Mediaboss Marketing

In a speech at Camp Lejeune in early 2009, President Obama outlined how he planned to end the U.S. military commitment to Iraq stressing his administration would notlet the pursuit of the perfect stand in the way of achievable goals. After December 2011, he predicted, it would be up to the Iraqis to secure their own future. His message resonated with the majority of Americans weary of continued troop commitment after six years of occupation and high U.S. casualties. When Obama took office, over 49 percent of Americans wanted to end the U.S. military presence there as soon as possible. By October 2011, two months before the last soldier would depart Iraq, three quarters of Americans approved of Obamas withdrawal plan.

Critics of the 2011 withdrawal often forget that the presidents timeline, while fueled by the American peoples desire to put Iraq in the past, was in fact already determined by the Status of Forces Agreement set by the Bush administration in 2008. Then Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki described the deal thus: The incomplete sovereignty and presence of foreign troops are the most dangerous, most complicated, and most burdensome legacy we have faced since the time of dictatorship. Iraq should get rid of them to protect its young democratic experiment.

In 2009, Obama hoped to amend the Status of Forces Agreement to leave a residual U.S. presence to assist Iraqi forces. Maliki, however, refused to grant these soldiers immunity from prosecution. For many observers, this outcome seemed to politically suit the White House. In December 2011, State Department lawyers concluded that without approval from the Iraqi Parliament, American soldiers could not stay in the country.Malikis obstinancy aided his sectarian agenda that favored Shia communities.The leverage that the military presence afforded U.S. diplomats weakened, leaving Maliki increasingly unchecked. He reinforced his grip on the Iraqi militarys Special Forces, turning them into a private militia used to intimidate dissenters and ensure loyalty from the intelligence and judicial services.

In 2013, anger and discontent among Sunni populations sparked nationwide and peaceful protests against Malikis policies in 2013. Rather than take advantage of this opportunity to engage in dialogue with this well-organized movement, Obama turned his attention away from Iraq. During the first two years of his second term, the president did not make any substantive comment about Iraq, and in June 2013, he proposed 70 to 95 percent cuts in U.S. funding for Iraqi peacebuilding, human rights, and civil society.

By that time, Malikis security forces had cracked down violently on protesters in Hawija a Sunni Arab town in northern Iraq now controlled by ISIS killing at least 42 unarmed civilians. As one demonstrator told NPR, For a year, we did not attack anyone; we were an example of democracy on an international level....The world simply turned its face from us and gave Maliki the permission to attack the demonstrations and kill innocent demonstrators. The international Crisis Groups Joost Hiltermann would later call Hawija a poster child for all the ills that would facilitate the [ISIS] takeover one year later. With silence from Washington and seemingly no protection from international or Iraqi leaders, many Sunnis returned to an insurgency that had largely been crushed in 2011.

The two years following ISISs emergence in 2014 have witnessed Obamas reengagement with Iraqs challenges and political leaders. Learning from his mistakes in 2011-2014, he tried to adopt a more balanced approach to protect Iraqi civilians, support humanitarian efforts, and address corruption in the Iraqi government. After ISIS swept into Mosul in June 2014, the president predicated his support on Malikis removal a line that succeeded in ushering Haidar al-Abadi into the Prime Minister role. Since then, the White House has supported Abadis efforts to address inefficiencies, nepotism, and corruption inside the Iraqi political system, while also maintaining a more balanced approach to the countrys many ethnic and sectarian constituencies.

As the fight against ISIS in northern Iraq grinds on, lessons learned since 2011 that military and political disengagement can have tragic results should guide Washingtons policy in Baghdad. Iraq today faces daunting challenges as it defends against ongoing insurgency, rebuilds a shattered country, confronts regional actors seeking to infringe on its sovereignty, and manages ongoing economic crisis. The Obama administration has taken important steps to support these efforts: boosting the U.S. militarys train and equip program for Iraqi Army and Special Forces, providing continued air support for the counter-ISIS fight, pledging funds to help clear mines and debris from liberated areas, implementing civil society programs through USAID, and holding pledging conferences to encourage other nations to contribute as well.

