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There has been mildly encouraging news out of Libya in recent months, almost nine years after the overthrow of Muammar Qaddafi led to chaos rather than an improvement in governance and stability. The international community has ignored many chances to help the country get back on its feet. Now it has another opportunity that should not be squandered, lest a humanitarian tragedy ensue, and Libya once again becomes a gateway of numerous refugees streaming into Europe, as well as extremists making their way to the conflicts of the broader Middle East region.

The immediate reasons for this renewed opportunity come from a series of military setbacks by the forces of Khalifa Hafter and his Libyan National Army, which is essentially one large militia operating out of strongholds in the east. Last spring, Hafter and his forces moved south then west, taking much of the country, including the central regions where oil is produced, ultimately knocking on the door of the capital of Tripoli, a city otherwise generally spared of the fighting until then. Haftar benefited from Russian mercenaries and United Arab Emirates airpower, and quieter assistance from countries such as Egypt, France, and Saudi Arabia.

Fortunately, various militias operating in support of the Government of National Accord, led by Prime Minister Fayez Sarraj and blessed by the United Nations, have managed to push Haftar back, first out of the city center, then out of nearby strongholds, and now entirely out of the west. The situation is still fluid, to be sure, and Russian warplanes have been seen in the country, raising the prospect of an escalation. With material assistance from Turkey, however, the tide has now turned.

Libya again resembles what had been the norm for a number of years, with a well intentioned but weak government effectively controlling only parts of Tripoli, various militias dominating in one city or another, some oil flowing with production, and the population generally managing to scrape by, at least more so than people in other war torn Middle East lands such as Yemen and Syria can. This means there is an opportunity.

Tracking a similar state of affairs in 2018 as part of a working group led by the Brookings Institution, we advocated a form of governance based on cities for Libya. Rather than a strong central state with its own powerful military, we favored effectively stitching the country together piece by piece from the ground up. Militias and other local power brokers that tolerated outside observers, minimized use of violence, and provided security or services to local populations would, under this concept, qualify for a prorated share of the oil revenue in Libya.

An oversight board composed of Libyans as well as outside technical experts would make the determinations about who qualifies for such funding, and who should be at least temporarily docked from some of it based on bad behavior. A United Nations observation force could also deploy to the country in small numbers, not to keep the peace, but to report on violations and thus incentivize the militias to keep the peace between themselves and within the areas they control.

The situation in Libya does not suggest that all armed groups in the area can lay down their weapons. Their existence is not only a phenomenon related to power. It goes much deeper. Young men, without a state grid capable of giving them a critical citizenship dimension, have found their economic and social realization in the militias, a sense of belonging that will be difficult to unhinge. Over time, this system could evolve into a set of municipal governments and small armies or paramilitaries that would then join the coast guard as a truly national security service. The effort would happen from the bottom up and not the top down.

But there are some problems. Haftar may not yet have accepted his return to a regional power broker in just part of Libya. If he is hatching plans to retake much or all of the country again, he will have to be stopped. But the challenge is that this kind of idea is not going to emerge from the Libyans themselves. There is not enough trust, and there are too many disparate actors, all of whom are relatively weak. None except perhaps Sarraj are in a position to request the economic and security assistance, along with a United Nations observation force, that would most likely be needed for such a concept of recovery and reunification.

At a time of uncertainty at home and abroad, and with diplomatic efforts from North Korea to Afghanistan and elsewhere mostly dead in the water, the administration should consider arbitrating a new peace process to promote a vision of cooperation in Libya. The United States more than other parties is still seen by most Libyans as neutral and relatively well intentioned. The moment is ripe to give this problem another try, while being more realistic about what it will take to bring some semblance of order to Libya than other previous efforts have attempted.

Michael OHanlon is a senior fellow and Federica Saini Fasanotti is a nonresident scholar in foreign policy with the Brookings Institution.

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The next steps in Libya | TheHill - The Hill

By Salma El Wardany on 6/25/2020

CAIRO (Bloomberg) --Libyas oil industry is crumbling after more than nine years of neglected maintenance amid a civil war thats killed thousands and destroyed towns across the country.

The lack of basic, nuts-and-bolts servicing has left pipelines corroding and storage tanks collapsing. Remedial work at wells alone could cost more than $100 million, the head of the state-run National Oil Corp. told Bloomberg, and thats money the government can ill afford.

The damage means that Libya, despite having Africas largest crude reserves, will struggle to ramp up production quickly even if the conflict abates soon. Fighters are poised now for what could be a decisive battle at Sirte, a city just a two-hour drive from the so-called oil crescent -- a cluster of export terminals for most of the nations crude.

