Archive for the ‘Iraq’ Category

NBC News Appoints An Iraq War Cheerleader As Its New President – Media Matters for America (blog)


Media Matters for America (blog)
NBC News Appoints An Iraq War Cheerleader As Its New President
Media Matters for America (blog)
As NBC News faces growing questions about moving to the right, the network's chairman, Andrew Lack, announced that Noah Oppenheim, a Today show producer who was an outspoken supporter of the Iraq War and has a lengthy history with conservative ...

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NBC News Appoints An Iraq War Cheerleader As Its New President - Media Matters for America (blog)

Iraq Plans For Enormous Boost To Refining Capacity – Yahoo Finance

Iraqs government is ambitious and it wants to make the most of the countrys oil and gas reserves. Plans for an expansion of the countrys refinery network have been circulating for years, but the war with IS has put these on hold. Whats worse is that the prospects for these plans are gloomy unless it gets a significant amount of external help.

Before the war with IS engulfed OPECs second-largest exporter, plans were to add five new refineries to the network over a period of 20 years, starting in 2008. At the time, the refining capacity of Iraq stood around 886,000 bpd.

Since then, the only progress made has been the start of construction of the Karbala refinery, as one expert, the former chief of the Energy Study Secretarial of OPEC, notes in an industry analysis.

In it, Saadallah al Fathi quotes information from an unnamed industry insider who had told media that Iraqs government is planning the construction of not five but twelve to thirteen new refineries with combined installed capacity of between 1.425 and 1.530 million bpd. All this is supposed to happen in the next four years, no less.

Al Fathi is right to be suspicious of this information. He is also suspicious of the unnamed sources statement that Iran will be helping Iraq prop up its downstream industry, but these suspicions are not so well grounded: Irans current rulers are allies of the government of Haider al-Abadi, and it makes sense to suggest that the neighbors have realized that if they work together they may reap more benefits than if they try to compete.

The suspicion surrounding the timeline for the construction of these twelve or more refineries, however, is sound. Iraq is still fighting IS the army has not yet retaken Mosul. Progress with that mission has been slow, but it is being made and we will probably see the terrorist group ousted from its last big stronghold in Iraq later this year.

This, however, will not solve Iraqs security problems: the consensus in army circles seems to be that a prolonged presence of U.S. forces will be needed to help the Iraqi army maintain peace between various religious groups and deal with the very likely resurgence of IS.

This situation is by no means conducive to business. Investors are bound to be wary when they make decisions about throwing money at new refineries. And without external investors, Iraqs refinery expansion plan is doomed.

Related:Is $60 Oil Within Reach?

The countrys coffers have been drained from the war with IS and the oil price crash. Iraq cant even make the most of the price improvement because it has to cut its production as per the agreement struck with the other members of OPEC as a way of propping up prices. It cant wriggle out of the agreement because traders and analysts are watching it like hawks: Iraq is considered the most likely OPEC member to cheat on its compliance with the agreement precisely because it needs more oil revenues desperately.

Last month, Oil Minister Jabar al-Luaibi reassured the market that Iraq will stick to its undertaking in the production cut agreement, adding that it plans to tender five new refineries on an investment basis, and expand existing ones, most of them damaged during the war with IS. Saadallah al Fathi is skeptical the investment basis has been advertised before but has failed to attract meaningful investor interest.

While skepticism may be in order when it comes to war-torn Iraq, it is still the country with the fifth-largest oil reserves in the world, and that changes things. It all seems to hinge on the success in rooting out IS from Iraq and on the success of the output cut deal, which has so far been limited.

By Irina Slav for Oilprice.com

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Iraq Plans For Enormous Boost To Refining Capacity - Yahoo Finance

2017 feels almost as strange as this writer’s dystopian vision of Iraq in 2103 – PRI

Anoud (her pen name) arrived in the United States in late December 2016. She was engaged to be married to an American citizen, so entered the US on a fiance visa.

