Mediaboss Marketing

THE ACHILLES TRAP: Saddam Hussein, the C.I.A., and the Origins of Americas Invasion of Iraq, by Steve Coll

People love to imagine that world affairs are a game of chess, played by judicious leaders trying to outwit each other, acting with perfect self-knowledge and a clear understanding of what their opponent might do. But consider Vladimir Putin, Benjamin Netanyahu or Yahya Sinwar. There can be a tragic mismatch between the interests of a nation and the self-interest of its leaders. The people running the show are people. They act on their whims, and with myopic agendas. They screw up. Call it the frail man theory of history.

This cosmic, unavoidable inefficiency is the real subject of Steve Colls excellent The Achilles Trap, a chronicle of the lead-up to the Iraq war. In telling this history, he offers a useful reminder that Americas omniscience is just as likely to be overestimated as are the capabilities and intentions of most world actors.

Coll, a staff writer for The New Yorker and a former dean of the Columbia Journalism School, has written a suite of books about Americas entanglements in the Middle East. The Achilles Trap is clearly intended as a parallel project to his Pulitzer Prize-winning Ghost Wars, a history of the C.I.A.s role in the wars in Afghanistan. The new book stretches from Saddam Husseins earliest days in power to the U.S. invasion of Iraq in March 2003.

At its heart lies an engrossing portrait of Hussein, which is drawn from interviews with U.S. officials, U.N. weapons inspectors and surviving members of the dictators government as well as what Coll calls the Saddam tapes: 2,000 hours of rarely accessed audio from high-level meetings that Hussein recorded as assiduously as Richard Nixon. The resulting details he assembles give a more intimate picture of the dictators thinking about world politics, local power and his relationship to the United States than has been seen before.

The American side of the lead-up to the Iraq war has been well documented, particularly the George W. Bush administrations megalomaniac ideologues and their intelligence failures. (And the C.I.A.s Iraq operation was nicknamed The House of Broken Toys long before anyone was talking about yellowcake or slam dunks.) Coll briskly moves past those preoccupations, which he chalks up, as others have, to confirmation bias: The United States assumed that Hussein was lying when he disavowed plans to possess and use weapons of mass destruction because hed possessed and used them before.

The richer narrative vein that Coll explores is the other confirmation bias thats been much less understood: that of Saddam Hussein, whose great mistake was in thinking that the United States was all-powerful and always competent. As Hussein later told U.S. investigators about his occupation of Kuwait in the early 1990s, If you didnt want me to go in, why didnt you tell me? Hussein also figured the C.I.A. knew he had no W.M.D.s. A C.I.A. capable of getting such a big question dead wrong on the facts, Coll writes, was not consistent with Saddams bedrock assumptions.

We are having trouble retrieving the article content.

Please enable JavaScript in your browser settings.

Thank you for your patience while we verify access. If you are in Reader mode please exit andlog intoyour Times account, orsubscribefor all of The Times.

Thank you for your patience while we verify access.

Already a subscriber?Log in.

Want all of The Times?Subscribe.

Read the original post:
Book Review: The Achilles Trap, by Steve Coll - The New York Times

The Federal Emergency Management Agency Office of the Chief Information Officer has tracked scores of employees bringing government mobile devices abroad, including to countries like China and Iraq, without authorization, according to a document obtained by FedScoop.

The issue was highlighted in a DHS inspector generals report published last July that pointed to concerns about how the emergency management agency handles the security of government-issued mobile devices.

Among other issues, the report centered on concerns with international travel. FEMA policies stipulate that employees cannot bring government devices abroad, while DHS policy requires the use of loaner devices and that any device detected internationally (without authorization) is turned off. The inspector general found that FEMA was not effectively tracking whether data on devices taken on international travel had been wiped.

FEMA is still working on fixes, originally expected in December of last year, to address the issue, which heightens security risks and violates broader Department of Homeland Security mobile device policy.

The document obtained by FedScoop similarly shows scores of devices detected abroad by FEMA. Many of them were tracked in countries that Americans commonly visit for vacation, including the Dominican Republic, the United Kingdom, and Mexico. But the list which displays devices that had access restricted and were then beginning to be investigated after being used abroad also shows that employees brought government devices to countries that fall under the International Traffic in Arms Regulation country list.