Libya produces about 90,000 barrels a day. Thats a fraction of the 1.6 million that companies such as Eni SpA and Repsol SA pumped in partnership with the NOC before the ouster of strongman Moammar Al Qaddafi in 2011 and the catastrophic war that followed. Until now, the NOC has usually succeeded in restoring operations quickly after regaining control of oil facilities shut due to fighting. That resilience, however, is fraying.

The longer we wait, the greater the damage and the higher the cost, NOC Chairman Mustafa Sanalla said in a written response to questions. It is a tragedy for the people of Libya that political game-playing has been allowed to cause such damage to our countrys critical national infrastructure.

The political turmoil has left Libya divided between a United Nations-recognized government in the capital Tripoli, where the NOC has its headquarters, and a competing administration based in the east. Since January, when supporters of the eastern-based commander Khalifa Haftar shut most of the countrys oil fields and ports, daily output has plunged by more than a million barrels.

The Tripoli government of Fayez al-Sarraj, backed by Turkey, appears for now to have the upper hand on the battlefield. Its troops repulsed Haftars western offensive and have advanced as far as Sirte, on the central coast, which the rebels still control. When Haftar, who has support from Russia and Egypt, called a cease-fire this month, the government rejected it, saying it would first capture Sirte and an air base called Jufra.

Armed groups forced Libyas biggest oil field of Sharara to stop production twice this month, and they also closed the nearby El-Feel deposit. Both southwestern fields had only just re-opened after halting in January.

The NOCs lack of access to Sharara prevented workers from injecting chemicals into a pipeline to stop corrosion. A 16,000-barrel tank that handles overflows, or surges, collapsed last month as a result, Sanalla said.

We are deeply concerned about corrosion in the pipelines, he said. Due to the disruption of exports, crude oil has stayed in the pipelines, which has environmental and other implications that will not be easy to address in the future.

Harouge Oil Operations, a joint venture between the NOC and Canadas Suncor Energy Inc., blames corrosion for at least 80 leaks at its facilities from January to May, Sanalla said. Harouge exports crude from Libyas third-largest oil port at Ras Lanuf.

Throughout the last nine years, Libyan production has been able to rebound, said Mohammad Darwazah, an analyst at consultant Medley Global Advisors. But many fields require urgent maintenance, and damage sustained to storage depots at the eastern terminals has not been fully repaired, limiting how quickly fields can ramp up.

Prolonged shutdowns have reduced the pressure that wells need to spout oil. On earlier occasions when Sharara re-opened, it took just a few days to restore production to around 300,000 barrels a day. This time, the field will need around three months to recover, according to the NOC.

How to pay for the repairs is an open question; the NOC said Sunday that blockades of fields and ports by Haftars supporters have deprived Libya of $6 billion in potential oil revenue since January.

Sustained under-funding of the state operator and multiyear delays to field and asset maintenance will make the challenge of a resumption greater this time around, said Bill Farren-Price, a director at consultant RS Energy Group Canada Inc.

Any increase in Libyan supply could jar efforts by the OPEC+ coalition to limit global production. The Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries and allies such as Russia are seeking to rebalance crude markets and prop up prices after they crashed with the spread of the coronavirus early in the year. Brent crude has more than doubled since late April, but at around $40 a barrel its still down 40% this year.

Libya, an OPEC member, is exempt from the output cuts, due to the nations strife.

For energy analysts and traders, the rot in Libyas oil facilities makes it that much tougher to predict when production will pick up.

Even if a peace deal is reached, its durability and impact on oil production remain uncertain, analysts at Citigroup Inc., including Francesco Martoccia, said in a note this month. The NOC is also confronting a steep natural decline rate of roughly 8% per year, which requires capital expenditures to at least marginally offset it.

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Civil war's end won't be enough to revive Libyan oil production - WorldOil

Africa File: Egypt threatens military intervention in Libya

[Notice: The Critical Threats Project frequently cites sources from foreign domains. All such links are identified with an asterisk (*) for the reader's awareness.]

Egypts president ordered preparations for a military intervention in Libya on June 20, opening a new phase in an escalating regional conflict that increasingly threatens US interests. Critical Threats Project Research Manager Emily Estelle writes that Egypts direct involvement raises a small but serious risk of direct confrontation with Turkeyan outcome that would pit two of the regions strongest militaries (and two US allies) against each other. Russia will likely benefit from both an Egyptian intervention and rising tensions between Turkey and fellow NATO members (particularly France and Greece) over Turkeys ambitions in Libya and the Eastern Mediterranean.

Meanwhile, the ongoing conflict in Libya is setting conditions for Salafi-jihadi groups to recover from losses suffered in recent years. The Islamic State in Libya has resumed regular attacks in the countrys south after a nearly yearlong pause.

