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History is beset by military blunders, from Napoleon's attempt to conquer Russia to America's decision to invade Iraq. But do leaders learn from the mistakes of others?

The authors of the RAND Corporation report Blinders, Blunders, and Wars: What America and China Can Learn look at eight examples of blunders -- and four cases where blunders were not made -- with the aim of warning leaders away from future blunders of their own.

Here is the authors take on the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003.

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States like [Iraq, Iran, and North Korea] and their terrorist allies constitute an axis of evil. . . . By seeking weapons of mass destruction, these regimes pose a grave and growing danger. . . . I will not wait on events while dangers gather.

President George W. Bush, State of the Union, January 29, 2002

For us, war is always the proof of failure and the worst of solutions, so everything must be done to avoid it.

President Jacques Chirac to a joint session of the French and German parliaments, January 2003

President George W. Bushs decision to invade Iraq on March 20, 2003, was not a blunder on the scale of those of Napoleon, Hitler and Tojo.

There was a case to be made on several grounds for operations against Saddam Hussein. The initial phase of combat was highly successful, and some still argue that the American investment was worth the cost of toppling the Saddam regime.

Bush was reelected in November of 2004 as much because of as despite his invasion of Iraq. His subsequent 2007 decision to launch the surge did limit some of the damage.

The main premise for the war was that Saddam had weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) and that these were at risk of falling into the hands of terrorists. In the end, however, there were no such weapons, and Saddams links to al Qaeda were unproven. This robbed the invasion of legitimacy.

The insurgency that ensued after initial combat operation robbed the invasion of success. Today, the United States has less influence in Baghdad than Iran does. Iraq is a Shia-dominated state with an alienated Sunni minority, rampant violence and virtually no control over the Kurdish north. At least 134,000 Iraqis died as a direct result of the American invasion, and the violence there continues.

Violent Salafists from Syria and elsewhere have swept through the Sunni areas of Iraq, routing the Iraqi army, seizing important cities and declaring an Islamist caliphate. There were no U.S. military forces available in Iraq to support the Iraqi army.

The Kurds have taken the oil-rich contested city of Kirkuk and hinted at the possibility of separating from the Iraqi state. The United States has been compelled to send military advisors back to Iraq, and it may no longer have enough influence with any of the parties or in Baghdad to preserve a unified state.

Meanwhile, the Afghan conflict was neglected for half a decade. Allied trust in America was eroded, and attitudes about the United States in the Muslim world were poisoned. Some 4,486 American service personnel were killed and more than thirty thousand wounded. The total financial cost by some estimates could approach $2 trillion. Largely because of Iraq, the U.S. public has become very skittish about overseas U.S. combat deployments, especially involving ground forces.5

Major errors included misinterpretation and misuse of intelligence on Iraqs WMD capability, unwillingness to give WMD inspectors time to conclude their work, peremptory diplomacy that damaged the Atlantic Alliance, and failure to properly anticipate what would happen in post-conflict Iraq.

When George W. Bush entered office, nation building was anathema.

During the 1990s, the United States would have preferred regime change in Baghdad, but it settled for containment. The 1991 Gulf War ended after one hundred hours of combat with Saddam still in power. Afterward, President George H. W. Bush signed a covert-action finding authorizing the CIA to topple the Saddam regime.

During the Bill Clinton administration, no-fly zones in the north and south of Iraq kept Saddams aircraft grounded in an effort to protect the Kurds and Shias. In February 1998, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright confirmed that U.S. strategy toward Saddam was containment, arguing that removing Saddam would be too costly and that fomenting a coup would create false expectations.6

In October 1998, however, Clinton signed the Iraq Liberation Act, providing funds for the Iraqi opposition. Later in 1998, Clinton authorized a four-day bombing campaign designed to strike Iraqi WMD sites.7 But the Clinton administration never contemplated an invasion of Iraq.

When the George W. Bush administration entered office, its initial focus was on China and military transformation. Nation building was anathema. CIA threat briefings concentrated on al Qaeda, not Iraq,8 though efforts to have the new administration deal with al Qaeda failed.

Well before the September 11 attacks, officials at the Pentagon, led by Deputy Secretary Paul Wolfowitz, quietly began to consider military options against Saddam. Deputy National Security Advisor Stephen Hadley developed a policy of phased pressure on Iraq, which included ratcheting up many of the measures used by the Clinton administration, such as sanctions, weapons inspectors, and aid to the opposition.9

That all changed on September 11, 2001.10 Initially, Bush, Wolfowitz and others thought that Iraq might be behind the attacks.11 So did a large majority of the American people, a belief reinforced by the speculation of administration officials.

It became clear that this was not the case, as Bush finally revealed,12 but for many this connection stuck. The first order of business was to destroy al Qaeda in Afghanistan, but the case against Iraq moved rapidly to the front burner. Bush indicated that as soon as the Taliban were driven from Afghanistan, he would turn his attention to Saddam.13

After 9/11, the CIA began to highlight Saddams WMD capabilities.

The case for invasion resembled a layer cake. At the base was the acute sense of imminent national danger caused by the September 11 attacks. A rogue regime with WMDs and ties to terrorists aroused fear of a much more devastating attack on the U.S. homeland.

Saddam had shown himself for the ruthless villain he was. He had used chemical weapons against his own people and against Iranian troops in the 1980s. He had invaded Kuwait and started a bloody war against Iran. He perpetually threatened Israel. He refused to implement at least ten UN Security Council resolutions aimed at ending his WMD programs and had expelled weapons inspectors in 1998.

In the aftermath of September 11, the CIA began to highlight Saddams WMD capabilities. The director of central intelligence, George Tenet, revealed eight ways that Saddam might develop a nuclear capability and called the WMD case against Saddam a slam dunk.14

The CIA had missed several indications that might have given specific warning about the September 11 attack and was not about to be caught off guard again.15 Because the Bush administration had not acted on more-general intelligence warnings of the al Qaeda threat to the U.S. homeland, it would take any future warning much more seriously.

This sense of immediate and extreme danger was amplified in the wake of the September 11 attacks by two other events that cemented the link between WMDs and terrorism. Soon after September 11, anthrax spores were mailed to the U.S. Congress and others, killing five people. Intelligence reports indicated, wrongly it turned out, that Saddam had weaponized anthrax, although he was not suspected of initiating these particular attacks.

If the US could change the regime in Baghdad, it might create a new model of democracy in the Middle East.

Also, the CIA received reports that Osama bin Laden was seeking dirty (i.e., radiological) bomb capability, possibly from Pakistan.16 Public concern grew, U.S. hardware stores began to run out of duct tape and pharmacies ran short of ciprofloxacin.

In considering war on Iraq, the sibling of danger was opportunity.17 Some of the neoconservatives around Wolfowitz had held mid-level jobs in the administration of George H. W. Bush. They had seen efforts at regime change work when the United States invaded Panama to topple Manuel Noriega in 1989, when Eastern Europeans cast communism aside that same year, when the Soviet Union itself collapsed in 1991, and when the Bulldozer Revolution toppled the Serbian strongman Slobodan Milosevic in the wake of the Kosovo War.

Emboldened by these successes, this group now saw the opportunity to press for forcible regime change in Iraq.

Meanwhile, there was growing recognition that U.S. military power was in a class of its own. The United States had developed new military technologies and tactics that Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld championed as defense transformation.

These included data networking, accurate and voluminous intelligence, instantaneous command and control, and precision strike. Developed in the 1980s and 1990s, they had been on display during Desert Storm and more recently in Afghanistan, where this military transformation technology toppled the Taliban regime effortlessly and created a sense of total American military dominance.

By contrast, the Iraqi military had suffered contractions of 35 percent in its army and 60 percent in its air force since before Desert Storm.18 Iraq stood no chance in a force-on-force war.

The thinking went that if the United States could change the regime in Baghdad, it might create a new model of democracy in the Middle East. After all, democracy was on the rise globally in what the political scientist Samuel Huntington called the Third Wave.

Just as it was flourishing throughout Eastern Europe and Latin America, it could take hold in Iraq and serve as a model for the Arab world. Democracy in the Middle East would be a geostrategic game changer, foster stability in that strife-ridden region, and provide Americas ally Israel with a much more secure environment.19

The fact that Saddam tried to kill [his] dad weighed on Bushs decision making.

