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In January, Muqtada al-Sadr, the leader of Iraqs largest political party, traveled to Irans holy city of Qom to meetwith representativesof several Iraq-based paramilitaries from the hugely influential Popular Mobilization Units (PMU). That visit was part of an attempt by Sadr to position himself as the face of public anger directed against the United States over the assassination of Iranian military commander Qassem Suleimani.

Sadr is an important figure in Iraq not only because of his ties to Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei but also because members of his Saraya al-Salam militia turned outin significant numbers to protect anti-government protesters against Iraqi security forces, including the PMU, last year. The death of Suleimani caused pro-Iranian paramilitaries to flex their muscles by clashing more openly with U.S. troops, which could be a sign that the PMU is reimagining its future role in Iraq. Sadrs intervention now makes the PMUs ascendance undeniable. While he tried to navigate the wave of popular protest last year, he has hedged his influence with the PMU this year, illustrating that the organization cannot be sidelined.

The PMUs engorged status is rooted in the war against the Islamic State. At the outset of the conflict, the powerful Shiite cleric Ayatollah Ali Sistani issued a fatwa that rallied more than 100,000 young men to join the organization. Most of the volunteers were Shiites, but groups of Sunnis, Christians, and Yazidis also formed their own units under the PMU umbrella. At its core, the PMU is a sectarian organization whose leaders see themselves as allies in Irans broader geopolitical ambitions.

Many of the PMU militias have roots in older organizations, such as the Badr Organization, led by Hadi al-Amiri. Amiri had served alongside Irans Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) in the 1980s fighting Saddam Husseins regime. Like Sadr, Amiri and his organization were seen as more moderate than other Shiite militias. For instance, the more radical Asaib Ahl al-Haqsplitfrom Sadrs movement and targeted U.S. forces after 2006.

The PMUs presence in Iraq ballooned during the war against the Islamic State, giving it large numbers ofarmed men and some 50brigades that wanted to play a major role in the social, military, and economic life of the country. I saw this on the roads around Mosul in 2017. As the citys environs were liberated from the Islamic State, the flags of various Shiite militia groups went up at checkpoints outside the city, a typical sight across Iraq. The groups had their own munitions warehouses as well and allegedly had their own prisons.

The PMU reached a turning point in 2017 and 2018, when it was integrated into the Iraqi security forces as an official paramilitary force. That could have meant standardizing its units and blurring the line between the various militias and the regular armed units, but instead the PMU solidified its status as a distinct organization within the country. The brigades preserved their sectarian and political links to various former militias. Then-Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi defended the role of the PMU in 2017 when U.S. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson urged the militias to return home. He said they would become thehope for the future ofIraq.

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As tensions between Iran and the United States escalated beginning in May 2019, so too did those between U.S. troops in Iraq and the PMU. Both sides traded attacks, including more than a dozen PMU rocket attacks targeting important bases such as Camp Taji, Ayn al-Assad, Q-West, and K-1 near Kirkuk, where a U.S. contractor was killed. The latter action sparked a U.S. airstrike on five Kataib Hezbollah positions in Iraq and Syria and the strike that killed Suleimani and Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, the deputy chief of the PMU. Further rocket attacks eventually led to an attack on March 11 that killed three members of the U.S.-led coalition and led directly to a U.S. retaliatory strike on a series of PMU-controlled warehouses on March 13. In late March, the United States withdrew from many of the bases targeted by rocket attacks, including Q-West and K-1, as various PMU group continued to make threats to remove the U.S. troop presence.

Coinciding with these events has been an outburst of tension between protesters and the Iraqi government. In late November, after numerous protesters were killed in clashes with local authorities, Sadr called for the next prime minister to be chosen by popular referendum. He issued several further statements in support of the protesters, all of which helped lead to the ouster of Prime Minister Adil Abdul-Mahdi in November. Sadr has since rescinded his support for the protesters, but his influence during that critical moment is still felt.

The anti-government protests also opened an opportunity for the PMU to test its own clout in the country, and itwasopenly implicated in suppressing the protests. Its opposition to the protests likely stemmed from its belief that they represented a fundamental threat to its newfound power. The PMU was in the ascendant after the war against the Islamic State, and it hoped to entrench itself in Iraqi society thereafter, but the protests were broadly reflective of a younger generation that wanted sweeping change to a system that, by that time, served the PMUs interests. Protesters targeted PMU offices as well as some Iranian consulates and other symbols linked to the PMU.

