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A new United Nations report alleges that the United Arab Emirates has established direct contact with armed Sudanese groups fighting in Libyas proxy conflict on the side of Khalifa Haftar.

The report by the Panel of Experts on the Sudan, released in January, says that for around a year the UAE has had direct relations with armed groups from Sudans Darfur region fighting in Libya on the side of Haftars Libyan National Army. Last year, the Wall Street Journal reported that the UAE had, in violation of a U.N. arms embargo, increased its deliveries of weapons to Haftar, who ended his unsuccessful 14-month assault on the capital, Tripoli, last June.

The UAEs contact with the Sudanese armed groups in Libya, bypassing Haftars forces, is seen by some experts as a sign of the countrys appetite for a more hands-on role in the conflict and of growing mistrust of the renegade general.

I think theres an argument to be made that they distrust Haftars battlefield competence. Many outside backers have [distrusted it], including the Russians, said Frederic Wehrey, a senior fellow in the Middle East Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

Haftars international backers have stuck by him so far out of concern that eastern Libya could descend further into chaos fueled by fracturing rebel groups in the absence of clear leadership. But in establishing closer direct ties with Sudanese groups in Libya, the UAE could be well positioned to shift its support to another leader, should one emerge.

Whoever takes on Haftars mantle later on, theyll definitely try to endow him with the same sort of support that includes, inter alia, the mercenaries, said Emadeddin Badi, a nonresident senior fellow at the Middle East Program of the Atlantic Council.

The UAE is one of several countries that have waded into the complex conflict in Libya as they jostle to further their own objectives in the fragile North African nation. The proxy war has pitted allies against each other. France, Egypt, and Russia (through the Wagner mercenary group) have thrown their support to Haftar and his Libyan National Army. Turkey, Italy, and Qatar have provided military backing to the U.N.-backed Government of National Accord in Tripoli. Complicating matters further is the presence of militias from Sudan, Chad, and Syria.

A report by the U.S. Department of Defenses inspector general for counterterrorism operations in Africa last year assessed that the UAE was possibly helping to fund the activities of the Russian mercenary group Wagner in Libya. The Emirati ambassador to the United States, Yousef Al Otaiba, strenuously denied the claims.

In October 2020, the U.N.-backed government and Haftars Libyan National Army signed a peace deal that stipulated that all foreign parties leave the country by Jan. 23. But satellite imagery reveals that Russian fighters are digging enormous trenches, and the UAEs outreach to Sudanese groups suggests that foreign parties are in no hurry to disentangle themselves from the conflict.

According to the U.N. report, leading Darfuri commanders had regular meetings with Emirati officers in Benghazi, Libya, to discuss how the UAE could support the logistical and financial needs of the groups. The report details how Abu Dhabi sought to cultivate close ties with the senior commanders, and it alleges that at least two of them spent several weeks in the UAE in late 2020, where they reportedly met with members of the countrys security services.

Analysts have suggested that the UAEs intervention in Libya stems from a deep fear of political Islam and is intended to send a message about the perils of popular uprisings. The Libyan story is meant to push an almost moral lesson not just to the Libyans but other populations that if you revolt against the ruler, it brings instability, Badi said.

The embassy of the UAE in Washington declined to comment. Last week, the UAE ambassador to the U.N., Lana Nusseibeh, called for a renewed diplomatic effort to bring the conflict to an end.

A peace deal signed between the Sudanese government and an alliance of rebel groups this past August called on all members of armed groups to return to the country, but the authors of the U.N. report noted they expected a significant Sudanese presence to remain in Libyathough its unclear how many even remain there now.

One commander from the Sudan Liberation Army-Minni Minawi group told the U.N. panel that they had recruited 3,000 new fighters since mid-2019. That group and the Justice and Equality Movement recruited fighters in Darfur and in refugee camps in eastern Chad, according to the report. The U.N. panel noted that the Justice and Equality Movement had focused its activities in Libya on smuggling and was the only major Darfurian group not aligned with Haftars forces.

Sudanese fighters have a long history in Libya. Theyve been used as pawns in the Libyan conflict since 2011, said Wehrey of the Carnegie Endowment. Its estimated that former Libyan leader Muammar al-Qaddafi recruited as many as 10,000 fighters from Sudan, Chad, Mali, and Niger to fight on his behalf before he was ousted and killed in the wake of the Arab Spring protests in 2011.