In addition, a new regime in Iraq would allow the United States to remove its troops from Saudi Arabia, where they fueled extremism, and to have another friendly source of oil.20 Converting Iraq from an adversary to a friend could also strengthen the U.S. handand even provide military basesagainst Iran.21

A third and related line of thinking that led to war was a prevailing sense of unfinished business with Saddamnamely, his removalthat needed closure. The United States had been waging a low-grade undeclared war against Saddam since Desert Storm ended as part of its containment strategy. As part of Operations Northern Watch and Southern Watch, the U.S. Air Force flew daily missions over 60 percent of Iraqi territory and was often fired upon, though never hit.22

Other anti-Saddam options seemed to be failing. France and Russia were not cooperating with international sanctions and funds were being diverted by Saddam from the Oil-for-Food Programme to buy arms. In January 2002 the CIA presented Vice President Dick Cheney with an assessment that Saddam had created a nearly perfect security apparatus that made the prospects of a successful coup nearly impossible.23

This unfinished business concerned Bush directly. Saddam had earlier tried to have assassins attack his father while on a Middle East trip. The fact that Saddam tried to kill [his] dad evidently weighed on his decisionmaking.24

The concept of preemptive war was deeply flawed.

Finally, after September 11, forcing a regime change in Baghdad made good political sense for the Republicans. The attack on Afghanistan had bipartisan and international support. But the administration needed to be seen as doing more in its declared global war on terror. By going after Saddam they would be well positioned to wrap themselves in the flag and compensate for missing the September 11 attacks.25

The 2000 Republican platform had already set the stage by calling for a comprehensive plan to remove Saddam, though without specifically referring to an invasion.26 After September 11, the use of force against Saddam would be difficult for Democrats to protest.

From this logic developed a new national security doctrine of preemptive war. Bush made the case for this during a June 2002 speech at West Point, arguing that the United States could not rely on Cold War concepts such as deterrence and containment to deal with terrorists who are willing to commit suicide for their cause. Neither could it afford to wait for a rogue regime to transfer WMDs to others or gain a decisive capability to harm the United States. It had a responsibility to preempt if necessary.27

During his UN General Assembly speech in September 2002, Bush tied the doctrine of preemption to Iraq, noting with every step the Iraqi regime takes towards gaining and deploying the most terrible weapons, our own options to confront that regime will narrow.28

This concept was formalized in the September 2002 National Security Strategy of the United States of America, which said: We cannot let our enemies strike first. . . . The overlap between states that sponsor terror and those that pursue WMD compels us to action.29 The new strategy had general application, but in the context of 2002 it provided the specific strategic justification for an invasion of Iraq.

This concept, born of danger and opportunity, was deeply flawed. The case for Saddam having WMDs turned out to be wrong, and Saddam never had close ties to Sunni terrorists. The preemption doctrine lacked international legitimacy and undermined international trust in the United States.

And yet this flawed concept drove the Bush administration to an early and uncoordinated decision for war, brushing aside the need for analysis, distorting intelligence, marginalizing senior officers who raised doubts and neglecting postconflict stabilization requirements.

Hawks, Doves, Diplomats and the Decider

It is not clear exactly when Bush decided to invade Iraq. Even before the inauguration, Cheney asked outgoing Secretary of Defense William Cohen to provide Bush with a briefing focused on Iraq. Wolfowitz was pushing for military seizure of Iraqs oil fields, which Secretary of State Colin Powell is reported to have called lunacy.30

Rumsfeld raised the possibility of an invasion on September 11, 2001, as a potential opportunity.31 On September 17, Bush told his advisors: I believe Iraq was involved.32 Some in the administration felt that al Qaeda would be unable to organize an attack like September 11 without a state sponsor. With little intelligence to support this assertion, the administration continued to repeat that claim.33

A week after the attack, Wolfowitz began sending memos to Rumsfeld making the case for an attack on Iraq.34 Cheney soon began talking about Iraq as a threat to peace.35 Bush told the British prime minister, Tony Blair, in mid-September that Iraq was not the immediate problem.36 But that changed after the fall of Kabul.37

On November 21, 2001, Bush asked that the war plan for Iraq be secretly updated, which shocked the military.38 By the end of December 2001, Central Command (CENTCOM) Commander Tommy Franks was at the Bush ranch in Crawford, Texas, briefing the President and his national security team on the war plan.39

This early planning did not necessarily reflect a final decision: Some saw it as part of a two-track effort to rid Saddam of his WMDs by using diplomacy and military threats to give diplomacy teeth. But within the next six months, the cement began to dry.

Some speculate that Cheneys change of heart was caused by his bypass operation.

In March of 2002, Bush informally told a group of senators: Were taking him [Saddam] out.40 That same month, Cheney told Senate Republicans that the question was no longer if the U.S. would attack Iraq, the only question was when.41 By late July 2002, the British chief of intelligence returned from Washington concluding that military action against Saddam now seemed inevitable.42

National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice brushed back State Department concerns about invasion, saying that the president had made up his mind.43

The three camps in the administration regarding Iraq might be called the hawks, the doves, and the diplomats.44 The hawks were led intellectually by Wolfowitz. Bureaucratically they formed the leading position within the Bush administration in 2002, with Cheney dominating the White House and Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz controlling Defense.

Wolfowitz thought it was a mistake in 1991 to have allowed Saddam to attack Iraqs Shia population after Desert Storm and had favored a demilitarized zone enforced by the United States. Powell opposed him. In the late 1990s, both Wolfowitz and Rumsfeld, out of office, continued to call for Saddams overthrow.45 Wolfowitzs model in 2002 was the Holocaust, believing that a tyrant who attacks his own people will eventually export that terror.46

Cheney had been a pragmatic internationalist while serving in the George H. W. Bush administration; but according to Brent Scowcroft, he had changed.47 Some speculate that it was his bypass operation, others that it was the psychological impact of being in the White House during the September 11 attacks. Cheney had daily contact with Bush and was his closest advisor on national security matters.

The doves were anything but 1960s tie-dyed peaceniks.

Cheney was described during this period as having a disquieting obsession and acting as a powerful steamrolling force.48 Rumsfeld also strongly supported military intervention, but his principal role was to think about details of the coming conflict and continually refine the war plan to conform it to his notion of military transformation.49

The hawks in government were supported by a combination of neoconservative colleagues and people with connections to the Middle East. Prime among them was a slick American-educated mathematician Iraqi expatriate named Ahmed Chalabi, who was head of the Iraqi National Congress and hoped to return as Saddams successor. Wolfowitz gave Chalabi access and Chalabi provided intelligence that turned out to be of highly questionable veracity.50

The doves were anything but 1960s tie-dyed peaceniks. They were generally influential pragmatic leaders who were not in the administration. They included the chairman of Bushs Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, Brent Scowcroft; the former CENTCOM commander Anthony Zinni, and the chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, Ike Skelton.

Scowcroft went public in August 2002, telling Face the Nation that war with Iraq would be an unnecessary and bad choice that would seriously harm international cooperation against terrorism.51 Zinnis alternative model was Vietnam. He had been badly wounded there and wanted to make sure the cause was just before sending young Americans into harms way.

"Blinders, Blunders and Wars" by David C. Gompert, Hans Binnendijk, Bonny Lin Rand Corporation

The Joint Chiefs cut off debate about the wisdom of an invasion.

While at CENTCOM, he had seen no intelligence that Saddam had WMDs. He wanted evidence. He also felt that those pushing for war had no idea that the war might last ten years.52 Skelton sent Bush multiple questions about the cost and duration of the occupation, noting that he should not take the first step without considering the last. Skelton was told that the administration did not need his vote.53

Within the military, several senior officers, including Lieutenant General Gregory Newbold and General Eric Shinseki, demonstrated concern about the force structure needed for the operation. But in the fall of 2002, the Joint Chiefs cut off any further debate about the wisdom of an invasion.54 Most in the military were compliant with Rumsfelds directions.

The diplomats tended to see the same problems that the doves saw, but many were serving in the State Department or wanted to preserve their standing with the administration. Once it became clear that Bush was on a track to war, they sought to find a diplomatic exit or, failing that, to garner international support and create legitimacy for an invasion. This group included Powell and former secretaries Henry Kissinger, James Baker, and Lawrence Eagleburger.55

On August 5, 2002, Powell advised the President that the United States should only attack Iraq if it had a UN Security Resolution authorizing such action. Powell hoped that a UN resolution might force Saddam to back down from his intransigence on WMD inspectionswhich it in fact did. Powell also told Bush that the United States would own Iraq after an invasion and that it would dominate all other foreign- policy initiatives.

