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On 19 March 2011, a multi-state NATO-led coalition began a military intervention in Libya, to implement United Nations Security Council Resolution 1973, in response to events during the First Libyan Civil War. With ten votes in favour and five abstentions, the UN Security Council's intent was to have "an immediate ceasefire in Libya, including an end to the current attacks against civilians, which it said might constitute crimes against humanity ... [imposing] a ban on all flights in the country's airspace a no-fly zone and tightened sanctions on the [Muammar] Qadhafi regime and its supporters."[18]

American and British naval forces fired over 110 Tomahawk cruise missiles,[19] while the French Air Force, British Royal Air Force, and Royal Canadian Air Force[20] undertook sorties across Libya and a naval blockade by Coalition forces.[21] French jets launched air strikes against Libyan Army tanks and vehicles.[22][23] The intervention did not employ foreign ground troops.[24]

The Libyan government response to the campaign was totally ineffectual, with Gaddafi's forces not managing to shoot down a single NATO plane despite the country possessing 30 heavy SAM batteries, 17 medium SAM batteries, 55 light SAM batteries (a total of 400450 launchers, including 130150 2K12 Kub launchers and some 9K33 Osa launchers), and 440600 short-ranged air-defense guns.[9][25] The official names for the interventions by the coalition members are Opration Harmattan by France; Operation Ellamy by the United Kingdom; Operation Mobile for the Canadian participation and Operation Odyssey Dawn for the United States.[26] Italy initially opposed the intervention but then offered to take part in the operations on the condition that NATO took the leadership of the mission instead of individual countries (particularly France). As this condition was later met, Italy shared its bases and intelligence with the allies.[27]

From the beginning of the intervention, the initial coalition of Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Italy, Norway, Qatar, Spain, UK and US[28][29][30][31][32] expanded to nineteen states, with newer states mostly enforcing the no-fly zone and naval blockade or providing military logistical assistance. The effort was initially largely led by France and the United Kingdom, with command shared with the United States. NATO took control of the arms embargo on 23 March, named Operation Unified Protector. An attempt to unify the military command of the air campaign (whilst keeping political and strategic control with a small group), first failed over objections by the French, German, and Turkish governments.[33][34] On 24 March, NATO agreed to take control of the no-fly zone, while command of targeting ground units remains with coalition forces.[35][36][37] The handover occurred on 31 March 2011 at 06:00 UTC (08:00 local time). NATO flew 26,500 sorties since it took charge of the Libya mission on 31 March 2011.

Fighting in Libya ended in late October following the death of Muammar Gaddafi, and NATO stated it would end operations over Libya on 31 October 2011. Libya's new government requested that its mission be extended to the end of the year,[38] but on 27 October, the Security Council unanimously voted to end NATO's mandate for military action on 31 October.[39]

Initial NATO planning for a possible no-fly zone took place in late February and early March,[82] especially by NATO members France and the United Kingdom.[83] France and the UK were early supporters of a no-fly zone and had sufficient airpower to impose a no-fly zone over the rebel-held areas, although they might need additional assistance for a more extensive exclusion zone.

The US had the air assets necessary to enforce a no-fly zone, but was cautious about supporting such an action prior to obtaining a legal basis for violating Libya's sovereignty. Furthermore, due to the sensitive nature of military action by the US against an Arab nation, the US sought Arab participation in the enforcement of a no-fly zone.

