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Education is a human right, a public good and a public responsibility.

Recognizing the collective responsibilities of governments, civil society and the international community in realizing this right, the United Nations General Assembly proclaimed 24 January as the International Day of Education, to continuously remind us of the role of education in realizing peace and sustainable development.

This years global theme is Recover and Revitalize Education for the COVID-19 Generation. World over including in Iraq, the COVID-19 pandemic and resulting school closures have shown how central learning is: for social cohesion, wellbeing, and building of a prosperous future. On this day, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), United Nations Childrens Fund (UNICEF) and the United Nations World Food Programme (WFP) call on the government as well as the international community in Iraq for continued investments towards a more flexible, sustainable education system, that is suitable to the needs of learning in Iraq. The UN in Iraq affirms its commitment to support and work with the government and all partners, on efforts to ensure that every learner has access to quality educational opportunities.

In Iraq, the closure of schools, universities and learning institutions, and the interruption of many literacy and lifelong educational programs have affected more than11 million learners in Iraq. For children, this impacted not only upon their ability to learn, but also their access to nutritious food and additional health support schemes. Since the start of the outbreak, the UN has worked closely to support the Federal Government of Iraq and Kurdistan Regional Government to minimize the impact of the disruption in schooling, and develop a framework for safe school reopening as part of efforts to ensure that all learning is taking place in a safe manner.

UNESCO and UNICEF have collaborated with the government on establishing an education television channel (ETV), online education portals, production and broadcast of television lessons and self-learning materials. At least 4 million children and adolescents, including some in the most vulnerable communities, have been able to continue access to learning. Together UNESCO and UNICEF have also supported the government and NGO partners to ensure that 192,312 children in camps for internally displaced people, returnee areas, as well as out-of-school children in the governorates of Anbar, Erbil, Duhok and Salah Al din continue their education through a blended approach, that combines face-to-face learning, remote studying, and home-based learning.

The COVID-19 pandemic has been a wake-up call to make education systems more resilient to crisis, and more inclusive, flexible and sustainable. It has forced the systems to innovate to ensure continuation of education, challenged teachers to adapt to distance pedagogical approaches and forced parents to provide learning support at home. In Iraq, besides the provision of sanitizers, gloves and masks for teachers and students for immediate response, UNESCO is supporting training of the trainers and teachers in blended distance learning and strengthening of e-learning platforms. Further, recognizing the limitations and challenges of internet access for online learning in rural and remote areas, UNESCO is working with the Ministry of Education (MoE) and partners to develop and broadcast TV lessons for all subjects for all 1 12 grades, and Alternative Learning classes reaching more than 9 million across the entire country, said Paolo Fontani, UNESCO Representative to Iraq.

Since day one, UNICEF has been working to ensure that the most innovative and up to date learning methods are adapted to childrens needs here in Iraq, and that children are able to continue learning in the safest possible way. We also trained educators on delivering blended learning and have equipped studying and taking exams in over 5,000 schools and centres in Iraq with disinfectant and protective gear, explained Dr Paula Bulancea, UNICEFs Deputy Representative in Iraq.

With the reopening of schools, WFP and the MoE worked to re-launch the National School Feeding Programme (NSFP) this past week, which will support 255,000 primary schoolchildren in 11 vulnerable districts across Iraq. Children benefiting from the programme receive a healthy meal at the beginning of the school day. Through the NSFP, WFP and MoE aim to increase enrolment and attendance rates while providing support to the most vulnerable families and communities. During Ramadan when schools were closed, WFP and MoE arranged take-home food baskets for children and their families, reaching nearly 140,000 people.

In 2020, WFP and UNICEF signed a Joint Work Plan to bring together expertise and support to improve education and learning, nutrition and health, for school age children. The joint approach is working to enhance the overall wellbeing of school children in Iraq. With the Directorate of Education in Basra, WFP and UNICEF are collaborating on a pilot project to help around 2,500 girls transition from primary to intermediate education, through providing cash stipends to support the girls families during the academic year. Health and education are interlinked. When we provide the complementary support that children need, from school meals to helping relieve the financial burden on families, we can help them fully realise their potential during their formative years, said WFP Representative in Iraq, Abdirahman Meygag.