Bushs decision-making style was based on his gut instincts.

Bush did not back down from his decision to proceed toward war, but he did agree to give a UN resolution a try. The diplomats may have delayed the invasion by half a year by seeking UN authorization, but once a modest UN resolution was achieved, they lost the ability to prevent war.

Foreign leaders also lined up as hawks and doves. The most important hawk was Blair, who was weary of letting a gap open with American policy.56 Spains prime minister, Jos Mara Aznar, lined up with Blair, while the French president, Jacque Chirac, and the German chancellor, Gerhard Schroeder, eventually opposed invasion. Getting the international consensus Powell wanted would not be easy.

Bush considered himself to be the decider. After September 11, he seemed reborn as a crusading internationalist who had embraced Woodrow Wilsons vision of a democratic world and who was willing to use Americas military might to make it happen.57

Bushs decision-making style was based on his gut instincts.58 His snap judgment that somehow Saddam was behind September 11, or might be behind the next attack on America, remained with him. Bush felt that September 11 was the Pearl Harbor of the 21st Century,59 and that his new and transcending purpose as president was to prevent another, possibly worse, one.60

That early decision solidified during the first half of 2002. Bush was quick to reach decisions, and, once reached, he saw change as a sign of weakness.61 After he reached an early decision on war, he was prepared to try a UN resolution, but not change his fundamental course. He would not let Saddams new willingness in 2003 to open up to WMD inspectors stop him from invading.62

Rice was Bushs closest confidant. Her primary interest was protecting the President and translating his wishes into policy. But she did not develop the decision-making process needed to analyze and debate the wisdom and implications of going to war. According to Powell, there was no moment when all views and recommendations were aired.63

Nor was there much White House interest in complicated analysis: They already knew the answers, it was received wisdom.64 There was no meeting with pros and cons debated. . . . If there was a debate inside the Bush Administration, it was one- sided and muted.65 The urgent sense of danger, the instinct to be bold and the vision of transforming the Middle East trumped debate and analysis.

Demonstrators with the Iraq Campaign 2008 raise a banner declaring "Mission Accomplished?" on the fifth anniversary of U.S. President George W. Bush's "Mission Accomplished" speech which declared an end to major hostilities in Iraq during a rally on Pennsylvania Avenue in Front of the White House in Washington, DC, May 1, 2008. Joshua Roberts/Reuters

The worst U.S. intelligence failure since the founding of the modern intelligence community.

Shortly after the September 11 attacks, Tenet presented Bush with a list of countries malevolent enough to help al Qaeda get a dirty bomb: Iraq was on the top of that list. That notion had a profound impact on Bush.66 Bush said: I made my decision [for war] based upon enough intelligence to tell me that [our] country was threatened with Saddam Hussein in power.67

The case for Saddams complicity in September 11, or at least for his strong ties with terrorist organizations, was weak.68 The case for his possession of WMDs appeared stronger and drove decision-making. After all, he had used chemical weapons against the Iranians and the Kurds in the 1980s.

But the intelligence was wrong. Iraq had gotten rid of its WMDs. Some say this was the worst U.S. intelligence failure since the founding of the modern intelligence community.69

The intelligence that Bush and others received was based on outdated and incorrect evidence, material from untrustworthy human sources, and worst-case analysis.70 The United States had no reliable intelligence assets in Iraq.71 International WMD inspectors had been kicked out of Iraq since 1998; so in that sense Saddam brought this about himself.

The Pentagon was receiving intelligence from Chalabi, the Iraqi opposition politician, who had an ulterior motive, and from sources such as the aptly named Curveball. The Pentagon set up a one-off intelligence unit, called the Counter Terrorism Evaluation Group, which began producing alarming interpretations of the murky intelligence about Saddam Hussein, WMD, and terrorism.72 They were in essence cherry-picking the intelligence in order to draw links between al Qaeda and Iraq and thereby justify intervention.73

In July of 2002, British intelligence concluded that the intelligence and facts were being fixed around the policy.74 A State Department intelligence analyst concluded similarly that the administration was looking for evidence to support conclusions it had already drawn.75

The decision-makers and their staffs did not listen to WMD experts like Charles Duelfer, who argued that there was no significant remaining stockpile.76 In fact, they sought to have two intelligence officers removed whose analysis did not comport to their view of events.77

We dont want the smoking gun to be a mushroom cloud.

CIA analysts were tasked to prepare a National Intelligence Estimate (NIE).78 They had just been embarrassed by missing the September 11 attacks. Now they were faced with the Pentagons autonomous intelligence unit, to which the Vice President was listening.

Before the intelligence community rendered its official verdict, Cheney was saying in August of 2002 that Saddam was pursuing a nuclear weapons program.79 Similarly, Rice told CNN: We dont want the smoking gun to be a mushroom cloud.80

At the same time a series of leaks to The New York Times put this faulty intelligence on the front pages.81 So while there was no effort by the intelligence community to falsify evidence,82 all of the mistakes tilted in the same direction.83

The NIE was delivered in October 2002 and was considered by many as a warrant for going to war. It concluded, with caveats, that the Iraqis possessed chemical and biological weapons along with delivery systems and sought to reconstitute their nuclear program.84

The body of the NIE contained several qualifiers that were dropped in the executive summary. The fact that the State Departments Bureau of Intelligence and Research disagreed with the conclusions was not highlighted.85 As the draft NIE went up the intelligence chain of command, the conclusions were treated increasingly definitively.86 Only the summary of the NIE was partially declassified, and it omitted most of the reservations and nonconforming evidence.87

The fact that the NIE concluded that there was no operational tie between Saddam and al Qaeda did not offset this alarming assessment.88 A year later, a Senate Select Committee on Intelligence report found that the NIE was wrong, that it overstated the case, that statements in it were not supported, and that intelligence was mischaracterized.89

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The Iraq War: Bushs Biggest Blunder

The government of Iraq has evolved over millennia, with thousands of years of tyranny turning into a newly formed federal parliamentary representative democratic republic.

It is a multi-party system whereby the executive power is exercised by the Prime Minister of the Council of Ministers as the head of government, as well as the President of Iraq, and legislative power is vested in the Council of Representatives and the Federation Council.

The current Prime Minister of Iraq is Haider al-Abadi, who holds most of the executive authority and appoints the Council of Ministers, which acts as a cabinet and/or government.

The federal government of Iraq is defined under the current Constitution as an Islamic, democratic, federal parliamentary republic. The federal government is composed of the executive, legislative, and judicial branches, as well as numerous independent commissions.

The legislative branch is composed of the Council of Representatives and a Federation Council. The executive branch is composed of the President, the Prime Minister, and the Council of Ministers. The federal judiciary is composed of the Higher Judicial Council, the Supreme Court, the Court of Cassation, the Public Prosecution Department, the Judiciary Oversight Commission, and other federal courts that are regulated by law. One such court is the Central Criminal Court.

The Independent High Commission for Human Rights, the Independent High Electoral Commission, and the Commission on Integrity are independent commissions subject to monitoring by the Council of Representatives. The Central Bank of Iraq, the Board of Supreme Audit, the Communications and Media Commission, and the Endowment Commission are financially and administratively independent institutions. The Foundation of Martyrs is attached to the Council of Ministers. The Federal Public Service Council regulates the affairs of the federal public service, including appointment and promotion.

Iraqs full name is Republic of Iraq, or Jumhuriyat al-Iraq/Komar-i Eraq. It is a parliamentary democracy which uses a federal system of government.

There are 3 branches: Executive, Legislative and Judicial.

Executive Branch: The Presidency Council, which consists of one President and as many as three Vice Presidents, and the Council of Ministers, which includes one prime minister, three deputy prime ministers and 30 cabinet members.

Current Members:Chief of State: President TBD 2014Head of Government: Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi elected 2014

Legislative Branch: The Council of Representatives (COR), an elected (4-year terms) group of 325 members representing the populace of Iraq.

Judicial Branch: The Higher Judicial Council, the Federal Supreme Court (9 judges), the Court of Cassation, the Public Prosecution Department, Judiciary Oversight Commission, as well as other federal courts.