At a congressional hearing, United States Secretary of Defense Robert Gates explained that "a no-fly zone begins with an attack on Libya to destroy the air defences ... and then you can fly planes around the country and not worry about our guys being shot down. But that's the way it starts."[84]

On 19 March, the deployment of French fighter jets over Libya began,[21] and other states began their individual operations. Phase One started the same day with the involvement of the United States, United Kingdom, France, Italy and Canada.[citation needed]

On 24 March, NATO ambassadors agreed that NATO would take command of the no-fly zone enforcement, while other military operations remained the responsibility of the group of states previously involved, with NATO expected to take control as early as 26 March.[85] The decision was made after meetings of NATO members to resolve disagreements over whether military operations in Libya should include attacks on ground forces.[85] The decision created a two-level power structure overseeing military operations. In charge politically was a committee, led by NATO, that included all states participating in enforcing the no-fly zone, while NATO alone was responsible for military action.[86] Royal Canadian Air Force Lieutenant-General Charles Bouchard has been appointed to command the NATO military mission.[87]

After the death of Muammar Gaddafi on 20 October 2011, it was announced that the NATO mission would end on 31 October.[88]

Before NATO took full command of operations at 06:00 GMT on 31 March 2011, the military intervention in the form of a no-fly zone and naval blockade was split between different national operations:

These are the forces committed in alphabetical order.

Since the start of the campaign, there have been allegations of violating the limits imposed upon the intervention by Resolution 1973 and by US law. At the end of May 2011, Western troops were captured on film in Libya, despite Resolution 1973 specifically forbidding "a foreign occupation force of any form on any part of Libyan territory".[214] In the article however, it reports that armed Westerners but not Western troops were on the ground.[214]

In a March 2011 Gallup poll, 47% of Americans had approved of military action against Libya, compared with 37% disapproval.[215]

On 10 June, US Secretary of Defense Robert Gates criticized some of the NATO member nations for their efforts, or lack thereof, to participate in the intervention in Libya. Gates singled out Germany, Poland, Spain, Turkey, and the Netherlands for criticism. He praised Canada, Norway and Denmark, saying that although those three countries had only provided 12% of the aircraft to the operation, their aircraft had conducted one-third of the strikes.[216]

On 24 June, the US House voted against Joint Resolution 68, which would have authorized continued US military involvement in the NATO campaign for up to one year.[217][218] The majority of Republicans voted against the resolution,[219] with some questioning US interests in Libya and others criticizing the White House for overstepping its authority by conducting a military expedition without Congressional backing. House Democrats were split on the issue, with 115 voting in favor of and 70 voting against. Despite the failure of the President to receive legal authorization from Congress, the Obama administration continued its military campaign, carrying out the bulk of NATO's operations until the overthrow of Gadaffi in October.

On 9 August, the head of UNESCO, Irina Bokova deplored a NATO strike on Libyan State TV, Al-Jamahiriya, that killed 3 journalists and wounded others.[220] Bokova declared that media outlets should not be the target of military activities. On 11 August, after the NATO airstrike on Majer (on 9 August) that allegedly killed 85 civilians, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon called on all sides to do as much as possible to avoid killing innocent people.[221]

The military intervention in Libya has been cited by the Council on Foreign Relations as an example of the responsibility to protect policy adopted by the UN at the 2005 World Summit.[222] According to Gareth Evans, "[t]he international military intervention (SMH) in Libya is not about bombing for democracy or Muammar Gaddafi's head. Legally, morally, politically, and militarily it has only one justification: protecting the country's people."[222] However, the Council also noted that the policy had been used only in Libya, and not in countries such as Cte d'Ivoire, undergoing a political crisis at the time, or in response to protests in Yemen.[222] A CFR expert, Stewert Patrick, said that "There is bound to be selectivity and inconsistency in the application of the responsibility to protect norm given the complexity of national interests at stake in...the calculations of other major powers involved in these situations."[222] In January 2012, the Arab Organization for Human Rights, Palestinian Centre for Human Rights and the International Legal Assistance Consortium published a report describing alleged human rights violations and accusing NATO of war crimes.[223]

According to a Gallup poll conducted in 2012, 75% of Libyans were in favor of the NATO intervention, compared to 22% who were opposed.[224] A 2011 Orb International poll also found broad support for the intervention, with 85% of Libyans saying that they strongly supported the action taken to remove the Ghadafi regime.[225]

