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On May 7, armed militiamen stormed the Corinthia Hotel compound that was being used as one of the headquarters for the interim government in the Libyan capital of Tripoli (al-Hadath, May 8). Social media videos showed militants searching cars and asking for the location of Libyan Foreign Minister Najla Mangoush (al-Marsad, May 7). The militants eventually departed and were later promised a meeting with the President of the Presidential Council, Muhammad Menfi (RT Arabic, May 8).

The militants were aligned with Burkan al-Ghadab (Volcano of Rage), a coalition of militias tasked by the previous Tripoli-based government, the Government of National Accord (GNA), to defend Tripoli from the assault launched by the eastern Libyan-based Libya National Army (LNA) in April 2019. [1]Earlier in the day on May 7, the militia had met to discuss recent statements by Mangoush and the appointment of Hussein al-Ayeb as the replacement for Imad Trabelsi as head of intelligence within the new unified Libyan government (Al-Ain, May 8).

In a statement posted by Burkan al-Ghadabs media office, the militia insisted that Mangoush should be dismissed for calling for the complete departure of all foreign forces and mercenaries from the country, without making an exception for the Turkish military (Burkan al-Ghadab, May 7). The statement, praising brotherly Turkey for being the only country to answer the GNAs call to intervene and protect civilians during the LNA assault, made clear Burkan al-Ghadabs proximity to Ankara. Burkan al-Ghadab also denounced both al-Ayeb and Mangoushs alleged previous alignment with General Khalifa Haftar of the LNA.

Libyas Continued Security Fragmentation

Libya made significant progress toward political unity after a ceasefire between the LNA and the GNA was brokered by the UN in October 2020, leading to a unity government headed by interim Prime Minister Abdul Hamid Dbeibeh (DW, March 10). The governments agenda was to reunify state institutions before nationwide general elections in December 2021.

Despite the progress in the political realm, the Libyan security environment remains fragmented among a multiplicity of various non-state actors. While in Tripoli the GNA has now been disbanded, the domestic militia groups that were aligned with and sponsored by the GNA remain. The GNA had used militia groups to provide law and order in Tripoli and they made up the bulk of the fighting force that repelled the LNA assault on the capital. In exchange, militias burrowed themselves into the Tripoli-based state infrastructure, accruing significant influence. [2]The Hotel Corinthia incident showcases the continued intent of these militias to exert similar influence on the new interim government.

Likewise, the foreign militia presence has remained largely unchanged since the October 2020 ceasefire. The expiration of the 90-day deadline for the complete withdrawal of foreign forces from Libya, which was contracted within October 2020s ceasefire agreement, passed without any reduction in foreign troop presence (al Jazeera, May 15). While the UN has since agreed to deploy a small ceasefire monitoring team, none of the international powers involved in the Libyan conflict, including Turkey, Russia, and the UAE, have shown any commitment to reducing military activity in the country (UN, April 16).

The Burkan al-Ghadab-Turkey Connection

Burkan al-Ghadabs attempted storming of the Corinthia Hotel represents Turkeys success in turning the militia group into a de facto Turkish proxy.

The Turkish government is keen to safeguard its economic interests in Libya, including almost $35 billion in Libyan contracts and a 2019 maritime border delineation agreement. Turkeys strengthened links to the GNA militias in the face of the LNA assault resulted in the GNA benefiting from increased Turkish financial support, arms supplies, and coordination with Turkish military advisors. Ankara also attached itself ideologically to the more Islamist-leaning militias by housing in Turkey influential Mufti Sadiq al-Ghariani. Turkey has used Ghariani to legitimize and praise the Turkish role in Libya. [3]Now with the GNA replaced by the interim unity government, Turkey has become the main patron of several once nominally GNA-aligned militias.

The interim government, which remains based in Tripoli, has a fading interest in appeasing the militias based in the city, such as Burkan al-Ghadab, as the ceasefire continues to hold and the frontline has solidified around Sirte, which is 400 kilometers east of the capital. This has significantly increased militia motivation to counter its waning influence by further aligning with Turkey.