There are over 31 major political parties in Iraq, with many smaller tribal parties also in existence. A few main parties that now makeup the Council of Representatives include: Iraqi National Movement, State of Law Coalition, Iraqi National Alliance, Kurdistan Alliance.

Civil and Islamic law.

Iraq declared independence from the League of Nations mandate under British administration on October 3rd, 1932. This marked the first year of true independence and recognition for the nation.

On June 28th, 2004, the Coalition Provisional Authority transferred power to the Iraqi Interim Government. On October 15th, 2005, the first Iraqi consitution was ratified, but is still subject to review by the Constitutional Review Committee and a public referendum.

8. What are the main issues surrounding the current Iraqi government?

Political pressure groups are causing great inner political turmoil, with Sunni and Shia militias as well as various tribal parties.

The capital of Iraq, Baghdad.

10. What is the national symbol of Iraq?A golden eagle.

Political Parties of Iraq

Iraq Government vs. Terrorism

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Iraq Government

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TheIraq-related Sanctionsrepresent the implementation of multiplelegal authorities. Some of these authorities areinthe form of executive ordersissued by thePresident. Other authorities arepublic laws (statutes) passed byThe Congress. Theseauthorities are further codified by OFACinits regulations which are published the Code of Federal Regulations(CFR).Modificationsto these regulationsare posted in the Federal Register. OFAC may alsoimplementUnited Nations Security Council Resolutions (UNSCRs)with regard to theIraq-related Sanctions

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Iraq-Related Sanctions

01/03/18 IraqiNews: Six civilians killed, injured in two bomb blasts, south Baghdad

01/03/18 shafaaq: ISIS claims 771 suicide attacks in Iraq, Syria in 2017

01/03/18 IraqiNews: Three policemen injured as bomb blast targets police patrol in Anbar

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01/02/18 IraqiNews: Iraqi troops kill 15 Islamic State militants on border with Syria

01/01/18 IraqiNews: Five IS militants killed as paramilitary troops repulse attack, west of Mosul

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01/01/18 BAS: Blast Rocks Baghdad on First Day of 2018

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12/28/17 GulfToday: After Daesh, now Iraq battles cash crunch

12/28/17 VOA: Iraqi Cities in Ruins After IS, Little Cash to Rebuild

12/28/17 Reuters: France repatriates from Iraq three children of suspected jihadists

12/28/17 Reuters: Less than 1,000 IS fighters remain in Iraq and Syria, coalition says

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iCasualties | Operation Iraqi Freedom | Iraq

Iraq WarPart of the Iraq conflict (2003present) and the War on TerrorClockwise from top: U.S. troops at Uday and Qusay Hussein's hideout; insurgents in northern Iraq; an Iraqi insurgent firing a MANPADS; the toppling of the Saddam Hussein statue in Firdos Square.Belligerents

Invasion phase (2003)United StatesUnited KingdomAustraliaPoland Peshmerga

Post-invasion(200311) United StatesUnited Kingdom

New Iraqi government

Supported by: Iran[2][3]Iraqi Kurdistan

Post-invasion (200311) Ba'ath loyalists

Sunni insurgents

Shia insurgents

supported by: Iran

Ba'ath Party Saddam Hussein(POW) Izzat Ibrahim ad-Douri

Sunni insurgency Abu Musab al-Zarqawi Abu Ayyub al-Masri Abu Omar al-Baghdadi Abu Bakr al-BaghdadiIshmael Jubouri Abu Abdullah al-Shafi'i(POW)

Shia insurgency Muqtada al-SadrAbu DeraaQais al-KhazaliAkram al-Kabi

Invasion forces (2003)309,000United States: 192,000[15]United Kingdom: 45,000Australia: 2,000Poland: 194 Peshmerga: 70,000

Coalition forces (200409)176,000 at peakUnited States Forces Iraq (201011)112,000 at activationSecurity contractors 6,0007,000 (estimate)[16]Iraqi security forces805,269 (military and paramilitary: 578,269,[17] police: 227,000)

Iraqi Armed Forces: 375,000 (disbanded in 2003) Special Iraqi Republican Guard: 12,000 Iraqi Republican Guard: 70,00075,000 Fedayeen Saddam: 30,000

Sunni Insurgents70,000 (2007)[20]al-Qaeda1,300 (2006)[21]

Iraqi Security Forces (post-Saddam)Killed: 17,690[22]Wounded: 40,000+[23]Coalition forcesKilled: 4,815[24][25](4,497 U.S.,[26] 179 UK,[27] 139 other)[24]Missing/captured (U.S.): 17 (8 rescued, 9 died in captivity)[28]Wounded: 32,776+ (32,249 U.S.,[29] 315 UK, 212+ other[30])[31][32][33][34]Injured/diseases/other medical*: 51,139 (47,541 U.S.,[35] 3,598 UK)[31][33][34]ContractorsKilled: 1,554[36][37]Wounded & injured: 43,880[36][37]Awakening CouncilsKilled: 1,002+[38]Wounded: 500+ (2007),[39] 828 (2008)[40]

Iraqi combatant dead (invasion period): 7,60010,800[41][42]Insurgents (post-Saddam)Killed: 26,544 (200311)[43]Detainees: 12,000 (Iraqi-held)[44]

Estimated deaths:Lancet survey** (March 2003 July 2006): 654,965 (95% CI: 392,979942,636)[45][46]Iraq Family Health Survey*** (March 2003 July 2006): 151,000 (95% CI: 104,000223,000)[47]PLOS Medicine Study**: (March 2003 June 2011): 405,000 (95% CI: 48,000751,000), in addition to 55,000 deaths missed due to emigration.[48]

Documented deaths from violence:Iraq Body Count (2003 14 December 2011): 103,160113,728 civilian deaths recorded,[49] and 12,438 new deaths added from the Iraq War Logs[50]Associated Press (March 2003 April 2009): 110,600[51]

The Iraq War[nb 1] was a protracted armed conflict that began in 2003 with the invasion of Iraq by a United States-led coalition that overthrew the government of Saddam Hussein. The conflict continued for much of the next decade as an insurgency emerged to oppose the occupying forces and the post-invasion Iraqi government.[52] An estimated 151,000 to 600,000 or more Iraqis were killed in the first 34 years of conflict. The U.S. became re-involved in 2014 at the head of a new coalition; the insurgency and many dimensions of the civil armed conflict continue. The invasion occurred as part of a declared war against international terrorism and its sponsors under the administration of US President George W. Bush following the September 11 terror attacks.

The invasion began on 20 March 2003,[53] with the U.S., joined by the United Kingdom and several coalition allies, launching a "shock and awe" bombing campaign. Iraqi forces were quickly overwhelmed as U.S. forces swept through the country. The invasion led to the collapse of the Ba'athist government; Saddam was captured during Operation Red Dawn in December of that same year and executed by a military court three years later. However, the power vacuum following Saddam's demise and the mismanagement of the occupation led to widespread sectarian violence between Shias and Sunnis, as well as a lengthy insurgency against U.S. and coalition forces. Many violent insurgent groups were supported by Iran and al-Qaeda in Iraq. The United States responded with a troop surge in 2007. The winding down of U.S. involvement in Iraq accelerated under President Barack Obama. The U.S. formally withdrew all combat troops from Iraq by December 2011.[54]

The Bush administration based its rationale for the war principally on the assertion that Iraq, which had been viewed by the US as a rogue state since the Persian Gulf War, possessed weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) and that the Iraqi government posed an immediate threat to the United States and its coalition allies.[55][56] Select U.S.officials accused Saddam of harbouring and supporting al-Qaeda,[57] while others cited the desire to end a repressive dictatorship and bring democracy to the people of Iraq.[58][59] After the invasion, no substantial evidence was found to verify the initial claims about WMDs, while claims of Iraqi officials collaborating with al-Qaeda were proven false. The rationale and misrepresentation of US prewar intelligence faced heavy criticism both domestically and internationally, with President Bush declining from his record-high approval ratings following 9/11 to become one of the most unpopular presidents in US history.[60]

In the aftermath of the invasion, Iraq held multi-party elections in 2005. Nouri al-Maliki became Prime Minister in 2006 and remained in office until 2014. The al-Maliki government enacted policies that were widely seen as having the effect of alienating the country's Sunni minority and worsening sectarian tensions. In the summer of 2014, the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) launched a military offensive in Northern Iraq and declared a worldwide Islamic caliphate, eliciting another military response from the United States and its allies. The Iraq War caused over a hundred thousand civilian deaths and tens thousands of military deaths (see estimates below). The majority of deaths occurred as a result of the insurgency and civil conflicts between 2004 and 2007.

