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TRIPOLI -Libyan political analysts view with suspicion the slowing down of the appointment process for new figures in key government positions.

They do not rule out the possibility that the ultimate aim of the jockeying around the process aims to delay the appointments so as to maintain the incumbents in place, especially the governor of the Central Bank, Saddek Elkaber, who has been entrenched in the same position for nearly ten years.

The analysts believe that current limbo may be the result of a deal between the Speaker of Parliament, Aguila Salehand the Speaker of the State Council, Khaled al-Mishri.

The State Council wrote to the House of Representatives (Parliament) on Saturday regarding the nominations for the sovereign positions to be filled, saying, We have noticed that the outputs referred to us from your committee are inconsistent with what was previously agreed upon in Bouznikas meetings. This indicates that there is a different basis for the work of the committees in the two chambers .

While the State Council lauded the House of Representatives efforts to reach a consensus regarding the holders of the leadership positions in sovereign posts pursuant to Article 15 of the Political Agreement on consultation between the two chambers in particular, the Council pointed out however that it remains committed to what has been previously agreed.

It added that in case parliament wishes to make any modifications to the criteria and mechanisms, we have no objection to holding additional meetings and discussions to reach common ground.

The position of the State Council strengthened suspicions about its intent to circumvent the Bouznika understandings on the reshuffling of sovereign positions, so as to keep the incumbents in their posts.

Sayyida al-Yaqoubi, a member of the State Council and the Libyan Political Dialogue Forum, expressed the belief that with Mishris message, it seemed that the deal between the two councils (the State Council and the House of Representatives) was over.

She added in a Facebook post, There are indications of delays on the horizon. Where has the State Council been all this time?

It did not mention before the procedures followed in nominating candidates for sovereign positions, while now it occurs to it to suspend the process under the pretext of the procedures agreed upon in Bouznika.

Former member of the General National Congress, Tawfiq al-Shuhaibi, said, In short, the sovereign positions will not be changed, adding, There is a distribution of roles between the presidents of the House of Representatives and the State Council and the goal is to keep Elkaber and others in position. The comprehensive solution resides in holding parliamentary and presidential elections at the same time.

Observers link the stalled parliamentary approval of the 2021 budget to disagreements over the distribution of sovereign positions. This means that the budget crisis is on its way to a solution since an understanding has been reached over the sovereign positions.

The same observers do not rule out that international stakeholders in Libya, especially Turkey, that have close ties to the Libyan central bank governor, could be behind the delay which deprives Libyans of the opportunity to replace a figure accused of gross mismanagement that has adversely impacted the living conditions of the population.

The oil-rich North African nation has gone through many crises during Elkabers tenure, starting with the liquidity crisis and the salary freeze, to the decline of the dinars exchange value against the dollar, which has had a disastrous effect on Libyans purchasing power.

Despite decisions by the House of Representatives to remove him from office, Elkaber , who is perceived as a Muslim Brotherhood protg, has kept his post.

The authorities in the east and the tribes supporting them have often accused the Central Bank of Libya of distributing wealth unfairly and favouring pro-Islamist businessmen as well as the authorities in the west, while marginalising the eastern region, where most of the oil fields are located.

Last week, the Libyan parliament said it had sent the names of its nominees for sovereign positions to the State Consultative Council.

These positions include the governor of the Central Bank of Libya, the heads of the Higher National Elections Commission, the Audit Bureau, the Administrative Control Authority, the Anti-Corruption Commission, the Attorney General and the president of the Supreme Court.

On April 20, the Libyan parliament chose the head of the investigations department in the office of the Attorney General Al-Siddiq Al-Sour to be Attorney General.

The criteria for selecting candidates were agreed upon in the Bouznika talks in Morocco, last October, based on quotas between Libyas three historical regions (Tripoli, Cyrenaica and Fezzan).

Article 15 of the Political Agreement provides for consultations between parliament and the State Consultative Council to determine who will hold these positions.

