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The UNs mission in Libya has voiced dismay at the sentencing of a journalist to 15 years in prison in the countrys east, controlled by strongman Khalifa Haftar. UNSMIL is dismayed by the sentencing of the journalist Ismail Abuzreiba to 15 years imprisonment following a trial by a military tribunal in Benghazi, it said on Twitter on Saturday. The detention and trial appear to violate Libyas laws as well as its international obligations on the right to a fair trial and freedom of expression, it added.

The European Unions ambassador to Libya, Alan Bugeja, wrote on Twitter that he was extremely concerned by the sentence, which he said came after the journalist had been held in detention for two years or more. I call on the authorities to immediately release him, ensure the respect of his fundamental rights and of freedom of expression, Bugeja said. Authorities in eastern Libya have not specified the exact nature of the charges faced by Abuzreiba, but, according to local media, he was accused of contact with channels and agencies banned in that part of the country.

Haftar launched an offensive on the capital Tripoli, seat of the internationally recognised Government of National Accord, in April last year. Troops loyal to the GNA in May pushed Haftars forces back from the southern outskirts of the capital, before repelling them in early June 2020 as far as Sirte, a northern coastal city that is a gateway between Libyas east and west. The fighting over the last year or so has killed hundreds, including many civilians. It has also heightened the dangers faced by journalists, who have increasingly been harassed and threatened, leading most to leave the country. Libya ranks 164 out of 180 countries on Reporters Without Borders (RSF)s World Press Freedom Index for 2020.

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Libyan journalist Ismail Abuzreiba gets 15 years in prison by illegitimate court linked to warlord Haftar - North Africa Journal

On 20 July, Egyptian legislators authorised sending combat troops to Libya, where Cairos ally Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar is on the defensive. Following Turkeys intervention on the Tripoli governments behalf, Egypts involvement could escalate the war dramatically. All parties should seek a compromise.

Egypts threat to send its army into neighbouring Libya is a predictable and understandable but dangerous response to Turkeys deepening military involvement that risks embroiling both countries in a costly war. Cairo has warned that it will intervene directly should Turkish-backed forces loyal to the Tripoli-based government try to retake key locations in central Libya and nearby oil installations now under the control of an Egyptian-backed rival coalition led by Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar. As Egypt sees it, a Turkish-backed advance into central Libya would cross a red line, endangering its border and national security. Both Ankara and Cairo should take a step back and seek a settlement on the status of central Libyas strategic sites, including its prized oil assets. Foreign capitals with close ties to both countries should help them de-escalate tensions and reach such an accommodation. The alternative is to further regionalise what has become an unwinnable war.

The latest tipping point in the six-year Libyan conflict came on the heels of the pro-Tripoli coalitions successful counteroffensive in western Libya, made possible by support from the Turkish army and the Syrian fighters on its payroll. Ankaras deployment came in response to a request for help from the government of Prime Minister Fayez al-Serraj in Tripoli in early 2020. The overt nature of its intervention, sanctioned by a Turkish parliamentary vote, enabled Turkey to dispatch military assets more rapidly and with greater freedom than its regional adversaries.

Fresh from its military win, the Tripoli government is now insisting that Haftars troops pull back from the former Qadhafist stronghold of Sirte and the Jufra air base in central Libya, both used by Haftars foreign backers as operational hubs. In addition, Tripoli wants Haftars forces to withdraw from the nearby oil crescent as a precondition for a ceasefire. These requests mark a shift from the Serraj governments previous demand that Haftar move his troops back to their pre-April 2019 positions, before the Tripoli offensive, when both the oil crescent and Jufra were still under his coalitions control. The explanation for this change is not hard to discern: Ankara and Tripoli now believe they can not only beat back but defeat Haftar, despite the support he enjoys from Egypt, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Russia and France. Although Tripoli has nominally laid out its conditions for a ceasefire, it continues to reject political negotiations with the Haftar camp, blaming it for waging a year-long offensive that killed at least 3,000 people, both civilians and combatants. By imposing new ceasefire terms that it knows will be hard for the Haftar camp to accept, Tripoli is hoping to legitimise its refusal to negotiate.

A major driver behind a new flare-up in fighting would be the desire to control oil facilities and revenues. Haftars withdrawal from the oil crescent would amount to handing over the countrys main oil facilities to Tripoli. Haftars forces imposed a blockade on oil exports in January to protest Tripolis alleged misuse of oil revenues, including purportedly to fund Turkish military efforts in Libya. The blockade has almost completely halted oil exports, bringing down daily production from around one million barrels to just 100,000 barrels, and causing revenues (already affected by low international oil prices) to plummet.