Catch our podcast: The World in Words

Each week on The World in Words, Patrick Cox and Nina Porzucki tell stories about languages and the people who speak them.

Within a month, Donald Trump was president, and days after that he issued his seven-country immigration and refugee ban. One of the countries was Iraq, Anoud's place of birth.

"It feels very strange," says the writer. Almost as strange as her dystopian story "Kahramana," which imagines Iraq in the year 2103 as a country split into zones. One, the Islamic Empire of Wadi Hashish,is run by a bumbling, extremist narcissist with hints of both Islamic State and Donald Trump. Another zone, Baghdadistan, is overseen by NATO. All sides, including humanitarian groups,playfast and loose with the facts. Would-berefugee Kahramana, whose name recalls the slave girl in "Ali Baba and the Forty Thieves," is no saint herself.

Anoud writes in English, though she spends much of her time thinking in Arabic. Her bilingualism stems from a childhood spent in England and Ireland as well as Iraq.

I knew I had to visit Anoud in her New York home for The World in Words podcast. There, she told me of her upbringing at one stage she believed she was Irish and her blossoming as a storyteller, first in Arabic, then in English. She also told me ofresearch she did for Western news organizations about extremist groups, predominantly ISIS. Her conclusions are chilling.

"Whenyou listen to the Trump administration and the people who support Trump, some of them are specifically picking on the rhetoric that says, 'Ban Muslims, ban immigrants, all Arabs are crazy,'" she says. "It is the exact same way of thinking of someone who supports ISIS, [who]says, 'All Americans are bad; you can't speak English, you can't be a Westerner or you're an infidel.'"

Dark it may sound, but in her fiction,Anoud transforms observations like these into vivid satirical episodes, always with a sting in the tail.

1:40 What the name Anoud means.

2:20 Coming to America.

4:50 "Take me back home, I'm Irish!"

5:20 A gift from a teacher.

7:40 Falling in love with Baghdad.

9:32 "Write in English! Talk to them!"

10:00 Arabic vs English.

12:08 An excerpt from "Kahramana."

15:40 "You're Iraqi, how cute!"

16:50 "I'm obsessed with ISIS."

17:30 ISIS and some Trump supporters: a shared intolerance.

19:50 "In Arabic, the adjectives automatically creep in."

20:30 Check out Anoud's story in"Iraq + 100," stories by Iraqi writers who imagine Iraq 100 years after the 2003 US invasion and fall of Saddam Hussein.

You can follow The World in Words stories onFacebookor subscribe to the podcast oniTunes.

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2017 feels almost as strange as this writer's dystopian vision of Iraq in 2103 - PRI

6 Steps the Trump Administration Should Take in Iraq – Center For American Progress

The ongoing battle to retake Iraq from the Islamic State, or IS, also known as ISIS or ISIL, is one of the most dynamic foreign policy challenges that the Trump administration confronts as it takes office. A fierce fight is underway to recapture Iraqs second-largest city, Mosul, with American soldiers operating near the frontlines of a bewilderingly complicated battle space. Major questions remain regarding how Mosul will be stabilized and governed once the city is liberated, and how a still-fractured Iraq can approach the enduring challenge of national reconciliation.

President Donald Trump has issued a new executive order requesting an anti-IS strategy in 30 days. But the new president has already undercut Americas position in Iraq through his words and deeds. He has repeated his campaign calls for the United States to take Iraqs oil as spoils of war, including in front of a memorial to fallen Central Intelligence Agency, or CIA, officers. And his first major action related to Iraqan executive order restricting Iraqis travel to Americainsults the nations Iraqi partners who have been at the frontline of the fight against IS and weakens U.S. influence in Iraq.