And on the occasion of International Day of Education, OHCHR published the second report in a series on The Right to Education in Iraq: Obstacles to Girls Education after ISIL. The report highlights the indispensable role of educated girls in post conflict stabilization, transition and recovery, and identifies how traditional gender roles and norms, family levels of education, poverty, perceived protection concerns, and trauma continue to create barriers for girls access to education.

Measures to ensure equality of access to education engender broader human rights dividends for society as a whole, including long-term peace and stability, said Danielle Bell, OHCHR Representative in Iraq. The report provides practical recommendations to address specific institutional and societal barriers girls face to access education and aims to promote inclusive and equitable education for all children in Iraq.

The investments made by the government and the partners, in provision of distance and blended learning methodologies in response to the COVID-19 pandemic in Iraq, are also an opportunity for the education system to transform itself towards a more flexible and sustainable system, providing an inclusive and equitable lifelong learning environment in the longer term, for all children and learners in Iraq. The UN in Iraq re-iterates its commitments to support this endeavour.

For more information please contact:

Mr. Husamaldeen El-Zubi, UNESCO/Baghdad, Public Information Officer, Mob. +964 789270324 h.el-zubi@unesco.org

Ms. Sharon Rapose, WFP/Erbil, Communications Officer, Mob. +964 780 915 0962 sharon.rapose@wfp.org

Ms. Zeina Awad, UNICEF/ Baghdad, Chief, Advocacy & External Communication, Mob. +964 7820238 zawad@unicef.org

Ms. Danielle Bell, OHCHR / Baghdad, Representative, Mob. +964 7809284127 belld@un.org

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2021 International Day of Education: Our shared commitment to build back better learning opportunities in Iraq - Iraq - ReliefWeb

Editors Note: Iraq faces many knotty political problems, and one of the most difficult concerns the population in the area near the border with Turkey and Syria. There, the legacy of Iraqs civil war and broader regional strife interacts with Iraqs political dysfunction, creating a potent stew of grievances and potential violence. Boston Universitys Shamiran Mako assesses the Baghdad-Erbil Sinjar agreement, explaining how discontent among local communities may jeopardize this fragile settlement and stability in general.

Daniel Byman

***

On Oct. 9, the federal government in Baghdad signed the Agreement on the Restoration of Stability and Normalization of the Situation in the District of Sinjar, a joint security agreement with the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) over Sinjar, a Yazidi town in Iraqs Nineveh Governorate that fell to the Islamic States onslaught in 2014, culminating in a genocide against its inhabitants. Strategically located in Ninevehs northwestern region, Sinjar closely borders Syrias al-Hasakah province to the northwest and Turkeys Silopi/Sirnak province to the northeast. The towns position in territory disputed by the federal government and the KRG shapes the competition over government control. While the agreement placates persistent tensions between Iraqi and Kurdish elites, it falls short of addressing local demands for an inclusive political settlement. Unless local minority populations become stakeholders alongside Iraqs national and subnational governments, exclusive, top-down negotiations will continue to prevent conflict resolution in one of the countrys most fragile regions.

Why Iraqs Disputed Territories Matter

The disputed territories are intertwined with various strategic nexus points for Baghdad and Erbil. Positioned between Mosul, Iraqs second largest city, to the east, the KRG to the north, and the Syrian border to the west, the territories encompass Khanaqin, Kirkuk, the Nineveh Plains, Tal Afar, Mandali, Tuz Khurmatu and Sinjar. They are some of the most ethnically and religiously diverse of Iraqs regions, home to substantial minority populations including Yazidis, Assyrian Christians, Turkmen, Kaka'i and Shabaks. Many inhabitants were subjected to Arabization campaigns under the Baath regime manifested by demographic manipulation through population exchanges and forced displacement where cities, towns and districts were repopulated with Arab tribes from Iraqs western and southern regions. They are also some of Iraqs most resource-rich regions. Cities like Kirkuk, Erbil and Mosul account for an estimated 20 percent of the countrys oil reserves, with Kirkuk alone containing 9 billion barrels of proven oil reserves managed by Iraqs North Oil Company. According to one local Iraqi member of parliament I spoke with, the disputed territories contain approximately 25 billion barrels of oil reserves, making the region a resource asset for both the Iraqi government and the KRG.

