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Collectively, the refugee protestors created a long list of demands addressed to the Libyan authorities, the UNHCR, and the EU. They ranged from evacuations, safety, and the closure of detention centres to Libya recognising the 1951 Refugee Convention and the EU ending support for Libyan militias. These armed groups have intercepted over 32,400 individuals trying to escape Libya across the central Mediterranean Sea in 2021 alone.

Many of the protestors have survived unimaginable hardship. Raids, mass detention, murder, as well as systematic forms of abuse, including torture, rape, and forced labour, are everyday experiences of marginalised refugee communities in Libya. For years, numerous international organisations have denounced the hellish conditions in Libya, the inhumane treatment, and the systematic incarceration of people on the move. To date these condemnations have changed nothing.

The protestors chose the site of the UNHCR building strategically, hoping that it would offer some protection from the Libyan security forces. The UNHCR, however, was dismayed at the protest camp outside its doors. It announced that it was suspending the services at Community Day Centre due to the security situation on 7 October and later closed the place entirely. In response, the protestors moved outside the main UNHCR office in the neighbourhood of Sarraj, which quickly put its activities on hold as well. The EU Head of Delegation to Libya, Sabadell Jose, voiced concern about the situation outside the UNHCR building and called upon the Libyan authorities to ensure security & to protect people & premises.

The refugee protestors felt abandoned by the UNHCR and feared that the suspension of its services would render them increasingly vulnerable to the violent Libyan security forces. They were particularly dismayed that the UNHCR repeatedly drew distinctions between protestors, on the one hand, and vulnerable individuals on the other. For example, one UNHCR statement said: We call on protestors not to block vulnerable asylum-seekers, including women, children, from accessing premises for help. And they were at a loss when the UNHCR called on protestors to disperse and to respect Libyan laws and regulations laws and regulations that had never protected refugees from systematic oppression or their shelters from destruction. Besides, where could they even disperse to?

Undeterred, the protestors remained on site and used their social media account Refugees in Libya to report on tactics of intimidation by authorities and the UNHCR. They rejected the UNHCRs attempt to divide them and worked together to build up the infrastructure of their collective struggle. They held large assemblies where discussions were translated into several languages. Multilingual committees also emerged around particular tasks, including political campaigning and negotiations, media work, cleaning of the camp site, mediating between protestors, and organising medical care.

The protest campaign of the refugees in Libya echoes other recent collective mobilisations, such as Lampedusa in Hamburg or the acts of resistance at Choucha refugee camp in Tunisia. Further mobilisations are currently emerging, such as those outside the UNHCRs offices in Zarzis and Medenine in the south of Tunisia.

In order to produce and circulate information and updates on their struggle, the refugee protestors in Libya launched a website and a Twitter account seeking to reach an international audience. Under the hashtag #EvacuateRefugeesFromLibya, the demands of protestors reverberated beyond Libya, especially in Europe where solidarity activists took to the streets to highlight that Libyas migration governance was inextricably also a European affair. While much of the mainstream media failed to report on these transversal struggles, forms of international solidarity multiplied.

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One hundred days of refugee protest in Libya - Open Democracy

The fourth wave of Covid-19 in Libya is ebbing, the Director of the National Centre for Disease Control, Haider Al-Sayeh, has confirmed, indicating that it was less damaging than the third wave.

The NCDC head lauded all who worked to confront the pandemic, saying they had a significant role in the receding of this wave.

"Some of them returned to work and ended their sit-in in response to the centre's call, but they are now waiting for their rewards and rights that we failed to pay."

According to Al-Sayeh, the broadly expanded Covid-19 vaccinations, which continued over the past year, had also led to the improvement of the epidemiological situation, noting that easing or continuing with some precautionary measures depends on the progress of the vaccination process.

As Ramadan approaches, Al-Sayeh said they are considering easing measures on Mosques during this holy month depending on the stability of the epidemiological situation and the progress of the vaccination campaigns.

He pointed out that schools may return to giving daily classes starting next semester.

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NCDC: Fourth wave of Covid-19 in Libya is waning - The Libya Observer

Led by Caretaker Prime Minister Abd Alhamid Aldabaiba, the current government of National Unity pledged that the construction of three urgent power plants in Libya is nearing completion.

Also Read:License Issued for Construction of Solar Power Plant in Ghadames, Libya

The projects in question, which are the Tripoli West gasoline power station, the Misrata power station, and the Tobruk gas power station, will be operational before the summer (which begins in July) when electricity demand is high according to Aldabaiba.

This move by Prime Minister Abd Alhamid Aldabaiba is reportedly intended to curb the North African countrys electricity problems.