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Libya's delay in filling key positions seems aimed at keeping central bank governor in place | | AW - The Arab Weekly

Fri, Apr 30, 2021

MENASourcebyEmadeddin Badi

French President Emmanuel Macron flanked by Mahamat Idriss Deby, son of the late Chadian president, arrives to attend the state funeral for the late Chadian President Idriss Deby in N'Djamena, Chad April 23, 2021. Christophe Petit Tesson/Pool via REUTERS

On April 20, after clashes that pitted the Chadian national army against rebels in the Kanem region of northern Chad, the countrys President Idriss Dby was killed. Dby, a larger than life figure that had ruled the country for over three decades, had flown to northern Chad to visit his troops at the military frontline.

With his death, FranceChads former colonial powerlost one of its closest allies in the Sahel, an arid, underdeveloped area stretching from Senegal to Sudan where jihadists have thrived on surrounding states governance failures. At his funeral on April 23, French President Emmanuel Macron declared: We will not let anybody put into question or threaten Chads stability and territorial integrity. This comes as no surprise. France had been buttressing Dbys rule ever since it supported the coup dtat which brought him to power in 1990.

French troops, reconnaissance aircraft, and warplanes were often deployed to support Dby whenever rebels and opposition groups mobilized to unseat him. This time, however, the tyrants propensity for frontline spectacles proved to be his undoing. Far from being the sole architect of his premature death, the conditions that led to Dbys passing are also a direct byproduct of the myopic policies of his main Western allyFrancein neighboring Libya. Dbys death illustrates inherent flaws in French foreign policy in Libya and Chad and the shortcomings of Paris impulse to prop up autocrats in Africa.

The rebels that launched an incursion into northern Chad were from the Front for Change and Concord in Chad (FACT), a rebel group founded by dissident Chadian army officers in 2016, with the explicit aim of overthrowing Dby. FACT had launched their offensive into northern Chad from Libyas southern region of Fezzan right after presidential elections were organized in their home country on April 11.

In Libya, FACT fighters operated for years as guns-for-hire, offering their services to the highest bidder. They also benefit from equipment supplied by the conflict parties and raise revenue through criminal economic activities, such as trafficking, smuggling, and gold mining. For the better part of FACTs existencethe bulk of which was spent in Libyamost of the groups fighters have been aligned and fighting on behalf of General Khalifa Haftar, the chief of the Libyan National Army. Aside from benefitting from weaponry supplied to Haftar by his foreign backers, FACT fighters even received training from Russias Wagner Group mercenaries as part of Haftars attempted coupwhich France politically abetted and militarily supportedagainst the then United Nations-recognized Government of National Accord in Tripoli in 2019.

This backing was not new. For years, Haftars chief political backer in Western policymaking circles has been France. This disconcerting support had catapulted the septuagenarian general into political relevance despite his clear authoritarian aspirations. Haftars claim of building a professional military institution was often uncritically echoed by Paris despite it being a fallacy intended to veil a highly personalized style of rule. It was belied by the generals handing of key positions to his sons, reliance on irregular tribal groups, empowerment of hardline Salafi factions, and expedient co-option of local criminal militias and mercenaries for his broader designs. Foreign troopssuch as Sudanese and Chadian rebelshave long been a key holding and fighting force within the ranks of Haftars troops, though much of the international media attention has only been on the Russian Wagner Group mercenaries that now operate in his territory. Yet, despite the clear implication of attacks against civilians and war crimes by his amalgam of forces, France never revised its long-standing support for the general. This doubling down on Haftar often puzzled observers because, unlike with Chads Dby, propping up an ailing general like him could never be remotely argued to be pragmatic.

In the rare instances where their support for Haftar was acknowledged, French policymakers often justified their partnership with the general by portraying him as an ally that could counter Libyan Islamist and jihadist militias with links to al-Qaeda and the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS). By supporting Haftar, they saw another Franco-African military alliance forged, enhancing the Sahels security. This prompted France to support Haftars military operations in Benghazi in 2015 clandestinely, deploy reconnaissance aircraft to back his territorial expansion, and embed French forces operating US-manufactured anti-tank missiles with his troops during his botched 2019 coup.