On 3 June 2011, the U.S. House of Representatives passed a resolution, calling for a withdrawal of the United States military from the air and naval operations in and around Libya. It demanded that the administration provide, within 14 days, explanation of why the President Barack Obama did not come to Congress for permission to continue to take part in the mission.[226]

On 13 June, the House passed resolution prohibiting the use of funds for operations in the conflict, with 110 Democrats and 138 Republicans voting in favor.[227][228]

On 24 June, the House rejected Joint Resolution 68, which would have provided the Obama administration with authorization to continue military operations in Libya for up to one year.[229]

The military intervention was criticized, both at the time and subsequently, on a variety of grounds.

An in depth investigation into the Libyan intervention and its aftermath was conducted by the U.K. Parliament's House of Commons' cross-party Foreign Affairs Committee, the final conclusions of which were released on 14 September 2016 in a report titled Libya: Examination of intervention and collapse and the UK's future policy options.[230] The report was strongly critical of the British government's role in the intervention.[231][232] The report concluded that the government "failed to identify that the threat to civilians was overstated and that the rebels included a significant Islamist element."[233] In particular, the committee concluded that Gaddafi was not planning to massacre civilians, and that reports to the contrary were propagated by rebels and Western governments. Western leaders trumpeted the threat of the massacre of civilians without factual basis, according to the parliamentary report, for example, it had been reported to Western leaders that on 17 March 2011 Gaddafi had given Benghazi rebels the offer of peaceful surrender and also that when Gaddafi had earlier retaken other rebel cities there were no massacres of non-combatants.[234][235][236]

Alison Pargeter, a freelance Middle East and North Africa (MENA) analyst, told the Committee that when Gaddafi's forces re-took Ajdabiya they did not attack civilians, and this had taken place in February 2011, shortly before the NATO intervention.[237] She also said that Gaddafi's approach towards the rebels had been one of "appeasement", with the release of Islamist prisoners and promises of significant development assistance for Benghazi.[237]

According to the report, France's motive for initiating the intervention was economic and political as well as humanitarian. In a briefing to Hillary Clinton on 2 April 2011, her adviser Sidney Blumenthal reported that, according to high-level French intelligence, France's motives for overthrowing Gaddafi were to increase France's share of Libya's oil production, strengthen French influence in Africa, and improve President Sarkozy's standing at home.[238] The report also highlighted how Islamic extremists had a large influence on the uprising, which was largely ignored by the West to the future detriment of Libya.[231][232]

The intervention prompted a widespread wave of criticism from several world leaders, including: Iran's Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei (who said he supported the rebels but not Western intervention[239]), Venezuelan President Hugo Chvez (who referred to Gaddafi as a "martyr"[240]), South African President Jacob Zuma,[241][failed verification] and President of Zimbabwe Robert Mugabe (who referred to the Western nations as "vampires"[242]), as well as the governments of Ral Castro in Cuba,[243] Daniel Ortega in Nicaragua,[244] Kim Jong-il in North Korea,[245] Hifikepunye Pohamba in Namibia,[246] and others. Gaddafi himself referred to the intervention as a "colonial crusade ... capable of unleashing a full-scale war",[247] a sentiment that was echoed by Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin: "[UNSC Resolution 1973] is defective and flawed...It allows everything. It resembles medieval calls for crusades."[248] President Hu Jintao of the People's Republic of China said, "Dialogue and other peaceful means are the ultimate solutions to problems," and added, "If military action brings disaster to civilians and causes a humanitarian crisis, then it runs counter to the purpose of the UN resolution."[249] Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh was critical of the intervention as well, rebuking the coalition in a speech at the UN in September 2011.[250] Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi, despite the substantial role his country played in the NATO mission, also spoke out against getting involved: "I had my hands tied by the vote of the parliament of my country. But I was against and I am against this intervention which will end in a way that no-one knows" and added "This wasn't a popular uprising because Gaddafi was loved by his people, as I was able to see when I went to Libya."[251][252]