In November 2020, Human Rights Watch reported that an Emirati security company, Black Shield Security Services, had recruited more than 390 Sudanese men on the pretense of working as security guards in the UAE, before transferring them to Ras Lanuf in oil-rich eastern Libya, controlled by Haftar. Several men interviewed by Human Rights Watch said they lived alongside Haftars forces and were expected to guard oil facilities in the region. The company has previously denied any allegations of misleading the Sudanese men about the nature of their work in Libya, and it said that it does not offer any services that are military in nature.

Katie Livingstone contributed to this report.

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The Conflict in Libya Is Getting Even Messier - Foreign Policy

Wed, Feb 3, 2021

MENASourcebyWill O'Brien

Libyan military commander Khalifa Haftar shakes hands with a comrade during Independence Day celebrations in Benghazi, Libya December 24, 2020. REUTERS/Esam Omran Al-Fetori

As the civil war in Libya approaches the decade mark, many in the international community and certain segments of Libyan society have started to look for seemingly simple solutions to end the conflict. One of the solutions that has started to gain traction is the potential partitioning of Libya into two separate nation-states. This is a bad idea.

For international bodies, western alliances, and separatist powers, partitioning states was a hallmark of twentieth century statecraft. This relic of a bygone age ostensibly fixed a handful of global conflictssuch as Ireland, Israel, and Indiawhich contain some of the most militarily and politically contested borders in the world today.

There are three primary arguments against partitioning Libya: the historical outcomes of partitioned countries, the potential for exacerbating the ongoing proxy war in Libya, and the risk of degrading international institutions.

History is against partitioning

The historical case against partitioning is twofold. First, partitioning remains a divisive relic of the colonial era. Second, the timeline to achieve peace and stability after partitioning cannot be known. Partitioning was a standard practice to sow division and make it easier to govern divided territories and countries. Proponents of partition argue that it brings peace and stability to the region quickly; the historical examples below would suggest otherwise.

Three key examples of partition illustrate its utility for twentieth century colonial powers seeking to divide and conquer, thereby debunking the claim that it is a quick solution to conflict.

The first historical example to consider is Ireland. At the end of the Irish War of Independence (1919-1921), Ireland was partitioned by the United Kingdom in 1921 following the passage of the Government of Ireland Act of 1920. This sparked the Irish Civil War and led to the three decades of insurgency known widely as the Troubles. The political and military upheavals that stem directly from the partitioning of Ireland have remained contentious for a century. As recent as September of this year, the border between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland was revisited as a source of tension during Brexit negotiations.

The most well-known example of partitionand the closest to Libya geographicallyis the partitioning of the British Mandate of Palestine in 1947 along ethnic-religious lines and the subsequent creation of the state of Israel a year later. The recent establishment of diplomatic ties with Israel by the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain, the opposition by the Palestinian authority, and ongoing conflict demonstrate that partitioning successfully divided the regions population, but did not manage to bring peace.

The final historical case against partition is the division of colonial India and the creation of the dominions of India and Pakistan. Britain partitioned Indiaagain, along ethnic-religious linesthe same year it partitioned British Mandate Palestine. The partitioning led to the Kashmir conflict, decades of skirmishes, nuclear buildup in the region, and the continued contestation of nearly 120,000 square miles of territory. In September, the army chiefs of both India and Pakistan engaged in a rhetorical standoff over military capabilities and threatened conflict.

In brief, these historical case studies demonstrate that partitioning is not a tool to end division and conflict. Rather, partition has heightened divisive forces, prolonged armed conflicts, and intensified political rivalries.

Proxy war by a different name

Partitioning Libya would prolong the violent conflict that the country has been experiencing for nearly a decade. The conflict in Libya has devolved from a revolution in 2011 to oust Colonel Muammar Gaddafi into a proxy war with two different Libyan governments claiming legitimacy on the basis of differing international support. The Government of National Accord led by Prime Minster Fayez Al-Sarraj was established by the United Nations (UN) in 2015 and is nominally supported by a broad group of Western democracies and NATO allies, including the United States and the United Kingdom (however, Turkey has emerged as the GNAs primary backer). The Tobruk-based government of General Khalifa Haftar is supported by Russia, Egypt, and the United Arab Emirates.