Two interlinked sets of grievances have exacerbated Yazidi tensions. First, the lack of representation of Yazidi stakeholders in the negotiations for the agreement reached in October reflects a pattern of neglect at the national and subnational levels. Elites in Baghdad and Erbil often rely on co-opted elites instead of dialogue with civil society organizations. Second, local communities have been excluded from the execution and implementation phase of the agreement, particularly plans regarding putting forth mayoral candidates, integrating current and former Yazidi combatants who took up arms against the Islamic State since 2014, and building community engagement in reconstruction efforts. Other local minority populations, such as Assyrians in the Nineveh Plains, echo Yazidi concerns regarding security, representation and reconstruction.

Since the toppling of the Baathist regime in 2003, various U.S. and Iraqi policymakers have attempted to address local grievances, to no avail. Article 58(c) of the Coalition Provisional Authoritys interim Transitional Administrative Law for Iraq of 2004 and its subsequent incorporation into Article 140 of the permanent Iraqi Constitution of 2005 attempted to address the status of the disputed territories with a census, but it has yet to be conducted. U.N. Security Council Resolution 1770 committed the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI) to assist and advise the Iraqi government to resolve the boundaries of the disputed territories. Between 2008 and 2009, UNAMI conducted a private study of the socioeconomic, political, and administrative conditions in the disputed territories and discovered that the majority of residents prefer an in-between solution, with a special status for Kirkuk (the most contested governorate of the disputed territories) jointly administered by Baghdad and Erbil. However, the recommendations of the report were never adopted due to continued tensions between Arab and Kurdish elites, particularly in the run-up to the 2008 election.

These areas are, in effect, spaces in between the clear control of either government, which has fueled much of the spat between Baghdad and Erbil. Starting in 2003, Kurdish Peshmerga forces, led by the Kurdistan Democratic Party, occupied key towns and districts, including Sinjar, as part of a U.S.-brokered security arrangement following the dismantling of the Iraqi army. This allowed Kurds to control an estimated 300 miles of territory outside the formal boundaries of the KRG, some of which is now under the control of the Iraqi army following the fallout from the 2017 Kurdish independence referendum. Western support for Kurdish political parties and the Peshmerga and a weak and fractured Iraqi army enabled the KRG to exercise near absolute political and security control in the disputed territories prior to 2014. Local communities were left vulnerable to the Islamic States onslaught when Kurdish Peshmerga forces unexpectedly retreated and abandoned Yazidi towns as Islamic State fighters approached in early August 2014.

Fractured governance and insecurity in Sinjar and the rest of Iraqs disputed territories have directly shaped acts of violence against minority populations. Following years of neglect compounded by insecurity and laggard development, minority populations sought help from internal and external non-state actors to protect them following the Islamic States advance in 2014. Having established a strong foothold in Syrias Jazira region, the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) and its proxy, the Kurdish-dominated Peoples Protection Units, offered fleeing Yazidis humanitarian and military aid, leading to the formation of a militia, the PKK-aligned Shingal Resistance Unit (YBS). Other Yazidis formed a Yazidi-Yazidkhan force, while some joined the Peshmerga and the Shiite-dominated Popular Mobilization Forces (al-hashd al-shaabi). Currently, four Yazidi militias operate in Sinjar: The YBS has approximately 2,500 members; the Yazidi Peshmerga forces about 7,000; the Yazidkhan Protection Forces about 3,000; and between 1,500 and 2,000 Yazidis have aligned with the Popular Mobilization Forces. A key concern in the agreement is what to do about these forces and how best to demobilize them or integrate them into the governments security forces.