Despite its stated opposition to NATO intervention, Russia abstained from voting on Resolution 1973 instead of exercising its veto power as a permanent member of the Security Council; four other powerful nations also abstained from the voteIndia, China, Germany, and Brazilbut of that group only China has the same veto power.[253]

Criticisms have also been made on the way the operation was led. According to Michael Kometer and Stephen Wright, the outcome of the Libyan intervention was reached by default rather than by design. It appears that there was an important lack of consistent political guidance caused particularly by the vagueness of the UN mandate and the ambiguous consensus among the NATO-led coalition. This lack of clear political guidance was translated into an incoherent military planning on the operational level. Such a gap may impact the future NATO's operations that will probably face trust issues.[254]

The American Libertarian Party opposed the U.S. military intervention and LP Chair Mark Hinkle in a statement described the position of the Libertarian Party: "President Obama's decision to order military attacks on Libya is only surprising to those who actually think he deserved the Nobel Peace Prize. He has now ordered bombing strikes in six different countries, adding Libya to Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan, Somalia, and Yemen."[255] Former Green Party presidential candidate Ralph Nader branded President Obama as a "war criminal"[256] and called for his impeachment.[257]

A 2013 paper by Alan Kuperman argued that NATO went beyond its remit of providing protection for civilians and instead supported the rebels by engaging in regime change. It argued that NATO's intervention likely extended the length (and thus damage) of the civil war, which Kuperman argued could have ended in less than two months without NATO intervention. The paper argued that the intervention was based on a misperception of the danger Gadaffi's forces posed to the civilian population, which Kuperman suggests was caused by existing bias against Gadaffi due to his past actions (such as support for terrorism), sloppy and sensationalistic journalism during the early stages of the war and propaganda from anti-government forces. Kuperman suggests that this demonization of Gadaffi, which was used to justify the intervention, ended up discouraging efforts to accept a ceasefire and negotiated settlement, turning a humanitarian intervention into a dedicated regime change.[258]

Micah Zenko argues that the Obama administration deceived the public by pretending the intervention was intended to protect Libyan civilians instead of achieving regime change when "in truth, the Libyan intervention was about regime change from the very start".[259]

On 22 March 2011, BBC News presented a breakdown of the likely costs to the UK of the mission.[276] Journalist Francis Tusa, editor of Defence Analysis, estimated that flying a Tornado GR4 would cost about 35,000 an hour (c. US$48,000), so the cost of patrolling one sector of Libyan airspace would be 2M3M (US$2.75M4.13M) per day. Conventional airborne missiles would cost 800,000 each and Tomahawk cruise missiles 750,000 each. Professor Malcolm Charmers of the Royal United Services Institute similarly suggested that a single cruise missile would cost about 500,000, while a single Tornado sortie would cost about 30,000 in fuel alone. If a Tornado was downed the replacement cost would be upwards of 50m. By 22 March the US and UK had already fired more than 110 cruise missiles. UK Chancellor George Osborne had said that the MoD estimate of the operation cost was "tens rather than hundreds of millions". On 4 April Air Chief Marshal Sir Stephen Dalton said that the RAF was planning to continue operations over Libya for at least six months.[277]

The total number of sorties flown by NATO numbered more than 26,000, an average of 120 sorties per day. 42% of the sorties were strike sorties, which damaged or destroyed approximately 6,000 military targets. At its peak, the operation involved more than 8,000 servicemen and women, 21 NATO ships in the Mediterranean and more than 250 aircraft of all types. By the end of the operation, NATO had conducted over 3,000 hailings at sea and almost 300 boardings for inspection, with 11 vessels denied transit to their next port of call.[278] Eight NATO and two non-NATO countries flew strike sorties. Of these, Denmark, Canada, and Norway together were responsible for 31%,[279] the United States was responsible for 16%, Italy 10%, France 33%, Britain 21%, and Belgium, Qatar, and the UAE the remainder.[280]

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2011 military intervention in Libya - Wikipedia

Its a dignified, austere pose befitting the incarnated goddess of death. She stands, along with the fragments of three inanimate companions, showing the wear and tear of centuries in the heart of Paris far away from her native Mediterranean coastline and the deceased shes supposed to protect.

