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Travel writer and backpacker Jonny Blair at the Blue Mosque in Mazar-i-Sharif during a 2016 visit: The city the third-largest in Afghanistan was one of the first to fall in 2001 after the American-led invasion

From Bangor, Co Down, Jonny Blair has travelled to Afghanistan, Iraq, El Salvador and many places you may not have even ever heard of such as Transnistria and the Republic of Karakalpakstan.

A travel writer and backpacker, he has been travelling full-time for seven of the past 13 years and has visited around 120 countries many of them currently struggling under the weight of years of warfare.

I like to go to places where there are typically less tourists, or preferably, no other tourists, says Blair, who takes up jobs along the way and blogs at dontstopliving.net.

It gives me an adrenalin rush and a passion for writing about off-the-wall spots. As a travel writer, nothing upsets me more than another boring article on Thailand or Australia, so I try to steer away from that market and find out about a place nobody heard of.

Typically unknown wacky regions like Gorno Badakhshan, Transnistria and Ladonia hit my niche, but the media-hyped danger spots like Afghanistan, El Salvador and Iraq do too. You can even find less touristy places in Ireland - has anyone else heard of Podjistan for example? Look it up, its on the island of Ireland [The Peoples Republic of Podjistan is a micronation in Banbridge, Co Down].

In 2013, I visited Iraq. We toured the northern Kurdish part including Erbil, Duhok, Mosul and Sulaymaniyah. In Sulaymaniyah, I was able to visit Iraqs first museum, housed at Amna Suraka a complex notorious for being a killing zone and house of horrors under the Saddam Hussein regime. I found the country to be extremely welcoming and peaceful especially in the mountain villages near Amadiya and in Erbil. Erbil even has a strip of bars and a Christian quarter, so Iraq is not the complete warzone the media claim its a huge country and the dangers are more prevalent in some parts.

This year, I visited the autonomous regions of Karakalpakstan and Gorno Badakhshan and crossed the land border to Afghanistan. In Afghanistan, I got to play football with teenagers in Samangan, tour Tashkurgan, and visit the home of Zoroastrianism at Balkh and the stunning Blue Mosque in Mazar-i-Sharif.

Afghanistan was brilliant, and emotional. Its a huge country and of course parts of it are very remote, extreme and full of mountains and scenery Ireland would be proud of. Its not a complete country of war and people need to realise that.

Most people live their daily lives as normal and most people are the same as you or I. I was crying when I left the football pitch that day by the Buddhist monastery and it was an emotional sendoff at the border exit bridge in Hairatan as well. I also got to hang out with an Afghanistan former under-19 international footballer and we watched Buzkashi, their national sport [horse-mounted players attempt to place a goat in a goal].

Despite travelling to these countries, the main security incidents I have experienced in life have been in Belfast, or in Caracas [Venezuela] or at the Tajikistan to Uzbekistan border. But the buzz of travel always wins over the dodgy moments.

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'I've been to Afghanistan and Iraq, but main security incident I experienced was in Belfast' - Irish Times

By Isabel Coles | KHAZER, Iraq

KHAZER, Iraq Bushra Mohammed married two years ago in her hometown of Mosul and bore a child last spring but as far as the Iraqi state is concerned she is single and her son does not exist.

Bushra is one of thousands of Iraqis emerging from more than two years of Islamic State rule to find themselves in legal limbo: neither her marriage nor her son's birth certificate issued by the militants are recognised by the Iraqi government.

As Iraqi forces retake territory from the militants, the state is working to reverse the bureaucratic legacy of Islamic State, which subjected millions to its rule after seizing large parts of Iraq during the summer of 2014.

At a makeshift court housed in a cluster of portacabins at a camp for the displaced in Khazer near Mosul, Iraqi bureaucrats are busily converting certificates issued by the self-declared caliphate into official government documents.

"We are changing them so that we can feel like citizens again," said 20-year-old Bushra, her infant child tugging at the bottom of her abaya. "(Islamic State) are not a state: this is a state."

Despite the violence and privation that came with Islamic State rule, life went on in Mosul and other areas controlled by the militants: people married, had children, divorced and died.

Outside the portacabin court, displaced Iraqis clutch Islamic State documents as proof not only of their rites of passage, but also of the sophisticated bureaucracy the militants ran in their ambition to create a state for all Muslims.

"We don't recognise Daesh (Islamic State) procedures," said judge Khalid al-Shammari, his suit and tie incongruous with the spartan portacabin in which he sits.