For regional actors, Egypt in particular, the stakes transcend Libya and its oil sector. Their main concern is defending their vision of the regional order. Egypt and its Arab allies Saudi Arabia (which has provided political and financial support), Jordan (under-the-radar military support) and the UAE (financial and military assistance) oppose the presence of Turkish forces and pro-Ankara Syrian fighters in Libya and see the Syrians, in particular, as militant Islamists. Egypt considers an expanded Turkish military presence in central Libya to be a potential threat to its own national security. It fears that a Turkish-backed offensive could alter the power balance in eastern Libya, allowing pro-Tripoli forces to use this area as a staging ground for attacks inside Egypt. Egypts Arab allies share these views, while France is especially concerned with the conflicts ripple effects in southern Libya, which borders Chad, an important ally.

These preoccupations have pushed Cairo to take the unprecedented step of preparing for an openly declared military intervention, rather than continuing to back Haftars forces covertly. Egypt did not consider taking this step even in 2015, when the Islamic State took over Sirte and established a presence in Benghazi. Cairo is now trying to match and counter Ankara, which it sees as a regional sponsor of the Muslim Brotherhood, the Egyptian governments mortal enemy.

Egypt is relying on eastern Libyas parallel governing institutions to provide a veneer of legitimacy for its intervention. On 13 July, the Tobruk-based House of Representatives officially asked Cairo to intervene. A few days later, President Abdelfattah al-Sisi met with a delegation of tribal leaders from eastern Libya in Cairo, who likewise called on Egypt to step in. Tripoli slammed both appeals as illegal, pointing out that tribal leaders have no official authority and that the east-based parliament, whose active members number no more than 40 of the 200 nominal parliamentarians, held no vote on its request. Regardless, on 20 July, the Egyptian parliament responded by authorising the deployment of Egyptian troops for combat missions outside the country to defend its national security against criminal armed militias and foreign terrorist elements. In escalating rhetoric, the Tripoli government condemned this decision as a hostile act and direct interference, amounting to a declaration of war.

Military experts believe that Cairo is likely to limit its intervention to securing the border area inside Libya. It could back up such an operation with airstrikes upon pro-Tripoli forces, should they seek to advance. With Sirte located 1,000km from the Egyptian border, deploying troops to central Libya would pose significant logistical challenges for the Egyptian army, lengthening supply lines and promising only inconsistent air cover to ground troops. A more expansive intervention should not be excluded, however, one that could expose Egyptian troops to a direct confrontation with the Turkish military and affiliated Syrian fighters in central Libya. Private military contractors of the Russian-owned Wagner company are also consolidating a presence in central Libya, reportedly operating fighter jets in Jufra and bringing in reinforcements to Sirte and the oil terminal areas in a bid to bolster the Haftar forces positions there.

The repercussions of a resumption of hostilities for the local civilian population would be catastrophic. The growing involvement of conventional armies raises the spectre of intensified violence, particularly in the residential areas of Sirte. Likewise, Egypts rumoured plan to transfer weapons to eastern Libyan tribal groups risks unleashing even more local violence and retaliatory measures against civilians. Renewed fighting in the oil crescent could also result in hard-to-reverse damage to hydrocarbon facilities; while secondary to humanitarian concerns, such damage would be worrying, as it could stanch the flow of financing critical for Libyas long-term economic viability and standing. Finally, with Turkish and Egyptian troops potentially coming into close contact and pro-Russia private military fighters also in the fray, the risk of a wider regional confrontation looms.

All sides ought to take immediate de-escalatory steps to minimise these risks and save civilian lives. Tripoli should freeze its military advance in central Libya and pursue a negotiated agreement on Sirte and Jufra, both now under the control of pro-Haftar forces aided by Wagner fighters. In Sirte, such an accord could entail Haftar and the forces backing him withdrawing from the area, to be replaced by a limited pro-Tripoli military presence that would leave out Turkish-backed forces and hardware; in Jufra, an agreement could allow for a symbolic presence of Haftar-aligned fighters with guarantees that foreign forces currently operating there move out. This would be one step toward a partial demilitarisation of central Libya rather than the full demilitarisation that Berlin and Washington have advocated but which would be difficult to achieve.