The document provides some insight into how FEMA handles the issue. While most of the incidents are unlabeled, some note that a case was investigated, that there was a tracking action, or a request for comment was issued, a spokesperson for FEMA told FedScoop. The document also displays dates that refer to when there was an update to the device in DHSs Enterprise Incident Database, or ECOP, portal.

If youre a large government organization, I think its always better to err on the side of safety and caution and preparation and training rather than have employees not know the potential risks, said Kristin del Rosso, the public sector field chief technology officer at Sophos, a security and hardware firm. There are different countries that have different rules [and] some dont respect personal privacy If youre in a customs border zone [and] you dont have access to your devices, they can do what they want with those devices.

She said the OIG report didnt raise massive alarm bells but it was good the agency was addressing the problem.

Notably, in February 2022, the Federal CIO Council released the final version of its guidance for international travel and government devices. The guidance establishes that government devices taken abroad risk being stolen, compromised, or damaged physically while also potentially exposing personal and government application data and account information. A blog announcing the guidance noted that both government and industry employees could be targeted by foreign adversaries looking to procure government data.

For a sense of scope, FEMA maintains tens of thousands of mobile devices, the OIG report outlines. The agency uses a cloud-based management system for monitoring the data on these devices, as well as connecting them to FEMAs network. One particular branch of the agencys Office of Chief Information Officer, the Mobility Service Center, is in charge of sanitizing devices that encounter security concerns, while another section called the Security Operations Center is supposed to detect devices abroad.

Ultimately, the OIG report found that 227 mobile devices without authorization were detected by FEMA internationally, and, that within a sample of nine, only two were turned off those two were on the ITAR list. FEMA did not provide the OIG any documentation as to whether those devices were sanitized, according to the report. The audit looked at mobile device management between October 2020 and April 2022 a somewhat distinct source of data from the one obtained by FedScoop, which came from the OCIO and includes incidents between October 2021 and June 2022. Still, the OIG document also shows that employees took devices to countries like China and Iraq.

A FEMA spokesperson said: DHS and FEMA are committed to continuously improving our cybersecurity posture to ensure information stored on mobile devices remains secure while supporting employee productivity. We take this matter seriously and have protocols and tools in place to ensure devices are used securely and in accordance with policy, regardless of location. We recognize the sensitivity around devices being taken to countries with heightened security risks and have specific procedures for when employees travel with government devices.

To deal with this problem, FEMA concurred with several recommendations made by the DHS OIG in the report, including implementing new documentation of device wiping, modifying mobile technology sanitization procedures, communicating requirements to sanitize devices taking on authorized international travel, and updating FEMAs response playbook procedure to require disabling devices taken abroad without authorization.

But while FEMA initially said it would complete those recommendations by the end of 2023, an agency spokesperson told FedScoop that completing them is still an ongoing process. The DHS OIG did not confirm whether it had received an update from FEMA about its progress. The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency and the Office of Management and Budget both declined to comment and directed FedScoop to FEMA.

We take this matter seriously and have protocols and tools in place to ensure devices are used securely and in accordance with policy, regardless of location, said a spokesperson for DHS in a statement to FedScoop. We recognize the sensitivity around devices being taken to countries with heightened security risks and have specific procedures for when employees travel with government devices.

The DHS spokesperson continued: We appreciate DHS OIGs work which showed that there have been inconsistencies in following these policies and procedures in the past. FEMA has completed work to address each recommendation in OIGs July report and expects these recommendations to be resolved and closed following OIGs review of our documentation.

Read the rest here:
FEMA employees brought government devices abroad without authorization, including to China and Iraq, document ... - FedScoop

Its been more than two decades since the United States invaded Iraq in 2003, starting a war that ultimately lasted eight years, cost tens of thousands of lives, and destabilized the Middle East.

Countless books and news articles have been written about what led to the Iraq War. Told largely from the perspective of western officials, most of them have focused on the United States post-9/11 hunt for weapons of mass destruction that we now know didnt exist.