The Trump administrations reckless rhetoric on Iran, including Trumps accusation that Iran is taking over more and more of Iraq, undercuts the anti-IS campaign and undermines broader efforts to counter Irans malign regional influence.The 2003 Iraq war ended a U.S. policy of dual containment of Iran and Iraq, and the fallout from the Iraq war contributed to Irans rising influence across the region. More than a decade later, however, Iraqi nationalism remains strong, and the recent enhanced U.S.-Iraqi cooperation in countering IS has helped reaffirm Iraq as an independent actor not beholden to any other regional forces, including Iran.Trumps saber-rattling against Iran risks making Iraq a battleground for the United States and Iran. It heightens the chances of conflict between U.S. troops and Iranian-backed Iraqi Shia militantsan outcome that would set back the campaign against IS and quickly wear out Americas welcome in Iraq.

The time is now for President Trump to change course and set a more responsible path for U.S.-Iraqi relations. His team will confront policy decisions in its first 100 days that will have consequences for years to come. The good news is that the new administration inherits an anti-IS campaign with considerable momentum. President Barack Obama left behind a global coalition on the cusp of a major military victory in Mosul. With U.S. and coalition support, Iraqis have already liberated most of their country and are now degrading remaining IS sanctuaries.

Trumps challenge will be to correct his early missteps, see the last administrations effort through to its conclusion, and chart a stable course for post-IS Iraq. To this end, the Trump administration should take the following six steps.

Despite having retired generals in his cabinet who have military experience in Iraq, President Trump remains an unknown quantity to Iraqi political leaders; many have concerns about his rhetoric. The presidents incendiary comments about Islam, torture, and stealing Iraqs oil all play directly into the hands of Shia hardliners and Iranian-backed militias pushing for the United States to withdraw again from Iraq. Prime Minister Haider Al-Abadis ability to partner with America against IS depends on maintaining a degree of political support from a range of Iraqi politicians. Trumps recent actions isolate Al-Abadi and empower those Iraqis who seek to curry favor with Iran at Americas expense. Many Iraqis rightly view the travel ban as an insult to the sacrifices they and their country have made to fight IS with the help of the U.S. military. In short, Trumps early rhetoric and policy decisions jeopardize the hard fought gains made by Americans risking their lives on the ground.

Trump needs to reverse course quickly and reach out to Iraqis as partners. First and foremost, he should immediately rescind his executive order banning travel from Iraq and six other countries to the United States. He should then send a trusted emissary to Iraq to reassure Iraqi leaders that the United States will not abandon them. He should also designate a senior official to oversee Iraq policy, much as President Obama did with Vice President Joe Biden. Preferably, this individual would be someone whom the Iraqis already know and trust. Trump should also explicitly disavow his demand that America take Iraqs oil. It is vital to the security of U.S. servicemen and women inside Iraq that Trump sends a clear message to Iraqis that American troops are on their soil at the request of the Iraqi government to fight IS, not to take their national resources. The Trump team should also exercise extreme caution in pursuing any policy revisions that increase the risk of civilian casualties. Loosening precautions may offer expediency on the battlefield, but it risks far greater costs to the overall counterterrorism mission by alienating Sunni partners.

After rectifying his early unforced errors, the single most pressing decision facing President Trump on Iraq is whether to keep U.S. soldiers in the country for a follow-on mission after the defeat of IS. The U.S. military presence in Iraq has expanded incrementally since mid-2014, and now includes more than 6,000 personnel at Al Asad and Taqaddam air bases in Anbar; Qayarrah Air Base near Mosul; and Joint Operations Centers in Baghdad and Erbil. The overall mission has also expanded to include close air support, fire support, logistical assistance, high-value targeting, and embedded U.S. forces behind the frontlines.

Even after IS is pushed out from Iraqi cities, much of this U.S. military support will still be needed to help provide enduring security. Two years ago, the Iraqi army suffered the most stunning collapse of any modern military force in recent memory. With help from the American-led anti-IS coalition, the Iraqi military has since improved and made impressive gains against IS. But Iraqi security forces have yet to demonstrate their ability to protect these gains without assistance, and the battle for Mosul is taking a terrible toll on the units in which America has invested the most time and money.