The increasing role of Sadr and the PMU during the protests is a significant development in Iraqi politics because it signals a gradual shift in power away from the civil government and toward actors that are not only unaccountable to the public but also feel they owe more allegiance to Irans broader ambitions than to the Iraqi government, as is the case with many factions in the PMU.

In the aftermath of the Suleimani and Muhandis killings, the PMU chose to temporarily restrain its activities in the country, but Sadr continued to foment trouble by calling for large protests against U.S. troopsin Iraq.

Sadrs politicking is one of several challenges the PMU must reconcile with. Suleimanis death signaled the loss of a key ally in Iran that could jeopardize the organizations unity and relationship with Tehran. Further, Muhandiss death resulted in the loss of a significant degree of institutional and tactical knowledge that will be difficultif not impossibleto replace. With the specter of social and political unrest in Iraq growing and the PMUs future in the country in doubt, the organization has important decisions to make regarding its future.

The PMU could choose to continue to channel the groundswell of popular anger against the United States over its own role in Iraq. This might convince the Trump administration to pursue a political arrangement incorporating the varied interests in Iraq (which would include a troop withdrawal), similar to the deal it recently struck in Afghanistan. Alternatively, it could cause Washington to dig in as part of its efforts to counter Iran, which could serve as part of a broader effort by the PMU to take a greater stake in Iraqs political and military affairs.

Because the PMU is both part of the security forces and is linked to prominent religious and political leaders, it now plays a key role in many aspects of Iraqi civil society. The role that some factions of the PMU played in suppressing the protests, its attempt to force U.S. troops out of the country, and its attempt to influence the appointment of a new prime minister show that it has become a central force in Iraqs political and security fabric. As the PMU takes on a greater role in Iraqi society, it could eventually expand its influence to resemble that played by the IRGC in Iran. Its role already surpasses the one played by Hezbollah in Lebanon because it has been officially incorporated into the security forces.

As this happens, the PMU must also decide if it will take a more independent path or if it will continue to implement policies that serve Irans interests. This is a critical crossroads because if the PMU serves only Irans interests, it will rub up against large sections of the public and potentially come into conflict with either the United States or other groups in Iraq. As the country looks to an uncertain future, it is unlikely that the PMU will be content with settling into a role subservient to the security forces and disentangled from politics or, more importantly, from Iran.

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After Suleimani, the PMU Is Getting More Aggressive in Iraq - Foreign Policy

Apr 11th 2020

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IN SADR CITY, the vast shantytown east of Baghdad, cars still pack the roads, pilgrims still pray at shrines and people still gather in shops. Many see covid-19 as either a Zionist hoax or a fast track to paradise, so they feel no obligation to comply with the governments order to stay inside. The government itself seems unprepared. Iraq claims to have just 1,122 cases of the virus, but it is accused of minimising the number. Its public hospitals are not equipped to handle a big outbreak.

If the virus were Iraqs only problem, that would be enough. Alas, the country is nearly bankruptthe result of a precipitous decline in the price of oil, which supplies more than 90% of government revenue. Its politics are also a mess, with parties unable to agree on a new prime minister. Iraqs militias are running amok, while the jihadists of Islamic State (IS) regroup. America and Iran, which helped Iraq muddle through past crises, are focused on fighting each other. Fears are growing that the state will collapse, says an Iraqi official.

Saudi Arabia and Russia are in talks over oil-production cuts, which would provide some relief to Iraq by raising prices. But even if the price of oil jumps by half, Iraq would still be looking at a sizeable budget deficit. As it is, the government cannot afford to pay salaries in the ever-expanding public sector (see chart). It has around $60bn in cash reserves, but that could run out by the end of the year, leaving it dependent on a loan from the IMF, which may not be forthcoming. The states 7m employees and pensioners are worried. Without salaries, thats the end of Iraq, says Mowaffak al-Rubaie, a former national-security chief.

That may sound alarmist, but Iraq does not have much of a private sector to fall back on. Many firms rely on government contracts. Much of the sector is informal. With a curfew in place, travel restricted and the borders closed, commerce has slowed considerably. Even before the virus, many Iraqis struggled to get by. Such hardship, along with blatant corruption, sparked big protests, beginning last year.