Between 2012 and 2016, French customs discovered and identified six artifacts presumed to have been trafficked from war-affected Libya and Syria. These include funerary statues from the Libyan region of Cyrene and Byzantine-era reliefs likely from Palmyra. The Louvre Museum, which recently reopened after the countrys latest pandemic lockdown, temporarily exhibits them under seal in its famed Denon aisle through December 2021. The museum views their presence as a testament, a contribution to increased public awareness on the issue of looting except it forgets that it is already a violent graveyard of colonial-era cultural trophies removed from their homelands under dubious circumstances.

About 20 years into the catastrophic United States-led wars on terror and a decade into the revolutions which instigated hope for systemic change throughout the Arab world before facing a debilitating hangover, the exhibition curators recall the platitude that heritage sites within warzones across North Africa and West Asia are in grave danger. In the case of Cyrene, a passive-voiced statement attributes this circumstance to an unbridled urbanization which accelerated since the Arab Spring, together with opportunistic amateurs and criminal networks prospering in the wake of the crisis affecting Libya. Whose crisis, and most crucially, whose responsibility?

In 2011, I lived in Beirut, Lebanon. I worked there for the United Nations and I recall young people protesting across the region, aspiring to basic so called universal human rights, which is to say they demanded to be able to lead a decent life free from want and fear. They prominently marched in Tunisia, where half of my family comes from, and of course in Syria and other places.

Are these young people, arguably the first victims of the disenchantment brought on by the unfolding proxy wars, to be blamed for plundering their own culture as the Louvre curators seemingly imply? What if the protests never happened, would all be fine for heritage sites? Narratives matter and a closer inspection should be paid instead to Frances very active role in these conflicts, and the decades of Western connivance in sustaining corrupt ally regimes until this exposure was no longer defensible. We should also examine how economic interests have benefited from morally compromised, lucrative opportunities which fuel complex war economies now exacerbated by COVID-19.

In an interview, Ludovic Laugier, one of the co-curators, states that its better for these fine-looking items to be admired in the Louvre rather than in the confines of a police station or court vault. This is quite a touching, romantic consideration for the public and the ideals of beauty, though perhaps videos or photos would have sufficed rather than organizing a media fanfare which incidentally brings additional revenue flow to the museum itself. How much of this revenue is going to the families of Libyans and Syrians who continue to perish at sea and on land?

There is blood on these artifacts, Laugier continues, likely unaware of the irony, if not dissonance, of this situation. If the Louvre museum is genuine about combatting the wrongful acquisition of artwork, which I would fully commend, it should start with decolonizing its century-long institutional practice and accelerate voluntary restitutions. While museum collections are considered inalienable, theft should void such policies, and justice starts at home.

Since 2016, its been permissible under French law to showcase trafficked art pieces under investigation (if a judge agrees to it) and the Louvre is the first museum in the country to do so. Its not an illegal undertaking per se. As a dual Tunisian-French citizen, Im grateful that French public entities acknowledge the sophistication of the ancient Mediterranean civilization, a shared legacy of syncretic beliefs, and mutually-enriching exchanges and migration, even if these artifacts are narrowly (subconsciously?) hosted in the Greek Antiquities department. I regret, however, that the same effort isnt always exerted towards the people living or originating from these spaces who are worthy of no less protection than statues. One could for example, refrain from enforcing harmful policies against asylum seekers.

While a long-awaited and broader reckoning slowly permeates the French art scene, the outcome of ongoing investigations will decide when to return the trafficked pieces to Libya and Syria (at this point, possibly in 2022). To me, these six artifacts represent the haunting ghosts of a French failure to question incisively, to act expeditiously, and to care a little bit more.