The U.S. has yet to secure Iraqi assent for a U.S. follow-on force after Mosul has been liberated. The Trump administration will be entering negotiations at a time when American leverage in Iraq is already on the decline. Some Iraqi leaders have already come under pressure to reduce the U.S. military footprint. Prime Minister Al-Abadi has indicated that, The number of trainers and advisers will be reduced immediately after the liberation of Mosul. The Trump administration should expect Shia hardliners and Iranian proxies to aggressively seek to derail a follow-on presence, and Iraqi backlash to hosting U.S. military will likely intensify due to the Trump administrations restrictions on Iraqis coming to the United States.

The Trump administration should therefore quickly assemble options for a continued international military presence to advise and assist Iraqi forces. This presence should help the Iraqis secure major population centers and push IS out of any remaining safe havens. It should also continue to train and equip various Iraqi and Kurdish forces at training centers already up and running across the country. The United States should help encourage these forces to work together to form a lasting partnership to secure Iraq. A continued U.S. presence will also provide a key regional platform for coalition efforts to combat IS in Syria. The exact number and mission would need to be finely calibrated with the Iraqis. But 3,000 to 5,000 troops should be sufficient, while remaining small enough to avoid triggering Iraqi sensitivities.

Such arrangements should be made quickly, before Iraqs 2018 election campaign begins and further politicizes the issue of a U.S. presence. Unfortunately, President Trumps antagonizing words and actions have made the political task before Iraqis who wish to see a continued U.S. presence more difficult. The lesson of 2011 is that Iraqi leaders cannot be expected to push such an agreement through Iraqs legislature. Instead, the U.S. military could remain at the invitation of the Iraqi government, codified under the same exchange of letters that protects the current deployment. The Trump administration must prepare for the possibility that a less friendly prime minister could emerge from the 2018 elections and face pressure to turn away from Washington. At that point, U.S. leverage to protect its core interests in Iraq will be highest if the terms of its military partnership are already in place.

Support for reconciliation must be a top priority for the new administrations Iraq policy. One lesson of recent years is that U.S. military action alone cannot secure long-term stability if Iraqi leaders are unable to heal their divided politics and address the grievances of the Iraqi people. To date, U.S. backing for reconciliation has included support for the devolution of authority and resources to local government; efforts to mobilize Sunni Arabs and integrate them into the security forces; and support for legislation like the amnesty law that passed last August. But much more urgently needs to be done, as campaign politics in advance of Iraqs 2017 provincial and 2018 national elections could further divide the country.

A key priority will be to demonstrate tangibly to Sunni Arab communities that they have a stake in the future of the Iraq. The Trump administration should consider additional resources to support government decentralization, including through USAIDs Taqadum program. It should also accelerate efforts to recruit Sunni Arabs into the security forces through the U.S. Department of Defenses Iraq Train and Equip Fund. As the fighting winds down, the United States should push international coalition partners to strengthen their civilian assistance to Iraq, including support for displaced populations and stabilization in liberated communities. Finally, the administration may need to condition continued U.S. assistance on Iraqi progress on implementing the Iraqi governments formal reconciliation agenda. To facilitate these efforts, the U.S. Department of State should bolster its presence in Iraq, including through multiple diplomats of ambassadorial rank.

One of the biggest threats to reconciliation in Iraq comes from the rise of the Shia militias backed by Iran. While thousands of Sunni Arabs have joined the fight against IS, Shia recruits, mostly under the Popular Mobilization Force, or PMF, structure dominated by Iranian-backed militias, have grown significantly faster. Leaders of the PMF are pushing to formalize their power and structure for the long term.

This would expand Iranian influence within Iraq and risk turning the PMF into an Iranian proxy along the lines of Hezbollah, threatening both Iraqi sovereignty and U.S. interests inside Iraq. It would also undercut attempts to craft a lasting balance of power between Iraqs sectarian and ethnic communitiesan essential element of long-term stability. The Iraqi government must bring the PMF under the chain of command of Iraqs military, not under militia leaders who answer to Iran. It should restrict the PMF from engaging in military operations outside of Iraq and enhance transparency and accountability inside the PMF.