Those have largely subsided as people keep their distance from each other. But Iraqs politicians are not taking advantage of the calm. Since the prime minister, Adel Abdul-Mahdi, resigned in November, two men have been put forward to take his place. The first, Muhammad Allawi, failed to gain the backing of important Shia parties and their associated militias. The second, Adnan Zurfi, is trying to win over parliament, but he is opposed by Iran and is also unpopular with Shia politicians, who cannot agree on a successor. Many are happy to leave the pliable Mr Abdul-Mahdi in office as a caretaker.

Meanwhile, the militias that once fought against IS as part of the Hashd al-Shaabi, or popular mobilisation forces (PMF), are fragmenting. Two men who held them togetherAbu Mahdi al-Mohandis, the PMFs commander, and Qassem Suleimani, the head of Irans Quds Force, its foreign legionwere killed by America in January. Now some militias want to integrate with the army. More militant ones are going their own way. There are also signs of trouble within the militias, with splinter groups acting like criminal gangs.

Iran continues to use militias to wield influence in Iraq and try to push out America. A rocket attack by militia forces on March 11th killed two American soldiers and a British medic at an Iraqi military base. America responded with strikes on an Iranian-backed militia, Kataib Hizbullah. On March 16th militia forces attacked another Iraqi base used by American soldiers (causing no casualties). An unknown group called Usbat al-Thayireen claimed both attacks and issued threats against America, suggesting that the [Quds Force] had assembled its proxy militias into a new coalition, says the Soufan Centre, a New York-based research body.

President Donald Trump says Iran will pay a very heavy price if its proxies keep up their attacks. He has been consolidating Americas position in Iraq. Of the 5,200 American soldiers who were in the country at the start of the year, most have been gathered into a few large bases, mainly in Kurdish and Sunni areas. Some have been withdrawn. European and Canadian soldiers, part of the anti-IS coalition, have left, citing the outbreak of covid-19. IS, meanwhile, is active again. It has a bit of a free pass right now, says Michael Knights of the Washington Institute, a think-tank. Theyre better prepared for the virus than any fighting force. Theyre doomsday preppers.

With no leader and outside powers preoccupied with their own interests, it is not clear who will hold Iraq together. Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, Iraqs spiritual arbiter, has receded from politics. The Kurds, who have sought independence before, may do so again if the central government cannot produce the cash promised to their region. Sunni leaders are discussing carving out their own state, too. And the protests are likely to resume once the outbreak subsides. Politicians and analysts differ over how Iraq might collapse, but many think it is only a matter of time.

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This article appeared in the Middle East and Africa section of the print edition under the headline "Dark times ahead"

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The risk that Iraq might fall apart - The Economist

Under its effective leader, firebrand ultra-nationalist cleric Moqtada al-Sadr, Iraq is theoretically committed to not allowing itself to become overly dependent on any one country. That was the rallying call of al-Sadrs Sairoon (Marching Forward) power bloc during the last general election in Iraq in May 2018 that saw him and his grouping win the most seats of any party. For a while, this theory seemed to be in effect, with Iraq playing off Chinese and Russian interests against those of the U.S. All the time, though, in practice, Iran continued to dodge and weave around any and all sanctions aimed at preventing it from continuing to wield the deciding power in its neighbour through the leverage of its military, militias, and pro-Iran politicians in Baghdad. The surest sign yet that the U.S. has had enough of this situation came in the shape of the latest waiver granted just over a week ago by the U.S. to Iraq to continue to import Iranian electricity and natural gas just 30 days, its shortest waiver ever, by a long way.

At the same press conference that Morgan Ortagus, a U.S. State Department spokeswoman, announced the new short waiver, she also pointedly announced new sanctions against 20 Iran- and Iraq-based entities that were cited as funnelling money to Irans Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) elite Quds Force. This Force functions in large part as Irans chief foreign intelligence operation, as well as its most zealous military unit more akin to Russias GRU than the U.K.s SIS having been built up and led by General Qassem Soleimani until his assassination by the U.S. on 3 January. According to Ortagus and absolutely correct - these 20 entities (there are more than that but this is a start) are exploiting Iraqs dependence on Iran as an electricity and gas source by smuggling Iranian petroleum through the Iraqi port of Umm Qasr (true, and other sites) and money laundering through Iraqi front companies (also true), among other sanctions-busting activities. Prior to this 30-day only waiver being granted, the U.S. had originally granted an initial 45-day waiver to Iraq after the U.S. re-imposed sanctions on Iranian energy exports in November 2018.