Also in this Africa File:

Recent Critical Threats Project Publications

Warning Update: Egypts Libya threat risks larger Mediterranean war by Emily Estelle

Al-Qaedas return by Katherine Zimmerman

ISIS: Resilient on sixth anniversary by Katherine Zimmerman

Figure 1. The Salafi-Jihadi Movement in Africa: June 2020

Source: Author

North AfricaWest AfricaEast Africa

Updated April 28, 2020

The COVID-19 pandemic will hasten the reduction of global counterterrorism efforts, which had already been rapidly receding as the US shifted its strategic focus to competition with China, Iran, North Korea, and Russia. The US administration has begun to withdraw troops from Afghanistan after signing a peace deal with the Taliban on February 29. The future of US forces in Iraq and Syria is uncertain following the destruction of the Islamic States physical caliphate and its leaders death, though the group already shows signs of recovery. The US Department of Defense is also considering a significant drawdown of US forces engaged in counterterrorism missions in Africa, though support for the French counterterrorism mission in the Sahel has been extended for now.

This is happening as the Salafi-jihadi movement, including al Qaeda and Islamic State affiliates and allies, continues to make gains in Africa, including in areas where previous counterterrorism efforts had significantly reduced Salafi-jihadi groups capabilities. The movement was already positioned to take advantage of the expected general reduction in counterterrorism pressure before the pandemic hit; now, a likely wave of instability and governmental legitimacy crises will create more opportunities for Salafi-jihadi groups to establish new support zones, consolidate old ones, increase attack capabilities, and expand to new areas of operations.

The Salafi-jihadi movement is on the offensive in Burkina Faso, Niger, and Mali, where it has pressured the Malian government to offer negotiations. It is also stalemated in Somalia and Nigeria and persisting amid the war in Libya. Conditions in these last three countries favor the Salafi-jihadi movement rather than its opponents in the coming year.

Libyas civil war, reignited on a large scale in April 2019, will continue to fuel the conditions of a Salafi-jihadi comeback, particularly as foreign actors prolong and heighten the conflict. Counterterrorism efforts in Somalia and Mali rest on the continued efforts of international coalitions, support for which is eroding in both host and troop-contributing countries and on local partners that have demonstrated their inability to govern effectively or establish legitimacy in their peoples eyes.

Amid these conditions, US Africa Command (AFRICOM) is shifting its prioritization from the counterterrorism mission to great-power competition, a move also intended to reduce risk after a 2017 attack killed four servicemen in Niger. US and European powers aim to turn over counterterrorism responsibilities to regional forces of limited effectivenesssuch as the G5 Sahel, which is plagued by funding issues, and the African Union Mission in Somalia, which is beginning a scheduled drawdown. COVID-19 has exacerbated existing problems with these forces, with contributing nations reevaluating their commitments to foreign intervention during the pandemic.

The Salafi-jihadi movement has several main centers of activity in Africa: Libya, Mali and its environs, the Lake Chad Basin, the Horn of Africa, and now northern Mozambique. These epicenters are networked, allowing recruits, funding, and expertise to flow among them. The rise of the Salafi-jihadi movement in these and any other places is tied to the circumstances of Sunni Muslim populations. The movement takes root when Salafi-jihadi groups can forge ties to vulnerable populations facing existential crises such as civil war, communal violence, or state neglect or abuse (all now likely to be exacerbated by the pandemic). Local crises are the incubators for the Salafi-jihadi movement and can become the bases for future attacks against the US and its allies.

Libya

The Libya war is entering a new phase that could lead to direct confrontation between major regional militaries. Egyptian President Abdel Fatah al Sisi announced on June 20 that Egypt has a legitimate right to intervene in Libya and ordered his military to prepare. Sisi declared a red line at Sirte and Jufra in central Libya, where Egypts Libyan partnerthe Libyan National Army (LNA) led by Khalifa Haftarhas fallen back after abandoning a 13-month campaign to seize Tripoli in early June. Sisi and Haftar announced a unilateral cease-fire on June 6 in a bid to stop Turkish-backed forces affiliated with the internationally recognized Government of National Accord (GNA) from advancing on Sirte, the gateway to an LNA-controlled oil-producing region.

Diplomatic efforts, including a Turkish-Russian channel and an Arab League meeting boycotted by the GNA, have faltered. Both sides are now preparing to battle for control of Sirte.

Russian mercenaries will likely assist the LNA in its defense of Sirte. The Russian Air Force sent eight fighter jets to LNA-controlled al Jufra airbase in mid-May. AFRICOM shared imagery of Russian aircraft at al Jufra on June 18 and warned that inexperienced mercenary pilots are flying the aircraft. Russian mercenaries have also reportedly planted mines in the Sirte region.

