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By Brian Keith Simpkins, Ed.D.

In early July 2017, the Iraqi government regained control of Mosul from the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), thereby ending a bloody and destructive nine-month campaign. ISIS controlled Mosul for almost three years after seizing control of the city in June 2014. With Mosul back under Iraqi control, the main focus of the fight against ISIS turns to Raqqa in Syria, where international-backed forces are zeroing in on ISIS forces.

[Related: Understanding the Ideology of Terrorism]

While progress is being made against ISIS in Iraq, it is beneficial to examine the intelligence failures that contributed to the ISIS territorial gains in Iraq in 2014 to avoid similar mistakes.

Erik Dahls (2013) Theory of Preventive Action can help examine the Iraq intelligence failures. In fact, Dahls theory can be easily applied to other notable intelligence failures such as 9/11, Pearl Harbor, and the national intelligence estimate that led to the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq.

Dahls theory focuses on the type of available intelligence (tactical versus strategic) and policymaker receptivity to the intelligence. More specifically, the theory defines that the collection and production of tactical intelligence has the potential to influence policymaker decisions as it is more specific and highlights the need for immediate and/or specific action. Conversely, strategic intelligence is less precise and focuses more on long-term goals related to foreign policy and international security. As for policymaker receptivity, one can easily deduce that policymakers are more influenced by and prefer tactical intelligence. Using these two concepts (type of intelligence and policymaker receptivity), can help explain the pre-incident intelligence failures leading to the 2014 ISIS territorial gains in Iraq.

Intelligence Collection Methods

The first factor of Dahls theory deals with the type of intelligence that was collected by the U.S. intelligence community (IC). Prior to the U.S. military withdrawal from Iraq in 2011, the U.S. military and the IC collaborated to develop one of the most successful battlefield intelligence systems in history (led by the U.S. militarys Joint Special Operations Command [JSOC]), which relied heavily on human intelligence (HUMINT). Both the U.S. military and CIA utilized extensive networks of operatives and analysts within Iraq focused on HUMINT. The CIA station in Baghdad was the agencys largest overseas station in the world during the Iraq War. Utilizing overt and covert (clandestine) collection methods, HUMINT operations provided tactical intelligence on insurgents and their movements, including those of former Iraqi Republican Guard members, some of whom became important figures in ISIS.

[Related: How Syrians are Using Cyber Community Policing to Fight Terrorism]

However, when the military withdrew in 2011 so did the important intelligence assets, thereby creating an intelligence-collection vacuum in its wake. After the U.S. militarys withdrawal, HUMINT operations ended (even the CIA ceased clandestine operations in Iraq). As a result, the IC had to rely solely on satellite imagery and signals intelligence (SIGINT) for intelligence collection.

[Related: Why Overt Intelligence Is Important But Often Undervalued]

The problem with reliance on SIGINT intelligence was that ISIS used human couriers for message transmission (thus nullifying SIGINT) and was able to bypass satellite imagery by blending into the social environment. In essence, ISIS became better at denying HUMINT collection strategies while the IC became worse at HUMINT collection.

As a result of inadequate intelligence collection, the IC started producing more strategic intelligence and warnings instead of the more useful tactical and specific intelligence and warnings. The IC was now relying on intelligence that was overly broad, lacked specifics for senior officials, and provided little benefit when given to the Iraqi army to respond to ISIS.

As Dahl (2013) states, strategic-level intelligence and warnings are surprisingly easy to acquire and are often readily available before major attacks, but they are unlikely to be acted upon by decision makers, and in any case too general to be useful (p. 22). Ultimately, even though the IC raised warnings about ISIS, the inadequacy of the collected intelligence resulted in an underestimation of the will and capability of ISIS and an overestimation of the will and capability of the Iraqi army.

Policymaker Reception to Strategic Intelligence Reports

The second factor of Dahls theory and its application to the 2014 ISIS territorial gains in Iraq deals with policymaker receptivity. In 2014, the Obama administration was not receptive to the strategic intelligence regarding the ISIS threat in Iraq. This was mainly due to the Obama administrations reluctance to get drawn back into Iraq after pledging and ultimately getting U.S. troops out of Iraq.