The partitioning of Libya alone is not enough to discourage all international actors from supporting the armed conflict. More importantly, partition cannot meet the peoples desires for increased democratization and improved governance in Libya. This proxy war allows self-interested governments with authoritarian tendenciesincluding the government of General Haftarto undermine the democratic desires of the Libyan people that sparked the 2011 revolution during the Arab Spring. Furthermore, a partitioned Libya would not stop international actors from injecting the military armaments that are fueling the war.

Consider the aforementioned historical examples; partitioning Ireland led to financial and political support for violence from Irish Americans. Similarly, the Arab league has provided financial support for the Palestinian Authority. While the foreign actors faith in General Haftar may waver, somenotably Egyptremain committed to opposing GNA allies in Eastern Libya.

An attempt to draw a partition between these two sides will merely change the rhetoric of political scientists, who will rebrand the civil war as a war between bordering nation-states. This will not increase the accountability of Libyan government(s) to the citizens of Libya, nor will it change the daily lives of millions of Libyans who have lived in a country divided by conflict for nearly a decade.

The 2011 Arab Uprising was a missed opportunity to build strong, democratic institutions in North Africa. The partitioning of Libya draws a line in the sand that will be impossible to reverse; the hope for a united, democratic government will be all but extinguished. The proxy warbe it civil or between two newly formed stateswill continue until unity-focused diplomatic solutions can be implemented. Partition cannot inherently end armed conflictit can only complicate a potential reunification.

Leaning into international institutions

Partitioning Libya would further undermine the international institutions that could support democracy and stability in Libya and North Africa. We are at a moment that requires greater support for international institutions and their ability to convene decision-makers to build political consensus.

The power and legitimacy of international institutions are degraded when they appear to set up pathways for democratic growth and then stand by as violent conflicts fester. The United Nations assistance in establishing the GNA in Libya five years ago was critical to supporting peace, unity, and democracy in Libya. The subsequent creation of a parallel government in Tobruk sabotaged this step, increased division, and prolonged the violence in Libya. This divisive response cannot be repaired through the even more divisive act of partitioning.

Partitioning Libya moves the goalposts a decade into the conflict. What began as a movement to build a democratic government in Libya cannot be seen as successful if there are two states, potentially at war, with differing levels of adherence to democratic values and practices. This will reaffirm to separatists that the UN and other international bodies will abandon half a nation if they can draw out conflict for a decade.

The UN, Arab League, African Union, and international governments must use their platforms to facilitate diplomatic communications that build political consensus around supporting fledgling democracies. Furthermore, they must support the hard work of establishing domestic and international coalitions to build democratic systems in the first place.

The dangerous precedent set by failing to support a UN-backed government coupled with the lack of diplomatic options to reverse partitioning demonstrates the need for Libya to forgo partitioning and lean into the strength of international institutions to support a unified state.

The path ahead

The path forward for a united Libya hinges on Libyans aspirations for peace, the political will of Libyas two governments, and the support of the international community to find a peaceful solution that can lay the groundwork for stability in Libya. This will require three difficult, yet, essential steps: rebuilding political consensus for a united Libya, which has dissipated since 2015, negotiating a ceasefire that is respected by all parties, and creating a long-term, diplomatic pathway forward. The seeds have been planted in each of these areas, but partition would prevent these seeds from ever taking root and bearing fruit.

The international community must continue to show a vested interest in long-term peace and stability in Libya and the broader Mediterranean region. Constructive engagement with Libya and regional partners must follow the Hippocratic principle of first, do no harm.

Partitioning Libya is a diplomatic band-aid that merely substitutes a border war for a civil war, degrades the legitimacy of international institutions, and prolongs the political and military conflict in Libya. It is time to throw out the twentieth century playbook. The twenty-first century answer will require greater focus on diplomacy, stronger international institutions, and a renewed commitment to building a stable, peaceful Libya.

Will OBrien is the special assistant to the Atlantic Councils executive vice president. He has a masters degree in religion in global politics from SOAS, University of London with a focus on North Africa and the Middle East. Follow him on Twitter: @WmThOBrien.