The Libya conflict is deepening fissures in NATO, advancing a core Russian objective. Turkeys ambitions in Libya and the eastern Mediterranean Sea are bringing it closer to military confrontation with Greece and France. Turkey seeks to establish a maritime corridor to Libya that will allow it to exploit undersea hydrocarbon resources. This claim infringes on established maritime boundary claims, including Greeces.

Turkey and France have traded rhetorical barbs since Turkish frigates prevented the Greek and French Navies from inspecting suspected weapons transports to the GNA in May and June. (A European naval mission focused on enforcing the Libya arms embargo disproportionately affects Turkey, whose rivals can route arms shipments through Egypt. France has provided clandestine military support to Haftar during the conflict.)

For more detail, see Warning Update: Egypts Libya threat risks larger Mediterranean war.

The Islamic State in Libya resumed regular attacks in southwestern Libya after a nearly a year of limited attacks and media activity. The Islamic State claimed eight attacks between May 17[1] and June 11[2] targeting LNA personnel and civilians accused of supporting the LNA economically in several localities in Fezzan region. The attacks were claimed through the Islamic States Naba bulletin, indicating ongoing communications with the Islamic State media apparatus. The Islamic State included Libya in a cross-theater messaging campaign that marked the final third of the Muslim holy month of Ramadan.[3]

The uptick in Islamic State activity coincides with increased pressure on the LNA, which had occupied key locations in the Fezzan in the months prior to launching the Tripoli campaign in April 2019. LNA operations in southwestern Libya in the first half of 2019 appear to have disrupted Islamic State operations; the groups limited media releases in the latter half of 2019 were significantly delayed.[4] The Islamic State resumed attacks as the LNA lost control of a key military position on the outskirts of Tripoli to Turkish-backed GNA forces in mid-May and withdrew from the Tripoli front by June 6.

Forecast: In the most likely case, fighting will stalemate in central Libya. Egypt may make a show of force to persuade Turkey to scale back its support, limiting the advance of GNA-aligned forces and preserving LNA control of the oil crescent. This de facto partition would likely lead to future rounds of civil war and proxy conflict after the combatants rearm.

In a less likely but more dangerous case, a miscalculation or error could draw external forces into direct conflict, possibly including conflict between two US allies (NATO ally Turkey and major non-NATO ally Egypt).

Either case preserves and worsens the conditions that allow Salafi-jihadi groups to strengthen. The Islamic State will likely continue its renewed attack tempo and may resume intermittent attacks targeting symbolic state institutions in coastal cities in the coming months. (Updated June 24, 2020)

The Western Sahel

Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) confirmed the death of its emir but has not yet announced a successor. A French operation supported by US intelligence killed Droukdel and several of his associates in northern Mali on June 3. An AQIM official eulogized Droukdel on June 18.[5] AQIM is severely degraded in Algeria, where it originated, but continues to conduct intermittent attacks on Algerian security targets. AQIM claimed to kill an Algerian soldier in Ain Defla province in western Algeria on June 21.[6]

French military officials stated that Droukdel may have been in Mali to provide guidance to the AQIM affiliate Jamaat Nusrat al Islam wa al Muslimeen (JNIM) due to clashes between JNIM and an Islamic State branch. An al Qaedaaffiliated jihadist online claimed that Droukdel had ordered the eradication of the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS), formally known as the Islamic States West Africa Province.[7] French forces also captured a senior ISGS commander on May 19.

Tensions remain high between ISGS and JNIM. ISGS and JNIM have cooperated in the past but also clash over territory, economic opportunities, and personnel. The current clashes, which began in March, are the most severe and sustained eruption of hostilities between the groups. Islamic State media claimed multiple attacks targeting JNIM in Mali and Burkina Faso in late May and mid-June.

ISGS is attempting to challenge JNIMs dominance in the Sahel. The Islamic States overall spokesman promised retaliation against al Qaeda in the Sahel on May 28.[8] ISGS has grown more lethal and hewed more closely to Islamic State ideology and tactics over time.

Meanwhile, the Islamic State has increasingly showcased its West African branchesin both the Sahel and the Lake Chad Basinas it has suffered setbacks in its core terrain in Iraq and Syria. The JNIM-ISGS rift also reflects the Islamic States opposition to the al Qaedasupported Afghan Taliban deal with the United States, which JNIM now seeks to replicate in Mali.

Recent French-led coalition operations have pressured ISGS in the border region between Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso. This pressure paired with the intra-jihadist clashes have temporarily reduced ISGSs ability to conduct offensive attacks.