Further, at the time, the Obama administration was focused on the Syrian civil war and al-Qaeda in Afghanistan, which caused the administration to be blind to the ISIS threat. In addition, the Obama administration felt that ISIS could be checked and rolled back at Fallujah and Ramadi. Despite warnings by senior IC and military officials, the Obama administration was not receptive to the intelligence (which was strategic and not tactical) and, therefore, failed to adequately confront the ISIS threat.

Overall, there were intelligence failures by the IC as well as policy and leadership failures in the Obama administration in response to the ISIS threat in 2014. Based on Dahls Theory of Preventative Action, an attack is most likely to succeed if there is strategic intelligence/warning (instead of tactical intelligence/warning) and low policymaker receptivity.

As illustrated above, this was exactly the situation and pre-incident intelligence failures led to the 2014 ISIS territorial gains in Iraq. Specifically, the IC was collecting inadequate intelligence to inform policy makers (due to the withdrawal of intelligence assets) and providing only strategic intelligence/warning to unreceptive policymakers who were focused on other matters and underestimated the ISIS threat.

The failure in responding to the ISIS threat in 2014 especially underscores the importance of HUMINT operations as well as the need for tactical intelligence and for policymakers to be receptive of, and take action based on, available strategic intelligence when appropriate. The IC must also look back at previous intelligence successes and try to repurpose what has worked in the past. As militant groups associated with ISIS are attempting to gain control of territory in the Philippines, it is imperative that the United States does not let what transpired in Iraq repeat itself elsewhere.

About the Author: Dr. Brian Simpkins is the Principal Investigator and Co-Director of the Bluegrass State Intelligence Community Center of Academic Excellence (BGS IC CAE) and Associate Director of the Eastern Kentucky University (EKU) Justice and Safety Center. Dr. Simpkins is also a part-time faculty member with EKU where he teaches courses in intelligence, critical infrastructure protection and resiliency, and homeland security technologies. In 2016-2017, Dr. Simpkins served as the Program Director of the Institute for Research, Innovation, and Scholarship (IRIS) for the School of Security and Global Studies (SSGS) at American Military University in which he focused on faculty and student research engagement.

Reference

Dahl, E. (2013). Intelligence and surprise attack: Failure and success from Pearl Harbor to 9/11 and beyond. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press

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How Intelligence Failures Contributed to ISIS Territorial Gain in Iraq - In Public Safety (blog)

Canada plans to send more police officers to Iraq to advise and train their counterparts as the war-torn country gradually moves from military to police control of newly liberated areas, including the city of Mosul.

The Liberal government will shortly announce a significant increase in its authorized police contingent in Iraq, to 20 officers from the current four, CBC News has learned.

And the RCMP-led peacekeeping effort, drawing on provincial and municipal officers, will emphasize the training of female Iraqi officers to improve the country's ability to deal with domestic violence and human trafficking.

Foreign Affairs Minister Chrystia Freeland recently approved increasing the number of Canadian police trainers in Iraq to 20 from the current four. The renewed mission will emphasize the training of Iraqi women officers. (Adrian Wyld/Canadian Press)

A senior government official, speaking on condition of anonymity,confirmedthe numbers will ramp up over the next year or more, after Canada sends a fourth officer to Iraq next month to fulfil an earlier commitment made in May 2016.

A briefing note for Foreign Affairs Minister ChrystiaFreelandand Marie-Claude Bibeau, the international development minister, spells out the rationale:"This increase will enable Canada, as a member of the global coalition against Daesh, to build key capacities in Iraqi security institutions and support transitions to new policing approaches."

The Feb. 24 document outlining the mission, approved jointly by Public Safety Minister Ralph Goodale, Freeland and Bibeau, was obtained by CBC News under the Access to Information Act.

The document estimates the annual cost of providing 20 Canadian officers to Iraq at $7 million, paid for out of RCMP and Global Affairs Canada peacekeeping funds.

"As military operations to recapture Mosul progress, the government of Iraq is looking beyond immediate security needs and toward the sustainable reform of its security institutions, including the rebuilding of Iraq's police forces," says the document.

"This is a critical step toward enabling Iraqi police to play a more stabilizing role in Iraq and to manage threats such as Daesh," also known as the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), which has sought to establish a caliphate based in northern Iraq.

Earlier this month, the Iraq government declared victory over ISIS forces in Mosul, the city seized in 2014 by extremists and subject to hard fighting in the last eightmonths.