Burkan al-Ghadabs strong reaction to Mangoushs call for the absolute departure of foreign military troops from Libya is likely to have been directed by Turkey. Burkan al-Ghadabs statement in condemnation of Mangoush mimics Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglus defense of the Turkish military presence in Libya almost word for word. [4] A day before the incident at the Corinthia Hotel, Turkey-based Ghariani launched a verbal assault on Mangoush, describing her as insolent and an agent of the enemy before calling on Burkan al-Ghadab to equally denounce her (al-Arabiya, May 7). Media linked to the Libyan Muslim Brotherhood movement, which has itself been strongly backed by Turkey since 2012, also published edited clips of Mangoush criticizing previous GNA Prime Minister Fayez al-Sarraj at a 2019 seminar. Mangoush in the same seminar equally criticized Haftar (al-Marsad, May 8).

Mangoushs statements regarding the departure of foreign forces cannot be seen as particularly controversial to anyone, except for Turkey. The withdrawal of foreign forces is contracted within the October 2020 ceasefire agreement and has been backed by two unanimous UN Security Council resolutions.

Unintended Consequences Ahead

For Turkey, influence over Tripolis militia groups is seen as vital to maintaining its economic and military interests in the country in the longer term. Turkeys military presence and the maritime border delineation agreement, both agreed upon by the former GNA administration in 2019, have received both tacit and explicit support by interim Prime Minister Dbeibeh (Andalou Agency, March 9). However, Turkey knows that Dbeibeh is likely to remain an interim leader and Decembers elections could lead to a very different Libyan position on both fronts. Turkey knows even if a new Libyan executive power or mounting international pressure forces it to withdraw either its own troop presence or the portion of the roughly 13,000 Syrian militants that it sent to fight in Libya, it could still wield leverage in the country through its domestic militia groups.

However, increasing alignment with Turkey is likely to have unintended consequences for Burkan al-Ghadab. Many Tripoli militias attained their local legitimacy by defending the city from the LNA assault of 2019 and from participation in the 2011 revolution. If the militias fighters continue to act as a tool used by a foreign country, Turkey, to exert pressure against decisions or statements considered unfavorable, then they risk losing any remaining domestic credibility. This could lead to renewed inter-militia conflict in Tripoli, particularly if the ceasefire continues to hold.

Turkey simply does not have the soft power to attract support from all of Tripolis militias, several of which have contrasting ideological orientations and loyalties. [5] Without the existential threat posed by the LNAs assault, militias jealous of Burkan al-Ghadabs clout could use Turkish influence over it as a pretext to commence hostilities. In sum, despite the political progress made in Libya since October 2020, without significant security sector reform leading to the monopoly of state control over armed force, long-term stability in the country remains unlikely.

Notes

[1]See Jason Pack, Kingdom of Militias: Libyas Second War of Post-Qadhafi Succession (Italian Institute for International Political Studies, May 2019)

[2]See Wolfram Lacher, Tripolis Militia Cartel (German Institute for International and Security Affairs, April 2018)

[3]Ghariani publicly supported the GNA-Turkey Maritime Memorandum (Andalou Agency, December 12 2019), called upon Libyans to stage demonstrations in support of Turkeys cooperation with the Libyan government (Andalou Agency, July 9 2020), and claimed that anyone who denies Turkeys benevolence does not deserve respect (Arab Weekly, May 12)

[4]Both claimed that the Turkish presence in Libya cannot be compared to foreign mercenary groups fighting in the country (Associated Press, May 3)

[5] See Karim Mezran, Libya 2021: Islamists, Salafis and Jihadis (Wilson Center, March 2021)

See the article here:
Burkan al-Ghadab Militants' Display of Force Highlights Deepening Turkish Influence in Libya - Jamestown - The Jamestown Foundation

By Sami Zaptia.

Germany and UN announce second Berlin Libya conference on 23 June (Photo: German Foreign Ministry).

London, 2 June 2021:

The German Foreign Ministry announced yesterday that the Second Berlin Conference on Libya will take place on 23 June.

The event will be held jointly with the UN Secretary General Antonio Guterres, UNSMIL and German Foreign Minister Heiko Maas. The unified Libyan government will also be participating.

