islamic Republic has been forced to reduce its military spending in recent years. Anecdotal evidence backs this claim. In March 2019, Hassan Nasrallah, the leader of Lebanons Hezbollah, asked supporters to donate money, suggesting that the Iranian-supported militants were short of funds. In February 2020, a high-ranking Iranian politician recalled that Soleimani came to him looking to raise funds for the IRGCs proxies in Syria.

Irans proxies in Syria are not only on the ropes financially; they are also under military pressure from Israel. Gadi Eisenkot, chief of staff of the Israel Defense Forces, stated in January 2019, We struck thousands of [Iranian] targets without claiming responsibility. Among such targets are Iraqi militias that also belong to the PMF. In late April 2020, Defense Minister Naftali Bennett told the Israeli news media that his country was stepping up its campaign against Iran in Syria: since the beginning of the year, Israel has conducted at least 11 raids against targets affiliated with Iran.

To expect Irans influence to vanish from Iraq overnight would be naive, but certainly the circumstances under which Kadhimi begins his tenure are the best aligned of any in recent years to the purpose of restraining Irans hand.

The new prime minister can start by freezing further expansion of the PMF. Then Kadhimi should divide responsibility among the various leaders across the military organization. When Muhandis was the PMFs sole leader, he liaised directly with Soleimani, who exercised considerable control. Kadhimi should structure the organization differently, such that leadership is sharedand among the groups leaders, he should appoint some who believe in a sovereign Iraq, in order to balance the commanders loyal to Iran. At the same time, Kadhimi must put effective auditing in place to make the PMFs spending more transparent. He should establish a good working relationship with the units that have broken with the PMF and facilitate the defection of others, should the pro-Iranian militias refuse to implement his reforms. A Shiite paramilitary force that operates under the jurisdiction of the Iraqi state will offer an alternative to the rogue Shiite militias led by Iran.

Iraqs new prime minister has momentum behind him. He has only to implement his plan.

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Iraq Can Now Wrest Its Sovereignty From Iran - Foreign Affairs Magazine

Baghdad, Iraq, 31 May 2020 Approximately 14 million people in Iraq have been reached with critical information related on Covid-19 to increase awareness and combat dangerous misinformation spreading online and offline.

Technology is playing a key role in bringing people together as we maintain social distancing, but unfortunately its also being used to spread misinformation and fake news, fueling anxiety and stigma at a time when we must come together in solidarity against a common enemy, said Hamida Lasseko, UNICEFs Representative in Iraq.

Alongside our partners, we are combating misinformation and communicating on multiple channels and in multiple languages to ensure parents, young people and children have the correct and necessary information to care for themselves and their loved one, she added.

UNICEF has partnered with telecommunication companies like Korek Telecom, Zain and Asia Cell to provide people with reliable information on prevention, as well as mental and physical health during the pandemic. Through Korek Telecom, 4 million people have been reached on the U-report chatbot, SMS and Viber.

In the south and center zones, an additional 10 million people have been reached through partnerships with Zain and Asia cell. Messages have been delivered in Arabic and Kurdish.

We are calling on all Iraqis to be health champions and to fight misinformation in their communities. Every single of us can make a difference please stay vigilant to keep yourselves safe from the virus and to also guard against misinformation. To learn more about Covid-19, please visit UNICEF and WHO websites, concluded Lasseko.

In partnership with young volunteers and other organizations, UNICEF is also conducting awareness raising campaigns to reach people in camps and non-camps settings.

###

About UNICEF

UNICEF promotes the rights and wellbeing of every child; in everything we do. Together with our partners, we work in 190 countries and territories to translate that commitment into practical action, focusing special effort on reaching the most vulnerable and excluded children, to the benefit of all children, everywhere.

For more information about UNICEF and its work for children, visit http://www.unicef.org/iraq

Media contacts:

Laila Ali, laali@unicef.org, +964 7511 844 086

Zeina Awad, zawad@unicef.org +964 782 782 0238

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Spread awareness, not fear UNICEF reaches 14 million people in Iraq through SMS with critical information related to Covid-19 [EN/AR] - Iraq -...

SC/14200

The Security Council decided unanimously to extend the mandate of the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI) until 31 May 2021, during a 29 May videoconference meeting*.

In adopting resolution 2522 (2020), the Council further decided that the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of UNAMI, at the request of the Government of Iraq, shall prioritize the provision of advice, support and assistance to the Government and people of Iraq on advancing inclusive, political dialogue and national and community-level reconciliation.

By the resolutions terms, the Council also decided that the Special Representative and Head of Mission shall further advise, support and assist the Government with regard to several initiatives, including constitutional reviews, security sector reform and planning and executing free and fair Iraqi-led, Iraqi-owned elections, and shall promote, support, and facilitate, in coordination with authorities, the delivery of humanitarian assistance, and implementation of programmes to improve the countrys capacity to provide effective essential civil and social services, among other things.

The Council also recognized that the security of United Nations personnel is essential for UNAMI to carry out its work for the benefit of Iraqs people and called upon the Government to continue to provide security and logistical support to the United Nations presence in the country.

The Council had previously decided on 21 May 2019 to extend UNAMIs mandate for one year through resolution 2470 (2019). (See Press Release SC/13819.)

For information media. Not an official record.

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Security Council Extends Mandate of United Nations Assistance Mission in Iraq, Unanimously Adopting Resolution 2522 (2020) - Iraq - ReliefWeb