Likely JNIM militants conducted the deadliest Salafi-jihadi attack since 2016 in Cote dIvoire. Militants killed 12 Ivorian soldiers at an Ivorian frontier military post near the town of Kafolo on the Ivorian-Burkinabe border on June 12. This was the deadliest attack in the country since AQIM attacked the Grand Bassam beach resort in 2016. The attack comes after sustained Ivorian-Burkinabe operations against JNIM and its affiliates in northern Cote dIvoire and southwestern Burkina Faso in recent months. Ivorian security forces captured the attack leader on June 21.

Separately, JNIM conducted a series of raids targeting Malian military targets in Segou Region in central Mali. The group attacked military bases on June 6 and June 21 and targeted at least two convoys.[9]

France officially launched the International Coalition for the Sahel on June 12. The coalition, first announced in January after a series of JNIM and ISGS attacks killed over 200 soldiers in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger, brings international and regional counterterrorism forces under a single command.

Germanys parliament voted in late May to extend its deployment with the European Union Training Mission in Mali until 2021.

Human rights violations by Sahel militaries are threatening their international backing while contributing to the grievances exploited by Salafi-jihadi groups. The French defense minister called on Sahel governments to address accusations of extrajudicial executions. Burkinabe soldiers are accused of executing unarmed members of the Fulani ethnic group in Djibo in northern Burkina Faso in April. This alleged attack is part of a larger wave of violence by security forces and state-approved vigilantes that now kills as many people as Salafi-jihadis and bandits.

Security forces abuses are a key driver of support for Salafi-jihadi groups in northern Burkina Faso. Burkina Faso has claimed recent progress in the fight against Salafi-jihadi groups. Burkina Fasos president visited Djibo briefly on June 19 as a show of force and commitment. The city remains largely cut off from southern Burkina Faso due to surrounding instability. Burkinabe security forces claimed to destroy terrorist bases in northern and eastern Burkina Faso on June 23. Such advances will be fleeting, however, as long as state actions (and inaction) deepen the grievances of populations that Salafi-jihadi groups co-opt and exploit.

For more detail, see How Ansar al Islam Gains Popular Support in Burkina Faso.

The Malian president committed to dialogue following mass protests.Malian President Ibrahim Boubacar Keita announced that he would hold talks with opposition leaders on June 17.Keita also suggested first steps toward institutional governmental reform and stated that abducted opposition leader Soumala Ciss, whom JNIM captured during elections in April, is still alive. Thousands of Malians rallied in Bamako demanding Keita's resignation on June 5, citing mismanagement and corruption related to the election results.

Forecast: The perceived illegitimacy of the Malian elections will fuel unrest with interest groups in northern Mali, possibly distracting the state from counter-Salafi-jihadi efforts and creating more opportunities for Salafi-jihadi groups to establish mutually beneficial agreements with other anti-government groups. Salafi-jihadi groups will begin to establish governing institutionssuch as courtsin the Burkinabe-Malian-Nigerien tri-border area, though they may mask these efforts to facilitate a deal with the Malian government.

Salafi-jihadi groups may also work through local governance structures to present themselves as legitimate interlocutors and avoid scrutiny. Attacks on Fulani civilians will drive greater popular support to JNIM, which will present itself as a more moderate alternative.

The JNIM-ISGS clashes will likely not have a significant operational effect because French pressure on ISGS is already limiting the groups operations in the near term. ISGSs opposition to negotiations may increase JNIMs palatability to local populations over time. (Updated June 24, 2020)

The Lake Chad Basin

The Islamic States West Africa Province (ISWA) in the Lake Chad Basin has begun attacking Muslim civilians directly, signaling a shift in targeting and strategy. ISWA conducted twin attacks on Monguno village and Nganzai district in northeastern Nigerias Borno State on June 13, killing at least 60 soldiers and civilians. The group also claimed a June 9 attack on Gubio village in Borno State that killed at least 90 civilians. This shift to targeting civilians indicates a hard-line turn by ISWA under the direction of senior Islamic State leaders, who ordered the purging of more moderate ISWA leadership with ties to al Qaeda who advocated a more lenient approach toward civilians. This brutal shift may increase ISWAs area of control in the short term but may ultimately weaken the group by incentivizing local populations to resist rather than accept ISWAs governance.