Strong international opposition to the Saddam Hussein regime began after Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in 1990. The international community condemned the invasion,[61] and in 1991 a military coalition led by the United States launched the Gulf War to expel Iraq from Kuwait. Following the Gulf War, the U.S. and its allies tried to keep Saddam in check with a policy of containment. This policy involved numerous economic sanctions by the UN Security Council; the enforcement of Iraqi no-fly zones declared by the U.S. and the UK to protect the Kurds in Iraqi Kurdistan and Shias in the south from aerial attacks by the Iraqi government; and ongoing inspections to ensure Iraq's compliance with United Nations resolutions concerning Iraqi weapons of mass destruction.

The inspections were carried out by the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM). UNSCOM, in cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency, worked to ensure that Iraq destroyed its chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons and facilities.[62] In the decade following the Gulf War, the United Nations passed 16 Security Council resolutions calling for the complete elimination of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction. Member states communicated their frustration over the years that Iraq was impeding the work of the special commission and failing to take seriously its disarmament obligations. Iraqi officials harassed the inspectors and obstructed their work,[62] and in August 1998 the Iraqi government suspended cooperation with the inspectors completely, alleging that the inspectors were spying for the U.S.[63] The spying allegations were later substantiated.[64]

In October 1998, removing the Iraqi government became official U.S. foreign policy with enactment of the Iraq Liberation Act. The act provided $97 million for Iraqi "democratic opposition organizations" to "establish a program to support a transition to democracy in Iraq."[65] This legislation contrasted with the terms set out in United Nations Security Council Resolution 687, which focused on weapons and weapons programs and made no mention of regime change.[66] One month after the passage of the Iraq Liberation Act, the U.S. and UK launched a bombardment campaign of Iraq called Operation Desert Fox. The campaign's express rationale was to hamper Saddam Hussein's government's ability to produce chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons, but U.S. intelligence personnel also hoped it would help weaken Saddam's grip on power.[67]

With the election of George W. Bush as president in 2000, the U.S. moved towards a more aggressive Iraq policy. The Republican Party's campaign platform in the 2000 election called for "full implementation" of the Iraq Liberation Act as "a starting point" in a plan to "remove" Saddam.[68] However, little formal movement towards an invasion occurred until the September 11 attacks.[69]

After 9/11, the Bush Administration national security team actively debated an invasion of Iraq. On the day of the attacks, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld asked his aides for: "best info fast. Judge whether good enough hit Saddam Hussein at same time. Not only Osama bin Laden."[71] President Bush spoke with Rumsfeld on 21 November and instructed him to conduct a confidential review of OPLAN 1003, the war plan for invading Iraq.[72] Rumsfeld met with General Tommy Franks, the commander of U.S. Central Command, on 27 November to go over the plans. A record of the meeting includes the question "How start?", listing multiple possible justifications for a U.S.Iraq War.[70][73] The rationale for invading Iraq as a response to 9/11 has been widely questioned, as there was no cooperation between Saddam Hussein and al-Qaeda.[74]

Bush began formally making his case to the international community for an invasion of Iraq in his 12 September 2002 address to the UN Security Council.[75] Key U.S. allies in NATO, such as the United Kingdom, agreed with the U.S. actions, while France and Germany were critical of plans to invade Iraq, arguing instead for continued diplomacy and weapons inspections. After considerable debate, the UN Security Council adopted a compromise resolution, UN Security Council Resolution 1441, which authorized the resumption of weapons inspections and promised "serious consequences" for non-compliance. Security Council members France and Russia made clear that they did not consider these consequences to include the use of force to overthrow the Iraqi government.[76] The U.S. and U.K. ambassadors to the UN publicly confirmed this reading of the resolution.[77]

Resolution 1441 set up inspections by the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) and the International Atomic Energy Agency. Saddam accepted the resolution on 13 November and inspectors returned to Iraq under the direction of UNMOVIC chairman Hans Blix and IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei. As of February 2003, the IAEA "found no evidence or plausible indication of the revival of a nuclear weapons program in Iraq"; the IAEA concluded that certain items which could have been used in nuclear enrichment centrifuges, such as aluminum tubes, were in fact intended for other uses.[78] In March 2003, Blix said progress had been made in inspections, and no evidence of WMD had been found.[79]

In October 2002, the U.S. Congress passed the "Iraq Resolution". The resolution authorized the President to "use any means necessary" against Iraq. Americans polled in January 2003 widely favored further diplomacy over an invasion. Later that year, however, Americans began to agree with Bush's plan (see popular opinion in the United States on the invasion of Iraq). The U.S. government engaged in an elaborate domestic public relations campaign to market the war to its citizens. Americans overwhelmingly believed Saddam did have weapons of mass destruction: 85% said so, even though the inspectors had not uncovered those weapons. By February 2003, 64% of Americans supported taking military action to remove Saddam from power.[80]

On 5 February 2003, Secretary of State Colin Powell appeared before the UN to present evidence that Iraq was hiding unconventional weapons. However, Powell's presentation included information based on the claims of Rafid Ahmed Alwan al-Janabi, codenamed "Curveball", an Iraqi emigrant living in Germany who later admitted that his claims had been false.[81] Powell also presented evidence alleging Iraq had ties to al-Qaeda. As a follow-up to Powell's presentation, the United States, United Kingdom, Poland, Italy, Australia, Denmark, Japan, and Spain proposed a resolution authorizing the use of force in Iraq, but NATO members like Canada, France, and Germany, together with Russia, strongly urged continued diplomacy. Facing a losing vote as well as a likely veto from France and Russia, the US, UK, Poland, Spain, Denmark, Italy, Japan, and Australia eventually withdrew their resolution.[82][83]

In March 2003, the United States, United Kingdom, Poland, Australia, Spain, Denmark, and Italy began preparing for the invasion of Iraq with a host of public relations and military moves. In an address to the nation on 17 March 2003, Bush demanded that Saddam and his two sons, Uday and Qusay, surrender and leave Iraq, giving them a 48-hour deadline.[84]

The UK House of Commons held a debate on going to war on 18 March 2003 where the government motion was approved 412 to 149.[85] The vote was a key moment in the history of the Blair administration, as the number of government MPs who rebelled against the vote was the greatest since the repeal of the Corn Laws in 1846. Three government ministers resigned in protest at the war, John Denham, Lord Hunt of Kings Heath, and the then Leader of the House of Commons Robin Cook.

In October 2002, former U.S. President Bill Clinton warned about possible dangers of pre-emptive military action against Iraq. Speaking in the UK at a Labour Party conference he said: "As a preemptive action today, however well-justified, may come back with unwelcome consequences in the future.... I don't care how precise your bombs and your weapons are, when you set them off, innocent people will die."[86][87] The majority of Democrats in Congress voted against the Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002, although a majority of Democrats in the Senate voted in favor of it. Sen. Jim Webb wrote shortly before the vote "Those who are pushing for a unilateral war in Iraq know full well that there is no exit strategy if we invade."[88]

In the same period, Pope John Paul II publicly condemned the military intervention. During a private meeting, he also said directly to George W. Bush: "Mr President, you know my opinion about the war in Iraq. Lets talk about something else. Every violence, against one or a million, is a blasphemy addressed to the image and likeness of God."[89]

On 20 January 2003, French Foreign Minister Dominique de Villepin declared "we believe that military intervention would be the worst solution".[91] Meanwhile, anti-war groups across the world organised public protests. According to French academic Dominique Reyni, between 3 January and 12 April 2003, 36 million people across the globe took part in almost 3,000 protests against war in Iraq, with demonstrations on 15 February 2003 being the largest.[92]Nelson Mandela voiced his opposition in late January, stating "All that (Mr. Bush) wants is Iraqi oil," and questioning if Bush deliberately undermined the U.N. "because the secretary-general of the United Nations [was] a black man".[93]