See original here:
Obama's legacy in Iraq - The Hill (blog)

Habib al-Sadr, director general of Iraq's biggest television company, Al-Iraqiya, answers questions during an interview with AFP at his Iraqi Media Network company headquarters, Baghdad, Iraq, Aug. 23, 2007. (photo byAHMAD AL-RUBAYE/AFP/Getty Images)

Author:Mustafa Saadoun Posted January 20, 2017

BAGHDAD As Egypt and Saudi Arabia remain at odds, Iraq and Iran are making their moves to befriend the Land of the Nile and perhaps shepherd Egypt into the Axis of Resistance.

Iraqi Minister of Foreign AffairsIbrahim al-Jaafari said recentlythat Egypt is the Arabs greatest, referring to the country's people, history and culture.

Habib al-Sadr,in aDec. 28 speechas he assumed his position as the new Iraqi ambassador to Egypt, called Egypt "the backbone of the Arab world."He said the countries share similar pressures, and risks from armed groups, and from those commonalitiesarose the necessity of cooperation between the two countries."

When Sadr visited Cairo on Jan. 16, hesaidIraq is keen to proceed with its agreement to export oil to Egypt,which the Saudis stoppedsupplying.Iraq will provideEgypt with 1 million barrels of Basra light oil each month.

Iraqi National Alliance parliamentarian Sadiq al-Mahna recently told Al-Monitor Iraq's influence is growing.In response to the question about whether Iraq will manage to include Egypt in the Axis of Resistance led by Iran, I would like to say that Iraq will manage to become a key player in settling affairs in its regional surroundings and in tipping the balance of power and opening international horizons to end the terrorist phase.

Also on the topic of the axis,Fatima al-Zarkani, anotherNational Alliance parliament member,told Al-Monitor, It is likely that Egypt would join an alliance with Iraq, Iran and Syria to fight terrorism and to stop extremist thought from [harming] the region.

Relations between Iraq and Egypt are strategic on all levels economic, security and political according to Jaafari, Iraq's foreign minister. He agreed that rapprochement between the two countries could turn into an alliance or cooperation to face terrorist risks and economic crises.

Ambassador Alaa Youssef, official spokesperson for the Egyptian presidency, addressed the topic instatements published Dec. 22. He said that Jaafari,during his December meeting with Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, calledfor participation in a strategic project to fight terrorism. This call constituted a step from Iraq to improve relations with Egypt, after Iraqsties with Saudi Arabiabecame tense.

A possiblefirst steptoinclude Egypt in theAxis of Resistancetook place when Iran invited Egypt to the round of peace talks regarding Syria thatwere held in October in Lausanne, Switzerland. Iranian media had also noted that Egypt asked Iran to help it face Saudi Arabia.

Egypts distance from its alliance with Saudi Arabia and its rapprochementwithIraq brings it closer to Iran, which heads the Axis of Resistance.

On Nov. 1, the Citizen Alliance affiliated with the Islamic Supreme Council, led by Ammar al-Hakim,called for using the Iraqi-Egyptian rapprochement to form an alliance including Iran and Algeria to face the Sunni axis of Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Qatar.

The Citizen Alliances call was among the proposals of influential Shiite political parties in Iraq that are part of the current government and the same alliance to which Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi and Jaafari belong.

Each member of the Axis of Resistance mustparticipate officially and unofficially in the battle against armed groups fighting President Bashar al-Assads regime in Syria. Egypt had sent young men affiliated with its forces to the Syrian battle unofficially and became part of the conflict in Syria.

Iran is pushing to make Iraq the main brokerof Egypts inclusion in the Axis of Resistance. This would allow Egypt to benefit from several resources it had been missing, like the oil it is now receiving from Iraq.

The Iraqi-Egyptian rapprochement will benefit Egypt more than Iraq, as their alliancemight pull Iraq away from the Gulf Cooperation Council, specifically from Saudi Arabia, which has the final say in Gulf matters. Meanwhile, Egypt will enjoy as much oil as it needs at a lower cost, compared to Saudipricing.

If Egypt joins the Axis of Resistance, whose stances in the Middle East are well known, it will make the axis stronger, as Egypt will be joininganother key Arab state in the alliance Iraq.