Despite fully knowing that mercenaries were part and parcel of Haftars forces, French bestowal of international legitimacy to him via diplomatic engagement was complemented with military support that effectively never abated. This backing not only added a key Western ally to the numerous foreign powerssuch as Egypt, Russia, and the United Arab Emiratesalready bolstering the general, it also was at cross-purposes with every French premise to support him. Haftar jettisoned Libyas political transition, created the space for jihadists to thrive by ushering in an internationalized civil war, and the repercussions of his French-backed actions have now caused direct instability in the Sahel.

To see one of Frances most reliableyet autocraticpartners in the Sahel being killed by mercenaries that benefitted from the military support and incompetence of another Paris-supported aspiring authoritarian in Libya is a cynical twist of fate. Both the Chadian and Libyan theaters highlight Frances overlooking of dismal records in corruption, human rights violations, and contempt for democratic values in favor of a narrow securitized outlook that prioritizes a false sense of security and illusory stability. With Dby unexpectedly gone, Chads transition hangs in the balance while France scrambles to back what is effectively another coupby none other than Dbys sonunder the guise of preserving continuity. One can only hope that Paris takes heed of its current predicament in Chad to amend its Libya policy, because Chad, Libya, and the Sahel can only truly be stable when France does away with its flawed, long-standing approach to the region.

Emadeddin Badi is a non-resident senior fellow at the Atlantic Councils Middle East Program. Follow him on Twitter @emad_badi.

Originally posted here:
Dby's death: A microcosm of the flaws of French foreign policy in Libya - Atlantic Council

Tuesday, 27 April 2021 - With the aim to advance the implementation of the Libyan Political Dialogue Forum (LPDF) Roadmap leading up to the holding of national elections on 24 December 2021, and the full implementation of the Ceasefire Agreement Special Envoy of the UN Secretary-General for Libya and Head of the United Nations Support Mission in Libya Jn Kubi, accompanied by Assistant Secretary-General/UNSMIL Coordinator Raisedon Zenenga, held a meeting on 26 April with Special Envoys, Ambassadors and other senior officials representing France, UK, US , Germany and Italy in the P3+2 format.

Participants reiterated the importance of committing to the date of elections on 24 December and of expediting the withdrawal of mercenaries and foreign fighters and forces from Libya, in accordance with the Ceasefire Agreement and relevant UN Security Council Resolutions, including the recently adopted UNSCRs 2570 (2021) and 2571 (2021). The meeting also discussed possible next steps to implement the LPDF Roadmap and the UNSC Resolutions.

Within the same context and objectives and in the light of the political and security situation in Libya and the region, the Special Envoy held telephone conversations with high -level representatives of the GIS of Egypt, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation Mikhail Bogdanov and NATO Deputy Secretary-General Mircea Geoan.

Link:
Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Libya discusses security and political situation and support for elections with high-level international...

Tripoli, 26 April 2020 - The Government of Germany, through its Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) contributed US$ 5,973,716 (EUR 4,938,859) to UNICEF for containment of the spread of COVID-19 and mitigate its impact on children, families, health workers, teachers and people on the move in Libya. The programme aims to reach 4.8 million people (70.6 per cent of the local population), including some 409,000 migrants and refugees, and 274,000 internally displaced persons.

Key areas of focus of the programme are to strengthen national Risk Communication and Community Engagement efforts in municipalities; conduct community awareness-raising sessions and campaigns to promote child protection and prevent violence against children; improve the provision of water, sanitation and health services in health facilities, detention centres, internally displaced persons/collective shelters, communal spaces, and schools; provide lifesaving and essential supplies; and provide COVID-19 related and online learning materials for children, teachers and facilitators in the targeted schools and centres.

The programme will be implemented in partnership with Libyan Government counterparts, national and international organisations, and the private sector.