Canada has been under pressure to contribute as many as 45 police trainers to Iraq, including to an Italian-led police training mission. But the Liberal government has resisted the demands, as Canada had little direct experience of Iraq's policing sector.

But with three Canadian officers now on the ground, and a March visit to Iraq by officials with the RCMP-led Canadian Police Arrangement group, which manages overseas deployments of Canada's police trainers, the government is committing up to 20 officers until March 31, 2019.

The briefing note says some of them may be sent to support the Kurdish regional government in the north.

The beefed-up mission will emphasize the training of women officers in Iraq, where there are only about 10,000 to 12,000 female police compared with more than 600,000 male officers.

"Male and female officers are provided different training at separate training institutes," says the note to Freeland and Bibeau. "Among female police, 9,000 are uniformed and work primarily to search women and children upon arrest or at checkpoints.

"As many as 3,000 [female] officers have administrative duties."

The expanded Canadian mission will look for opportunities to recruit and train more Iraqi women for broader police work.

"Canadian officials have met with female officers and trainees, noting they are educated and eager, though they lack dedicated resources, access to the same training as men, family and societal support."

The United Nations' peacekeeping web page says that as of last month, there were 58 Canadian police deployed to UN-sanctioned missions, with the vast majority in Haiti.

Walter Dorn of the Canadian Forces College applauds the increased deployment of Canadian police officers to Iraq, but says number should not be counted as part of Canada's commitment of 150 officers to UN-sanctioned missions. (Mike Blanchfield/Canadian Press)

Walter Dorn, an associate professor at the Canadian Forces College in Toronto, welcomed the increased numbers to Iraq.

"I think it's a valuable thing to do to help Iraq get back on its feet after ISIS had taken a large part of Iraq territory, and policing is a major factor in creating stability," he said.

But he noted that the Iraq mission is not UN-supported, and so Canada's commitment last year to deploy 150 peacekeeping police officers to various UN missionsstill stands.

Earlier this year, Canada agreed to send up to 10 police officers to Colombia to help in an international UN-led effort to demobilize guerrilla groups and monitor a ceasefire.

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Petrofac wins $100 million in contracts in Iraq MarketWatch LN) said Wednesday it has secured a contract extension and a new award with a combined value of more than $100 million for construction management, engineering, commissioning and start-up services for two International Oil Companies in Iraq. Shares at ... Petrofac shares rise on $100m order boost in IraqArab News Petrofac announces Iraq contracts worth $100 millionThe National Petrofac wins two deals in IraqUpstream Online all 14 news articles »

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Petrofac wins $100 million in contracts in Iraq - MarketWatch

Iraq has announced it's offering financial rewards for information regarding the whereabouts of dozens of Indian citizens believed to have been kidnapped by the Islamic State militant group (ISIS) in 2014.

Iraqi Foreign Minister Ibrahim al-Jaafarivisited India Monday to discuss his country's efforts to find the 39 Indian construction workers with Indian Foreign MinisterSushma Swaraj. While Indian officials remained quiet about what exactly was said during the meeting, Jaafari said afterward that Iraq still had "no substantial information" as to the location or fate of the suspected ISIS captives, The Hindustan Times reported. As the final pockets of ISIS members are cleared in Iraq, Baghdad has apparently upped the ante byputting an undisclosed amount of money on the table for anyone who is able to find the missing Indians.

Related: U.S. ally Iraq turns to Russia for military support, oil deals and nation building

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"There are financial incentives from the Iraqi government for people who help us to locate those Indians," Jaafari said after speaking with Swaraj, according to a tweet by New Delhibased Asia News Internationalthat was later shared by Swaraj's official account. "We are trying to follow news gained through intelligence sources, and we consider that all the Indians are alive."

Rakesh holds up a photograph of his father Balwant, an Indian worker who has been kidnapped in Iraq, at a Gurudwara (Sikh temple) before meeting India's Foreign Minister Sushma Swaraj in New Delhi, June 19, 2014. Balwant was one of about 39 Indian construction workers kidnapped by the Islamic State militant group (ISIS) when it overran Iraq's second largest city of Mosul in 2014. More than three years later, their fate remains unknown. Adnan Abidi/Reuters

Swaraj last week brought up the possibility that the Indians were at the Badush prison, where ISIS slaughtered hundreds of Shiite Muslims during the group's lightning advance nationwide in 2014. The prison is situated west of Iraq's second city, Mosul, where the Indian laborers were reportedly abducted after ISIS overran the city that year. After Iraqi President Haider al-Abadi declared Iraqi forces and their allies had defeated ISIS in Mosul earlier this month, Swaraj said she sent Indian Minister of State for External AffairsVijay Kumar Singh to the northern Kurdish Iraqi city of Erbil in order to investigate any leads,The Times of India reported.