Iransinfluence onEgypt and Iraqwill strengthen Iran'sposition facing Saudi Arabia, which has lost Egypt as an important ally in the region. This might stir new conflicts in some Arab states, specifically Egypt, which is likely to be the new stage of terrorist operations.

Read More: http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2017/01/iraq-egypt-iran-saudi-axis-resistance-basra-oil.html

Continue reading here:
Will Egypt join Iraq in the 'Axis of Resistance'? - Al-Monitor

By Hayder al-Khoei & Ellie Geranmayeh & Mattia Toaldo

SUMMARY

ISIS has suffered significant setbacks in both Iraq and Libya with the battles for Mosul and Sirte representing potential turning-points.

Without a clear political strategy to guide post-ISIS efforts, these military gains could quickly be lost. Both countries could again become breeding grounds for conflict and extremism, exacerbating European security and migration challenges. This risk is especially high for Iraq given the conflict in neighbouring Syria.

The new US administration is likely to invest less energy than its predecessors in strengthening political orders which provide stability. European states must step up their own efforts.

Iraq will need increased efforts on representative power-sharing, including deeper decentralisation, locally directed reconstruction, and security sector reform.

In Libya, Europeans should focus on broadening the local and international coalition supporting the UN-backed political agreement, in part through economic tools. They should also focus increased economic recovery efforts on the reconstruction of Sirte and Benghazi.

POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

In Iraq:

Refocus from humanitarian aid to economic development: the EU and its member states should agree on a timeline to gradually shift existing economic stabilisation funds for Iraq towards development programmes that aim to promote job creation and long-term investment in the country.

Support decentralisation efforts led by Baghdad: European actors should support the Iraqi central government in its efforts to roll out a process of decentralisation.

Push for political progress within the KRG: European states should, for example, press for greater transparency in government spending and oil exports.

Reform the security sector: European member states should work together with the central government through increased financial aid and training to bolster and professionalise the Iraqi security and intelligence apparatus.

Fill potential gaps in US-Iran channels: European member states such as the UK, France and Germany will become important players in defusing areas of tensions between Tehran and Washington that could provoke over-reactions against one anothers military positions in Iraq.

In Libya:

Strengthen the political coalition behind Tripolis government: the EU and its member states, through bilateral and multilateral mediation and engagement with Libyan political actors, could work to expand the coalition-backing unity efforts.

Help Libyans build a decentralised state: the EU should help to (1) unlock funds from the central government for municipalities; (2) encourage coordination and provide advice and recommendations on best practice; (3) promote capacity-building through on the job training in Europe for Libyan civil servants.

Support deep reconciliation efforts: EU member states should provide logistical support or adopt tracks of dialogue similar to those pursued in the past by countries undergoing democratic transition, like Spain or Bulgaria.

Pursue military de-escalation: the EU and its member states should support efforts to reach a military deal between different actors in western and southern Libya.

Conclude an economic deal to keep the country united: the EU and its member states must give concrete support to a deal that saves the country from economic collapse while addressing the legitimate concerns of eastern Libya about marginalisation within a unified Libya.

Do not forget Sirte (and Benghazi): de-mining, humanitarian relief, and building the conditions for the safe return of IDPs are priorities not just for Sirtes residents but also for the stability of the rest of western Libya.

Deal with regional powers and Russia through the UNSC, and set up an EU member state contact group: its main policy should be to preserve the architecture of resolutions and agreements negotiated by the UN and approved by the UNSC over the past two years with the support of the US, Egypt and Russia.

INTRODUCTION

2016 was not a good year for the Islamic State group (ISIS). Under a military onslaught from the United States-led Global Coalition against ISIS and its local allies, ISIS lost vast territory and thousands of fighters in Iraq, Libya and Syria. This is welcome news, but, as ISISs grip on territory loosens, the perhaps more difficult task of establishing a new political order begins. In recent years we have learned to our cost that counter-terrorism without stabilisation simply does not work. Without a sustained international effort to address the political and economic grievances that gave rise to ISIS a new wave of extremism and conflict will surely follow.

This problem presents itself most immediately in Iraq and Libya, both of which may soon be free of all ISIS territorial control. The potential for renewed conflict in these countries is increased by power rivalries between competing armed political and militia factions. Many of these factions find support from regional powers, which, having fought hard to counter ISIS, now want to retain a degree of influence in the liberated areas.