But a new book by Pulitzer Prize-winning journalist Steve Coll provides a fresh perspective on the origins of the war, one that explores the 2003 invasion through the two decades that preceded it and through the eyes of the brutal dictator at the center of it all: Saddam Hussein.

In The Achilles Trap: Saddam Hussein, the C.I.A., and the origins of Americas invasion of Iraq, Coll draws on a wide range of sources to tell a compelling, character-driven story about how the United States bungled its way into an avoidable war with Iraq. But some of the most revealing information in the more than 500-page book comes from transcripts of tape-recorded meetings from inside Saddams regime, including many materials never before published, which were captured by invading U.S. forces.

As Coll notes in the books introduction, he obtained a cache of 145 transcripts and files after settling a Freedom of Information Act lawsuit against the Pentagon with free legal support from attorneys at the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press. He also received additional records from the private archive of scholar Michael Brill.

By connecting these and additional parts of the captured files with other sources, including interviews with surviving participants, Coll writes, it became possible to see in new ways what drove Saddam in his struggle with Washington, and to understand how and why American thinking about him was often wrong, distorted, or incomplete.

Ahead of his book tour, the Reporters Committee spoke with Coll about why he decided to team up with RCFP attorneys for the project, how the Saddam tapes provided the books narrative voice, and what the U.S. government can learn from his research about how to deal with other authoritarian foreign leaders. (This interview has been edited for length and clarity.)

Primarily, I felt that the mystery of why Saddam did as he did was a neglected part of our understanding of the origins of the decision to invade. Our self-reflection and political arguments about the invasion had concentrated understandably almost exclusively on the decisionmaking in Washington and in London about the threat Saddam seemed to pose, about the bad WMD intelligence, about the public selling of the war, about the medias involvement. All of that had been the way that we had come to terms with the invasion and the discovery that the premise that Iraq had WMD was false.

But why had Saddam created the impression that he had WMD when he didnt? Why did he risk his long run in power and ultimately give up his life for weapons that he didnt possess? That was a question that was almost never asked. And when I learned about the tapes and the other records from his regime, I thought that perhaps there would be a way to tell a multi-sided story to include his part of the bargain into our understanding of where this came from.

I wasnt sure. There were a fair number of materials in a scattershot way that I could access to get a flavor for what they read like, what they felt like. There were conferences that had released excerpts of some transcripts and those materials were still publicly available. I thought they were interesting because they provided an authentic and very unusual case study of the thinking and decisionmaking of a dictator in a closed system, one whose actions and thinking ended up having an enormous impact through the Iraq War on the United States. Its just unusual to get that level of real-time transcripts, even in the U.S. political system.

My ambition was to add to the record substantially by filing a FOIA request that could draw out new materials that maybe had never been released or that were no longer available and still seemed to be important.

In a couple of previous books, I had filed FOIA requests on my own and had had slow but good experiences with extracting useful materials. In those cases, I had a sense of what I was looking for. I would send in my FOIA requests like a stranded survivor throwing a message in a bottle into the sea, hoping that something would come back. Sometimes, in the case of the Exxon book, I didnt hear anything for a long time and I thought, Oh, this is just pointless. Im never going to get anything. And then suddenly, these large envelopes started arriving at my home address some years after I had filed the requests, and I would rip them open and discover what turned out to be good and important materials.

This time, I thought, I cant afford to do it that way. I need professional assistance. I have to run on a more predictable timeline. These materials are too central to the project for me to go alone. So I called the Reporters Committee, and [RCFP Senior Staff Attorney] Adam [Marshall] ended up being my point of contact. He was incredibly helpful in just laying out a process for how I should proceed individually as a filer and what timeline to expect by way of the government failing to do its duty in responding, and then once enough time had passed, then we could talk about litigation. The whole plan made good sense to me, and so thats what we did. And it unfolded almost exactly the way Adam predicted.

My hypothesis about what I should file for was partly based on my own experience with federal FOIA, which is not a great system, the advice I got from Adam and the team, and my analyses of some indexes that were publicly available that provided lists of transcripts, tapes, and other documents with short descriptions saying what they described, and they had dates, so I could see when a conversation had taken place. So I looked through as many indexes as I could find, and I thought and Adam agreed that I should ask for files that were listed in these indexes because they had identification numbers that would make it very easy to locate them so that the government couldnt say, I cant find them, or I have to go dig around a warehouse in Qatar or something like that.