The 68 members of the global coalition against IS are all watching closely to see if the coalition will hold together. President Trump should publicly affirm his commitment to the global coalition and assure its members that they will be treated as full partners.

On the campaign trail, Trump said he wanted to work with NATO to fight terrorism. Iraq is the perfect theater to test that commitment. On February 5, NATO announced that it has launched a new new training programme in Iraq teaching Iraqi security forces to counter Improvised Explosive Devices (IED). The new administration should push NATO to build on this commitment. Trump has said that he would destroy IS by expanding international cooperation to cut off its funding, increasing intelligence sharing, and conducting cyberwarfare to disrupt IS propaganda and recruiting capabilities. These are all necessary areas for renewed cooperation; such tasks should not be Americas burden to bear alone.

IS has left much of Iraq in ruins. Iraqis returning home have found their communities destroyed, and the Iraqi government is overwhelmed by the task of rebuilding in areas already liberated from ISIS. But as the battle for Mosul enters its final stages, the biggest challenge may lie ahead. Stabilization and reconstruction in Mosul and the surrounding, religiously and ethnically diverse Ninewa plain will be complex. Helping locals stand up a government, provide essential services, and resolve disputeslet alone grappling with the unthinkable psychological and social damage of IS genocide and systematic sexual abusewill be a formidable challenge. So far, more than 130,000 civilians have been displaced from Mosul. But an estimated 700,000 civilians remain trapped in areas of Mosul still controlled by IS. The new administration should push donors to fund the United Nations humanitarian appeal for Mosul, and coalition partners on the ground in northern Iraq should be mobilized to assist.

To fill the governance gap, a transitional period lasting up to 18 months should be declared once combat operations have ceased.A high-level Iraqi committee should be established to help oversee the administration of Mosul and surrounding areas during the transitional period.That committee could include representatives from Baghdad and Erbil. A senior U.S. official should support the committee on the ground and be prepared to serve as a broker between the parties.

The Trump administration has inherited a counter IS campaign and international coalition that are in a commanding military position in Iraq. But the lesson of previous wars in Iraq is that such gains can prove short-lived if unaccompanied by political progress and governance. President Trumps words and actions have already made the U.S. militarys joband his ownin Iraq harder.

After criticizing President Obama for failing to preserve gains made during the last war in Iraq, President Trump is now responsible for turning progress on the battlefield into the lasting defeat of ISIS. How his administration navigates the fall of Mosul and its aftermath, Iraqs ongoing security challenges, and the vexing political questions ahead will be important factors in Iraqs success or failure in the years to come. Trump should abandon his campaign rhetoric, repair his early mistakes, and take decisive steps to reassure Iraqis and to protect the accomplishments of the last two and a half years and the sacrifices of Americas servicemen and women.

Andrew Kim is the founder of RISE Stronger and formerly served in the White House as Iraq director on the U.S. National Security Council. Daniel Benaim is a Senior Fellow at the Center for American Progress. Hardin Lang is a Senior Fellow at the Center.

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6 Steps the Trump Administration Should Take in Iraq - Center For American Progress

Memo to Trump: Iraq Is Too Big to Fail – Foreign Policy (blog)

The first few weeks of Donald Trumps presidency have been a political roller coaster for Iraq.

On Jan. 21, the newly minted commander in chief raised his oft-repeated mantra that the United States might have offset the costs of the Iraq War by somehow seizing Iraqi oil. Six days later, he signed an executive order banning Iraqi nationals from entering the United States for 90 days and Iraqi refugees from entering for 120 days. The banned persons initially included thousands of translators and other Iraqis who risked their lives by serving alongside U.S. troops in Iraq.

Though Iraqs parliament issued a nonbinding call to retaliate by banning American visitors, Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi chose to take the high road. Refusing to bow to domestic political pressure, heruled outa reciprocal travel ban in a speech on Jan. 31.