Tue, Oct 29, 2019

Egypt is facing multiple security challenges for which a military solution is deficient. A complex interplay between internal and external challenges, as well as human and security challenges, is evident in western Egypt and within the area bordering Libya. The mix of harsh climatic conditions, inhospitable terrain, and lagging economic development, on one hand, and []

MENASourcebyAmal Kandeel

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Preventing partition: The case against a diplomatic band-aid in Libya - Atlantic Council

Figure 1. Minute time-lapse of The Egyptian Army (#_) hashtag, showing two suspicious spikes of tweets in a single minute.

We also found two suspicious spikes in account births. The number of accounts created on a single day can potentially indicate coordinated activity; an application or a person may create a large group of accounts at once in order to artificially inflate a hashtag. After analyzing all the accounts that tweeted this hashtag, we found two suspicious spikes in account births: 61 of the accounts were created on Jan. 5, 2017, and 62 of the accounts were created on June 8, 2020 (Figure 2).

After manually investigating these 123 accounts, we found suspicious similarities in the style of profile pictures included within each group. Many of the accounts were already flagged by Twitter for suspicious activity and shared the same or similar profiles and banner photos as other accounts.

Analysis of the relationships between these accounts found the network to be incredibly dense, meaning that all 123 accounts were equally retweeting each other, with no single or smaller group of influencer accounts dominating (Figure 5). The network is an incredibly dense echo chamber, retweeting only within its own network and rarely interacting with accounts outside of those that were created on the same day.

This coordinated, inauthentic campaign in support of the Egyptian army reflected changing dynamics on the ground. Whereas previous information operations strongly praised Haftar and supported his campaign for Tripoli, this online campaign did not focus on the Libyan generalindicating the departure of Haftar from the center of Egypts narrative on Libya.

As Haftar withdrew, Egypts emphasis shifted quickly to shoring up domestic support and promoting domestic interestsnamely, security along the western border. The specious promotion of the Egyptian military online demonstrates how digital manipulation is a low-cost alternative to direct military engagement. The most extreme language appears online, providing an outlet for nationalistic militarism at arms length from the regime. Domestically, this approach creates the perception that the regime is responding aggressively to threats to Egypts western border; for Egypts regional rivals, it clearly signals that these threats are Egypts red line. Bellicose rhetoric is reserved for the online theater and reflects Cairos underlying strategic objective: securing its porous western border.

Another hashtag, Erdogan is a war criminal, also exhibited suspicious characteristics. This tag trended on June 8, and we collected 12,995 tweets containing it between June 2 and 9. Tweets contained in the hashtag included vitriolic attacks on Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, with crude jokes and memes that often portrayed him as an ape. Users tweeting on the hashtag were located in Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the UAE; however, the importance given to this location data must be approached with caution as accounts self-report their own locations. As with the previous hashtag, there was a suspicious spike of 151 tweets in a single minute at 5:36 p.m. on June 8.

We also identified a spike in account births, with 133 accounts created on June 8, the day the hashtag trended (Figure 7).

Interestingly, we found that Ahmed Moussa, an Egyptian presenter on Sada El-Balad satellite channel, announced the creation of this hashtag live on his show (Figure 8). This could be part of a tactic called hashtag laundering, where traditional media announce and promote hashtags to obfuscate their inauthentic origins. This technique was identified in previous information operations targeting Libya. For example, Stanfords Internet Observatory found many examples of this technique, whereby media outlets would report on inauthentic hashtags in an effort to make them appear genuine and authentic. At the same time, it is also possible that a number of Egyptians saw the presenters plea to tweet the hashtag, signed up for Twitter immediately, and tweeted as they were told. This demonstrates how traditional media interact with information campaigns on social media to legitimize and normalize narratives.

The tactics and techniques identified in these trending hashtags reflect previous research conducted on information operations targeting Libya. In September 2019, Twitter removed 271 accounts linked to digital marketing firm DotDev based in both Egypt and the UAE. Researchers analyzed the data released by Twitter and found that these accounts repeatedly spread propaganda targeting the Libyan conflict. In December 2019, Twitter removed 88,000 accounts connected with another social media marketing firm, SMAAT, based in Saudi Arabia. Twitter alleged that these accounts were part of a large state-sanctioned information operation conducted by Saudi Arabia that would target Libya. In March 2020, Facebook removed 55 pages that the company said were affiliated with a digital marketing firm named Maat, based in Egypt. Another takedown by Twitter in April 2020 removed accounts tied to Egypt, the UAE and Saudi Arabia, all of which contained evidence of operations targeted at Libya.