This was followed by another five waivers - two 90-day waivers in a row followed by two 120-day waivers in a row in June and October, and then a 45-day waiver in February before the U.S. specifically asked that Iraq show signs that it was reducing its imports of Iranian gas and power to meet its electricity demand. Clearly these were not forthcoming and, according to sources in Washington close to the Presidential Administration spoken to by OilPrice.com last week, unless Iraq does show the U.S. some compelling evidence to this effect, this will be the last waiver for Iraq to import Iranian energy. Weve been down this road before with Pakistan [with] the government pretending to help in our fight against AQ [Al-Qaeda] but at the same time the ISI [Inter-Services Intelligence] offering all the help it could to [Osama] bin Laden and were not playing that game again, the source underlined. Related: Saudi Arabia Sends Wave Of Supertankers To U.S. Ahead Of Oil Meeting

The parallels between Iraq and Pakistan from the U.S. perspective go beyond just money, as U.S. President Donald Trump made clear recently. At the beginning of January, after Iranian surface-to-surface missiles hit two Iraqi military bases housing U.S. troops, Trump said that he would impose sanctions directly on Iraq if the U.S. military was forced out of the country by further such incidents. Earlier last month, though, 30 107-mm Russian-made Katyusha rockets were fired at the U.S. allied Camp Taji military base north of Baghdad, killing three service members, two of them Americans and one British, according to U.S. and Iraq military officials. This attack was in the same style as the rocket attacks on 4 January on the U.S.s Balad Air Base near Baghdad and on the Green Zone, both reportedly Iran-sponsored retaliation for the Soleimani killing, and as the multiple rocket attack of 3 December 2019 on the U.S. Ayn al-Asad airbase in Iraq that was a key factor in the U.S. deciding to neutralise the al-Quds leader.

Although these have been the most high-profile attacks on U.S. assets in Iraq to date, and only the 4 January attack was cited as a direct act of retaliation for Soleimanis killing by Iran, there have in fact been at least 15 further attacks on U.S. military and neo-military personnel (and those of its allies) in Iraq by Iran proxies this year alone, according to U.S. military sources. Given the distaste of President Trump for becoming involved in endless wars in the Middle East, the U.S. response to this ongoing provocation from Iran via Iraq is almost certainly not going to be of the military variety in either in Iran or Iraq but rather of the financial type favoured by Trump, in the specific form of sanctions against Iraq.

The timing for these is currently ideal for two key reasons. First, it would mean more oil taken off the already high-supply, low-demand market, as Iraq would simply not be able to pay its developers. Second, it would come at a time when Iraqs finances are already ravaged not just by the ongoing oil price war but also by endemic corruption in its oil sector, as even its own ministers have admitted during rare occasions of candour. In the case of the former, only last week saw Iraqs economic parliamentary committee recommend that international oil companies (IOCs) operating in OPECs second-largest oil producer are paid with crude oil instead of cash and that they lower unnecessary costs due to the oil price crash. The committee also proposed delaying payments of foreign debt, including reparations to Kuwait, cutting the salaries of various public sector employees by 60 per cent, and lowering investment spending and non-essential current spending. In the northern semi-autonomous region of Kurdistan, matters are also not helped by the fact that around US$1 billion of its own cash from oil exports is stuck in the Lebanese bank, BankMed, because it is frozen whilst oil trading firm, IMMS, sues the regional government for the return of the sum.

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On the second issue, Iraqs current financial situation looks like it may well become as bad as the situation it faced just five years ago when the Baghdad government itself estimated that dues to the IOCs of US$18 billon would accrue over the course of the year, adding to the US$9 billion in outstanding arrears from 2014. Given that the average remuneration fee per barrel of non-heavy oil produced over an initial threshold level, as delineated in the Long-Term Service Contracts (LTSCs) awarded in the first and second rounds of bidding to international oil companies (IOCs), ranges between US$1.15 (Lukoil, West Qurna 2) and US$5.50 (GazpromNeft, Badra), the question that inexorably bubbles up was how the figure owed to the IOCs could be so high?