In February 2003, the U.S. Army's top general, Eric Shinseki, told the Senate Armed Services Committee that it would take "several hundred thousand soldiers" to secure Iraq.[94] Two days later, U.S. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld said the post-war troop commitment would be less than the number of troops required to win the war, and that "the idea that it would take several hundred thousand U.S. forces is far from the mark." Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz said Shinseki's estimate was "way off the mark," because other countries would take part in an occupying force.[95]

Germany's Foreign Secretary Joschka Fischer, although having been in favour of stationing German troops in Afghanistan, advised Federal Chancellor Schrder not to join the war in Iraq. Fischer famously confronted United States Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld at the 39th Munich Security Conference in 2003 on the secretary's purported evidence for Iraq's possession of weapons of mass destruction: "Excuse me, I am not convinced!"[96]

There were serious legal questions surrounding the launching of the war against Iraq and the Bush Doctrine of preemptive war in general. On 16 September 2004, Kofi Annan, the Secretary General of the United Nations, said of the invasion, "I have indicated it was not in conformity with the UNCharter. From our point of view, from the Charter point of view, it was illegal."[97]

In November 2008 Lord Bingham, the former British Law Lord, described the war as a serious violation of international law, and accused Britain and the United States of acting like a "world vigilante". He also criticized the post-invasion record of Britain as "an occupying power in Iraq". Regarding the treatment of Iraqi detainees in Abu Ghraib, Bingham said: "Particularly disturbing to proponents of the rule of law is the cynical lack of concern for international legality among some top officials in the Bush administration."[98] In July 2010, Deputy Prime Minister of the UK Nick Clegg, in an official PMQs session in Parliament, condemned the invasion of Iraq as illegal.[99]

The first Central Intelligence Agency team entered Iraq on 10 July 2002.[100] This team was composed of members of the CIA's Special Activities Division and was later joined by members of the U.S.military's elite Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC).[101] Together, they prepared for the invasion of conventional forces. These efforts consisted of persuading the commanders of several Iraqi military divisions to surrender rather than oppose the invasion, and identifying all the initial leadership targets during very high risk reconnaissance missions.[101]

Most importantly, their efforts organized the Kurdish Peshmerga to become the northern front of the invasion. Together this force defeated Ansar al-Islam in Iraqi Kurdistan before the invasion and then defeated the Iraqi army in the north.[101][102] The battle against Ansar al-Islam, known as Operation Viking Hammer, led to the death of a substantial number of militants and the uncovering of a chemical weapons facility at Sargat.[100][103]

At 5:34a.m. Baghdad time on 20 March 2003 (9:34p.m., 19 March EST) the surprise[104] military invasion of Iraq began.[105] There was no declaration of war.[106] The 2003 invasion of Iraq, led by U.S. Army General Tommy Franks, under the code-name "Operation Iraqi Freedom",[107] the UK code-name Operation Telic, and the Australian code-name Operation Falconer. Coalition forces also cooperated with Kurdish Peshmerga forces in the north. Approximately forty other governments, the "Coalition of the Willing," participated by providing troops, equipment, services, security, and special forces, with 248,000 soldiers from the United States, 45,000 British soldiers, 2,000 Australian soldiers and 194 Polish soldiers from Special Forces unit GROM sent to Kuwait for the invasion.[108] The invasion force was also supported by Iraqi Kurdish militia troops, estimated to number upwards of 70,000.[109]

According to General Tommy Franks, there were eight objectives of the invasion, "First, ending the regime of Saddam Hussein. Second, to identify, isolate, and eliminate Iraq's weapons of mass destruction. Third, to search for, to capture, and to drive out terrorists from that country. Fourth, to collect such intelligence as we can relate to terrorist networks. Fifth, to collect such intelligence as we can relate to the global network of illicit weapons of mass destruction. Sixth, to end sanctions and to immediately deliver humanitarian support to the displaced and to many needy Iraqi citizens. Seventh, to secure Iraq's oil fields and resources, which belong to the Iraqi people. And last, to help the Iraqi people create conditions for a transition to a representative self-government."[110]

The invasion was a quick and decisive operation encountering major resistance, though not what the U.S., British and other forces expected. The Iraqi regime had prepared to fight both a conventional and irregular war at the same time, conceding territory when faced with superior conventional forces, largely armored, but launching smaller scale attacks in the rear using fighters dressed in civilian and paramilitary clothes.

Coalition troops launched air and amphibious assault on the Al-Faw peninsula to secure the oil fields there and the important ports, supported by warships of the Royal Navy, Polish Navy, and Royal Australian Navy. The United States Marine Corps' 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit, attached to 3Commando Brigade and the Polish Special Forces unit GROM attacked the port of Umm Qasr, while the British Army's 16Air Assault Brigade secured the oil fields in southern Iraq.[111][112]

The heavy armor of the U.S. 3rd Infantry Division moved westward and then northward through the western desert toward Baghdad, while the 1stMarine Expeditionary Force moved more easterly along Highway1 through the center of the country, and 1 (UK) Armoured Division moved northward through the eastern marshland.[113] The U.S. 1st Marine Division fought through Nasiriyah in a battle to seize the major road junction.[114] The United States Army 3rd Infantry Division defeated Iraqi forces entrenched in and around Talil Airfield.[115]

With the Nasiriyah and Talil Airfields secured in its rear, the 3rdInfantry Division supported by the 101st Airborne Division continued its attack north toward Najaf and Karbala, but a severe sand storm slowed the coalition advance and there was a halt to consolidate and make sure the supply lines were secure.[116] When they started again they secured the Karbala Gap, a key approach to Baghdad, then secured the bridges over the Euphrates River, and U.S. forces poured through the gap on to Baghdad. In the middle of Iraq, the 1st Marine Division fought its way to the eastern side of Baghdad, and prepared for the attack into Baghdad to seize it.[117]

On 9 April, Baghdad fell, ending Saddam's 24year rule. U.S.forces seized the deserted Ba'ath Party ministries and stage-managed[118] the tearing down of a huge iron statue of Saddam, photos and video of which became symbolic of the event, although later controversial. Not seen in the photos or heard on the videos, shot with a zoom lens, was the chant of the inflamed crowd for Muqtada al-Sadr, the radical Shiite cleric.[119] The abrupt fall of Baghdad was accompanied by a widespread outpouring of gratitude toward the invaders, but also massive civil disorder, including the looting of public and government buildings and drastically increased crime.[120][121]

According to the Pentagon, 250,000 short tons (230,000t) (of 650,000 short tons (590,000t) total) of ordnance was looted, providing a significant source of ammunition for the Iraqi insurgency. The invasion phase concluded when Tikrit, Saddam's home town, fell with little resistance to the U.S. Marines of Task Force Tripoli.

In the invasion phase of the war (19 March30 April), an estimated 9,200 Iraqi combatants were killed by coalition forces along with an estimated 3,750 non-combatants, i.e. civilians who did not take up arms.[122] Coalition forces reported the death in combat of 139 U.S. military personnel[123] and 33 UK military personnel.[124]

On 1 May 2003, President Bush visited the aircraft carrier USS Abraham Lincoln operating a few miles west of San Diego, California. At sunset, he held his nationally televised "Mission Accomplished" speech", delivered before the sailors and airmen on the flight deck: Bush declared victory due to the defeat of Iraq's conventional forces.

Nevertheless, Saddam Hussein remained at large and significant pockets of resistance remained. After Bush's speech, coalition forces noticed a flurry of attacks on its troops began to gradually increase in various regions, such as the "Sunni Triangle".[125] The initial Iraqi insurgents were supplied by hundreds of weapons caches created before the invasion by the Iraqi army and Republican Guard.

Initially, Iraqi resistance (described by the coalition as "Anti-Iraqi Forces") largely stemmed from fedayeen and Saddam/Ba'ath Party loyalists, but soon religious radicals and Iraqis angered by the occupation contributed to the insurgency. The three provinces with the highest number of attacks were Baghdad, Al Anbar, and Salah Ad Din. Those three provinces account for 35% of the population, but by December 2006 they were responsible for 73% of U.S. military deaths and an even higher percentage of recent U.S. military deaths (about 80%.)[126]

Insurgents used various guerrilla tactics, including mortars, missiles, suicide attacks, snipers, improvised explosive devices (IEDs), car bombs, small arms fire (usually with assault rifles), and RPGs (rocket propelled grenades), as well as sabotage against the petroleum, water, and electrical infrastructure.

