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Libya stretches along the northeast coast of Africa between Tunisia and Algeria on the west and Egypt on the east; to the south are the Sudan, Chad, and Niger. It is one-sixth larger than Alaska. Much of the country lies within the Sahara. Along the Mediterranean coast and farther inland is arable plateau land.

Military dictatorship.

The first inhabitants of Libya were Berber tribes. In the 7th century B.C., Phoenicians colonized the eastern section of Libya, called Cyrenaica, and Greeks colonized the western portion, called Tripolitania. Tripolitania was for a time under Carthaginian control. It became part of the Roman Empire from 46 B.C. to A.D. 436, after which it was sacked by the Vandals. Cyrenaica belonged to the Roman Empire from the 1st century B.C. until its decline, after which it was invaded by Arab forces in 642. Beginning in the 16th century, both Tripolitania and Cyrenaica nominally became part of the Ottoman Empire.

Tripolitania was one of the outposts for the Barbary pirates who raided Mediterranean merchant ships or required them to pay tribute. In 1801, the pasha of Tripoli raised the price of tribute, which led to the Tripolitan war with the United States. When the peace treaty was signed on June 4, 1805, U.S. ships no longer had to pay tribute to Tripoli.

Following the outbreak of hostilities between Italy and Turkey in 1911, Italian troops occupied Tripoli. Libyans continued to fight the Italians until 1914, by which time Italy controlled most of the land. Italy formally united Tripolitania and Cyrenaica in 1934 as the colony of Libya.

Libya was the scene of much desert fighting during World War II. After the fall of Tripoli on Jan. 23, 1943, it came under Allied administration. In 1949, the UN voted that Libya should become independent, and in 1951 it became the United Kingdom of Libya. Oil was discovered in the impoverished country in 1958 and eventually transformed its economy.

On Sept. 1, 1969, 27-year-old Col. Muammar al-Qaddafi deposed the king and revolutionized the country, making it a pro-Arabic, anti-Western, Islamic republic with socialist leanings. It was also rabidly anti-Israeli. A notorious firebrand, Qaddafi aligned himself with dictators, such as Uganda's Idi Amin, and fostered anti-Western terrorism.

On Aug. 19, 1981, two U.S. Navy F-14s shot down two Soviet-made SU-22s of the Libyan air force that had attacked them in air space above the Gulf of Sidra. On March 24, 1986, U.S. and Libyan forces skirmished in the Gulf of Sidra, and two Libyan patrol boats were sunk. Qaddafi's troops also supported rebels in Chad but suffered major military reverses in 1987. A two-year-old U.S. covert policy to destabilize the Libyan government ended in failure in Dec. 1990.

On Dec. 21, 1988, a Boeing 747 exploded in flight over Lockerbie, Scotland, the result of a terrorist bomb, killing all 259 people aboard and 11 on the ground. This and other acts of terrorism, including the bombing of a Berlin discotheque in 1986 and the downing of a French UTA airliner in 1989 that killed 170, turned Libya into a pariah in the eyes of the West. Two Libyan intelligence agents were indicted in the Lockerbie bombing, but Qaddafi refused to hand them over, leading to UN-approved trade and air traffic embargoes in 1992. In 1999, Libya finally surrendered the two men, who were tried in the Netherlands in 20002001. One was found guilty of mass murder; the other defendant was found innocent. Libya had hoped its fainthearted cooperation would lead to suspended sanctions, which had severely affected the Libyan economy. The UN did suspend its sanctions, but they were not formally removed for another four years, not until Sept. 2003, when Libya finally admitted its guilt in the Lockerbie bombing and agreed to pay $2.7 billion to the victims' families. In 2004, Libya also agreed to compensate the families of the victims of the UTA airliner bombing ($170 million) and the Berlin disco bombing ($35 million).

After months of secret talks with the U.S. and Britain, Qaddafi surprised the world in Dec. 2003 by announcing he would give up the pursuit of weapons of mass destruction and submit to full UN weapons inspections. After inspections at four secret sites, the International Atomic Energy Agency concluded that Libya's progress on a nuclear bomb had been in the very nascent stages. In May 2006, the U.S. announced it would restore full diplomatic relations with Libya after a 25-year hiatus.