Somalia

Al Shabaab conducted its first attack on a Turkish-run military training base in Mogadishu, marking an escalation in a campaign to discredit a Somali Federal Government (SFG) effort to secure the city. An al Shabaab militant detonated a suicide vest at the base on June 23. Somalias army chief claimed that security forces killed the attacker before he entered the base, contradicting the accounts of local officials who said the militant successfully entered the base before detonating his vest. The blast killed two civilians, according to local police, while al Shabaab claimed killing seven Somali military officers and wounding 14 more. Al Shabaabs Shahada News Agency reported that the attack showed that al Shabaab continues to dominate the security scene in the areas under the control of the Western-backed Somali government.[10]

Al Shabaab exploited the Muslim holiday of Eid al Fitr to present itself as an effective governing alternative to the SFG, but the celebrations may have helped spread COVID-19 in al Shabaabcontrolled territories. The group's Shahada News Agency boasted on May 28 that al Shabaab correctly identified the first day of Eid, while the SFG failed.[11] The press release included photos depicting large groups of civilians celebrating Eid in al Shabaabcontrolled areas of southern and central Somalia. Al Shabaab featured many of the same locations during Eid in 2019.[12]

The lack of social distancing at these gatherings may have contributed to the spread of COVID-19 in al Shabaab territories. The head of al Shabaabs COVID-19 response committee announced the creation of an isolation and health care facility in al Shabaab's stronghold of Jilib in southwestern Somalia on June 12. The committee head urged Muslims showing virus symptoms to come to the facility to avoid infecting others. A staff member at the facility said they had all the necessary equipment to treat patients but declined to say how many patients they had. Al Shabaab created the response committee in mid-May while claiming that the virus had not spread to its territories.[13] Al Shabaab will likely downplay the extent of the virus spread in its territory.

Forecast:Al Shabaab will attempt to capitalize on backlash to the SFGs pandemic response to present itself as the more legitimate governing force in Somalia but may suffer its own delegitimization if its effortspotentially including disrupting aidare seen as causing harm in the areas it controls. The pandemic may reduce targets available for al Shabaabs campaigns, potentially leading to fewer attacks (especially if the planned 2020 elections are postponed). The pandemic may also delay al Shabaabs efforts to execute a spectacular attack in Kenya. (Updated April 14, 2020)

For more on Salafi-jihadi groups opportunities during the COVID-19 pandemic, see Forecast: The African Salafi-Jihadi Movement After COVID-19.

Mozambique

Islamic Statealigned militants in northern Mozambique's Cabo Delgado province attempted to capture a large town for the first time. Islamic State Central Africa Province (ISCA) militants raised the Islamic State flag in Macomia after invading the town on May 28. The attackers were reportedly dressed in Mozambican security force uniforms and armed with rocket-propelled grenades and an armored personnel carrier equipped with a heavy machine gun captured from government forces.

The Mozambican Defense Armed Forces, supported by helicopter gunships piloted by South African mercenaries, drove the militants from the city on May 30 after heavy fighting. Mozambican President Filipe Nyusi claimed on June 1 that Mozambican forces killed two militant commanders during the fighting. Mozambiques defense minister later reported that the militant forces lost 78 fighters total.

The attack on Macomia is the latest departure from the militant groups usual hit-and-run tactics. Raids on the similarly sized cities of Muidumbe and Mocimboa da Praia in late March saw the militants chase security forces from the town, briefly address the local population, and withdraw after brief skirmishes with Mozambican reinforcements. The attempt to seize Macomia, despite its failure, indicates that the militants now have sufficient resources and capabilities to hold off government forces for days.

Forecast: The Mozambican ISCA branch will attempt to take control of a Cabo Delgado population center and declare it a part of the Islamic States caliphate this year. (Updated June 23, 2020)

[1] IS Reports Previously Undocumented Rocket Strikes in Libya in Naba 235 Exclusive, SITE Intelligence Group, May 21, 2020, translation available by subscription at http://www.siteintelgroup.com.

[2] al Naba 238, June 18, 2020, https://jihadology.net/wp-content/uploads/_pda/2020/06/The-Islamic-State-al-Naba%CC%84%E2%80%99-Newsletter-238.pdf.

[3] Is Reports Torching Farm of Municipal Guard Member And Blowing Up Businesses In Libya In Naba 236, SITE Intelligence Group, May 29, 2020, translation available by subscription at http://www.siteintelgroup.com.

[4] Following Pattern By IS Fighters Elsewhere, Those in Libya Renew Pledge To Baghdadi in Video, SITE Intelligence Group, July 6, 2019; With Photos Of Fighters Pledging To New Is Leader, "Libya Province" Demonstrates Its Continued Existence, SITE Intelligence Group, November 15, 2019, translation available by subscription at http://www.siteintelgroup.com; and IS Libya Province Video Documents April-June 2019 Raids, Grisly Executions, SITE Intelligence Group, December 4, 2019, translation available by subscription at http://www.siteintelgroup.com.

[5] AQIM Official Confirms Death of Droukdel, Urges University Students Embrace Jihad, SITE Intelligence Group, June 19, 2020, translation available by subscription at http://www.siteintelgroup.com.