I limited my request to items that were indexed, and then I decided to ask heavily for more recent files because, looking at what was available through scholarship and detritus on the internet, there was a real absence of material from after 9/11 and right up until 9/11. There was a strong bias toward material from the 1980s and 1990s, and I think it was because of the controversies around WMD after the invasion drove a lot of the selection process in the first releases of these materials. People wanted to know, What was the history of the chemical weapons program? How did Saddam talk about using WMD?

There was less on the record about what Saddam was saying and thinking after 9/11. And I was very curious as to why that was and wondered if there was a political bias. Maybe the tapes were embarrassing in some way. I cant explain why there was so little of that material on the record, but once I saw some of those meetings, they were very interesting, and I think they worked really well to bring a completely fresh perspective and voicing onto the page in the part of the history that I figured would be the most familiar to readers, from 9/11 to the invasion. It was challenging because it was the more picked over part of the history, and I had these materials to kind of rewrite the history with Saddams voice very much present.

Well, theres some good stuff (laughs). Thats the main headline.

Its Saddams view of the world at critical junctures [leading up to the invasion of Iraq]. Its the totality of his mindset: his concerns, his paranoia, his conspiracy theories, his reading of the Americans. I would say that is probably over and over again the most interesting thing for the audience that I was trying to write for, which I think isnt just an American audience, but an international one as well. How did Saddam see his own adversaries? We had a theory of him, what was his theory of us? He was very shrewd about matters of power. Obviously he had taken power in very rough circumstances and held it under pressure for a long period of time, so it wasnt surprising to see that he was obsessed with his adversaries and with matters of power and competition among militaries and governments, but the way he thought about that, the way he read the Americans, the way he made his own decisions about whether to cooperate, whether to be aggressive, was absolutely fascinating.

The bonus points were that he was lively. He could be a drudge he rambled on about geopolitical matters and no one ever interrupted him because why would you interrupt someone like that? but he did have a sense of humor. He could be charismatic. There was just an energy in his presence that made it easier to write about him.

As a writer, I had the space to try to really empathize with Saddam, and I had the information available to try to do that in some depth and to try to see the world from behind his eyes. I think you cant help but come away with a sense that, in contemporary affairs, even though we may have a surface impression of adversarial authoritarians, the Saddam case cautions that, in such closed systems, there are almost always many layers of truth behind the surface presentation of a leader that will explain much more than whats visible.

One lesson is that it is in our national interest to maintain contact even with our enemies, even when its morally uncomfortable, even when its politically fraught, because these systems are so closed and there are limits to the insights that are available through other means. It doesnt have to be the president picking up the phone and calling his counterpart. But in Saddams case, we didnt have contact with Saddam or any of his envoys through any channel for like 12 years before the 2003 invasion. In hindsight, that was clearly a mistake. Would we have learned if we had been talking to him or his people that he had kind of lost interest in military affairs toward the end and was obsessed with novel writing? Would we have learned that he issued orders to scientists to make sure that all of the weapons were destroyed and that the documentation was eliminated? Would that have caused us to pause and think, Why is he issuing orders like that? Who knows, but we certainly didnt encounter those facts because we had no access at all.

Yeah, thats the answer. There was a conversation between [President Bill] Clinton and [British Prime Minister] Tony Blair in 1998, when theyre talking about Saddam, and Clinton asked Blair, Has anyone in your foreign ministry talked to Saddam over the last few years? And Blairs like, Id have to check. I dont think so. And Clinton says, If I could, Id pick up the phone and call the son of a bitch, but its so fraught in America that I would just be roasted if I did that, so I cant. But I sort of feel like we should be talking to him.