At the same time, the sides should come to a resolution to the oil sector standoff. Egypt should seek to convince Haftar and its other regional allies to drop their demand to see profits redistributed between western, eastern and southern Libya (in the absence of a legal framework that would regulate this arrangement), and instead accept a compromise agreement put forward by the U.S., UN and Libyas National Oil Corporation (NOC). This proposal envisages reopening oil production and exports in exchange for placing future oil revenues in a NOC-held account for 120 days rather than in the Tripoli-based central bank, as a means of reassuring Haftar as to how such funds would be used. Supporters of this plan believe that the timeframe would allow for negotiating a new line-up of the central banks top management as a possible precursor to reunification of the bank, which split into two parallel and competing institutions after 2014. This deal would also mean that, for now, Haftar-led forces remain in charge of the sites.

Such arrangements would fall short of what each side wants, but they could pave the way for a negotiated way forward. Moreover, acceptance of these arrangements would help build much-needed confidence between the two coalitions and their respective backers. From Cairos perspective, conceding on Sirte and Jufra and persuading the Haftar camp to accept an oil deal would also spare Egypt and its Libyan allies from the many unknowns that a military adventure would entail. For Ankara and Tripoli, a symbolic return to Sirte and acceptance of a semi-demilitarised Jufra would guarantee that these sites would not be used for military offensives aimed at taking Tripoli or Misrata, while an oil deal would provide much-needed revenues to sustain public-sector salary payments.

As for Turkey, it should be wary of overreach. Its authorities have made clear that they will not consider Haftar, or anybody else in his camp, as negotiating partners. Instead, they say they want to restore the Tripoli governments control over all of Libyan territory. Their strategy is wearily familiar: reestablishing their proxys military superiority with the aim of going back to the negotiating table from a position of strength. The problem with this approach is that the other side and its foreign backers are unlikely to accept a lopsided negotiation, as the past years of conflict and diplomacy in Libya have shown. Eventually, a new cycle of violence almost certainly will emerge, as the opposing side tries to level the playing field by counter-escalating. Turkey should avoid falling into this trap and instead push its allies in Tripoli to accept a compromise solution on central Libyas security arrangements and oil revenues that could lead, at a later stage, to a comprehensive military and political agreement to reunify the country.

With each new intensification of the conflict, the opportunity for compromise seems ever more remote, while the risk of a larger regional war looks ever greater. If there still is a chance to reverse course, regional actors should jointly take it now or find themselves mired in an endless regional confrontation.

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Averting an Egyptian military intervention in Libya - Libya - ReliefWeb

The Libyan warlord faces an ICC investigation for his alleged role in mass grave burials and resistance from his allies.

Libyan warlord Khalifa Haftar has reportedly decentralised his command by delegating powersto his subordinate, Abdulrazek al Nadoori.

This comes after several reports of a rift between Haftar and Libya's Tobruk-based so called House of Representatives (HoR), Aguilah Saleh, emerged in the past few months. Saleh however has denied this, albeit with a measured tone.

Although Saleh has repeatedly said his relationship with Haftar has exceeded any formal positions, he has been candid in confessing that instead of disagreements, he has only ever experienced a difference of views with the warlord, something he has called a "natural and healthy phenomenon" in all countries of the world.

With Haftar now taking a backseat - as per news reports - Nadoori will be heading the Operation Dignity Major Room, or in essence, the central command of Haftar's militias, as well as the military zones currently controlled by the warlords militias, and all security rooms, including a training directorate.

For regional experts, Haftar's decision to transfer powers to al Nadoori was done with the intention of avoiding potential consequences from his previous failures: overseeing burials of civilians in mass graves and war crimes committed by his mobs during an offensive against the UN-backed government of GNA.

Other experts say Aguila Salehs recent moves, coupled with the International Criminal Court's investigation of mass graves in Tarhuna, gave an irreversible battering to Haftar's reputation and paved the way for this new ascent to power.

Egypt is also apparently losing its confidencein Haftar, with reports emerging from Cairo that suggest the Egyptian regime is exploring alternatives to the warlord, especially after he faced back-to-back defeats at the hands of the UN-backed government.

According to Karim Mezran, a resident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council, Aguila Saleh wields a strong influence in eastern Libya. He is not only the speaker of a pro-Haftar parliament, but also a crucial political figure belonging to the al Ubadiat tribe in Tobruk.

In addition to this, Saleh comes from a tribe that has historically run security institutions in Tobruk.

In late June, Saleh urged Egypts Sisi to intervene militarily in support of Haftar should the Libya's forces attack the strategic city of Sirte. As a jurist and politician, Salehs demand struck many as odd.