One of the reasons is that as the Iraqi government was in so much debt at the time the contracts were awarded in 2009 the IOCs in many cases were asked to make large upfront payments as part of their bid, which would be repaid at a later date. These were broadly understood by the IOCs to be once the initial production thresholds were reached but there were no regular payment schedules incorporated into many of these contracts by the Iraqi authorities. Instead, they were regarded as being repayable on an ad hoc basis, as and when it could afford to pay them. Also related to the contracts which are still in place for many of the fields offered in 2009 - was an infrastructure support payment on a per barrel basis of output. This vague category of payments related and still do not just to general field maintenance as it is generally understood in standard oil contracts but also to the development costs and security of the fields. All of these were billed separately from the remuneration per barrel fee, all were liable for payment by the Iraqi government, and all were highly opaque in their terms of reference. In practical terms, the scale of these payments was often at least as great as the headline per barrel remuneration fee itself and much of these payments went on administration of these elements connected to the fields. According to the Oil Minister at the time, Adil Abdul Mahdi, Iraq lost US$14,448,146,000 from the beginning of 2011 up to the end of 2014 as cash compensation payments relating to these fields development.

In this precise context, Iraq as a whole ranked 162 out of 180 countries in 2019 by the independent international non-governmental organisation, Transparency International (TI), in its Corruption Perceptions Index. TI describes Iraq as demonstrating: Massive embezzlement,procurement scams, money laundering, oil smugglingand widespread bureaucratic bribery that have led thecountry to the bottom of international corruptionrankings, fuelled political violence and hamperedeffective state building and service delivery. Although acknowledging that the countrys anti-corruption initiatives andframework have expanded since 2005, TI adds that they still fail toprovide a strong and comprehensive integrity system. Political interference in anti-corruption bodies andpoliticisation of corruption issues, weak civil society,insecurity, lack of resources and incomplete legalprovisions severely limit the governments capacity toefficiently curb soaring corruption, concludes the agency.

By Simon Watkins for Oilprice.com

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Oil Smuggling And Politics Washington's Patience With Iraq Is Wearing Thin - OilPrice.com

On March 19, citing the virus, coalition and NATO training missions both suspended operations for two months. By March 29, Australia, Spain, France, the United Kingdom, New Zealand, Portugal and the Netherlands had withdrawn almost all of their trainers.

In parallel, the U.S. withdrew from its frontline operating bases at Mosul, Al-Qaim, Qayyarah, Kirkuk and Taqaddum in the last week of March. Most U.S. forces were redistributed inside fewer, better-protected Iraqi bases such as Al-Asad and Erbil airport, both of which are now protected by newly installed U.S. missile defenses, to prevent a recurrence of the Jan. 8 Iranian missile attacks that left more than 100 U.S. troops with mild traumatic brain injuries.

The Iraqi military are meanwhile distracted by disaster relief, enforcing a nationwide curfew, and looking after their own health and that of their families. (Officially, the virus had sickened over 1,100 and killed 65 Iraqis as of Tuesday, but lack of testing means the real number is likely significantly higher.) Rural clearance operations have almost ceased and the pace of special forces raids has slackened, in part because of the severe disruption to intelligence, planning and air support provided by the U.S.-led coalition.

For the Islamic State, this is all a godsend. In its view, the pandemic is a literal act of divine intervention as it reached its lowest ebb. Terrorism expert Aymenn Jawad al-Tamimi noted that IS newsletter, Al-Naba, called coronavirus Gods torment upon the Crusader nations, and urged fighters to take advantage of the distraction and disruption caused by the virus.

In many ways the Islamic State is quite well adapted for operations during a pandemic. Its cells are isolated, avoiding the risk of contamination by performing extreme social distancing long before the rest of us. Its leadership issued early instructions to its cadres to limit their exposure to the virusfrom the CDC-approved recommendations (washing hands and covering up coughs and sneezes) to Koranic verses involving lions and leprosy.

IS are somewhat self-contained, living in remote hideouts and underground shelters, drawing on independent food and water caches, and powering electronic devices with solar battery chargers. In every sense of the phrase, the thousands of members of this millenarian terrorist cult are the ultimate doomsday preppers.

On the ground, there have been small signs of Islamic State recovery at the tactical level, probably due to the cessation of counterinsurgency operations targeting them.

The four Iraqi military clearance operations undertaken in March were half as many as in April, and they lacked the coalition intelligence and air support that can focus such operations more effectively, instead falling into the less efficient category of unearthing arms caches but not catching enemy fighters.

Whereas U.S. and Iraqi special operations forces did a minisurge of joint raids in Februarydropping in by U.S. helicopters or tilt-rotor Osprey aircraft to raid caves and stop vehicles driven by IS membersthere were no such raids in March.