And its clear from the records that Saddam would have been happy to have a backchannel through his intelligence services or through his family members or any number of channels if we had appointed someone on our side to have those conversations. Would they have been very fruitful? Hard to say. But what is the cost of doing that? Not very high. Its only in domestic politics. And Clintons comment to Blair shows you how intense the pressure is in the White House not to be seen as compromising. And its not only about a presidents political or popular standing, its also that, in these cases, as today, we have sanctions regimes in place. And the effect of the sanctions regimes depends on compliance by allies. So there are good reasons why it doesnt happen, but youre asking an important question, which is, what can we learn from our past failures? And one of them is that you really cant afford to be silent if you think that this adversary can hurt you.

Its kind of the only way I know how to do things, to be honest (laughs). Its what I read, its what I have done before. My niche is to try to synthesize intelligence, political, and military history around Americas encounters with the world, particularly our failures, when we go out and struggle in complex and emerging countries like Iraq or Afghanistan or Pakistan. Im drawn to the challenge of trying to get the big picture into the book while making it readable. And to me, making it readable means you need characters and you need scenes and dialogue and action. And you need to keep it as brisk as you can while not compromising on the complexity of whats going on.

Ive been practicing this for a long time. And I felt like what was so satisfying about this project was that I could deliver a much higher ratio of fun characters and dialogue and action than I normally can because the transcripts were so lively, because Saddam was kind of a larger-than-life character, and because there was so much action behind the scenes: the defection of [Saddams] son in law, coup attempts by the Americans one after another, a couple of wars.

Working in this genre for so many years, I dont often have material that is like that, start to finish, and I was really grateful for it. It was fun. That was the gift of the transcripts. They provided a bedrock of narrative and voice and dialogue that is essential to make a complicated history like this readable.

The Reporters Committee was just invaluable to this whole project. It was a huge gift to have that collaboration. They are great lawyers. They are really committed to the goal of public interest work. They were very collaborative and careful to make sure that what we were doing was something that I understood and they gave me good, honest advice. I come from a family of lawyers, I live around lawyers, and so I appreciate them. But I also recognize best practices. And they were just excellent. I also thought they were hugely effective and efficient. We didnt waste a lot of time going down rabbit holes. They know their business so they were able to accurately predict and manage the process so that we got a great result without a lot of distraction.

The Reporters Committee regularly files friend-of-the-court briefs and its attorneys represent journalists and news organizations pro bono in court cases that involve First Amendment freedoms, the newsgathering rights of journalists and access to public information. Stay up-to-date on our work by signing up for our monthly newsletter and following us on Twitter or Instagram.

Original post:
Steve Coll discusses collaboration with RCFP attorneys for new book, "The Achilles Trap" - Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press

In December, 39 Missouri National Guardsmen received Combat Infantryman Badges, the formal recognition given only to troops who have engaged in active ground combat, for actions that took place during their 2023 deployment to Syria.

It was a somewhat uncommon occasion. Taking hostile fire in the Middle East had become more of a rarity for conventional troops in recent years, as the U.S. pared down its missions in Iraq and Syria.

But its become more commonplace since October as troops deployed to the Middle East have regularly faced drone, mortar and missile attacks from Iran-backed militias, totaling more than 180 injuries in 170 incidents.

U.S. Central Command, which is responsible for U.S. military presence in that area of the world, has not responded to repeated requests from Military Times to provide a list of awards for contact with the enemy since October.

Many of those troops in the line of fire have been National Guardsman, as regular rotations in Iraq, Syria and Jordan have largely been carried about by part-time soldiers spending six or more months at a time supporting the mission to defeat ISIS.

Served in Iraq, Syria or Jordan recently? We want to hear from you.

The Missouri soldiers were from 1st Battalion, 138th Infantry Regiment, Army Lt. Col. Rutledge McClain, a Missouri Guard spokesman, confirmed to Military Times. The unit deployed in May and returned in December.

McClain did not respond to a request for the award citations accompanying the badges, which could offer details on what troops downrange faced during the recent attacks.

Guardsmen from Massachusetts, Maryland and Michigan were also deployed in 2023, in a support role that has largely been done with little fanfare, a U.S. official, who was not authorized to speak on the record, told Military Times earlier this month.

The Missouri Guard did not publicize 1-138ths bravery, but members of the unit shared photos of the ceremony on Facebook,. One of the states recruiters then re-shared the photos.