The UNICEF Special Representative to Libya, Mr. AbdulKadir Musse reiterated, We are grateful to the German Government and its people for the partnership and continued support toward curbing the spread of the COVID-19 virus and mitigating its impact in Libya. This contribution made possible the support towards the continuity of health, water and sanitation, and education services, while keeping all the service providers safe by having the right information and protective equipment.

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BMZ Funding Toward the COVID-19 Pandemic Response in Libya - Libya - ReliefWeb

On 15 April, Libyas Prime Minister Abdul Hamid Dbeibah travelled to Moscow for the first time. During his trip, Dbeibah engaged with senior Russian officials, including Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin, Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu and Secretary of the Security Council Nikolay Patrushev, on intra-Libyan dialogue and energy sector investments. After meeting Dbeibah, Shoigu extolled the Libyan people as Russia-friendly and called for a resumption of full-scale cooperation between Russia and Libyas defence ministries. Dbeibah vowed to build new bridges with Russia and emphasised Moscows ability to play a key role in Libyas economy.

At first glance, the cordial nature of Dbeibahs meeting with Russian officials is surprising. Russia provided extensive material support for Libyan National Army (LNA) chieftain Khalifa Haftars offensive against the Tripoli-based Government of National Accord, which was the predecessor of the Dbeibah-led Government of National Unity (GNU). On 12 March, Dbeibah described foreign mercenaries, which included Russian Wagner Group private military contractors, as a stab in our back and a threat to Libyan sovereignty. Since the GNUs establishment on 9 March, Russia has embraced Libyas interim government and supports Libyas plans to hold national elections in December 2021. However, Russia also maintains residual links with anti-systemic actors, such as Khalifa Haftar, the al-Kaniyat armed group and Saif al-Islam Gaddafi, in case the GNUs authority weakens. This balancing strategy could allow Russias influence in Libya to remain impervious to political changes on the ground and yield lucrative reconstruction contracts for Russian state-owned companies.

Much like other international actors involved in Libya, the Russian Foreign Ministry immediately endorsed the GNUs legitimacy. On 15 March, Russias charg daffaires in Libya, Jamshed Boltaev, held talks with members of the Libyan parliament and announced plans to reopen a Russian embassy in Tripoli. This is noteworthy, as Russia relocated its diplomatic presence to Tunisia in October 2013 after its embassy in Tripoli was attacked by protesters. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov alsoemphasised Russias support for Libyas December 2021 parliamentary elections and its desire to promote political inclusivity in Libya. These diplomatic gestures were reinforced by the shipment of 100,000 Sputnik V vaccine doses to Libya on 4 April. These vaccines were the first to arrive in Libya, and Dbeibah showed his appreciation to Russia by calling the shipment the first drop of rain.

In tandem with its establishment of closer ties with the GNU, Russia has also preserved its relations with anti-systemic partners in Libya. In recent weeks, the LNA has faced dissension within its ranks, which was exemplified by the outbreak of clashes between Haftar-aligned militias in Benghazi on 21 April. To demonstrate Russias solidarity with Haftar at a moment of vulnerability, the Wagner Group will dispatch 300 new Syrian mercenaries to Libya at the end of April. Russia also blocked the UN blacklisting of Mohammed al-Kani, the head of the al-Kaniyat armed group, on the grounds that there is insufficient evidence of his involvement in civilian casualties. Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Vershinin has also emphasised the need for Khalifa Haftar and Gaddafi loyalists, who support the rehabilitation of Saif al-Islam Gaddafi, to influence Libyas future political system and electoral process. As Haftar and other anti-systemic actors could see their influence rebound if the Libyan election process falters, Russia is ensuring that its wartime partnerships persist into the post-conflict reconstruction phase.