In such circumstances, it is simply not enough to establish a new government, call it inclusive, hold some elections and then leave the country to stew in economic, political, sectarian and security problems. Greater instability in Iraq and Libya is possible if the post-ISIS transition does not deal with the core drivers of extremist forces, or if regional rivalries provoke further conflict among the forces that defeated ISIS.

The incoming administration of Donald Trump in the United States has evinced little interest in investing in the political stabilisation that the region and by extension Europe needs. In that case, the need for a strong European role and intensified political engagement will become more urgent and critical. While the US has the luxury of distance, European countries cannot ignore such a toxic mix of geopolitical rivalry, extremism, and human suffering on their borders. Some European Union member states recognise the importance and urgency of committing to a stabilisation effort; others are still too complacent.

In Iraq, neither the EU nor any of its member states will be the leading external players. There are, nevertheless, openings to bolster Iraqi security forces and provide willing political actors with expertise on capacity-building and on decentralising power. Member states that have supported the anti-ISIS coalition can now shift their efforts into immediate and longer-term stabilisation efforts.

In Libya, there is more space for Europe to play a lead role by using existing United Nations Security Council resolutions and UN-backed agreements. Economic stabilisation and mediation, two issues on which the EU has some leverage in Libya, could play a key role in avoiding a new escalation between the forces that support the government in Tripoli and Khalifa Haftars Libyan National Army (LNA).

As crucial military operations against ISIS in Mosul and Sirte near their end, this paper looks at where the EU and its member states can play a meaningful role in dealing with the coming challenges. In the case of both Iraq and Libya, the paper proposes recommendations for how the EU and its member states can develop an effective stabilisation policy. It concludes with four over-arching principles for European actors to follow throughout the post-ISIS space in the Middle East and North Africa, including in Syria.

Read more from the original source:
After ISIS: How to Win the Peace in Iraq and Libya - ReliefWeb

A trench near the Christian town of Bartella marks the extent of Kurdish military control in northern Iraq. Photograph: Cengiz Yar

On the plains north and east of Mosul, far from the battle in the city centre, a new frontline is taking shape. Mounds of earth have been heaped above a trench gouged out of the ground along about 650 miles (1,050km) of northern Iraq, which before the war with Islamic State was in Arab hands.

The berm runs from Sinjar, in the north-west, to Khanaqin, near the Iranian border, following the line of Kurdish military control. Woven into it are peshmerga positions, and on top flies the Kurdish flag, a clear statement of the Kurds hope that their role in fighting the war has already secured them a bigger slice of Iraq.

As Iraqi forces have pushed further into central Mosul over the past week, ousting Isis from the university and reaching the Tigris river that divides the city, the Kurds have been putting the finishing touches on what officials in Erbil, the capital of Iraqi Kurdistan, call a military line that commandeers more land than they have ever had in the modern Iraqi state.

The trench and berm, the Kurds say, is a recognition of their role in securing the citys eastern and northern outskirts in the first week of fighting, which started on 17 October last year and is now into its fourth month. Regional officials expect the battle for Mosul to continue for at least three more months, possibly into the summer, despite the renewed momentum of the Iraqi army. Across the river is the Grand Mosque where the Isis leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, proclaimed himself caliph of an Islamic state in July 2014.

Out of the fighting, the Kurds have turned their attention to advancing political goals. Consolidating military gains made by the peshmerga in and around the Christian towns of Bartella and Bashiqa have been central to the plans of senior leaders.

After losing the Nineveh plains and almost losing Erbil as Isis rampaged towards them in August 2014, the Kurds have increased the land mass under their control by up to 40%. In the first week of fighting for Mosul, another 193 sq miles (500 sq km) was added. Were not moving from the frontlines, said one Kurdish official. Especially the hilltops such as Sinjar.

Focus among the participants in the fight to recapture Mosul is starting to shift to what follows Isiss seemingly inevitable defeat. Iraqs weakened central government is hoping to restore its authority in Mosul, with the success of its military seen by many in government as a nation-building measure that could restore trust between the minority Sunnis, who are dominant in Mosul, and Iraqs Shia Muslim majority, which fills the ranks of the military.