In Dec. 2006, five Bulgarian nurses and a Palestinian doctor working in Libya were sentenced to death after being convicted of infecting hundreds of Libyan children with AIDS. The evidence used to convict the medical workers is considered highly specious, and many believe that Libya is attempting to deflect the blame for the 1998 outbreak of AIDS in a Libyan hospital. In July 2007, Libya's Supreme Court upheld the death sentences. Days later, however, the country's High Judicial Council commuted the sentences. On the same day as the commutations, the government agreed to pay $1 million to the families of each of the 460 victims.

Abdel Basset Ali al-Megrahi, the Libyan terrorist convicted of bombing of Pan Am Flight 103, was freed from prison on compassionate grounds by Scotland in August 2009. (He is suffering from terminal prostate cancer.) His return to a hero's welcome provoked outrage from victims' families, and the White House opposed this decision, stating that Megrahi should finish his sentence in Scotland.

Anti-government demonstrations gripped several countries in the Middle East in early 2011, and protests in Libya followed those in Egypt, Tunisia, and Bahrain. The crackdown by the government in Libya, however, was the most vicious. The protesters took to the streets on Feb. 16 in Benghazi, the country's second-largest city, demanding that Qaddafi step down. The next day, declared the Day of Rage, saw the number of demonstrations burgeon throughout the country. Security forces began firing on protesters, and by Feb. 20 Human Rights Watch estimated that as many as 200 people had been killed by troops. Several government officials and diplomats defected, and members of the military joined the ranks of the opposition as the government attacks on civilians grew increasingly brutal. Some reports had fatalities numbering near 1,000 or more. Qaddafi refused to resign, but offered to double the salaries of public workers and freed some Islamic militants from jail. Protesters dismissed the move as a hollow gesture and continued their actions throughout the country. Qaddafi enlisted the help of mercenaries as the number of defections by troops swelled. He cast blame for the uprising on the West, which he claimed wants to assume control of Libya's oil, and Islamic radicals who want to expand their base.

On Feb. 27, the UN Security Council voted to impose sanctions on Qaddafi and several of his close advisers. The sanctions included an arms embargo on Libya, a travel ban on Qaddafi and other leaders, and the freezing of Qaddafi's assets. The Security Council also requested that the International Criminal Court investigate reports of "widespread and systemic attacks" on citizens. The UN sanctions followed unilateral action by the U.S., and the European Union also sanctioned Libya. By Feb. 28, rebels had taken control of Benghazi and Misurata and were closing in on Tripoli. The rebels organized a military and formed an executive committee, the Transitional National Council, illustrating that they could establish a transitional government if given the opportunity. The Libyan Air Force and security forces, however, attacked the rebels from both the air and the ground, weakening the rebellion and wresting control of rebel-held towns, including Zawiya and Zuwara, cities west of Tripoli, and Ajdabiya in the east. The rebels fought on, clinging to the rebel strongholdand capitalof Benghazi, but Qaddafi's forces continued their march toward the city, attacking from both the ground and the air. The rebels, outnumbered, poorly armed, and inexperienced, seemed on the brink of defeat.

As the assault on rebel areas by Qaddafi's troops intensified, the Arab League turned to the international community for assistance. On March 17, the UN Security Council approved a resolution that authorized military action against Libya, including air strikes, missile attacks, and a no-fly zone, and two days later, Britain and France led a military action against Libya, launching attacks from the air and sea on Libya's air defenses. The U.S. participated in the action, but did not initiate it. Qaddafi railed against the intervention, calling it "a colonial crusader aggression that may ignite another large-scale crusader war." By March 21, the mission to implement a no-fly zone over Libya and cripple its air defenses was considered a success. In early April, two of Qaddafi's sons, Seif and Saadi, put forth a proposal in which their father would step down and allow the country to transition toward a constitutional democracy. The move would be managed by Seif. The rebels rejected the offer, and Qaddafi never fully endorsed the plan.

NATO took over control of the air strikes, which continued for weeks, and by May the rebels gained ground and momentum in cities in both the east and west of the country. Qaddafi refused to participate in talks mediated by South African president Jacob Zuma. In June, the International Criminal Court issued arrest warrants for Qaddafi, his son, Saif al-Islam, and his intelligence chief, Abdulla al-Senussi. They were charged crimes against humanity for the attacks on civilians in the first two weeks of the revolt.

In July, the U.S. and 30 other countries officially recognized the Transitional National Council (TNC) as Libya's government and gave the council access to the $30 billion in Libyan assests that had been frozen by the U.S. Later in the month, the council's military leader, Gen. Abdul Fattah Younes, was killed by fellow rebel soldiers. Younes, a former interior minister under Qaddafi, never gained the trust of the rebel movement and some questioned his loyalty.