These state-backed campaigns are pervasive and are conducted through the relative safety of third-party digital marketing firms that provide states with discretion and the technical knowledge to conduct complex influence operations. This digital theater of the war is dominated by non-state companies, acting on behalf of their state backers. Influence campaigns on Twitter are often connected with those on Facebook, where fake pages masquerade as legitimate news sources to further spread disinformation and propaganda narratives. News pages, while appearing neutral, act to launder and legitimize propaganda. Finally, there is clear coordination and sharing of resources between states in this regional alliance.

While the Egyptian, Emirati and Saudi axis overwhelmingly dominates information operations targeting Libya, some campaigns and hashtags in support of Turkeys aims have surfaced as well. In June 2020, we observed two diametrically opposed hashtags, both of which exhibited suspicious behavior: Libya, graveyard of Ottomans and Libya, graveyard of Sisi[.] This phenomenon of battling hashtags with nearly identical language has been observed before in the Libyan context.

Uncovering these coordinated campaigns plays an important role in revealing foreign hands. Intervening states actively alter the discourse around important events in conflict to serve their interests; cutting through this propaganda enables a better understanding of the dynamics of these events and the views of those impacted on the ground. Moreover, uncovering these manipulated narratives leads to a better understanding of the interests these actors are pursuing.

Its important not to overemphasize the impact of these campaigns. Coordinated, inauthentic behavior orchestrated by foreign interveners occurs within a wider ecosystem of authentic online engagement, and assessing the extent to which these campaigns have impacted Libyan public opinion is difficult. More research is needed to understand the relationship between inauthentic activity and authentic activity, and how these contests shape domestic, regional and international attitudes toward the conflict. With only 9 percent of Libyans on Twitter, campaigns likely play out only within small circles of the countrys population. Instead, the primary target audience may have been international stakeholders, the media or perhaps the governments themselves.

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Coordinated Behavior in Libya's Regional Disinformation Conflict - Lawfare

The Greek Foreign Ministry late on Saturday announced its plan to reopen the Greek Embassy in Tripoli, the capital city of Libya, and the opening of a Consulate General in Benghazi, a major seaport and the second-most populous city in the Arabic country.

On Friday, members of the Libyan Political Dialogue Forum (LPDF) voted for a new prime minister and a new Presidency Council in UN-sponsored talks in Geneva.

In a statement published on its website, the Greek Foreign Ministry said in light of Friday's developments, by the decision of Foreign Minister Nikos Dendias, the Greek Embassy in Tripoli will reopen.

It also said that in parallel, the necessary procedures will be undertaken to open a Consulate General in Benghazi.

Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis welcomed the election of a new interim government in Libya, in a post on social media on Friday.

He wrote on Twitter: "The election of a new unified Libyan government by the Libyan Political Dialogue Forum in Geneva is an important step towards peace in our neighboring country. Congratulations to the new leadership. All actors should support the process towards democratic and free elections in December."

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Greece to reopen embassy in Libya - Region - World - Ahram Online

The Libyan 5+5 Joint Military Commission (JMC) agreed Saturday on clearing mines in Sirte and reopening all roads leading to the city starting next Wednesday.

The member of the 5+5 JMC for the Government of National Accord, Mukhtar Naqasa, told reporters in a press conference after the meeting in Ouagadougou Hall in Sirte, that the delegations had agreed to start remove mines to pave the way for reopening the coastal road: Sirte-Misrata road.

Naqasa said the measures agreed upon in the meeting will begin on next Wednesday, adding that both delegations had vowed to implement all points of the ceasefire agreement, which was signed last October in Geneva.

He reiterated the keenness of the 5+5 JMC to withdraw all foreign mercenaries and fighters from Libya, urging the Security Council and Libya stakeholders to help implement the ceasefire in the country.

5+5 JMC also welcomed the outcomes of the Libyan Political Dialogue Forum and the election of a new Presidential Council and Prime Minister, hailing the efforts of the UNSMIL in achieving this historic step, thanking as well the field military leaders for their commitment to the ceasefire, paving the way for releasing detainees and making the political process a success.

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Libya's 5+5 JMC agrees on clearing mines in Sirte - The Libya Observer