"We are emergency judges, like you have emergency doctors. These are exceptional circumstances."

IDENTITY CHALLENGE

Untangling Islamic State's bureaucratic legacy is proving complex though.

Even proving identities is complicated by the fact most of those displaced by the fighting don't have national ID cards because the authorities in the Kurdish region where the camp is located have taken them away for security purposes.

Divorces pose a particular challenge as Iraqi law demands that both wife and husband be present to terminate a marriage. But couples who separated while under Islamic State rule often end up fleeing in different directions.

"Sometimes one is liberated and the other is still in an area controlled by Islamic State," judge Shammari said.

The procedures for registering deaths are particularly stringent to prevent people taking advantage of the chaos to fake their own deaths so they can escape justice, or claim inheritances before time, the judge said.

Marwa Salem is running up against those obstacles as she tries to register the death of her father, who she said was killed by Islamic State for cooperating with the Kurdish security services.

The militants dumped his body on the outskirts of the village where they lived near Mosul and gave his family a receipt for his death.

Before his death can be recognised by the Iraqi authorities, she must take the case to another court that deals with terrorism cases in a different city, but people staying in the camp are not permitted to leave for now.

THE ONLY WAY

Some people converting their documents in the makeshift court had initially tried to skirt Islamic State's bureaucracy but ended up having to comply.

Abu al-Abbas, 22, got married shortly after Mosul fell but instead of going to an Islamic State court he arranged for a cleric to preside over the wedding ceremony.

His neighbour also circumvented Islamic State procedures, but was found out and flogged by the militants as punishment.

Fearful of being discovered himself, Abu al-Abbas said he then went to an Islamic State court where a judge tested his knowledge of Islam before signing off on the marriage.

"Their way was the only way," Abu al-Abbas said, lining up outside a portacabin to register his marriage yet again.

The process is basic, with clerks using pen and paper rather than digital databases. In one cabin, staff enter details in a notebook which has the word "computer" written on the front.

The judges and their staff hope they will soon be able to return to Mosul as Iraqi forces advance.

"In Mosul we had everything but here we are in a caravan," said a legal assistant, laboriously transcribing personal details from a stack of forms into a ledger.

Two non-governmental organisations - Qandil, a Swedish group that works mainly in Iraq's autonomous Kurdistan region, and the Norwegian Refugee Council - are helping with the process.

Couples registering marriages first have their fingerprints taken. Then they are called into another portacabin where a judge, seated behind a plastic table with two witnesses present, asks for their dates of birth, when they married and the value of the dowry paid to the wife.

The couples step out into the camp and wait for their Iraqi documents to be processed, ripping up their Islamic State certificates as they go.

(Editing by David Clarke)

WASHINGTON Hundreds of thousands of people from all over the United States are expected to pack into downtown Washington on Saturday for a women's march in opposition to the agenda and rhetoric of President Donald Trump.

VERONA, Italy/BUDAPEST Sixteen people were killed and about 40 were injured when a bus carrying Hungarian students burst into flames on a highway in northern Italy, police and the fire service said on Saturday.

LONDON/VIENNA Thousands of women took to the streets of European capitals to join "sister marches" in Asia against newly installed U.S. President Trump ahead of a major rally in Washington expected to draw nearly a quarter of a million people.

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Iraq slowly untangles Islamic State's bureaucratic legacy - Reuters

In a speech at Camp Lejeune in early 2009, President Obama outlined how he planned to end the U.S. military commitment to Iraq stressing his administration would notlet the pursuit of the perfect stand in the way of achievable goals. After December 2011, he predicted, it would be up to the Iraqis to secure their own future. His message resonated with the majority of Americans weary of continued troop commitment after six years of occupation and high U.S. casualties. When Obama took office, over 49 percent of Americans wanted to end the U.S. military presence there as soon as possible. By October 2011, two months before the last soldier would depart Iraq, three quarters of Americans approved of Obamas withdrawal plan.

Critics of the 2011 withdrawal often forget that the presidents timeline, while fueled by the American peoples desire to put Iraq in the past, was in fact already determined by the Status of Forces Agreement set by the Bush administration in 2008. Then Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki described the deal thus: The incomplete sovereignty and presence of foreign troops are the most dangerous, most complicated, and most burdensome legacy we have faced since the time of dictatorship. Iraq should get rid of them to protect its young democratic experiment.