In August 2011, rebel fighters opposing Qaddafi made progress on several fronts. They seized Zawiyah and gained control of the city's oil refinery. Zawiyah, a port city just 31 miles west of Tripoli, was a key gain. Rebel forces soon advanced into Tripoli and foreigners tried to flee the city. On August 21, with the rebels meeting little resistance from loyalists, residents in Tripoli took to the streets to celebrate the end of Qaddafi's 42 years in power. Two days later, rebels seized Qaddafi's compound. Qaddafi and his family fled and remained at large. Mustafa Abdul Jalil, the chairman of the TNC and Qaddafi's former justice minister, became the country's leader and the rebels began transferring their administration from Benghazi to Tripoli.

Rebels continued to make gains in loyalist strongholds throughout the country into the fall. By October, they had advanced on Surt, Qaddafi's hometown, and captured Bani Walid. The fight for Surt proved to be more challenging for the rebels, with loyalist forces fiercely committed to maintaining control of the city. Both sides suffered significant casualties. On October 20, 2011, the interim government of Libya announced that Qaddafi had been killed by rebel troops in Surt. Initial reports were unclear on the cause of death.

With Qaddafi dead, the interim government could turn its attention to rebuilding the country and setting the stage for elections. The role and influence of Islamists in government and day-to-day life were unknowns for the future of Libya. During the turmoil in Libya, the Islamists became a powerful force in the country. At the very least, they are poised to form a political party, and Islamist leaders signaled that they would participate in the democratic process. In addition, it remained unclear how the many rivalaries in the countryIslamists vs secularist, geographic, inter-tribe, and between the educated elite and tribal populationwill affect the political climate in the country. At the same time, there was growing concern about the increased activity of militant groups.

At the end of October 2011, the Transitional National Council elected Abdurrahim al-Keeb, an engineer and opponent of Qaddafi, as interim prime minister. In July 2012, Libyans voted in its first national election since Col. Muammar Qaddafi was ousted. The National Forces Alliance, a secular party led by Mahmoud Jibril, a Western-educated political scientist, prevailed over Islamist parties, including the Muslim Brotherhood, in the election to form a national congress. The win by the National Forces Alliance is a sign that Libya, unlike Egypt and Tunisia, is not trending toward Islamist rule. Turnout was over 60%, and international observers declared the election largely fair, despite reports of election-related violence. In August, the Transitional National Council handed power to the newly elected General National Congress, a 200-seat body. Mohammed Magarief, a longtime opposition leader and head of the National Front Party, was elected chairman of the Congress and thus Libya's head of state. In September, Mustafa Abu Shagur, deputy prime minister, prevailed over Jibril in the second round of voting by the Congress to become prime minister.

On Sept. 11, 2012, militants armed with anti-aircraft weapons and rocket-propelled grenades fired on the American consulate in Benghazi, killing U.S. ambassador to Libya Christopher Stevens and three other embassy officials. Stevens was a widely praised diplomat and an advocate for the opposition in Libya, and had helped the new government in its transition to power. He was the first U.S. ambassador to be killed in the line of duty since 1979.

The attack coincided with protests at the U.S. embassy in Cairo over the release of a crude YouTube film, Innocence of Muslims, that insulted the Prophet Muhammad and criticized Islam. U.S. officials initially said the attack was also in response to the video, but later said they believed that the militant group Ansar al-Shariah orchestrated the attack. The Obama administration was criticized for the lack of security at the consulate that left diplomats vulnerable and for not immediately acknowledging it was a premeditated terrorist attack. During the 2012 U.S. presidential campaign, Republican nominee Mitt Romney repeatedly accused Obama of releasing misleading statements to downplay the role terrorists played in the attack. Susan Rice, U.S. ambassador to the UN, was also drawn into the controversy. After the presidential election Republicans in the U.S. Senate threatened to derail her potential nomination as secretary of state because, they claimed, in the days following the attack Rice said it was a spontaneous reaction to the release of Innocence of Muslims, rather than a terrorist attack. Obama and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, defended Rice, saying she was relaying the notes she received from the CIA. However, Rice withdrew herself for consideration in December.

Clinton appointed an independent panel to investigate the attack, and in its highly critical report, the panel said the U.S. State Department failed to provide adequate security at the American Embassy in Tripoli and the consulate in Benghazi, overly relied on local militias for security, and did not fulfill requests for safety improvements at the compounds. It also cited "systemic failures and leadership and management deficiencies at senior levels." The report listed 29 recommended actions and improvements, and Clinton said she would act on all of them. Several State Department officials resigned after the release of the report.