Coalition efforts to establish post-invasion Iraq commenced after the fall of Saddam's regime. The coalition nations, together with the United Nations, began to work to establish a stable, compliant democratic state capable of defending itself from non-coalition forces, as well as overcoming internal divisions.[127][128]

Meanwhile, coalition military forces launched several operations around the Tigris River peninsula and in the Sunni Triangle. A series of similar operations were launched throughout the summer in the Sunni Triangle. Toward late-2003, the intensity and pace of insurgent attacks began to increase. A sharp surge in guerrilla attacks ushered in an insurgent effort that was termed the "Ramadan Offensive", as it coincided with the beginning of the Muslim holy month of Ramadan.

To counter this offensive, coalition forces began to use air power and artillery again for the first time since the end of the invasion by striking suspected ambush sites and mortar launching positions. Surveillance of major routes, patrols, and raids on suspected insurgents were stepped up. In addition, two villages, including Saddam's birthplace of al-Auja and the small town of Abu Hishma were surrounded by barbed wire and carefully monitored.

Shortly after the invasion, the multinational coalition created the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA; Arabic: ), based in the Green Zone, as a transitional government of Iraq until the establishment of a democratic government. Citing United Nations Security Council Resolution 1483 (22 May 2003) and the laws of war, the CPA vested itself with executive, legislative, and judicial authority over the Iraqi government from the period of the CPA's inception on 21 April 2003 until its dissolution on 28 June 2004.

The CPA was originally headed by Jay Garner, a former U.S. military officer, but his appointment lasted only until May 11, 2003, when President Bush appointed L.Paul Bremer. On May 16, 2003, his first day on the job, Paul Bremer issued Coalition Provisional Authority Order 1 to exclude from the new Iraqi government and administration members of the Baathist party. This policy, known as De-Ba'athification, eventually led to the removal of 85,000 to 100,000 Iraqi people from their job,[129] including 40,000 school teachers who had joined the Baath Party simply to keep their jobs. U.S. army general Sanchez called the decision a "catastrophic failure".[130] Bremer served until the CPA's dissolution in July 2004.

Another group created by the multinational force in Iraq post-invasion was the 1,400-member international Iraq Survey Group, who conducted a fact-finding mission to find Iraq weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programmes. In 2004, the ISG's Duelfer Report stated that Iraq did not have a viable WMD program.[131]

In Summer 2003, the multinational forces focused on capturing the remaining leaders of the former government. On 22 July, a raid by the U.S.101st Airborne Division and soldiers from Task Force20 killed Saddam's sons (Uday and Qusay) along with one of his grandsons. In all, over 300 top leaders of the former government were killed or captured, as well as numerous lesser functionaries and military personnel.

Most significantly, Saddam Hussein himself was captured on 13 December 2003, on a farm near Tikrit in Operation Red Dawn.[132] The operation was conducted by the United States Army's 4th Infantry Division and members of Task Force 121. Intelligence on Saddam's whereabouts came from his family members and former bodyguards.[133]

With the capture of Saddam and a drop in the number of insurgent attacks, some concluded the multinational forces were prevailing in the fight against the insurgency. The provisional government began training the new Iraqi security forces intended to police the country, and the United States promised over $20 billion in reconstruction money in the form of credit against Iraq's future oil revenues. Oil revenue was also used for rebuilding schools and for work on the electrical and refining infrastructure.

Shortly after the capture of Saddam, elements left out of the Coalition Provisional Authority began to agitate for elections and the formation of an Iraqi Interim Government. Most prominent among these was the Shia cleric Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani. The Coalition Provisional Authority opposed allowing democratic elections at this time.[134] The insurgents stepped up their activities. The two most turbulent centers were the area around Fallujah and the poor Shia sections of cities from Baghdad (Sadr City) to Basra in the south.

The start of 2004 was marked by a relative lull in violence. Insurgent forces reorganised during this time, studying the multinational forces' tactics and planning a renewed offensive. However, violence did increase during the Iraq Spring Fighting of 2004 with foreign fighters from around the Middle East as well as al-Qaeda in Iraq (an affiliated al-Qaeda group), led by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi helping to drive the insurgency.[citation needed]

As the insurgency grew there was a distinct change in targeting from the coalition forces towards the new Iraqi Security Forces, as hundreds of Iraqi civilians and police were killed over the next few months in a series of massive bombings. An organized Sunni insurgency, with deep roots and both nationalist and Islamist motivations, was becoming more powerful throughout Iraq. The Shia Mahdi Army also began launching attacks on coalition targets in an attempt to seize control from Iraqi security forces. The southern and central portions of Iraq were beginning to erupt in urban guerrilla combat as multinational forces attempted to keep control and prepared for a counteroffensive.

The most serious fighting of the war so far began on 31 March 2004, when Iraqi insurgents in Fallujah ambushed a BlackwaterUSA convoy led by four U.S. private military contractors who were providing security for food caterers Eurest Support Services.[136] The four armed contractors, Scott Helvenston, Jerko Zovko, Wesley Batalona, and Michael Teague, were killed with grenades and small arms fire. Subsequently, their bodies were dragged from their vehicles by local people, beaten, set ablaze, and their burned corpses hung over a bridge crossing the Euphrates.[137] Photos of the event were released to news agencies worldwide, causing a great deal of indignation and moral outrage in the United States, and prompting an unsuccessful "pacification" of the city: the First Battle of Fallujah in April 2004.

The offensive was resumed in November 2004 in the bloodiest battle of the war: the Second Battle of Fallujah, described by the U.S. military as "the heaviest urban combat (that they had been involved in) since the battle of Hue City in Vietnam."[138] During the assault, U.S.forces used white phosphorus as an incendiary weapon against insurgent personnel, attracting controversy. The 46day battle resulted in a victory for the coalition, with 95 U.S.soldiers killed along with approximately 1,350 insurgents. Fallujah was totally devastated during the fighting, though civilian casualties were low, as they had mostly fled before the battle.[139]

Another major event of that year was the revelation of widespread prisoner abuse at Abu Ghraib, which received international media attention in April 2004. First reports of the Abu Ghraib prisoner abuse, as well as graphic pictures showing U.S.military personnel taunting and abusing Iraqi prisoners, came to public attention from a 60MinutesII news report (28 April) and a Seymour M. Hersh article in The New Yorker (posted online on 30 April.)[140] Military correspondent Thomas Ricks claimed that these revelations dealt a blow to the moral justifications for the occupation in the eyes of many people, especially Iraqis, and was a turning point in the war.[141]

2004 also marked the beginning of Military Transition Teams in Iraq, which were teams of U.S. military advisors assigned directly to New Iraqi Army units.

On 31 January, Iraqis elected the Iraqi Transitional Government in order to draft a permanent constitution. Although some violence and a widespread Sunni boycott marred the event, most of the eligible Kurd and Shia populace participated. On 4 February, Paul Wolfowitz announced that 15,000 U.S.troops whose tours of duty had been extended in order to provide election security would be pulled out of Iraq by the next month.[142] February to April proved to be relatively peaceful months compared to the carnage of November and January, with insurgent attacks averaging 30 a day from the prior average of 70.

The Battle of Abu Ghraib on 2 April 2005 was an attack on United States forces at Abu Ghraib prison, which consisted of heavy mortar and rocket fire, under which an estimated 80120 armed insurgents attacked with grenades, small arms, and two vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (VBIED). The U.S. force's munitions ran so low that orders to fix bayonets were given in preparation for hand-to-hand fighting. It was considered to be the largest coordinated assault on a U.S. base since the Vietnam War.[143]

Hopes for a quick end to the insurgency and a withdrawal of U.S. troops were dashed in May, Iraq's bloodiest month since the invasion. Suicide bombers, believed to be mainly disheartened Iraqi Sunni Arabs, Syrians and Saudis, tore through Iraq. Their targets were often Shia gatherings or civilian concentrations of Shias. As a result, over 700 Iraqi civilians died in that month, as well as 79 U.S. soldiers.

The summer of 2005 saw fighting around Baghdad and at Tall Afar in northwestern Iraq as U.S. forces tried to seal off the Syrian border. This led to fighting in the autumn in the small towns of the Euphrates valley between the capital and that border.[144]

A referendum was held on 15 October in which the new Iraqi constitution was ratified. An Iraqi national assembly was elected in December, with participation from the Sunnis as well as the Kurds and Shia.[144]

Insurgent attacks increased in 2005 with 34,131 recorded incidents, compared to a total 26,496 for the previous year.[145]

The beginning of 2006 was marked by government creation talks, growing sectarian violence, and continuous anti-coalition attacks. Sectarian violence expanded to a new level of intensity following the al-Askari Mosque bombing in the Iraqi city of Samarra, on 22 February 2006. The explosion at the mosque, one of the holiest sites in Shi'a Islam, is believed to have been caused by a bomb planted by al-Qaeda.