Tripoli West gasoline power station

The gasoline power station, which will be located in Tripoli, is expected to have a power production capacity of 670 MW and an 87 percent completion rate. It is said that the project is currently being executed by two organizations, Siemens of Germany and ENKA of Turkey.

Misrata power station

Another of the three urgent power plants in Libya is the Misrata power station project. It is defined as one of the Libyan governments revival of life initiatives to revitalize development projects in the nation.

Once finished, the Misrata power station is expected to have a production capacity of 640 MW. Its construction is being overseen by the General Electric Company and implemented by Siemens of Germany and ENKA of Turkey.

The projects current completion rate is 83 percent.

Tobruk gas power station

Tobruk power station is third on the list, with an 80 percent completion rate. Implemented by Metka, a Greek firm, the Tobruk power station is expected to have a production capacity of 740 MW, the most of the three urgent power plants, with the first of its four units anticipated to be functional before the summer peak period.

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Three Under Construction "Urgent" Power Plants in Libya to be Operational by Q3 2022 - Construction Review

(Paris/Tunis/Beirut, 15 February 2022) The Arab Reform Initiative (ARI) launched today its latest research on Libya called Libyan Youth in Limbo: Coming of Age in Conflict. The study focuses on Libyan youth and the impact of a decade of conflict on their transition to adulthood.

The report, authored by ARIs non-resident fellow, Asma Khalifa, explores the decision-making processes of youth through in-depth qualitative research carried out with 75 Libyan youth in the regions of Tripolitania, Fezzan, and Cyrenaica. It looks at the types of opportunities and constraints that youth face in terms of education and livelihood, the impact of war on their political beliefs and participation, their understandings of peace and security, and how war has changed gender norms and relations.

In the process of transcribing interviews and drafting the report, I was overwhelmed with the richness of young people's minds and experiences. The loss of hope is acute in many of the stories but still there is strength of will, awareness and an independence that is inspiring" Asma Khalifa, said Asma Khalifa

The report is part of ARIs Youth Trajectories in Contexts of Conflict Project that aims to understand the impact of conflict and political transitions on youth in Syria, Libya and Iraq. Specifically, it explores how conflict has impacted their visions for political participation and aspirations for their future as well as expectations for livelihood.

In publishing this study, ARI is contributing new knowledge on Libyan youth in the context of post-2011 that takes as its point of departure how youth themselves narrate and navigate their trajectories, choices, aspirations, and interpretations of the heterogeneity of the youth lived experience, said Sarah Anne Rennick, ARI deputy director. This ground-up, evidence-based research can be utilized by relevant stakeholders to adapt policies, programs, and responses designed for, with, and by youth to ensure that they account for the diverse realities of Libyan youth today, and to ensure that they are not left behind in the post-conflict period.

The report highlights the fact that, after a decade of instability, Libyan youth are no longer concerned solely with the conflict but also with fundamental and more historic issues such as tolerance of differences.

Through the in-depth interviews, youth expressed feelings of instability and insecurity that prevent them from building their lives and being more politically engaged. This can be achieved by empowering MENAs new generation of political and social actors in their pursuit of participatory politics, social justice, accountability, equal citizenship, and representation, as well as by engaging in programming in the region that is for and by the youth.

The views represented in this paper are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Arab Reform Initiative, its staff, or its board.

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Libya: Youth Transition to Adulthood Amid the Conflict -

Libya is entering a new cycle of its political crisis. In December 2021, a mere 48 hours before polls were supposed to open, the elections were postponed. Emad Sayah, the head of Libyas High National Election Committee (HNEC), declared it to be a case of force majeure. He then proposed to Libyas parliament, the House of Representatives (HoR), to reschedule the elections for 24 January 2022. This deadline has now also passed. But rather than resolve and reschedule elections, the HoR appointed a new rival Prime Minister Fathi Bashagha on 10 February, dividing Libya between two rival political administrations.

Libyas now faces a dangerous new reality, as rival factions cling to power returning the country to the political divisions of the past, whilst proposing future election roadmaps designed to bring about the demise of their political rivals while guaranteeing their own political survival. The tactical moves on the part of rival factions go back at least twelve months. Since then, Libyas constitution, election law, and judiciary have become weapons in a new battle over Libyas electoral roadmap as political actors attempt to either stall or re-sequence elections to push a rival out of power, whilst preserving ones own institutional power indefinitely.

The crisis began shortly after the Libyan Political Dialogue Forum (LPDF), a United Nations appointed body of 75 members, was tasked with appointing a new interim unity government and establishing a political roadmap to culminate with democratic elections. The LPDF made early progress in appointing an interim Government of National Unity (GNU) to be led by Abdulhamid Dbeibah that took office in March 2021 and in agreeing to schedule simultaneous presidential and parliamentary elections for 24 December.