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The Louvre Shouldnt Exhibit Trafficked Antiquities from Libya and Syria - Hyperallergic

Libya could boost its oil production to 1.6 million barrels per day (bpd) by the middle of 2022 if the industry has the necessary funding, Libyas Oil Minister Mohamed Oun told Italian news agency Agenzia Nova in an interview published this week.

Currently, the North African producer exempted from the OPEC+ cuts pumps around 1.2 million bpd. According to secondary sources in OPECs latest Monthly Oil Market Report, Libyas crude oil production averaged 1.163 million bpd in June, up from 1.157 million bpd in May.

Since getting a unity government in March and a petroleum minister for the first time in five years, Libya has vowed it would raise its oil production, provided that the National Oil Corporation (NOC) receives the necessary funds.

Libya plans to raise its oil production to1.45 million bpdby the end of this year, Mustafa Sanalla, the chairman of NOC, toldBloomberg Televisionin an interview earlier this year.

Libya will be able to increase its current production by years end, provided that the state oil firm is not compromised again, according to Sanalla.

The targets for the next few years are for Libya to increase production to 1.6 million bpd in two years and to 2.1 million bpd in four years, NOCs chairman told Bloomberg in March.

Libya surprised many oil market observers, and probably the OPEC+ group itself, after managing in just a few months to restore its oil productionback to 1.25 million bpdfrom less than 100,000 in September 2020. The 1.25 million bpd level was the volume Libya was pumping before the eighth-month-long oil port blockade began in January 2020.

Even after the lifting of the blockade in mid-September and theceasefirefrom October, Libyas oil production has not been entirely stable so far this year due tostrikesfrom the Petroleum Facilities Guard over unpaid salaries and thelack of fundsfor restoration and maintenance of oil infrastructure.

By Tsvetana Paraskova for Oilprice.com

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Libya Looks To Boost Oil Production To 1.6 Million Bpd In 2022 - OilPrice.com

Since taking office, Joe Biden has repeatedly emphasized that America is back and ready to take the lead on confronting difficult issues. However, beyond ambitious and laudable plans to crack down on tax avoidance, organize against climate change and counter China's economic diplomacy in developing countries, the still-new administration lacks concrete examples of what they stand for and what they can achieve in the realm of foreign policy. A concerted diplomatic effort to assist the Libyan constitutional process as it goes through a current moment of uncertainty is precisely the opportunity the administration needs.

Bidens team will need to overcome its thus far demonstrated reluctance to do so. In August 2020, Jonathan Finer, now Bidens deputy national security advisor, co-wrote a memo titled Ending the Forever Wars. This argued for a need to rethink the U.S. counterterrorism strategy in favor of a more cautious approach. This perspective parallels Bidens own long-held views. Regretting his support for the Iraq War, he waged a one-man opposition against troop surges in Afghanistan during Barack Obamas presidency. He is now following through on his promise to complete the troop withdrawal from Afghanistan by September, exemplified by the recent closing of Bagram Airfield. This is part of a conscious de-prioritization strategy: Biden and his team would rather not waste precious resources in a region that they view as having only drawn policymakers into long, arduous, and ultimately unproductive efforts.

These fears are heightened in the case of Libya. Memories of the 2011 NATO Intervention in Libya carried out under the Obama administration, the tragic 2012 Benghazi attacks which resulted in the assassination of the U.S. ambassador, and the ensuing collapse of governing institutions have dissuaded action. Obama described his lack of preparation for the day after in Libya as his greatest regret, and current members of the Biden administration were burnt by the fall-out. The result has been a lack of engagement on Libya, beyond general support for the United Nations and European Unions efforts to seek a solution for the protracted crisis gripping the country. Washington would simply rather not get involved.