Pacifying a National and Subnational Turf War

The agreement regarding Sinjar was mediated and signed by representatives of the KRG and the federal government in Baghdad; diplomats from Turkey, the United Nations and the United States expressed optimism about its prospects. It prioritizes three stabilization programs relating to administration, security, and reconstruction aimed at bolstering coordination between the regional and federal governments. Broadly, it calls for electing a new mayor and expanding existing administrative offices, appointing a 2,000-member local security force in Sinjar inclusive of displaced Yazidis for the purpose of eradicating the presence of the PKK and other militias, and establishing a Baghdad-Erbil reconstruction partnership. Article 4 of the agreement stipulates that a field committee comprising representatives from Baghdad and Erbil will oversee all consultations and implementation. Despite support from regional and international actors, the agreement has been met with dismay from the Yazidi community. The agreement in some ways reflects recent reform efforts by Prime Minister Mustafa al-Kadhimi, especially his focus on consolidating control over paramilitary groups. Additionally, the privileged place of the KRG in the negotiations fits into a broader political context: Kadhimis shaky tenure hinges on getting Kurdish elites in the KRG to support his candidacy in the upcoming elections in 2021 by appealing to KRG demands to regain control in the disputed territories and Sinjar.

The absence of Yazidi leaders and stakeholders from the negotiations amplified long-standing grievances between local populations and Baghdad and Erbil. According to Hadi Pirco-founder and vice president of Yazda, a Yazidi advocacy organizationthe agreement omits important details about its strategic planning and implementation. More clarity is needed regarding the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (if possible) of PKK-affiliated Yazidi forces; the process for selecting a mayoral candidate not affiliated with powerful political blocs; and the provision of police and security oversight to minimize meddling in local Yazidi affairs. These concerns were echoed by Pari Ibrahim of the Free Yazidi Foundation, who noted that [g]overnance in the Sinjar area and other disputed areas really must rely on the local people, and in this case, on the Yazidi voice. Mayors and political decisions should be made through choice and consultation with the locals, which is important for democracy. It should not always have to do with political blocs or parties. The ambiguous nature of the agreement hinders efforts to create durable and long-term solutions predicated on local capacity-building that minorities in the territories have long supported. It could aggravate the precise conditions that impeded durable political solutions in the past.

Revising the Sinjar Agreement

Insecurity in Iraq since 2003 is emblematic of fractured and fractionalized center-periphery relations, aggravated and sustained by ingrained corruption and co-optation of local elites at the local, subnational and national levels. Citizens, and minority populations in particular, in the disputed territories are caught between a rock and a hard place with little power to influence policy at the federal and regional levels. The protracted conflict over the disputed territories requires carefully tailored political, economic, and security strategies that make minority communities stakeholders in local governance through meaningful representation.

In a joint statement signed by various Yazidi elites and members of civil society organizations in October, Yazidi leaders hailed the agreement as an important step toward addressing Yazidi grievances. However, the signatories outlined significant bottom-up implementation mechanisms currently absent from the agreement. These include, but are not limited to, taking steps to curb external influence in Yazidi affairs in Sinjar, consulting directly with Yazidi stakeholders, allowing Yazidis from Sinjar to select a nonpartisan mayor, committing to provide reparations for Yazidi victims of genocide, and establishing a nonpartisan Yazidi-administered local police/security force. The statement in some ways is antithetical to the securitization objectives of the agreement, which focus on returning Kurdistans two ruling parties as key political and security players in Sinjar while appeasing Turkeys demands for eradicating the PKK there and in other northern borderland regions in Iraq.