The Libyan government condemned the attack and vowed to track down the perpetrators, though it proved too weak and ineffectual to do so. Indeed, the attack proved how little control the government has over the country's disparate militias, which act as the country's police yet operate independently of each other and the government. Ten days after the attack, several thousand Libyan citizens descended upon several militia headquarters and demanded that the government break up the groups. President Mohamed Magariaf rejected the demandan acknowledgement of the important role the militias play in the country's security. In mid-October the Libyan government said Ansar al-Sharia leader Ahmed Abu Khattala organized the attack. However, it did not detain the suspect.

In October 2012, the National Congress fired recently elected prime minister Mustafa Abushagur, citing its disapproval with the government he assembled. Ali Zeidan, a career diplomat who served under Qaddafi before going into exile, was then elected prime minister. Zeidan prevailed over an Islamist candidate. The political upheaval further illustrated the weakness of the fledgling government.

The New York Times reported in December that the Obama administration privately approved to transfer of weapons from Qatar to Libyan rebels in 2011, but later expressed concern that the arms ended up in the hands of Islamic militants. The concern gained urgency as the civil war intensified in Syria and the Obama administration mulled arming rebels in that country.

The National Congress passed a broad law in May 2013 that bans from taking public office anyone who served in a senior position under Qaddafi between 1969 and 2011. As written, the law threatens the standing of several current elected officials, including congress chairman Mohammed Magarief and Prime Minister Ali Zeidan. Secular opposition leader Mahmoud Jibril is also vulnerable under the new law. Magarief resigned weeks after the law passed, and his deputy, Giuma Attaiga, became acting chairman of the General National Congress. In June Congress elected Nouri Abusahmen as chairman. An independent member of Parliament, Abusahmen is a Berber, a minority group that suffered discrimination under Qaddafi.

By September 2013, Libya had deteriorated economically and politically. Oil production dropped from about 1.6 million barrels per day before the civil war to 150,000, costing the country about $5 billion in revenue from exports. Strikes were mainly responsible for the reduction. Prime Minister Zeidan came under fire for failing to stem tribal fighting. In addition, the government lacked a reliable armed force, making Zeidan dependent on militias for security. These militias exploited the situation for their own gain. The country's top cleric, Mufti al-Sadiq al-Ghiryani, called on Zeidan to resign.

U.S. commandoes captured Nazih Abdul-Hamed al-Ruqai, a high-ranking al-Qaeda operative who is known as Abu Anas al-Libi, in Tripol in early October 2013. He was indicted in New York in 2000 for helping to plan the 1998 bombings of the U.S. Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. U.S. authorities had been pursuing Abu Anas for about 15 years. U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry said "the Libyan government was aware of the operation." However, Prime Minister Zeidan denied that he had any prior knowledge of the raid. Days after the abduction of Abu Anas, members of a militia that has served as a government security force kidnapped Zeidan, presumably in retaliation for allowing the U.S. operation. He was held for several hours before being released. The incident revealed the increasing fragility of the country.

In July 2013, the Cyrenaica Political Bureau, a militia led by Ibrahim Jathran, began a blockade of Libya's major oil ports and demanded expanded autonomy for Cyrenaica, a province in eastern Libya, and a greater share in oil revenues. The government did little to end the blockade, despite the loss of oil revenuethe lifeblood of Libya's economy. In March 2014, the group loaded a tanker with 234,000 barrels of crude oil (valued at about $30 million) to sell on the black market. Prime Minister Zeidan said the move was an act of piracy and threatened to blow up the ship. The militants, however, defied the threats and the tanker left the port. Parliament voted to dismiss Zeidan, citing his weakness and inability to control the militia. Abdullah al-Thinni was named interim prime minister. U.S. Navy SEALS raided the ship days later and captured three Libyans said by crew members to be hijackers. The ship was set to return to Libya. The raid was a major setback to Jathran's militia.

In May, former general Khalifa Heftar organized a group of anti-Islamist nationalists, calling it the Libyan National Army, and led a campaign against a coalition of Islamic militias, Libya Dawn, in eastern Libya that he said had thrown Libya into disarray. Fighting continued for several weeks, and Heftar gained the support of the country's military. Heftar served under Qaddafi but split from him in the 1980s. He also accused Prime Minister Maiteg of being under the sway of the Islamic militias.