Although no injuries occurred in the blast, the mosque was severely damaged and the bombing resulted in violence over the following days. Over 100 dead bodies with bullet holes were found on 23 February, and at least 165 people are thought to have been killed. In the aftermath of this attack the U.S.military calculated that the average homicide rate in Baghdad tripled from 11 to 33 deaths per day. In 2006 the UN described the environment in Iraq as a "civil war-like situation".[146]

On March 12, five United States Army soldiers of the 502nd Infantry Regiment raped the 14-year-old Iraqi girl Abeer Qassim Hamza al-Janabi, and then murdered her, her father, her mother Fakhriya Taha Muhasen and her six-year-old sister Hadeel Qassim Hamza al-Janabi. The soldiers then set fire to the girl's body to conceal evidence of the crime.[147] Four of the soldiers were convicted of rape and murder and the fifth was convicted of lesser crimes for their involvement in the events, which became known as the Mahmudiyah rape and killings.[148][149]

On 6 June 2006, the United States was successful in tracking Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the leader of al-Qaeda in Iraq who was killed in a targeted killing, while attending a meeting in an isolated safehouse approximately 8km (5.0mi) north of Baqubah. Having been tracked by a British UAV, radio contact was made between the controller and two United States Air Force F-16C jets, which identified the house and at 14:15GMT, the lead jet dropped two 500pound (230kg) guided bombs, a laser-guided GBU12 and GPS-guided GBU38 on the building where he was located at. Six othersthree male and three female individualswere also reported killed. Among those killed were one of his wives and their child.

The government of Iraq took office on 20 May 2006, following approval by the members of the Iraqi National Assembly. This followed the general election in December 2005. The government succeeded the Iraqi Transitional Government, which had continued in office in a caretaker capacity until the formation of the permanent government.

The Iraq Study Group Report was released on 6 December 2006. The Iraq Study Group, made up of people from both of the major U.S.parties, was led by co-chairs James Baker, a former Secretary of State (Republican), and Lee H. Hamilton, a former U.S.Representative (Democrat). It concluded that "the situation in Iraq is grave and deteriorating" and "U.S.forces seem to be caught in a mission that has no foreseeable end." The report's 79recommendations include increasing diplomatic measures with Iran and Syria and intensifying efforts to train Iraqi troops. On 18 December, a Pentagon report found that insurgent attacks were averaging about 960 attacks per week, the highest since the reports had begun in 2005.[150]

Coalition forces formally transferred control of a province to the Iraqi government, the first since the war. Military prosecutors charged eight U.S. Marines with the murders of 24 Iraqi civilians in Haditha in November 2005, 10 of them women and children. Four officers were also charged with dereliction of duty in relation to the event.[151]

Saddam Hussein was hanged on 30 December 2006, after being found guilty of crimes against humanity by an Iraqi court after a year-long trial.[152]

In a January 10, 2007, televised address to the U.S.public, Bush proposed 21,500 more troops for Iraq, a job program for Iraqis, more reconstruction proposals, and $1.2billion for these programs.[153] On 23 January 2007, in the 2007 State of the Union Address, Bush announced "deploying reinforcements of more than 20,000 additional soldiers and Marines to Iraq".

On 10 February 2007, David Petraeus was made commander of Multi-National Force Iraq (MNF-I), the four-star post that oversees all coalition forces in country, replacing General George Casey. In his new position, Petraeus oversaw all coalition forces in Iraq and employed them in the new "Surge" strategy outlined by the Bush administration.[154][155]

On 10 May 2007, 144 Iraqi Parliamentary lawmakers signed onto a legislative petition calling on the United States to set a timetable for withdrawal.[156] On 3 June 2007, the Iraqi Parliament voted 85 to 59 to require the Iraqi government to consult with Parliament before requesting additional extensions of the UN Security Council Mandate for Coalition operations in Iraq.[157] Despite this, the mandate was renewed on 18 December 2007, without the approval of the Iraqi parliament.[158]

Pressures on U.S.troops were compounded by the continuing withdrawal of coalition forces.[citation needed] In early 2007, British Prime Minister Blair announced that following Operation Sinbad British troops would begin to withdraw from Basra Governorate, handing security over to the Iraqis.[159] In July Danish Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen also announced the withdrawal of 441 Danish troops from Iraq, leaving only a unit of nine soldiers manning four observational helicopters.[160]

In a speech made to Congress on 10 September 2007, Petraeus "envisioned the withdrawal of roughly 30,000 U.S. troops by next summer, beginning with a Marine contingent [in September]."[161] On 13 September, Bush backed a limited withdrawal of troops from Iraq.[162] Bush said 5,700 personnel would be home by Christmas 2007, and expected thousands more to return by July 2008. The plan would take troop numbers back to their level before the surge at the beginning of 2007.

By March 2008, violence in Iraq was reported curtailed by 4080%, according to a Pentagon report.[163] Independent reports[164][165] raised questions about those assessments. An Iraqi military spokesman claimed that civilian deaths since the start of the troop surge plan were 265 in Baghdad, down from 1,440 in the four previous weeks. The New York Times counted more than 450 Iraqi civilians killed during the same 28day period, based on initial daily reports from Iraqi Interior Ministry and hospital officials.

Historically, the daily counts tallied by The New York Times have underestimated the total death toll by 50% or more when compared to studies by the United Nations, which rely upon figures from the Iraqi Health Ministry and morgue figures.[166]

The rate of U.S.combat deaths in Baghdad nearly doubled to 3.14 per day in the first seven weeks of the "surge" in security activity, compared to previous period. Across the rest of Iraq it decreased slightly.[167][168]

On 14 August 2007, the deadliest single attack of the whole war occurred. Nearly 800civilians were killed by a series of coordinated suicide bomb attacks on the northern Iraqi settlement of Kahtaniya. More than 100homes and shops were destroyed in the blasts. U.S.officials blamed alQaeda. The targeted villagers belonged to the non-Muslim Yazidi ethnic minority. The attack may have represented the latest in a feud that erupted earlier that year when members of the Yazidi community stoned to death a teenage girl called Du'a Khalil Aswad accused of dating a Sunni Arab man and converting to Islam. The killing of the girl was recorded on camera-mobiles and the video was uploaded onto the internet.[169][170][171][172]

On 13 September 2007, Abdul Sattar Abu Risha was killed in a bomb attack in the city of Ramadi.[173] He was an important U.S.ally because he led the "Anbar Awakening", an alliance of Sunni Arab tribes that opposed al-Qaeda. The latter organisation claimed responsibility for the attack.[174] A statement posted on the Internet by the shadowy Islamic State of Iraq called Abu Risha "one of the dogs of Bush" and described Thursday's killing as a "heroic operation that took over a month to prepare".[175]

There was a reported trend of decreasing U.S.troop deaths after May 2007,[176] and violence against coalition troops had fallen to the "lowest levels since the first year of the American invasion".[177] These, and several other positive developments, were attributed to the surge by many analysts.[178]

Data from the Pentagon and other U.S.agencies such as the Government Accountability Office (GAO) found that daily attacks against civilians in Iraq remained "about the same" since February. The GAO also stated that there was no discernible trend in sectarian violence.[179] However, this report ran counter to reports to Congress, which showed a general downward trend in civilian deaths and ethno-sectarian violence since December 2006.[180] By late 2007, as the U.S.troop surge began to wind down, violence in Iraq had begun to decrease from its 2006 highs.[181]

Entire neighborhoods in Baghdad were ethnically cleansed by Shia and Sunni militias and sectarian violence has broken out in every Iraqi city where there is a mixed population.[182][183][184] Investigative reporter Bob Woodward cites U.S.government sources according to which the U.S."surge" was not the primary reason for the drop in violence in 200708. Instead, according to that view, the reduction of violence was due to newer covert techniques by U.S.military and intelligence officials to find, target and kill insurgents, including working closely with former insurgents.[185]

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Iraq War - Wikipedia