Recalibrating the existing agreement requires short- and long-term conflict resolution strategies to assuage local demands for substantive representation in governance, security and reconstruction. In the short run, power brokers in Baghdad and Erbil should facilitate cross-communal, local-level participation and representation by engaging directly with multiple Yazidi stakeholders, especially civil society organizations. Communal group demands and interests are seldom monolithic. The existing agreement should be reformulated to grant local populations agency through bottom-up community-oriented solutions as a pathway toward reconciliation and everyday peace. Eventually, Iraqi leaders in Baghdad will have to devise institutional solutions to address the status of the disputed territories that center minority interests alongside those of the KRGinterests that are not necessarily mutually inclusive. Options include establishing distinct minority administrative zones as promulgated in Article 125 of the Iraqi Constitution and reviving the 2008 UNAMI process regarding the disputed territories in consultation with minority stakeholders in light of evolving socioeconomic, political and security conditions since 2014. Such bottom-up political settlements, long advocated for by minorities in the disputed territories, could mitigate existing tensions regarding political representation, foreign intervention and influence, security, and reconstruction.

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Negotiating Peace in Iraq's Disputed Territories: Modifying the Sinjar Agreement - Lawfare

Turkeys foreign policy regarding Iraq and the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) has been guided by a wide range of factors. Ankara not only shares a border with Iraq, but also common water sources, mutual concerns and common stakes. Needless to say, Iraq occupies a critical place in the Turkish foreign policy agenda.Turkeys Defense Minister Hulusi Akar, along with his entourage, this week paid a visit to first Baghdad and later Irbil. He had a busy agenda. In Baghdad, he came together with senior Iraqi officials, including President Barham Salih, Prime Minister Mustafa Al-Kadhimi, Defense Minister Jouma Anad, and Interior Minister Othman Al-Ghanimi. While in Irbil, he met with KRG Prime Minister Masrour Barzani, former President Masoud Barzani, and current President Nechirvan Barzani.Combating terrorism was the main focus of the talks, as well as cooperation between Turkey and Iraq/the KRG. The Ankara-Baghdad and Ankara-Irbil cooperation will pave the way for important developments in fighting terrorism in the coming period, according to Akar. While stating that key successes have been achieved against Daesh in Iraq, he expressed his belief that the parties would gain further important successes in fighting other terror groups.Turkeys foreign policy toward Iraq is mostly shaped and directed by the threat posed by the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK). Akar reiterated Turkeys plan to eliminate this threat through unity and solidarity to ensure border security and peace with its neighbors. Ankara has become aware that its traditional security-oriented approach to the PKK, without a correlation with regional actors, cannot achieve success. The PKK, which is designated a terrorist organization by the US, the EU and Turkey, among others, has long used the Qandil Mountains in northern Iraq, which are just across the border from Turkey, as a shelter. The Turkish army, which regularly conducts cross-border operations in northern Iraq, has targeted the PKKs positions in the Qandil and Sinjar mountains, as well as other locations where the group has a presence.Akar pointed out that Iraqi, Turkish and Kurdish officials should strengthen their cooperation and take a decisive stand against the PKK, while his main reference point was the Sinjar area. The PKK managed to establish a foothold in Sinjar in mid-2014 under the pretext of protecting the local Yazidi community from Daesh. Since then, it has reportedly established a new base for its activities in Sinjar.Last October, Iraq and the KRG reached an agreement to restore and normalize the situation in Sinjar district. The deal was widely welcomed by local and international actors. Turkey also expressed its hope that the deal would enable the reinstatement of Iraqi authorities control over Sinjar and lead to the eradication of Daesh and PKK from the region. Akar this week reportedly discussed the possibility of a joint military operation in Sinjar with Baghdad and Irbil. It was possible to read this from between the lines in Akars statements. We can say that we are determined to wipe out the terrorists as a result of our cooperation with both the regional administration and Baghdad, he said.Several reports claimed that the Irbil-Baghdad deal on governance and security in Sinjar has not been implemented properly, and that Al-Hashd Al-Shaabi and the PKK still have a presence there. Baghdad is already losing patience with the PKKs presence in Iraq and the issues it causes in its ties with Ankara. In recent months, there has also been increasing discomfort in the KRG regarding the PKK, particularly after the Sinjar deal was signed. Al-Monitor last month reported that the KRG had formally asked the US to deploy observers to patrol its border with the Kurdish-controlled northeast of Syria, where US-backed groups have been dominant since 2012.