The German Foreign Ministry said The conference will take stock of progress made since the Berlin Conference on Libya on 19January 2020. Moreover, the next steps needed for a sustainable stabilisation of the country will be discussed.

The main focus will be on preparations for the national elections scheduled for 24December and on the withdrawal of foreign troops and mercenaries from Libya as agreed in the ceasefire. In addition, steps towards the creation of unified Libyan security forces will be discussed.

The conference is an expression of the continued international support for the stabilisation of Libya. The international community remains ready to continue its close and constructive support of the UNled peace process in Libya.

As indicated, the first Berlin Conference on Libya took place on 19 January 2020 and its outcomes are partially credited for the relative peace, stability and unified government in Libya today.

Co-Chairs of Berlin Process Political Working Group on Libya: holding of national elections on 24 December 2021 remains the overarching priority | (libyaherald.com)

France, Germany, Italy and UK welcome first round results of LPDF and conclusions of Berlin Libya Conference | (libyaherald.com)

European states underline importance of all tracks of UN-led Berlin process | (libyaherald.com)

Berlin Economic Working Group discusses Libya electricity crisis | (libyaherald.com)

At Berlin Libya Process meeting: U.S. supports Libyan peace efforts through UN-led process | (libyaherald.com)

Russia believes in implementing the Berlin Libya agreement in full: Lavrov | (libyaherald.com)

Third International Follow-up Committee meeting on Libya Berlin conference outcomes expressed alarm on military escalation and renews calls for immediate de-escalation | (libyaherald.com)

UNSMIL welcomes UNSC resolution endorsing Berlin outcomes | (libyaherald.com)

UNSMILs Salame deeply angered and disappointed by hypocrisy towards Berlin conference outcomes | (libyaherald.com)

UNSMIL condemns attack on Mitiga airport as Berlin truce and commitments falter | (libyaherald.com)

UNSMIL regrets blatant Libya arms embargo violations by both sides despite Berlin commitments | (libyaherald.com)

The Berlin Conference on Libya: CONFERENCE CONCLUSIONS | (libyaherald.com)

Faltering international steps in Berlin towards peace in Libya | (libyaherald.com)

NOC condemns calls to blockade eastern oil facilities by local tribes ahead of Sundays Berlin conference on Libya | (libyaherald.com)

Hafter will attend 19 January Berlin Libya conference and continue to respect ceasefire: German Foreign Minister | (libyaherald.com)

Serraj and Hafter invited by Germany to 19 January Berlin conference on Libya | (libyaherald.com)

Read more here:
The 2nd Berlin Conference on Libya will take place on 23 June | - Libya Herald

The Libyan Minister of Economy, Mohammed Al-Huweij, has said the country was working on increasing investments with France as they stand now at 450 million dinars, which he thinks is below expectations.

Al-Huweij told French Radio Monte Carlo that Libya and France signed in the past several agreements that included double taxation, trade exchange, and investment, saying that the most important one was signed on October 12, 2010: a strategic partnership between Libya and France in political consultation, transportation, security, military and nuclear energy cooperation.

Al-Huweij indicated that Libya aims to implement an investment plan to diversify economic growth and break away from utter dependence on oil, saying the plan focuses on renewable energies, services, agriculture, and industries to increase the GDP from 40 billion dollars to 250 billion a year, adding that this needs cooperation with the European Union and other countries.

"Libya is an aspiring country that has a strategic location within the Mediterranean region, which helps attract more investments from France between the two countries' private sectors. This includes opportunities in agriculture in the south. We have agreed with France on implementing mechanism via the reactivation of the High Joint Committee and subcommittees." He further explained.

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Libya ponders more investments with France - The Libya Observer

By Sami Zaptia.

Algerias ambassador discusses economic cooperation with Libyas General Union of Chambers of Commerce (Photo: General Union of Chambers).

London, 18 May 2021:

Libya and Algeria discussed increased economic cooperation and the 29 May Algerian-Libyan Economic Form.