In 2009, Obama hoped to amend the Status of Forces Agreement to leave a residual U.S. presence to assist Iraqi forces. Maliki, however, refused to grant these soldiers immunity from prosecution. For many observers, this outcome seemed to politically suit the White House. In December 2011, State Department lawyers concluded that without approval from the Iraqi Parliament, American soldiers could not stay in the country.Malikis obstinancy aided his sectarian agenda that favored Shia communities.The leverage that the military presence afforded U.S. diplomats weakened, leaving Maliki increasingly unchecked. He reinforced his grip on the Iraqi militarys Special Forces, turning them into a private militia used to intimidate dissenters and ensure loyalty from the intelligence and judicial services.

In 2013, anger and discontent among Sunni populations sparked nationwide and peaceful protests against Malikis policies in 2013. Rather than take advantage of this opportunity to engage in dialogue with this well-organized movement, Obama turned his attention away from Iraq. During the first two years of his second term, the president did not make any substantive comment about Iraq, and in June 2013, he proposed 70 to 95 percent cuts in U.S. funding for Iraqi peacebuilding, human rights, and civil society.

By that time, Malikis security forces had cracked down violently on protesters in Hawija a Sunni Arab town in northern Iraq now controlled by ISIS killing at least 42 unarmed civilians. As one demonstrator told NPR, For a year, we did not attack anyone; we were an example of democracy on an international level....The world simply turned its face from us and gave Maliki the permission to attack the demonstrations and kill innocent demonstrators. The international Crisis Groups Joost Hiltermann would later call Hawija a poster child for all the ills that would facilitate the [ISIS] takeover one year later. With silence from Washington and seemingly no protection from international or Iraqi leaders, many Sunnis returned to an insurgency that had largely been crushed in 2011.

The two years following ISISs emergence in 2014 have witnessed Obamas reengagement with Iraqs challenges and political leaders. Learning from his mistakes in 2011-2014, he tried to adopt a more balanced approach to protect Iraqi civilians, support humanitarian efforts, and address corruption in the Iraqi government. After ISIS swept into Mosul in June 2014, the president predicated his support on Malikis removal a line that succeeded in ushering Haidar al-Abadi into the Prime Minister role. Since then, the White House has supported Abadis efforts to address inefficiencies, nepotism, and corruption inside the Iraqi political system, while also maintaining a more balanced approach to the countrys many ethnic and sectarian constituencies.

As the fight against ISIS in northern Iraq grinds on, lessons learned since 2011 that military and political disengagement can have tragic results should guide Washingtons policy in Baghdad. Iraq today faces daunting challenges as it defends against ongoing insurgency, rebuilds a shattered country, confronts regional actors seeking to infringe on its sovereignty, and manages ongoing economic crisis. The Obama administration has taken important steps to support these efforts: boosting the U.S. militarys train and equip program for Iraqi Army and Special Forces, providing continued air support for the counter-ISIS fight, pledging funds to help clear mines and debris from liberated areas, implementing civil society programs through USAID, and holding pledging conferences to encourage other nations to contribute as well.

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Obama's legacy in Iraq - The Hill (blog)

Habib al-Sadr, director general of Iraq's biggest television company, Al-Iraqiya, answers questions during an interview with AFP at his Iraqi Media Network company headquarters, Baghdad, Iraq, Aug. 23, 2007. (photo byAHMAD AL-RUBAYE/AFP/Getty Images)

Author:Mustafa Saadoun Posted January 20, 2017

BAGHDAD As Egypt and Saudi Arabia remain at odds, Iraq and Iran are making their moves to befriend the Land of the Nile and perhaps shepherd Egypt into the Axis of Resistance.

Iraqi Minister of Foreign AffairsIbrahim al-Jaafari said recentlythat Egypt is the Arabs greatest, referring to the country's people, history and culture.

Habib al-Sadr,in aDec. 28 speechas he assumed his position as the new Iraqi ambassador to Egypt, called Egypt "the backbone of the Arab world."He said the countries share similar pressures, and risks from armed groups, and from those commonalitiesarose the necessity of cooperation between the two countries."

When Sadr visited Cairo on Jan. 16, hesaidIraq is keen to proceed with its agreement to export oil to Egypt,which the Saudis stoppedsupplying.Iraq will provideEgypt with 1 million barrels of Basra light oil each month.

Iraqi National Alliance parliamentarian Sadiq al-Mahna recently told Al-Monitor Iraq's influence is growing.In response to the question about whether Iraq will manage to include Egypt in the Axis of Resistance led by Iran, I would like to say that Iraq will manage to become a key player in settling affairs in its regional surroundings and in tipping the balance of power and opening international horizons to end the terrorist phase.