The mission in Iraq, Syria and Jordan is to keep ISIS under control, mostly through special operations forces working with local forces to carry out kill-or-capture operations on known ISIS leadership.

To support that mission, thousands of conventional troops also deploy, taking care of everything from supply to legal services to security and air defense at outposts housing both U.S. and local troops.

The January attack on Tower 22, a small outpost on the Jordan-Syria border, which killed three Army Reserve soldiers and injured dozens of others, raised questions as to how safe these troops are, spending months at remote outposts, with questions being raised after the attack about the level of available air defenses.

Most casualties from recent attacks in Middle East are brain injuries

Guardsmen took most of the many of the casualties in that attack. Approximately 35 troops were from the Arizona National Guard, according to their spokeswoman, Army Capt. Erin Hannigan. Their injuries ranged from cuts and bruises to more serious traumatic brain injuries, including one soldier who returned stateside for treatment, she said.

New rotations of Guard troops headed to the Middle East at the beginning of the year, including the New Jersey National Guard. More than 1,500 members of the 44th Infantry Brigade Combat Team left in January for the states biggest deployment of troops since 2008.

In addition, the Ohio Army National Guards 1483rd Transportation Company, which hadnt deployed in 15 years, and 1st Battalion, 181st Infantry Regiment from Massachusetts, also headed downrange.

U.S. troops in the Middle East are not thought to have been targeted by Iran-backed militias since Feb. 4, following multiple attacks on Kataib Hezbollah facilities and leadership in retaliation for the Tower 22 attack.

We will maintain our focus on the mission that were there to do, which is the enduring defeat of ISIS, Air Force Maj. Gen. Pat Ryder, a Pentagon spokesman, said during a briefing Feb. 20. But again, if our forces are threatened or attacked, we maintain the inherent right of self defense and well take action.

Read more:
The National Guard's quiet role in Iraq, Syria and Jordan - Yahoo! Voices

Iraq (MNN) Religious minorities voice concern as Iraqs government threatens to close all of the Internally Displaced Persons or IDP camps by July 30, 2024.

Its a big concern because theres a huge number; were talking probably over half a million people that are currently housed in IDP camps in Kurdistan, Samuel* of Redemptive Stories explains.

Many people view the camps as not a long-term healthy solution, which is the truth. But it is the current solution, and it continues to be an issue for which there arent good answers.

IDP camp closures are kind of a yearly campaign promise that they try to push through, Samuel adds. I doubt it will fully come to fruition, but some camps will be closed over the next four months.

Most Christian IDPs have already been resettled in Iraq, but the Yazidi people have fewer options.

The Islamic State called Yazidis infidels and tried to eliminate the entire population in August 2014. Hundreds of thousands of Yazidi people took refuge in Kurdistan, where theyre being pushed out of IDP camps today.

Views in June of 2019 around Sardashte Camp for displaced Yazidis, atop Shingal Mountain. (Wikimedia Commons)

For many of them, that means being relocated back to their homes, but again, home doesnt really mean home because thats why theyre in this camp in the first place, Samuel says.

Their home has been destroyed; their home is no longer safe, or they dont have jobs; lots of different reasons.

Opportunity follows every crisis. This is another case where the Church, our brothers and sisters, can step in and fill a need, Samuel says.

If they (Yazidis) are displaced from these camps, they need to be housed somewhere so thats another chance for Christians to love their neighbor as themselves.

As Yazidis return to where they grew up, please pray that this will create new opportunities for organizations to move back into those spaces where they havent been for many, many years if ever to serve in those communities, Samuel requests.

Ask the Lord to protect the children of affected families. The children have only known the camp; theyve been there since 2015, Samuel says.

So many of them have been impacted by Christian ministries in those camps, centers that have taught them English, played games with them, and been in kindergarten or tutors.

Header image depicts the Hassan Sham IDP Camp for Arabs who fled the Islamic State. The camp is located near Erbil Governorate and Mosul (Nineveh Plains) on the border of the Kurdistan Region in Iraq. (Wikimedia Commons)

The rest is here:
Iraq to close all IDP camps by July 30 - Mission Network News