Time and again, Saleh has proved himself a cunning politician, ready to betray even his own allies. In May last year, he met with top leaders of Haftars militias without including the warlord in the meeting. Haftar's absence stood out because he had had several disagreements with Saleh around that time. The biggest disagreement they had was over Haftar appointing himself as the sole leader of Libya, a claim HoRs vehemently rejected. The other point of confrontation between them was Haftar violating the UN-brokered 2015 political agreement.

Since then, several reports have emerged that Aguila Saleh, who prefers to be called as Supreme Commander of Armed Forces, desired to appoint Nadori as Haftar's successor.

Libyan analyst, Mohamed Buisier, recently told the Anadolu Agency that Haftar will be defeated by the end of this year as several countries, including the US, have realised that he is a war criminal, especially after his militias attacked civilians and diplomatic missions.

Given these facts, Haftars decision might be read from different perspectives.

A first scenario suggests that after considering the internal and external dynamics, Egypt could well support Aguila Saleh as Cairos new political partner and hence impose Abdulrazek al Nadoori as its new militia leader.

In addition, in the eyes of Egypt, Saleh is a bit due to both his political identity and tribal power. Sisis latest attempt to arm tribes against the UN-backed government in Libya might be seen as a part of this thought despite its early failure. In response, Haftar might want to empower Nadoori to weaken Saleh's authority. It was Saleh who first appointed Nadoori as the self-styled Libyan National Armys chief of staff in 2016.

The second scenario would be based on Haftar trying to gain the support of Saleh's militia leaders and linking them to the crimes committed by his forces. With Saleh's militias on his side, he can easily blame them for war crimes committed under his watch.

Source: TRT World

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Analysis: The politics behind Haftar's devolution of power in Libya - TRT World

Bobby Ghosh is a Bloomberg Opinion columnist. He writes on foreign affairs, with a special focus on the Middle East and the wider Islamic world.

The Trump administrations desultory Libya policy has left the U.S. helpless as its friends fight each other, its enemies grab strategic resources and American credibility sinks into the Saharan quicksand.

The Libyan civil war is now at a dangerous inflection point: Government and rebel forces are facing off over the port city of Sirte, hometown of the former dictator Muammar Qaddafi and gateway to a coastal stretch of oil export terminals known as the oil crescent. But thanks to President Trumps equivocal positions over the conflict, the U.S. finds itself with little leverage over either side.

The latest demonstration of the perils of American ambivalence is the seizure of vital oil facilities in the North African country by Russian mercenaries, undeterred by U.S. warnings to steer clear. The Trump administrations feeble response has been to sanction the Russian businessman who employs the mercenaries. This is no more likely to deter Moscow than the U.S. Africa Command publishing satellite images of Russian military jets in the Jufra airbase in May: Despite being called out, Moscow didnt withdraw the planes.

In recent weeks, Trump has himself attempted to intervene in the Libyan civil war, by calling the principal foreign patrons of the two sides, Turkeys President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, who supports the government, and Egypts General Abdel-Fattah El-Sisi, who supports the rebels, and urging them to support a negotiated settlement. Neither has since shown the slightest intention of reining in their favored belligerents. If anything, Egypt has ratcheted up tensions, with its parliament last week approving a direct military intervention in Libya.

Trumps late, limp effort to broker a truce in Libya is doomed to go the way of his administrations other attempts at peacemaking in the Arab world from the disastrous deal of the century for the Israelis and Palestinians, to failed mediation between Egypt and Ethiopia over a giant dam on the Blue Nile, to its inability to end the feud between Saudi Arabia and Qatar.

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In Libya, the failure is a direct consequence of Trumps refusingto pick a side. Although the U.S. formally recognizes the Government of National Accord in Tripoli, led by Prime Minister Fayez al-Sarraj, it has at various times viewed the rebel Libyan National Army as an ally in the fight against Islamist extremism never mind that the rebels count Islamist extremists among their fastest friends. Trump, with his characteristic fondness for authoritarians, has praised the rebel commander Khalifa Haftar.

Trumps vacillation can be explained at least in part by the support that both Sarraj and Haftar receive fromAmerican allies; more to the point, both are championed by tough guys the president greatly admires.

On Sarrajs side is Turkeys Erdogan, the world leader whose frequent calls to the White House are instantly put through to Trump. Theres also Qatar, which hosts the largest U.S. military base in the Middle East.