Libya's transitional Parliament elected Ahmed Maitiq, a prominent businessman from Misurata, as prime minister in May 2014. The Supreme Court, however, ruled that the election was unconstitutional, and he resigned. Thinni remained in office as interim prime minister.

Parliamentary elections were held in late June 2014, and because the populace had largely lost confidence in government as militias continued to yield tremendous power, turnout and interest in the race were low. In light of the violence between rival militias in Tripoli, the new Parliament convened in the eastern city of Tobruk, which is controlled by Heftar. However, many of the Islamist MPs refused to attend. Members of the former Parliament, which is the preferred body of the Islamists, reconvened in Tripoli and on Aug. 25 appointed Omar al-Hassi as prime minister, further complicating the political landscape. Heftar's government is recognized by the majority of the international community.

Violence between Libya Dawn and Heftar's fighters intensified in Tripoli during the summer of 2014. In July, they battled for control of the city's international airport, and the barrage of shelling threatened the U.S. embassy, forcing the U.S. to evacuate embassy staff. Most other nations also withdrew their embassy personnel. After a month of fighting, Libya Dawn won control of the airport, and Heftar's troops fled Tripoli. Egypt and the United Arab Emirates launched airstrikes on the Islamic militias in Tripoli several times in late August. Neither nation informed the U.S. about the attacks, and U.S. officials were reportedly irate that they were kept in the dark. The ongoing violence illustrated that any hope of stability in Libya was quickly fading, and the threat of civil war loomed. In early September, the government acknowledged that Libay Dawn controlled government ministries in Tripoli. By October, some 100,000 people fled the Tripoli area. UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon made a surprise visit to Libya in October to try to broker peace between the groups. His efforts bore little fruit. The fighting escalated at end of 2014, with the government launching airstrikes on Misrata, which is under the control of Libya Dawn.

The instability was blamed for an influx of refugees into Italy from Libya. More than 5,300 Libyans arrived in Italy during the first six weeks of 2015, a 60% increase over 2014.

The rival militias agreed to a UN-brokered cease-fire in January 2015. The vaguely worded truce left ample room for interpretation and doubts that it would hold.

U.S. special operations troops captured Ahmed Abu Khattala in a secret raid in Benghazi on June 15, 2014. He is believed to be the mastermind of the Sept. 11, 2012, attack on the U.S. consulate that killed four Americans, including U.S. ambassador to Libya Christopher Stevens. In July 2014, the U.S. Attorney in the District of Columbia charged Abu Khattala and several others with the felony counts of "killing a person in the course of an attack on a federal facility involving use of a firearm," providing "material support to terrorists resulting in a death," and possessing a firearm during a crime. He pleaded not guilty to the charges in July.

As Libya's stability continued to deteriorate, at least three militant groups, one in each of Libya's three regions, pledged allegiance to ISIS. In February 2015, a group of the militants aligned with ISIS beheaded 21 Egyptian Coptic Christians who had been kidnapped from Sirte. Egypt responded by launching airstrikes on weapons depots in Derna, a militant stronghold in eastern Libya. In May, ISIS militants shot or beheaded at least 20 Ethiopian migrant workers, most of whom are believed to be Christian.

About 1,800 migrants fleeing countries in North Africa died in the Mediterranean Sea, many off the coast of Libya, during the summer of 2015. The migrants were hoping to reach Europe. European countries struggled to deal with the influx of hundreds of thousands of migrants during the crisis.

A court in Tripoli sentenced Saif al-Islam Qaddafi, a son of the former dictator, in absentia to death for his role in the violence against protesters during the 2011 uprising. Eight others, including former head of intelligence, Abdullah al-Senussi, received the same sentence. The sentence will not be carried out because the officials are being held by a militia in the town of Zintan. The militia has refused to release them into government custody.

See also Encyclopedia: Libya .U.S. State Dept. Country Notes: Libya

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Geography,Government,History,Libya - infoplease.com

An estimated 1.3 million people are in need of humanitarian assistance in Libya. Hundreds of thousands of people across the country are suffering. They are living in unsafe conditions with little or no access to health care, essential medicines, food, safe drinking water, shelter or education.

Our overall objective in Libya is to improve protection and life-saving assistance to displaced people, refugees and asylum-seekers and host communities. This includes supporting local public services which benefit the whole community, such as hospitals and schools.

The country presents a complex displacement scenario with 217,002 people displaced inside the country (IDPs) and 278,559 people who have returned home (returnees). Supporting IDPs is a priority for us and we provide them shelter kits, core relief items and cash assistance.