Ankaras foreign policy toward Iraq is mostly shaped and directed by the threat posed by the PKK.

Sinem Cengiz

Another aspect of Akars trip was the bilateral relations between the KRG and Turkey, particularly in regard to economic cooperation, such as trade and investment. Energy and construction have been the key elements of Turkeys economic pivot to Iraq and the KRG. However, this area is not without competitors. Turkey last month lost out on a major construction bid to a French company. Ankara has recently been at odds with Paris over influence in the Middle East and North Africa region. The French ADP Group won the contract to renovate Mosul International Airport a project Turkey had been eagerly eyeing since 2019 as part of its ambitious plans to be heavily involved in the reconstruction of Iraq following its liberation from Daesh. Turkey, the biggest donor with its $5 billion loans and investments pledge at the 2018 Kuwait conference, was planning to play a major role in Iraqs reconstruction process through several projects, such as the renovation of Mosul and Kirkuk airports.Turkey is wrestling for a presence in Iraq and its northern Kurdish region in political, economic and security terms.

Disclaimer: Views expressed by writers in this section are their own and do not necessarily reflect Arab News' point-of-view

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Turkey keen to expand its links with Iraq and KRG - Arab News

Iraqi political analyst Firas Al-Amiri expressed concerns about the activation of a plan to divide Iraq in the wake of Joe Biden's presidency.

"If this plan is implemented, it will have serious consequences for Iraq and the region," he said.

"The Americans have violated all diplomatic norms in Iraq," Al-Amiri said, adding that the US embassy in Baghdad has become a major military base.

He stressed that the policies of the former US president caused a lot of damage to Iraq, at the top of which is the obstruction of the implementation of the Iraqi- Chinese agreement.

"Ending the American presence in Iraq will not be easy and requires an integrated decision," he said.

"We should not be content with just passing a resolution in the Iraqi parliament to expel American troops from Iraq," he said.

RHM/5129196

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Iraqi analyst worries over Joe Biden's plan to partition Iraq - Mehr News Agency - English Version

The Kurdish community in Iraqs autonomous Kurdish region says that the numbers of suicides are increasing, particularly in refugee camps full of Kurdish Yazidis.

In the last two weeks, there have been 11 suicides in the autonomous Kurdish region of Iraq, the Kurdish community (KDG) in Gieen, Germany, told the Catholic news agency KNA on Monday.

The most affected group are young Yazidis, mostly residing in refugee camps in Kurdish region of northern Iraq, says KDG. The community thinks that the suicides are linked to the difficult conditions in which many refugees in the camp are living; the lack of perspective for the future, and economic and social problems.

On top of all that, the coronavirus pandemic has hit these communities particularly hard, reported KNA.

The KDG has called on the international community to provide more support for these vulnerable groups.

At the moment a psychologist who is famous for working with the Yazidi community in Germany, Jan Ilhan Kizilhan, is researching the potential causes for the increase in suicides. Kizilhan heads up the Institute for Transcultural Health Research Institute at Baden-Wrttemberg Cooperative State University Villingen-Schwenningen (Dualen Hochschule Baden-Wrttemberg.)

The Yazidi community was persecuted in 2014 by the terror group Islamic State (IS) who call Yazidis unbelievers, because of their alternative way of practicing their form of the Muslim faith. According to the UN, at least 5,000 Yazidis were killed in the massacre on Mount Sinjar, with many women and girls raped and or subjected to sexual and economic slavery.

The KDG has criticized the government of the autonomous Kurdish region in northern Iraq for not having done enough to meet the Yazidi refugee needs in their area. According to KNA, more than 100,000 Yazidis currently reside in northern Iraq. Germany took in around 1,000 Yazidis under a special relocation program in 2014.

With KNA

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Kurdish community in Iraq says suicides on the rise - InfoMigrants