[6] Pro-AQ Media Unit Reports AQIM Attack in Algeria, Major Ambush by JNIM In Mali, SITE Intelligence Group, June 22, 2020, translation available by subscription at http://www.siteintelgroup.com.

[7] AQ Jihadist Says Deceased AQIM Leader Ordered Eradication of ISWAP, SITE Intelligence Group, June 17, 2020, translation available by subscription at http://www.siteintelgroup.com.

[8] IS Spokesman Echoes Jihadi Sentiment of Covid-19 Being Divine Punishment, Vows Group Will Never Compromise Their Faith, SITE Intelligence Group, May 28, 2020, translation available by subscription at http://www.siteintelgroup.com.

[9] Pro-AQ Media Unit Reports AQIM Attack in Algeria, Major Ambush by JNIM In Mali, SITE Intelligence Group, June 22, 2020, translation available by subscription at http://www.siteintelgroup.com.

[10] Shabaab Says Camp Turksom Suicide Bombing Demonstrates Its "Domination Of Security Scene" in Government-Controlled Areas, SITE Intelligence Group, June 23, 2020, translation available by subscription at http://www.siteintelgroup.com.

[11] Shabaab Photographs Toy Gun-Totting Children During Eid Celebrations, Claims 18 Attacks in One-Week, SITE Intelligence Group, May 28, 2020, translation available by subscription at http://www.siteintelgroup.com.

[12] Shabaab Photographs Eid Al-Fitr Celebrations in Held-Territories, Claims 25 Casualties Among Kenyan Forces in Mandera, SITE Intelligence Group, June 5, 2019, translation available by subscription at http://www.siteintelgroup.com.

[13] Shabaab Appoints Committee to Monitor COVID-19 Pandemic in its Controlled Territories, SITE Intelligence Group, May 13, 2020, translation available by subscription at http://www.siteintelgroup.com.

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Africa File: Egypt Threatens Military Intervention In Libya - Critical Threats Project

In an unfinished building in a downtrodden neighbourhood of Tripoli, Solomon Gebreyonas Alema, a 29-year-old Eritrean refugee, can be found most days sketching and painting.

One small room in the dimly lit, overcrowded building that houses around 200 refugees from Eritrea, Ethiopia and Sudan has been designated by the residents as an art room a space for people to paint, draw, write and play music.

Since mid-March, few residents have been able to venture far from the building due to stringent restrictions on movement introduced to limit the spread of COVID-19 in Libya, as well as ongoing security concerns linked to the conflict in Tripoli, which until recently had raged for more than a year. This has prevented most from being able to earn money through daily labour.

"Painting means life to me..."

Painting means life to me, I dont want to be separated from it, said Solomon, as he displayed his sketches and drawings. When we get money, we spend it on necessary essentials like food and rent. Even so, because art is a necessary thing for me, for my life, my friends and other people around me help in whatever way they can by providing some items for painting and drawing.

Solomon has been drawing and painting since he was a young child. He is self-taught and never attended formal art classes. His faith informs much of his work large canvases in rich, vibrant colours portraying scenes from the bible, including figures of saints.

Painting these not only gives him purpose and inspiration, said Solomon, but has also helped other Eritrean and Ethiopian refugees struggling to get by in Libya.

We dont have any place to pray here in this country. So we use these pictures he explained. When people pray, it gives them hope. Using this painting to pray helps them with their faith and makes them feel they are protected from danger.

Much of Solomon's work is inspired by his faith, featuring images of saints and other biblical scenes.UNHCR/Mohamed Alalem

Painting for me means life, I don't want to be separated from it," Solomon explains. UNHCR/Mohamed Alalem

Solomon, who has no formal art training, sketches a new design in pencil.UNHCR/Mohamed Alalem

One of Solomon's completed works is affixed to the wall of the art room.UNHCR/Mohamed Alalem

Solomon displays his paint-spattered hands after working in the art room that he shares with other residents.UNHCR/Mohamed Alalem

There are currently close to 49,000 registered refugees and asylum seekers living in Libya. Many face violence and abuse on their journeys here, as well as in detention when they reach the country. Most continue to face huge challenges on a daily basis as they struggle to get by.

Many were smuggled into the country, like Solomon, who left his home and family determined to find a safe place to study and make a career as a professional painter. He paid smugglers US$5,500 to take him to Europe, which he paid for with the help of his mother, who sold her gold jewellery, and money from relatives in the Eritrean diaspora.

His attempt to reach Europe by boat, however, ended when the vessel was intercepted by the Libyan Coast Guard, and he was put in a detention centre with others.

On his release into the urban community in Tripoli, he developed tuberculosis a common disease among refugees living in cramped, unsanitary conditions and re-entered another detention centre in order to seek medical assistance, which he was unable to afford outside with no means to support himself.