The day before Abadi rejected a travel ban on Americans, the Iraqi parliamentratifiedthe appointment of Qassem al-Araji as the new interior minister.Araji is a staunchly anti-American Shiite militant who spent 26 months in coalition custody under charges of supporting Iranian-backed insurgents and now he is in charge of Iraqs largest ministry, complete with its own special forces, intelligence service, miniature army (the Federal Police), and hundreds of police stations all over the country.

Arajis party, the Badr Organization, has held the ministry since 2014, but the governmentresisted his appointment to the ministership for six months, in favor of a Badr officeholder less hostile toward the United States, Kurds, and Sunnis. That resistance crumbled in the face of the U.S. travel ban. It was a case study in how misplaced words or hasty acts in Washington can have dire consequences in places like Iraq, where America is most vulnerable.

U.S. national interests and Iraq

Abadis statesmanlike restraint which may yet come at a cost to his political future in the 2018 elections is also a reminder of the significant interests that the United States and Iraq share, particularly as the two countries fight shoulder to shoulder in Mosul. Whether you care about Iraqs fate or not and I do, emphatically the country is simply too important to broader U.S. interests to risk its failure.

Iraq is the fourth-most populous state in the Middle East. If you are sickened by the suffering of Syrias 23 million people or worried by the refugee outflow and the terrorist safe haven inside the country, try to imagine how much worse the situation would be with an added 36 million Iraqis thrown into the mix.

This nearly happened when the Islamic State seized a third of Iraq in 2014 but was prevented in large part due to the Iraqi counterattack enabled by the U.S.-led international coalition. Iraq will come apart again, and a new Islamic State-type threat will emerge, unless Washington stays engaged.

Iraq is also home to the fifth-largest oil reserves in the world. Imagine these riches in the hands of an anti-Western regime backed by Iran, which itself holds the fourth-largest oil reserves.

The new U.S administration has placed Iran on notice for its destabilizing support of proxy forces and the expansion of its influence across the Middle East. And nowhere is this struggle more urgent than in Iraq. Since the U.S. withdrawal from Iraq in December 2011, Iranian influence has swelled. The Iraqi Shiite militias supported by Iran have been executing their own foreign policy, acting as an Iranian foreign legion in Syria. Some of these actors Kataib Hezbollah and Asaib Ahl al-Haq have recast themselves as the Popular Mobilization Units, volunteers in the fight against the Islamic State, but their real intent is to fight on beyond the liberation of Mosul and form a permanent Iraqi arm of Irans Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). Other Iranian-backed actors, like Interior Minister Araji, now run key security organs.

If moderates like Prime Minister Abadi are undermined by these Iranian proxies, Iraq will slowly slide back into a Syria-like civil war. The Islamic State or a successor will fill this vacuum. All the gains of the last two years will be lost, and the United States will be driven out of Iraq by Iranian proxies thus losing the ability to directly prevent the re-emergence of a new terrorist safe haven in the heart of the Middle East.

Americas future role in Iraq

The good news is that the United States is not swimming against the tide of Iraqi politics. On the contrary, it has aligned itself with the political and religious mainstream. Most Iraqis dont want their country to be controlled by outsiders. They want sovereignty, choices, and leverage.

This is not what Iran offers. Iraqi nationalists whether they are Shiite moderates like Abadi, U.S.-trained special forces soldiers, Sunni Arabs, or even homegrown Shiite radicals like Moqtada al-Sadr know that it would be curtains for them as soon as the Iranian-backed factions took over Baghdad. Meanwhile, the Shiite religious leadership in Najaf is looking down the barrel of an Iranian gun. When the countrys preeminent Shiite religious authority, the 86-year-old Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, passes away, there will be a fierce scramble for spiritual leadership of Iraqi Shiites, and Iran will play hardball for this ultimate prize.