Russias diverse array of local partnerships in Libya might also help it secure nationwide reconstruction contracts. Due to Muammar al-Gaddafis overthrow in 2011, Russia lost $4 billion in extant arms contracts and hundreds of millions of dollars in gas exploration revenues, and abandoned a $3 billion national railway contract operated by Russian Railways. Since 2017, Russia has taken preparatory steps to establish a major foothold in Libyas reconstruction process. Russian oil giant Rosneft signed an oil offtake deal with Libyas National Oil Corporation in February 2017, and in October 2018, Libyas Minister of Economy and Industry Nasser Shaglan held talks with Russian officials about reviving the BenghaziSirte railway project. The Wagner Groups seizure of El-Sharara oil field in western Libyas Murzuq Desert in June 2020 further ensconces its presence in the countrys oil sector. If the UN arms embargo on Libya is eventually lifted, Russia could also receive fighter jet and missile defence contracts.

Taking a long-term perspective, Russias influence in Libya is challenged by competition from external stakeholders and soft power limitations. Although the UAE allegedly paid the Wagner Groups salaries and Egypts logistical assistance facilitated Russias entry into Libya, this cooperation might not extend to the post-conflict period. The UAEs orchestration of Haftars walk-out from the January 2020 Moscow peace conference and its blockage of Kremlin-aligned Algerian Foreign Minister Ramtane Lamamras appointment as UN Special Envoy to Libya reveal divergent diplomatic interests. Egypts Trans-African railroad project, which seeks to link Benghazi to Congo, could stymie the return of Russian Railways to Libya. Russia also faces stiff competition from Turkey, which has $16 billion in backlogged contracts with Libya; France and Italy, which have substantial stakes in Libyas oil industry via Total and Eni; and China, which sees Libya as an important vector in its Belt and Road Initiative.

Russia also suffers from a soft power deficit in Libya. The erosion of Russias image in Libya began with Gaddafis death in October 2011, as the newly empowered National Transitional Council eschewed commercial contracts with countries that opposed the NATO-led regime change, such as Russia and China. The Wagner Groups use of landmines in the Sirte-Jufra region, which still claim civilian lives on a frequent basis, and Libyan Interior Minister Fathi Bashaghas accusations of chemical weapons use by Wagner Group forces have tarnished Russias image. The perception that Russia supports authoritarianism in Libya, which was crystallised by the July 2019 arrest of two Yevgeny Prigozhin-aligned Fabrika Trollei operatives for political interference, has further sullied Moscows reputation in western Libya.

To overcome these headwinds, Russia could establish a military base in Libya and empower pro-Kremlin candidates in the Libyan elections. Since Muammar al-Gaddafi offered Russia a naval base in Benghazi in November 2008, Moscow has viewed Libyas eastern Mediterranean coast as a strategically significant location. If Russia could leverage its local ties in eastern Libya to establish an air base in Tobruk or a naval base in Benghazi, it would be able to legitimise its military presence and constrain Western influence in Libya. While Russias failed intervention in the 2018 Madagascar presidential elections and the December 2020 crackdown on Russian social media accounts in the Central African Republic highlight the limits of Kremlin election interference efforts, RT Arabics standing as one of Libyas most-viewed media networks could help Moscow influence public opinion ahead of the elections. Given that Khalifa Haftar might launch a presidential bid or back a sympathetic figure in Libyas December 2021 elections, Russia could rally its disinformation machinery behind candidates that are most amenable to its interests.

As the GNUs domestic and international legitimacy strengthens, Russias strategy in Libya is undergoing a drastic transformation. Russia wishes to preserve a diverse array of local partnerships and leverage its standing as a Mediterranean power to secure lucrative reconstruction contracts. The success of Russias strategy hinges on its ability to rebuild its depleted soft power and outbid stiff competition from rival international stakeholders in Libya.

Samuel Ramani recently completed his doctorate in International Relations at the University of Oxford and is writing a book on Russian foreign and security policy towards Africa, which will be published in 2022.

The views expressed in this Commentary are the author's, and do not represent those of RUSI or any other institution.

BANNER IMAGE: Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin and Libyan Prime Minister Abdul Hamid Dbeibeh at a meeting on 15 April. Courtesy of Government of the Russian Federation/Wikimedia Commons/CC BY 4.0

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Russia's Strategic Transformation in Libya: A Winning Gambit? - RUSI Analysis