"...people live a hand-to-mouth existence."

He is grateful now to be living in a place where he has the support of others in his community, despite the tough conditions.

People's thoughts are very much on coronavirus. They are so worried because most of the people live a hand-to-mouth existence, he explained, saying that with his housemates and friends, food and other items are shared among the group.

I honestly would prefer to spend everything I have on materials to paint. But life is very difficult and it is not easy to focus on painting when there are other really important things that are priorities for us, necessities for us to survive, he said.

UNHCR, the UN refugee agency, and its partners provide help to refugees and asylum seekers in urban settings in Libya, including documentation, cash assistance to the most vulnerable, hygiene and household items, medical assistance and psychosocial support.

Together with the U.N. World Food Programme, the agency will also start providing monthly emergency food assistance for up to 10,000 refugees and asylum seekers until the end of the year, to help those struggling to provide for themselves having lost access to daily work due to the COVID-19 restrictions.

See also: UNHCR, WFP join forces to reach thousands of refugees and asylum-seekers in Libya with emergency food aid

One of Solomons most recent sketches, which he is turning into a painting, shows life in Tripoli during the coronavirus pandemic. One side of the drawing depicts the city at war: shelling, fighting and tanks on the move; on the other side, a man wears protective clothing as he sprays disinfectant to fight the disease.

In the centre, surrounded by people who are praying and washing their hands, is a Madonna-like mother and baby. These central figures are protected by the shade of an umbrella, with the letters UNCHR written on it.

I have tried my best to focus on my art, he explained. We have tried to stick with the little hope that we have. And one thing that has given us all hope is having UNHCR's help.

We have a feeling that somehow, we are safe. We didnt lose hope due to this and due to our faith. We didnt give up.

More here:
Art provides comfort and hope to Eritrean refugee in Libya - UNHCR

Khairi Saadallah, the suspect in the Reading terror attack, is understood to be a Libyan national who came to Britain as a refugee from the countrys civil war, which began in 2014 during attempts to build a democratic state after the fall of Colonel Muammar Gaddafi.

Neighbours said a close family member of Saadallahs had fought in Libya against Gaddafi and had faced anti-Muslim abuse after the familys arrival in the UK.

Gary, a neighbour who did not wish to give his surname, told the Guardian: All he [Khairi Saadallahs relative] wanted was a quiet life. The first time I met him was when I heard people shouting anti-Muslim abuse at him. They called him a terrorist. I told them they were a bunch of liars When there was trouble [with anti-Muslim abuse], I wrapped my arms around him and said dont react, they are the ones in the wrong.

He added that Saadallahs family member was disgusted by the actions of the Manchester bomber, who was also from a Libyan family. Salman Abedi killed 22 people after an Ariana Grande concert at Manchester Arena in 2017. Born in Manchester in the UK, Abedi had been rescued by the Royal Navy from the civil war in Libya three years earlier, alongside other British citizens.

Gary said he did not think Saadallah, now 25, had fought in the conflict. I didnt think [Saadallah] fought in Libya because he was too young, he said. They were not massively religious. They were good to people.

British relations with Libya and its diaspora have been coloured by the UK governments often ambivalent relations with Gaddafi, the UKs active support for his ousting in 2011, and the UKs diplomatic efforts to try to secure an end to the widening civil war.

That on-off war, fed by the inability of Libyans to reach a political distribution of power and wealth between east and west, has reached a new fever pitch in recent months.

The backwash from the 2011 intervention led indirectly to the Manchester bombing. Abedi, 22,, whose parents fled Libya in 1994, returned to the country after Gaddafis fall in 2011 only to come back to the UK as the fighting continued in Libya. Abedi and his family developed links to the Libyan Islamic Fighting group, an Islamist group that helped oust Gaddafi.

After initial suspicions of a terrorist network, police later said they believed Abedi had largely acted alone but then came to realise the extent to which he had been working with his brother. In March 2020, his brother, Hashem Abedi, was found guilty of 22 counts of murder in relation to the attack. He had been in Libya at the time of the detonation.

In May 2017, MI5 launched an internal inquiry into its handling of the warnings it had received about Abedi and a second inquiry into how it missed the danger. MI5 admitted it had a policy of allowing Libyans in the UK to travel to fight against Gaddafi and return later, including some who had been under house arrest in the UK for counter-terrorist measures.

In November 2018, parliaments intelligence and security committee declared that MI5 had acted too slowly in its dealings with Abedi. The committees report noted: What we can say is that there were a number of failings in the handling of Salman Abedis case.

See the article here:
Reading terror suspect came to UK as refugee from Libyan civil war - The Guardian