Ceding ground, or more authority, to the Kurds of the largely autonomous north has been strongly resisted by Baghdad, which has played a diminishing role in Kurdish affairs over the past decade. However, senior Kurdish officials say the end of the war should mark a time of reckoning.

The president of the Kurdish north, Masoud Barzani, last year failed to deliver a referendum he had pledged to hold in November, which he said would further move the area away from central government control. Facing domestic political paralysis and an economy almost solely dependent on oil, the sale of which Baghdad insists must be coordinated centrally, Barzani has hung much on the fate of the Isis war.

He and other senior officials are hoping that the shared burden of the status quo, along with the newly carved line in the dirt will give the Kurds leverage.

A lot of Iraqi leaders understand deep down that it is gone, that its a lost cause, said the chancellor of the Kurdish region security council, Masrour Barzani, of the concept of a unified Iraq. The essence of this relationship should be one between Kurdistan and Iraqi Arabs, not a nationalistic approach, but a territorial relationship. We cannot live under the same formula anymore. We need to work out how we can be good neighbours.

The line where we are right now is a military line, not a political line. This is the minimum outreach of Kurdistan. We are not going to compromise on anything we did prior to 17 October. Anything beyond that is subject to agreements and the will of the people in those areas. The trenches are not politically binding, but that does not mean we dont have a say in what happens beyond those areas.

The Kurds are hoping that in the postwar shakeout some villages beyond the new, nominal border may choose them over Baghdad, further increasing their hold in the Nineveh plains. They have also insisted that Sinjar, which was reconquered in a peshmerga-led offensive 15 months ago more than a year after they had surrendered it, will not be returned to Baghdad.

About 12 miles from the foothills of Mount Sinjar, which towers above the Yazidi town, Isis remains bunkered down in the towns of Baaj, Billij and Tel Afar. Not far away, Shia militias, a powerful component of the fight against the terror group, are preparing for the Iraqi army assault on Mosul west of the Tigris. To their west is the remaining heartland of Isis, which spills towards the Syrian border and on towards Raqqa, one of the groups two remaining main centres of gravity.

There is a lot in this fight for everyone, said a senior Iraqi minister. The Kurds are getting ahead of themselves as they often do. They always miscalculate. The spoils of war will be divided on many levels when the terrorists are defeated. Everyone will want their share.

Additional reporting by Cengiz Yar

View original post here:
650-mile trench stakes out claim for bigger Kurdish territory in Iraq - The Guardian

Losing in Iraq, Islamic State Seeks to Shore Up Syria Presence by Tom Perry and Laila Bassam, Reuters

Islamic State is fighting hard to reinforce its presence in Syria as it loses ground in Iraq, deploying fighters to seize full control of a government-held city in the east while at the same time battling enemies on three other fronts.

It underlines the residual strength of Islamic State even after its loss of a cluster of cities in Iraq and half of Mosul, and points up the challenges facing U.S. President Donald Trump in the war he has vowed to wage against the group.

The jihadists have opened their most ferocious assault yet to capture the last Syrian government-controlled area in the eastern province of Deir al-Zor, a pocket of Deir al-Zor city that is surrounded by Islamic State territory.

The assault has raised fears for tens of thousands of people living under government authority in the city. Their only supply route has been cut off since Islamic State severed the road to the nearby air base earlier this week.

A military commander in the alliance of forces fighting in support of President Bashar al-Assad said Islamic State was seeking to turn Deir al-Zor city into a base of operations

Read on.

Reuters is an international news agency headquartered in Canary Wharf, London, England, United Kingdom and a division of Thomson Reuters. Until 2008, the Reuters news agency formed part of an independent company, Reuters Group plc, which was also a provider of financial market data. Since the acquisition of Reuters Group by the Thomson Corporation in 2008, the Reuters news agency has been a part of Thomson Reuters, making up the media division. It transmits news in English, French, Arabic, Spanish, German, Italian, Portuguese, Russian, Japanese, Korean and Chinese.

See the article here:
Losing in Iraq, Islamic State Seeks to Shore Up Syria Presence - smallwarsjournal (blog)