Also on the topic of the axis,Fatima al-Zarkani, anotherNational Alliance parliament member,told Al-Monitor, It is likely that Egypt would join an alliance with Iraq, Iran and Syria to fight terrorism and to stop extremist thought from [harming] the region.

Relations between Iraq and Egypt are strategic on all levels economic, security and political according to Jaafari, Iraq's foreign minister. He agreed that rapprochement between the two countries could turn into an alliance or cooperation to face terrorist risks and economic crises.

Ambassador Alaa Youssef, official spokesperson for the Egyptian presidency, addressed the topic instatements published Dec. 22. He said that Jaafari,during his December meeting with Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, calledfor participation in a strategic project to fight terrorism. This call constituted a step from Iraq to improve relations with Egypt, after Iraqsties with Saudi Arabiabecame tense.

A possiblefirst steptoinclude Egypt in theAxis of Resistancetook place when Iran invited Egypt to the round of peace talks regarding Syria thatwere held in October in Lausanne, Switzerland. Iranian media had also noted that Egypt asked Iran to help it face Saudi Arabia.

Egypts distance from its alliance with Saudi Arabia and its rapprochementwithIraq brings it closer to Iran, which heads the Axis of Resistance.

On Nov. 1, the Citizen Alliance affiliated with the Islamic Supreme Council, led by Ammar al-Hakim,called for using the Iraqi-Egyptian rapprochement to form an alliance including Iran and Algeria to face the Sunni axis of Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Qatar.

The Citizen Alliances call was among the proposals of influential Shiite political parties in Iraq that are part of the current government and the same alliance to which Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi and Jaafari belong.

Each member of the Axis of Resistance mustparticipate officially and unofficially in the battle against armed groups fighting President Bashar al-Assads regime in Syria. Egypt had sent young men affiliated with its forces to the Syrian battle unofficially and became part of the conflict in Syria.

Iran is pushing to make Iraq the main brokerof Egypts inclusion in the Axis of Resistance. This would allow Egypt to benefit from several resources it had been missing, like the oil it is now receiving from Iraq.

The Iraqi-Egyptian rapprochement will benefit Egypt more than Iraq, as their alliancemight pull Iraq away from the Gulf Cooperation Council, specifically from Saudi Arabia, which has the final say in Gulf matters. Meanwhile, Egypt will enjoy as much oil as it needs at a lower cost, compared to Saudipricing.

If Egypt joins the Axis of Resistance, whose stances in the Middle East are well known, it will make the axis stronger, as Egypt will be joininganother key Arab state in the alliance Iraq.

Iransinfluence onEgypt and Iraqwill strengthen Iran'sposition facing Saudi Arabia, which has lost Egypt as an important ally in the region. This might stir new conflicts in some Arab states, specifically Egypt, which is likely to be the new stage of terrorist operations.

Read More: http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2017/01/iraq-egypt-iran-saudi-axis-resistance-basra-oil.html

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Will Egypt join Iraq in the 'Axis of Resistance'? - Al-Monitor

By Hayder al-Khoei & Ellie Geranmayeh & Mattia Toaldo

SUMMARY

ISIS has suffered significant setbacks in both Iraq and Libya with the battles for Mosul and Sirte representing potential turning-points.

Without a clear political strategy to guide post-ISIS efforts, these military gains could quickly be lost. Both countries could again become breeding grounds for conflict and extremism, exacerbating European security and migration challenges. This risk is especially high for Iraq given the conflict in neighbouring Syria.

The new US administration is likely to invest less energy than its predecessors in strengthening political orders which provide stability. European states must step up their own efforts.

Iraq will need increased efforts on representative power-sharing, including deeper decentralisation, locally directed reconstruction, and security sector reform.

In Libya, Europeans should focus on broadening the local and international coalition supporting the UN-backed political agreement, in part through economic tools. They should also focus increased economic recovery efforts on the reconstruction of Sirte and Benghazi.

POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

In Iraq:

Refocus from humanitarian aid to economic development: the EU and its member states should agree on a timeline to gradually shift existing economic stabilisation funds for Iraq towards development programmes that aim to promote job creation and long-term investment in the country.

Support decentralisation efforts led by Baghdad: European actors should support the Iraqi central government in its efforts to roll out a process of decentralisation.