The discussions took place during a meeting today between the head of the General Union of Libyan Chambers of Commerce, Industry and Agriculture, Mohamed Al-Raeid and Algerian Ambassador to Libya, Kamal Abdel-Gader Hejazy, at the Chambers Tripoli headquarters.

The two parties discussed the programme and objectives of the Algerian-Libyan Economic Forum and cooperation and economic integration between the two countries in numerous areas. This included desert agriculture, facilitating procedures for the movement of goods between the two sides without any restrictions, in addition to opening airspace and maritime connectivity between the two countries.

The meeting also touched on the possibility of benefiting from Algerian expertise in extending gas networks to buildings and opening the border crossing between the two countries.

See the article here:
Libya and Algeria discuss increased economic cooperation and 29 May Algerian-Libyan Economic Form | - Libya Herald

As European leaders focus on tougher border security to address mass migration from Libya, they are ignoring the main culprit for this problem: the destabilizing effect of EU foreign policy in a country already wracked by war.

Over the past week mostly over the span of just a single day 2,000 new migrants to Europe have crowded Italys first-entry point on the small island of Lampedusa, in and around a reception center that can only hold 200 people.

The migrants have come mainly from Libya, a country in focus as a target recipient of expensive, highly controversial EU migration-control funding. Yet, as European politicians again wrangle over what to do with the new arrivals, they ought to be considering how their unsustainable migration-control programs in war-torn Libya actually worsen the problem.

This controversy has come increasingly into the spotlight with the publication on Monday of an internal document of the EUs Council of Ministers, released under a freedom-of-information request, that has revealed major fault lines among EU member states on how to deport the large numbers of rejected asylum seekers from Libya and other non-EU countries.

Detailing a January meeting of the IMEX (Expulsion) Working Party on the EUs new proposals for returning irregular migrants to their countries of origin, the report recounts ongoing efforts by the European Commission to create the position of return coordinator liaising with Frontex, the EUs border agency, to implement bloc-wide returns of illegal migrants whose asylum applications never materialize or are rejected.

Under the current proposals, an EU country could choose to fund the deportation of failed asylum seekers instead of taking them in, but if the deportations did not happen within eight months, that country would have to transfer the migrants to its own territory.

The report goes on to point out that frontline member states, which presumably include Italy, considered that eight months was too long for the time allotted to arrange the deportation of a failed asylum seeker in the EU, citing the argument that only a shorter deadline can guarantee that they do not abscond.

But the dangerous spiral of high-volume irregular migration coupled with complicated deportation enforcement really begins abroad, thanks to a single-minded EU obsession with curtailing migration rather than addressing its root causes. This thinking spurs EU officials to bribe authoritarian regimes under the guise of humanitarian aid, merely to stem the flow of migrants, while doing little if anything for their meaningful reintegration into their countries of origin.

Libya is now the burning fuse threatening to explode this misguided EU foreign policy into further cynical backlash over what to do about migration in domestic European politics. On the front line, Lampedusas mayor Salvatore Martello claims the Libyan government has turned on the taps in letting more migrants cross over to Italy, referencing the recent prevalence of big dinghies and fishing boats bringing 300 migrants or more each. The steel-hulled boats, significantly larger and sturdier than the rubber dinghies in wide use earlier, require port clearance to embark on the Mediterranean Sea, which could indicate the complicity of Libyan authorities.

Further exacerbating this situation is the stark reality that several factions armed to the teeth are currently contesting full sovereignty over Libya, with migrants often held hostage to the resulting political and military hostilities. Rebel warlord General Khalifa Haftar currently controls a large swath of eastern Libyan territory, while in the west, Prime Minister Abdul Hamid Dbeibeh, leader of the Government of National Unity (GNU) nominally running Libya with UN endorsement, holds a seat of power in the capital, Tripoli. Although Dbeibeh has the official support of the EU, granular complexity emerges beneath the surface: France, for one, is alleged to be among the countries supporting Haftar militarily.

But the whirlpool of Libyan civil strife is immensely complicated by the running battle that Haftar, chiefly backed by the UAE and Egypt, is fighting with Islamist militias threatening his and the unity governments bid for full authority militias that are heavily involved in the illegal smuggling networks sending migrants to Italy.