Left to operate without being pressured and chased from hideout to hideout, Islamic State has been getting more ambitious at local level. In Khanaqin District, close to the Iran-Iraq border, IS quadrupled its average number of mortar and rocket attacks in March and combined the bombardments with sustained machine-gun fire and ground assaults on security force outposts.

Over a five-day period beginning March 17, insurgents fired 15 mortar rounds into heavily populated neighborhoods of cities such as Tuz Khurmatu and Amerli, a type of attack that has not been seen for more than two years.

Islamic States next steps are easy to guess. It will increase rural assassination raids on local village leadersso-called mukhtarsand use intimidation to increase its ability to raise funds. Disruption to security force clearance operations will increase IS ability to make advanced roadside bombs in its hideouts and use these weapons, and other harassment tactics, to keep the security forces buttoned down in their bases.

If left unchecked, this kind of aggressive patrolling allows insurgents to gain psychological dominance over the local military garrisons and civilian populations. Before long, the insurgents will become the local power brokers, and it will no longer be possible to claim that IS days of territorial control are over. This is how the caliphate knits itself back together, one village at a time. This is exactly how it happened in 2012-14, after the previous U.S. withdrawal.

The only way to stop an IS resurgence, still in its infancy but now facing an improved outlook, is to reinvigorate an effective counterterrorism raiding campaign. This requires ongoing partnership between U.S. and Iraqi special forces, and between Iraqs commandos and the local Sunni populations in IS strongholds. Unlike 2011, the U.S. should not leave Iraq entirely, but should rather lower its visibility.

In all likelihood, non-U.S. military forces will never return to Iraq in the numbers that were recently withdrawn, with the virus providing a way to justify withdrawal even though Iraqi security forces are arguably not prepared to restrain an Islamic State resurgence. U.S. forces may also dwindle in terms of raw numbers in Iraq, where Iran-backed factions are promising long-term armed resistance to the open presence of U.S. advisers.

This does not have to be the end of an effective counterterrorism fight, however.

In places as diverse as Yemen, Somalia, Mali and Syria, the U.S. Special Operations Command has employed quiet partnerships with local special forces and paramilitary proxies to take on terrorist cells in a more targeted and effective manner than the large-scale train-and-equip program that appears to be eroding in Iraq. The coalition mission in Iraqdue to turn 6 years old in Septembermight expire, but the effort to prevent another IS comeback cannot afford to take a break, whether as a result of coronavirus, Iran-backed militias or a devilish combination of the two. The answer may be to take the war underground and back into the shadows.

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How the Islamic State Feeds on Coronavirus - POLITICO

Iraq's Kurdistan Regional Governmentwill prosecute the organizers of a prohibitedfuneral service that infected dozens of people with the coronavirus in the Kurdish region of Iraq, officials told a local news organization.

Arrest warrants have been issued for five people who organized a mourning ceremony on March 21 which led to the infection" of a number ofpeople with COVID-19,a spokesperson for Erbil's crisis task forcetold Rudaw.

Some of those wanted for arrest are themselves hospitalized with the virus, the Erbil-based news outlet reported. Their arrests will be delayed until they have recovered.

Despite a ban on funerals and other large gatherings, mourners gathered last month in Erbil's Karezan neighborhood for two separate services that infected at least 72 people, Health Minister Saman Barzanji said. On Sunday, the ministry announced 18 new cases in Erbil, each of whom came in contact with an infected person during one of the funerals.

The infected mourners now make up 35%of all cases in Erbil, according to the citys health directorate, which announced plans to sue the two families who broke the rules by holding the funerals. Rudaw quoted Barzanji as sayingtoday that Karezan and 10 other neighborhoodshave been placed under quarantine.

The Kurdistan region is in grave danger and is facing a humanitarian catastrophe, Barzanji said earlier this week.

Iraq's Kurdistan region has reported a total number of 288 cases and three deaths. The central government in Iraq today announced 1,122 cases and a death toll of 65. Health care workers on the front lines have told Reuters the number of infected persons in Iraq is likely much higher than what has been publicly reported.

Also today, an Iraqi delegation arrived in China to bring back medical supplies and preventative equipment, the countrys air force said on Twitter. The pandemic, which first emerged in the central Chinese city of Wuhan, has killed more than 81,000 people worldwide.

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Iraq Iraq's Kurdish region issues arrest warrants over funeral linked to surge in COVID-19 cases - Al-Monitor