If Libya exemplifies the motivation of this withdrawal, it also demonstrates the dangerous consequences of a lack of U.S. diplomatic attention. The current state of Libya is daunting. Divided after a decade of near-continuous conflict, a vast array of militias is split between two governments each counting on their own international patrons. The western Government of National Accord, recognized by the UN and backed militarily by Turkey, finds itself against the rogue General Khalifa Haftar, the de-facto ruler of the east of the country supported by the United Arab Emirates, Egypt, and Russia. The existence of the split has persevered, despite the ostensible creation of a Government of National Unity under Prime Minster Abdul Hamid Dbeibeh earlier this year.

Biden's view that Libya is a complex case best left to the UN and the EU is understandable. However, such a perspective not only overlooks the contribution that a poorly planned U.S. intervention made to the current crisis, but also the potential for its worsening without U.S. support. There are worrying signs that the UN-backed constitutional process is running into difficulty, leaving the prospect of December elections in doubt and making the resurgence of conflict likely. An uneasy ceasefire is barely holding but troop movements have started again. This risk of collapse without some degree of U.S. support, alongside regional implications, has been overlooked.

A decisive U.S. diplomatic effort would provide three sets of benefits: humanitarian, political, and diplomatic. It would help avert a resurgence of conflict and thus avert death, suffering, and an exacerbation of poverty. These humanitarian benefits also realize U.S. political aims. A free, prosperous, and stable Libya is good for the Middle East and bad for terror networks. Libyan stability lowers the temperature of the migrant crisis for European allies, a point that French president Emmanuel Macron has already stressed personally to Biden. It would also counter Russian influence in the Middle East, which used a similar U.S. vacuum in Syria to lay a claim to regional importance. Libyan stability would help the process of US-Turkish rapprochement, in turn strengthening NATO. Finally, there are potential diplomatic benefits. The United States stepping up sends a clear message to allies and opponents alike; the United States is again thinking internationally, multilaterally, and diplomaticallyThe United States is back.

In contrast to such vast potential gains, the costs of U.S. engagement are low. The United States already has the means to be a decisive actor. Anwar Sadats observation that the United States holds 99% of the cards in the region still rings broadly true. Through its pre-existing relationships with the UAE, Egypt, Turkey, and the EU, combined with a lack of deep prior involvement in the Libyan civil war, the United States is best positioned to offer solutions. Especially relevant for an administration cautious about the use of the force, there is little chance of the United States stumbling into a military intervention in Libya. The ceasefire is tentatively holding, and diplomatic efforts do not commit the United States in any way to using force. There is no risk of another forever war.

The role that the United States could play is not only by pressuring actors towards a solution but by injecting neglected ideas into the constitutional process. Currently, the constitutional process is running up against a gamut of dilemmas. A constitution is needed that wins widespread support and buy-in from competing factions. This must, however, be done before December to allow planned elections to be held. It must stop either of the two rival governments from dominating postwar Libya while providing leadership they can both support. It must include Libyas minority groups while offering a national vision. A failure on even one of these points raises the risk of renewed conflict. Even as the UN-backed process founders against these challenges, a revised adoption of the 1951 constitution could square the circle that Libya finds itself in.

Before being overturned by Muammar Gaddafis coup in 1969, the 1951 constitution provided a crucial role in maintaining peace and national unity. After significant changes to better incorporate the past seventy years of evolving constitutional design, there is reason to believe that it could provide the same role yet again. It contains provisions protecting human rights, promoting transparency, and committing the country to democracy. Its support for a constitutional monarchy has been seen as an archaic flaw, but provides unexpected benefits given the current situation. A monarchy, albeit with reduced powers, offers a national leader not associated with any of the current factions. It makes provision for a federalism that could avert partition while maintaining provincial autonomy.