If Martellos accusations are true, they could point to the possibility of two warring sides both turning the spigot of migration on for different ends. The GNU might be trying to raise its price for the increased exertions in patrolling its coast, turning migrants back into Libya, and keeping them in a country suffering under enormous humanitarian strains.

As part of EU foreign-aid schemes, 700 million euros have gone to Tripoli over the past several years, some of it paid to equip and train the Libyan coastguard to return migrants attempting a sea crossing to Europe, and some paid to keep the returnees in Libyan detention centers. Since 2017, the Tripoli government has been implementing its side of the deal, but with an economy that contracted by over 30% amid the ravages of Covid-19 in 2020, Dbeibeh may think playing the migration card is a way to obtain an economic stimulus from Brussels via foreign aid that cannot be obtained elsewhere.

The Islamist militias threatening both Dbeibeh and Haftar, however, may themselves be escalating the migration outflow for their own designs, and in doing so they have a powerful motive. According to Italys intelligence service, 70,000 migrants-in-waiting in Libya are gearing up to attempt the Mediterranean crossing into Europe, with the new arrivals from Libya to Italy having already tripled from roughly 4,000 in the first part of 2020 to 13,000 in the first part of 2021. That type of demand creates opportunity and leverage for the militia-controlled smuggling networks on the Libyan coast.

As the militias have seen their interests marginalized by the government in Tripoli, keeping their migrant-smuggling operations going at full tilt has become a means not only of revenue but also of political protest an attempt to erode the legitimacy of a government that, with millions in EU aid money, is supposed to be bolstering the protection and assistance of migrants, refugees, and internally displaced people yet has little to show for it.

Still, Brussels keeps focusing on returns, but not real amelioration of the security situation that has caused migrants to flee. Once illegal migrants are returned to Libya with EU funding and assistance, European concern largely ends there, even though subsequently many returnees face unlawful detention, torture, starvation, and even slavery, in a vortex of human-rights abuses which all sides in the conflict have been accused of perpetrating giving the migrants more of a reason than before to attempt the crossing into Europe again.

Many of the migrant detention centers in Libya for returnees, supported by part of the 455 million-euro EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa, have actually been little more than prisons on militia bases, where detained migrants have sometimes been forced at gunpoint to manufacture weapons for their Islamist captors.

One such center in Tajoura was hit by a Haftar-ordered airstrike in 2019 that killed over 50 migrants, even though the Libyan general knew in advance the coordinates of all detention centers in the country, thanks to information supplied to his forces by the International Organization for Migration. Yet, even after the airstrike, returnees were still sent to Tajoura under the aegis of EU aid funds.

In the EU, domestic grabs to take advantage of the situation politically and efforts to streamline deportations can help rally voters, but they stop short of remodeling the root of the problem.

Citing a 9% decline in the Italian economy in 2020 caused by the pandemic, League party leader Matteo Salvini has argued for stricter border-control measures from Italian Prime Minister Mario Draghi, leader of the coalition government in which the League is a member. With millions of Italians in economic difficulty, we cannot look after thousands of clandestine migrants, he said.

Giorgia Meloni is attempting to outflank her rival Salvini on the Italian right, having demanded a naval blockade to halt the operations of migrant smugglers off the Libyan coast.

Even Michel Barnier, the EUs former lead Brexit negotiator, has entered the fray in a bid to help the center-right Les Republicains in forthcoming French elections by calling on the EU to suspend immigration from non-EU countries for up to five years.

But promoting stricter migration control policies at home while funding authoritarian elements to pick up the slack on that policy abroad has already contributed to a human rights fiasco in Libya. It is easy for European politicians to score political points by playing up the border security implications of the dilemma. It is tougher, but more necessary, for them to examine the ways in which the EUs foreign policies have fed the migration crisis placing returned migrants in a Libyan security quagmire so severe that braving the perilous journey to Lampedusa is deemed less dangerous.

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The statements, views and opinions expressed in this column are solely those of the author and do not necessarily represent those of RT.

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Migrants will keep coming from Libya to Europe in huge numbers unless the EU rethinks its misguided foreign policy - RT