While residual fighting near Badush reportedly restricted access to the restive region, Swaraj said she learned that the Indians had been transferred to do agricultural work before being sent to the prison, and that the Indians may have remained there. A follow-up report disputed this, citing a commander of Iraq's elite counterterror Golden Division, which played a crucial role in expelling ISIS.

"I have no information about the abducted Indians but there is nothing at the prison anymore," Brigadier General Abdul Amin al-Kazraji told The Hindustan Times.

Less than a month after the 39 Indian workers went missing in 2014, a separate group of Indian nurses wasreturned to India after being held captive by ISIS in the northern Iraqi city of Tikrit, NDTV reported.

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Iraq Will Give Money to Anyone Who Can Find the Missing Indians Kidnapped by ISIS - Newsweek

Revolutionary soldiers in a street of Baghdad, Iraq, July 14, 1958. Photograph: AP/HO

Bagdad, July 25

Bagdad is hot but apparently not excessively bothered as Iraq settles down into its new revolutionary mould.

A ruined office here and there, a plethora of posters, a few erased slogans, an armed guard at the airport, an elated taxi-cab driver - these are the only signs you will see as you drive into the city of the Caliphs that the old order has been obliterated and the house of the Hashemites expunged from Bagdad.

Through a placid veneer, though, some of the violence and tragedy of the coup protrudes. A man demonstrates to you with cruel, clutching movements of his hands how Nuri es-Said was dismembered by the mob. The British Ambassador sits calm but anxious in a suite in the Grand Hotel. A troop of Iraqi soldiers guard the scarred British Embassy, that old symbol of British hegemony.

You ask the whereabouts of a well-known official and the Second Lieutenant gives you a sad, wry smile as he replies: That gentleman has now retired. It is a new world in Bagdad to-day. The dear old London buses still lurch down Rashid Street and the British still drink their gin happily enough in its bars; but behind the familiar faade of the city, that mercurial mixture of the sleazy and the brilliant, all is changed and all is blurred.

We do not yet know for certain what kind of a world the revolutionary leaders envisage for their people; whether they want Iraq to maintain her condition of prosperous independence or whether they want to contribute her vast resources to a United Arab State led by Egypt; whether they want to maintain the old special links with the West; whether they are positive neutralists like Nasser; or whether they incline towards the Soviet block.

To my mind the odds are heavily in favour of an association between Iraq and Colonel Nassers United Arab Republic, with all that such a link would imply; but we dont really know.

The New Government, under Brigadier Abdul Karim Kassem, has done so many things in so short a time, has upset so many rigidities, and has instituted so many innovations that it is difficult to descry for certain the shape of its policies. It has for example, expressed its regrets to Britain for the assault on the Embassy and has stuck outside the ruined consulate a reproving message to the mob You should not have done this: these are your friends. The Embassy will probably be functioning again in its own building in a few days.

Relations with West It has expressed its admiration for Nasser, but it has reportedly made clear that it intends to preserve the national independence of Iraq. It has dissolved the Arab Union with Jordan, but maintains that the revolution was purely an internal convulsion that will not affect the welcome to journalists from the West. Its relationship with the Western Powers is obviously a peculiar and precarious one, not only because the Western Governments do not recognise it but also because of the Anglo-American landings to the west, which some Iraqis still view as a precursor of a counter-revolutionary assault on Bagdad; yet the Iraq Petroleum Company still seems to be functioning normally and there has been no interruption of the flow of oil to Europe.

Certainly the new Government seems to be in firm control of the whole country and reports current in Jordan of dissident armies bearing down on Bagdad are nonsense. Nearly all the members of the previous Government are under arrest, together with many miscellaneous appendages of the ancient regime. Sixty-eight men are listed as persons who are accused of embezzling peoples property. Corruption seems to be the charge most often levelled against the old order. As the newspaper AI Bilad said this morning: The small ruling clique simply executed the will of the imperialists to embezzle our wealth.

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Military coup in Iraq ousts monarchy - archive, 1958 - The Guardian