The rebels are backed principally by Egypts Sisi, Trumps favorite dictator,and the United Arab Emirates, whose de facto leader, Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed,the crown prince of Abu Dhabi, enjoys enormous clout in Washington. And then, of course,they have the support ofthe toughest of tough guys: Russian President Vladimir Putin, who meddles in Libya principally through the mercenary forces of the Wagner Group.(Haftar also has Emmanuel Macronin his camp, although Trump has long sincelost his fondness for Francespresident.)

Unable to choose one side and incapable of mediating between them, Trump can only threaten economic punishment. But sanctions have limited effect in a civil war, especially when the prize control of enormous oil wealth is so valuable. As a result, in Libya as in much of the Arab world, the U.S. is doomed to be a mere spectator.

This column does not necessarily reflect the opinion of the editorial board or Bloomberg LP and its owners.

To contact the author of this story:Bobby Ghosh at aghosh73@bloomberg.net

To contact the editor responsible for this story:Nicole Torres at ntorres51@bloomberg.net

Before it's here, it's on the Bloomberg Terminal.

Bobby Ghosh is a Bloomberg Opinion columnist. He writes on foreign affairs, with a special focus on the Middle East and the wider Islamic world.

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Trumps Waffling on Libya Puts the U.S. in a Bind - Bloomberg

For days, rumours have been circulatingthat Yemeni mercenaries have left their own conflict for the one in Libya, joining an ever-growing international presence in the war-tornNorth African country.

Whether the rumours are true or notis difficult to establish, though four months ago one Yemeni militia, the Popular Resistance, began a recruitment drive, promising Yemenis military training but not disclosing the front they would be sent to.

Either way, for struggling Yemeni mercenaries looking to earn a decent wage amid war, economic collapse and the coronavirus pandemic, the location of the fight is neither here nor there.

New Popular Resistance recruits tell Middle East Eye they're happy to fight in someone elses war - for the right price.

The Popular Resistance is a militia linked to Yemen's Islah party, a Muslim Brotherhood affiliate that has good relations with both Saudi Arabia and its regional rival Turkey.

Part of the Saudi-led coalition fighting the Houthi movement, the party and the militia have enemies within the alliance battling on behalf of President Abd Rabbuh Mansour Hadi's government - particularly groups allied with the United Arab Emirates, which is a major backer of eastern Libyan commander Khalifa Haftar.

Recent reports by anti-Islah media in Yemen have accused the party of sending Yemenis to Turkey under the guise of receiving medical treatment, then transporting them to Libya. Turkey has sent arms, drones, advisers and Syrian mercenaries to Libya in support of Haftar's enemy, the UN-recognised Government of National Accord (GNA).

Criminals-turned-Saudi mercenaries terrorise Yemen's Taiz province

Some news websites saidmilitary and intelligence sources have revealed that 200 mercenaries from Yemen have arrived in Libya to fight on behalf of the Tripoli-based GNA.

Other news reports said three Yemenis fighters were caught by Haftar's Libyan National Army (LNA), and named the detainees.

Islah has a good relationship with Turkey, where many of its leaders are currently based after fleeing Yemen via Saudi Arabia in 2015. Pro-Islah TV channels are also based in Turkey.

Neither Islah nor Hadi's government have commented on the news about Yemeni mercenaries in Libya, and there has been no official confirmation that the party has sent fighters from Taiz and Marib provinces to Turkey.

Hundreds of wounded pro-Islah fighters have travelled in the last four years to receive medical treatment in Turkey. Media reports have alleged that some have claimed to be wounded, but were in fact mercenaries on their way to Libya.

The founder of the Popular Resistance in Taiz, Sheikh Hamoud al-Mikhlafi, an Islahi, left Yemen in 2016 and has been based in Turkey since.

His commanders on the ground in Taiz have in recent weeks been recruiting fighters left, right and centre, promising wealth but not revealing their destination. Schools across the southwestern province have been left empty by the coronavirus pandemic, and the Popular Resistance has commandeered them, turning them into training camps for new recruits.

The teen warlord who runs Yemen's second city with fear

Yemeni mercenaries have long fought the Houthis on the border with Saudi Arabia, but though the money was good many have abandoned the fight and returned home disillusioned by the fierce battles and dirty politics.

Prior to his latest recruitment efforts, Mikhlafi called on returnees from the battles on the Saudi border to join his camps in the outskirts of Taiz and thousands signed up. Others struggling to get by away from the fighting have also been tempted.