It also crucially occupies a vital space in the Libyan political consciousness, as the monarchy represents the one moment of freedom in pre-Gaddafi Libyan history. This is evidenced by a supportive domestic movement. In 2014, a proposal was launched in the Libyan General National Congress in support of a referendum to reinstall the monarchy with a former foreign minister even speaking out in favor. The adoption of a revised 1951 constitution satisfies the demands of the moment. It can be agreed upon in time for the December elections or immediately thereafter, does not provoke outright rejection from any one side, and provides a means through which the country can continue to develop diplomatically with a national yet decentralized vision. This is the fresh perspective that the United States can offer.

Libya stands at a tipping point. The Biden administration can make its first true foreign policy stand by supporting Libyas political, economic, and social recovery through an injection of diplomatic muscle and new ideas into the Libyan constitutional process. While doing so, the United States stands ready to achieve concrete geopolitical goals such as supporting European allies, renewing collaboration with Turkey, countering Russian influence, and reducing the instability that terror groups thrive on. Libya could serve as a potent example of moral and political goals working together in Biden's foreign policy, thus sending a clear signal of intent to the global community. This set of triple gainsmoral, political, and diplomaticwould come at relatively little cost; the United States already has the relationships, there are few obvious military risks, and there is a pre-existing, adaptable constitutional solution. The missing ingredient is diplomatic will. If Biden wants to prove the return of a helpful, global, and moral U.S. foreign policy, he should look no further than the Libyan constitutional process.

Nathaniel Amos is a graduate of the University of Cambridge where he studied History and Politics with a focus on US foreign policy in the Middle East, where he was a recipient of the Davidson Prize for History. He has previously worked in political communications in the Middle East and is a freelance foreign policy analyst.

Image: Reuters.

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Biden Can Show True Leadership By Helping to Stabilize Libya - The National Interest

The foundation stated that all relevant documents have been sent to concerned parties in Libya, the US, the UK and the EU. [Photo: AA]The Democracy and Human Rights Foundation (DHRF) in the United States stated that it had acquired intelligence indicating the presence of organized Russian troops in private fortifications near Al-Jufra airbase.

According to the Foundation, the deployment of organized Russian forces to Libya, as well as the Wagner mercenariesrevealingRussias intention not to evacuate its forces from Libya, but rather to escalate, mobilize, and increase their combat capability, making them a direct threat to both the Libyan State and European and American national security.

The Foundation emphasized the necessity for the Government of National Unity and the international community to create a political and military alliance to confront the so-called Russian occupation and force it to withdraw.

It also stated that it had provided copies of documents, including aerial photographs, coordinates, and other data, to the Libyan, American, and British governments, as well as European Union member states, and called for a response to the so-called imminent danger of preventing the recurrence of the Syrian landscape in Libya and denying Russia control over the countrys political, military, and economic affairs.

Emadeddin Zahri Muntasser, the Foundations head, stated that there was no hope of stability, freedom, or democracy anywhere with Russian military bases, or where Russian President Vladimir Putin could control his political future through the right of veto, or where he could influence public opinion throughmedia and online campaigns.

While Russia has stationed members of the Wagner Group in the country since at least 2017, the deployment of regular members of the Russian armed forces is a clear escalation with serious repercussions for the national security of Libya, the United States and the European Union, Muntasser said.

Allowing Putin to be a partner in the Libyan political discourse or any political or military initiative, according to Al-Muntasser, is a historic error with terrible historical ramifications.

On July 24, 2020, the United States Africa Command (AFRICOM) accused Russia of playing a harmful role in Libya by providing supplies and equipment to the Wagner group.

According to the command, the Wagner Group has 2,000 soldiers in Libya. The organization now maintains bases in the towns of Sirte and Jufra.

The United Nations and the international community have repeatedly urged all mercenaries and foreign forces to leave the war-torn country since e signing of the ceasefire agreement last year that stipulated all foreign forces must leave Libya within a 90 day period, an expiration date that has long passed but with no display from any party to depart Libyan soil any time soon.

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DHRF: Regular organized Russian forces begin their deployment to Libya - Libyan Express