The semiautonomous Iraqi Kurds, Americas oldest allies in Iraq, can also look forward to a new confrontation with the Iraqi government if Tehrans proxies take over Baghdad. Just as the theocracy in Tehran constantly vents its special hatred for Irans Kurds, so too will the IRGC try to place Iraqi Kurds under the hammer of an oppressive state.

The United States has a much less prescriptive vision thats far more attractive to Iraqis: Brett McGurk, the U.S. special envoy for the anti-Islamic State coalition, has called for functioning federalism, power sharing between ethnosectarian blocs, and a negotiated settlement over the future status of Iraqi Kurdistan between Baghdad and the Kurds. At heart, Washington wants a strong and sovereign Iraq so that the United States can reduce its presence without ceding the country to Iran.

Getting return on investment in Iraq

There is no recouping the young American lives lost in Iraq or clawing back the billions of dollars spent there. But the United States can save itself future costs in blood and treasure by keeping up a modest program of assistance to Iraqi moderates like Abadi and our allies in the Iraqi military and special forces.

Trump should understand that the U.S.-Iraqi partnership is, put simply, a great deal. If he is looking for a partner that supports U.S. objectives but carries most of the costs itself, he should look no further than Iraq over the last two years.

Take U.S. economic assistance to Iraq, for example. Washington played a lead role in pulling together $16 billion worth of economic aid to pay for Iraqs war against the Islamic State. But how much money did America directly put up? The main U.S. contribution was $2.7 billion in foreign military financing credit in effect, a loan to buy U.S. military equipment, which helps American industry as well as Iraqs military.

A strong Iraq led by moderates will become a powerful economy where American firms can compete on a level playing field. U.S. engineering giant General Electric recently announced a $1.4 billion deal to upgrade Iraqs electricity sector, one of a number of megadeals favoring the United States in sectors such as defense and energy.

Iraq is an even stronger partner in the security sphere. From 2014 to 2016, U.S. military commanders assessed that the Islamic State had suffered 45,000 fatalities in Iraq and Syria, with the larger share likely in Iraq. In the same period, four U.S. personnel were killed in action in Iraq. That number is so low only because the Iraqi security forces have taken on the vast majority of the fighting with air support from the U.S.-led coalition, the embodiment of the burden sharing expected from major allies by the new U.S. administration.

The Trump administration needs to act now to keep this formula going. The first thing it can do is extend the Combined Joint Task Force Operation Inherent Resolve mission by at least two years. This coalition of more than 60 nations not only locks in substantive contributions from countries like Australia, New Zealand, Italy, Germany, and France; it also ensures that Iranian-backed militants will have a harder time targeting and criticizing a coalition that includes many of the nations that Iran is counting upon as investors and supporters of sanctions relief.

The United States also needs to extend a new Iraq Train and Equip Fund (ITEF) to support the Iraqi military beyond the end of 2017. The previous ITEF cost $1.6 billion and shattered the Islamic States dream of carving out a lasting caliphate across large swaths of Iraq. This kind of investment should be replicated with another three-year plan that supports the U.S.-built Iraqi Counterterrorism Service and the Iraqi Army, which represent the last, best hopes of resisting the growth of Iranian-backed militias.

This months close run with a ban on American visitors to Iraq was a warning shot: The U.S.-Iraqi relationship is not too big to fail. If the travel ban had happened after Mosul was liberated when Iranian-backed elements could argue the U.S. military was no longer needed then Abadi might not have been able to withstand the pressure. With Iraqi provincial elections due in September 2017 and national parliamentary elections in spring 2018, there will be growing pressure on Iraqi leaders to take populist measures.

When the next crisis hits, the United States needs to be an integral part of Iraqs programs to train and equip its military and bolster its economy. If the Trump administration continues to gravely offend Iraqis across the country, it cannot expect moderates like Prime Minister Abadi to continue standing up to Iranian pressure. And in that case, historians will one day look back and ask how the Trump administration lost Iraq.

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Memo to Trump: Iraq Is Too Big to Fail - Foreign Policy (blog)