My shop went bankrupt and I dont have any other source of income, so joining the fighting is the only choice for me, said Walid, 38, an owner of a mobile accessories shop in Taiz city.

Many of my friends joined the battles with Saudi Arabia but I didnt like that because Saudi Arabia has been destroying Yemen.

Walid told Middle East Eye he trusts Mikhlafi "as he himself was a fighter and works for the interest of Taizs residents".

I closed my shop and joined the training for one month.

Desperate for income, Walid said he is willing to fight anywhere with the Popular Resistance for money.

The fighters on the internal fronts receive only 57,000 Yemeni rials ($76) per month, so I would not be happy to join them, he said.

There is information that some of us will go to fight in Libya, and thats the best choice for me.

Walid said news they will be sent to Libya is being spread among the recruits, and they had been promised $2,500 per month once in North Africa.

'There is information that some of us will go to fight in Libya and thats the best choice for me'-Walid, Popular Resistance recruit

Almost all recruits in the school hope to travel to Libya but it seems that we wont be as we have been waiting for around four months, he added.

Were back home now and receive a salary, but we dont know where we are going to fight.

Walid said none of his fellow fighters have travelled to Turkey, and he hasnt heard of anyone who hadalready participated in the fighting in Libya.

Even wounded fighters couldnt travel to Turkey in the past four months because of the coronavirus restrictions, he said.

I hope we can leave this country and earn some money that would help us to save our future.

Meanwhile, there have been reports about a supposed covert Turkish presence in Yemen, with activities concentrated in Shabwa, Taiz and Socotra. Some Islahmembers have also called on Turkey to intervene to rid Yemen of the Saudi-led coalition.

Anees Mansour, former media adviser to the Yemeni embassy in Riyadh, has appeared in more than one video urging Turkey to intervene in Yemen.

Yemen needs a Turkish intervention, Mansour said in one of the videos, accusing the Saudi-led coalition of destroying his country.

Mansour also praised the Turkish-backed forces in Libya, who succeeded in pushing back Haftars yearlong offensive on Tripoli, saying that the entire Arab world washappy for their victory.

Libya conflict: Turkey is looking for a 'third way' in Sirte

Like many other Islahleaders based in Turkey,Mansour supported the coalition when it intervened inYemen in 2015 and fled to Saudi Arabia at the time. But today they are calling for a new intervention.

Abdulghani, a member of the Islah party based in Marib, said that while he was proud of Turkey and its achievements in Libya, he wasagainst its involvement in Yemen.

All Muslims should be proud of Turkey and [President Recep Tayyip] Erdogan as he represents Islam in its best form, but we dont need any more interventions in Yemen, Abdulghani told MEE.

We are suffering from Saudi, Emirati and Iranian interventions in Yemen, so we need to liberate it from all countries.

He stressed that Mansour and other Islah members were only voicing their own opinions and thatthey didn'trepresent the party.

Abdulghani has also heard news about Yemeni fighters in Libya, buthe didnot believe it, saying that it waspropaganda against Islah.

It is true that some wounded fighters left Yemen to receive medical treatment in Turkey, but I dont believe they joined the fighting in Libya, he said.

Yemen has enough fronts and Islah is not stupid enough to send fighters to Libya, seeing that this would create anger in Yemen against the party.

The severe economic fallout of the war, including high unemployment, has forced people to join the battles on a multitude of front lines, as it is the only available source of income for many.

'The majority of fighters dont care about who controls Yemen and they only fight to earn money to provide for their families'-Nehad Abdul-Jabbar, social expert

[Becoming a] mercenary is a good choice for Yemenis, and it is a main source of income for many, so we see some fighting with Saudi Arabia, others with the United Arab Emirates, and we may see them fighting with any other country, Nehad Abdul-Jabbar, a social expert, told MEE.

Abdul-Jabbar believes that the deterioration of the situation in Yemen has led needy people to join the fighting for the sake of money.

The majority of fighters dont care about who controls Yemen and they only fight to earn money to provide for their families, she added.

For these people, they can stop fighting as soon as they get a job.

An estimated 80 percent of the population - 24 million people - require some form of humanitarian aid, including 14.3 million who are in acute need, according to UNOCHA.

Unfortunately, money has become the fuel of the war, so this conflict will continue until the economic situation of Yemenis is better, Abdul-Jabbarsaid.

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As rumours swirl of Yemenis fighting in Libya, mercenaries enlist to join the war - Middle East Eye