Push for political progress within the KRG: European states should, for example, press for greater transparency in government spending and oil exports.

Reform the security sector: European member states should work together with the central government through increased financial aid and training to bolster and professionalise the Iraqi security and intelligence apparatus.

Fill potential gaps in US-Iran channels: European member states such as the UK, France and Germany will become important players in defusing areas of tensions between Tehran and Washington that could provoke over-reactions against one anothers military positions in Iraq.

In Libya:

Strengthen the political coalition behind Tripolis government: the EU and its member states, through bilateral and multilateral mediation and engagement with Libyan political actors, could work to expand the coalition-backing unity efforts.

Help Libyans build a decentralised state: the EU should help to (1) unlock funds from the central government for municipalities; (2) encourage coordination and provide advice and recommendations on best practice; (3) promote capacity-building through on the job training in Europe for Libyan civil servants.

Support deep reconciliation efforts: EU member states should provide logistical support or adopt tracks of dialogue similar to those pursued in the past by countries undergoing democratic transition, like Spain or Bulgaria.

Pursue military de-escalation: the EU and its member states should support efforts to reach a military deal between different actors in western and southern Libya.

Conclude an economic deal to keep the country united: the EU and its member states must give concrete support to a deal that saves the country from economic collapse while addressing the legitimate concerns of eastern Libya about marginalisation within a unified Libya.

Do not forget Sirte (and Benghazi): de-mining, humanitarian relief, and building the conditions for the safe return of IDPs are priorities not just for Sirtes residents but also for the stability of the rest of western Libya.

Deal with regional powers and Russia through the UNSC, and set up an EU member state contact group: its main policy should be to preserve the architecture of resolutions and agreements negotiated by the UN and approved by the UNSC over the past two years with the support of the US, Egypt and Russia.

INTRODUCTION

2016 was not a good year for the Islamic State group (ISIS). Under a military onslaught from the United States-led Global Coalition against ISIS and its local allies, ISIS lost vast territory and thousands of fighters in Iraq, Libya and Syria. This is welcome news, but, as ISISs grip on territory loosens, the perhaps more difficult task of establishing a new political order begins. In recent years we have learned to our cost that counter-terrorism without stabilisation simply does not work. Without a sustained international effort to address the political and economic grievances that gave rise to ISIS a new wave of extremism and conflict will surely follow.

This problem presents itself most immediately in Iraq and Libya, both of which may soon be free of all ISIS territorial control. The potential for renewed conflict in these countries is increased by power rivalries between competing armed political and militia factions. Many of these factions find support from regional powers, which, having fought hard to counter ISIS, now want to retain a degree of influence in the liberated areas.

In such circumstances, it is simply not enough to establish a new government, call it inclusive, hold some elections and then leave the country to stew in economic, political, sectarian and security problems. Greater instability in Iraq and Libya is possible if the post-ISIS transition does not deal with the core drivers of extremist forces, or if regional rivalries provoke further conflict among the forces that defeated ISIS.

The incoming administration of Donald Trump in the United States has evinced little interest in investing in the political stabilisation that the region and by extension Europe needs. In that case, the need for a strong European role and intensified political engagement will become more urgent and critical. While the US has the luxury of distance, European countries cannot ignore such a toxic mix of geopolitical rivalry, extremism, and human suffering on their borders. Some European Union member states recognise the importance and urgency of committing to a stabilisation effort; others are still too complacent.

In Iraq, neither the EU nor any of its member states will be the leading external players. There are, nevertheless, openings to bolster Iraqi security forces and provide willing political actors with expertise on capacity-building and on decentralising power. Member states that have supported the anti-ISIS coalition can now shift their efforts into immediate and longer-term stabilisation efforts.

In Libya, there is more space for Europe to play a lead role by using existing United Nations Security Council resolutions and UN-backed agreements. Economic stabilisation and mediation, two issues on which the EU has some leverage in Libya, could play a key role in avoiding a new escalation between the forces that support the government in Tripoli and Khalifa Haftars Libyan National Army (LNA).

As crucial military operations against ISIS in Mosul and Sirte near their end, this paper looks at where the EU and its member states can play a meaningful role in dealing with the coming challenges. In the case of both Iraq and Libya, the paper proposes recommendations for how the EU and its member states can develop an effective stabilisation policy. It concludes with four over-arching principles for European actors to follow throughout the post-ISIS space in the Middle East and North Africa, including in Syria.

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After ISIS: How to Win the Peace in Iraq and Libya - ReliefWeb