Since last summer, however, the LPDF faced internal political deadlock over how to proceed with the legal framework, namely a constitutional basis for elections. Libya has had a draft constitution since 2017, but it has faced criticism for its lack of inclusivity. At the same time, it became clear that the widespread threat of a boycott of the referendum would almost certainly lead to further delays to the political transition especially if the constitution were rejected at a pre-election referendum. The debate over how to establish a constitutional basis before the elections swiftly became a reality check over how long Libyas political transition would last, as factions within the LPDF alleged this would stall the transition and extend the GNUs interim mandate beyond 24 December.

Salehs law sparked outrage from parliamentarians and members of the LPDF, but was accepted by former UN Special Envoy to Libya, Jan Kubis.

In the LPDFs stalemate, the HoRs chief speaker Aguila Saleh captured an opportunity to reshape the political roadmap to remove the GNU from power whilst preserving his own power in parliament. In September, Saleh illegally bypassed a parliamentary vote and issued a presidential elections law by decree. The law rescheduled the LPDF roadmap by sequencing presidential elections before parliamentary elections instead of holding them simultaneously, a move designed to ensure an end to the GNUs eight-month political tenure whilst extending Salehs eight years of institutional control over parliament.

Moreover, the law sidestepped the constitutional referendum and used Libyas rump 2011 constitutional declaration that offers weak legal restraints and limits on the power of Libyas first elected president, increasing the prospects of a winner-takes-all outcome at the polls.

The law also faced criticism by the GNUs prime minister Abdelhamid Dbeiba for including conditions to block his candidacy, whilst being tailored to allow Saleh and one of his key allies responsible for Libyas civil war, Khalifa Haftar, the self-styled leader of the Libyan Arab Armed Forces (LAAF), to run on the presidential ballot, but return to their positions in parliament and the LAAF should they lose.

Salehs law sparked outrage from parliamentarians and members of the LPDF, but was accepted by former UN Special Envoy to Libya, Jan Kubis, who rather than reject the law and mediate decided to accept Salehs law to expediate the process to hold one (but not both) elections by any means on 24 December. When Kubis resigned one month before the elections and was replaced by his predecessor Stephanie Williams as UN Special Advisor, it became clear that confidence was lost in the UN mediation and election process under his custodianship. However, it was left to HNEC, the body responsible for administering elections, to announce the news without compromising their apolitical standing.

The future of parliamentary and presidential elections remains unclear under the HoRs new political roadmap but what comes next is certain to be a deeper political crisis and potential delays to full elections by years. The international community have already ruled out recognising a replacement for the GNU before elections. The appointment of a new parallel administration is thus a cynical attempt at a power grab in the knowledge it returns Libya to the tense years of political divisions between East and West that legitimised Haftars war on Tripoli in 2019. Secondly it is a major setback for the UNs Berlin process that will require the UN to reverse course on its democratic roadmap to address the present elite power struggle before future elections can be rescheduled.

Now its high time for the UN to demonstrate bold leadership and resuscitate the aims of the Berlin Process.

Finally, the HoRs roadmap remains weaponised to include milestones to extend the political life by years, and in the process sparking new legal disputes that will drag Libya into a new complex crisis. Saleh has passed a motion to allow the HoR to draft a new constitution rather than pass a referendum on the current draft prior to elections. Salehs own constitutional process is designed to allow him to delay parliamentary elections until the HoRs work on a new constitution is completed.

Given the 2017 constitution was drafted by a democratically elected assembly in 2014, Salehs proposed constitution lacks an elected mandate to replace it and would open so many further legal disputes and political challenges prior to parliamentary elections that the HoRs new roadmap could delay parliamentary elections and extend the HoRs mandate by years not months.

Todays crisis is in large part based on the assumption that individuals responsible for Libyas political crisis and wars will demonstrate self-sacrifice and willingly give up the political institutions and military power they have clung to for years through an electoral roadmap of their own design.

The UNs Berlin roadmap offered the international community an opportunity to erode the power of spoilers by dismantling the political and military institutions responsible for war into a unified neutral state rather than reward the figures at their helm with an opportunity to revive their political fortunes through elections.

Now its high time for the UN to demonstrate bold leadership and resuscitate the aims of the Berlin Process, and sequence a neutral political roadmap, setting sober election milestones based on substantive compromise and institutional reform, rather than stick to dates and timelines for political expedience that disguise conflict and reward spoilers with custodianship over Libyas future.

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The weaponisation of Libya's elections Democracy and society - IPS Journal