We are using Quick impact projects (QIPs), which are small and rapidly implemented projects, to help support those in need of help. Together with the communities and partners we identify suitable projects to implement, mainly within the health, education, shelter or water and sanitation sectors.

Libya also hosts 43,113 refugees and asylum-seekers who are registered with UNHCR. Refugees are travelling alongside migrants through dangerous routes towards Europe. Up to 90 per cent of people crossing the Mediterranean Sea to Europe depart from Libya.

Our work at disembarkation points focuses on providing life-saving assistance to people and protection monitoring to identify those in need of international protection, such as unaccompanied and separated children, elderly people, medical cases, women at risk or victims of trafficking. We have access to 12 disembarkation points in western Libya and have upgraded reception conditions to meet the immediate basic needs of refugees and migrants (health posts, water and sanitation facilities and shaded areas to protect refugees and migrants from the elements).

In urban areas we work in community development centres and we use telephone hotlines and outreach visits to help identify, register and assist people in need of our protection.

We are working to end the detention of refugees and asylum seekers in Libya. We are also advocating for alternatives to detention, including care arrangements for children and family tracing. At the detention centres we provide humanitarian assistance and advocate for enhanced access to screening, identification and registration.

We continue to seek durable solutions such as resettlement, family reunification and voluntary repatriation, for refugees and asylum-seekers, giving particular attention to the most vulnerable.We are planning to significantly scale-up our capacity for refugee status determination, resettlement and evacuations to third countries in order that we can help as many people as possible.

Numbers updated 23 October 2017

For information about our work in Libya:

Read this article:
UNHCR - Libya

7th Brigades holds the Presidential Council responsible for the failure of the truce reached last year to end fighting in Tripoli. Libya

Libya- vehicles deployed to the south as part of new LNA operation: - Panthera F9 with wheel armor - T-55s - BM-21 launchers - BMP3 Khrizantema without launcher - Panthera T6

Unidentified plane was spotted yesterday and today conducting reconnaissance missions over Tripoli.

Al-Massmari calls on residents of Sabha to cooperate with the army during military operations to free the region from terrorism

Libyan army spokesman: The army will work to secure oil fields in the south

Libyan army spokesman: Army operations in the south aimed to address organized crime gangs

Libyan army spokesman: Army begins liberation of south-west areas

Libyan army spokesman: The aim of the operations of the Libyan army in the south to protect citizens from terrorism

Libya officially announces it will not attend Arab Economic Summit in Beirut

Libya- photos of LNA Tariq bin Ziyad Bn. deploying to the south, including at least 2 vehicles (possible KrAZ Cougar) with improvised mounting of 9M133 Kornet/AT-14 Spriggan and at least 4 Jordan ian KADDB al-Wahsh + Snake Head turret

LNA sending reinforcements to the South Brak, Jufra and Temenhint military airports. This comes at a time UNSMIL is visiting Fezzan. Increasing attention on Fezzan by LNA, GNA and international community. Libya

Spotted earlier today near the Tunisian border around 80 fuel tank trucks smuggling subsidized Libyan fuel to Tunisia.

Libya- "Special Operations Force" deployed around That El Emad Towers in Tripoli following reports of a car bomb threat

That El Emad Towers in Tripoli evacuated after reports of a possible car bomb threat

Moroccan Foreign Minister: Security arrangements in the Skhirat agreement must be implemented to resolve the crisis in Libya

Libya- al-Radaa (Kara/SDF) release photos of 2 ISIS militants, who were concluded through investigations to be responsible for recent attacks in Tripoli, Misrata, Fuqaha (no mention of Tazirbu), and mostly move around Sabha, often disguised as women

Libya- photos from Misrata Customs Inspection Unit purportedly showing foiling of Turkey-made handguns. According to the statement, 556 boxes, each containing 36 ekol p29 handguns, were hidden inside a 20-foot container

Libya- photos of LAF SF.260 aircraft that took off from Brak al-Shati Airbase and crashed near Hamada, pilot and co-pilot reportedly survived

The military court in Benghazi drops all charges against ICC-wanted killer Mahmoud Werfalli and his aide Mohamed Al-Jali, saying they are not guilty of committing war crimes

Libya- photos of large ISIS explosives making facility uncovered (and later destroyed) by LNA near Ghadduwah

Libya- photos @218Tv showing weapons (almost exclusively Turkish-made shotguns) confiscated from smugglers near Tobruk after an exchange of fire, during which a 2nd vehicle fled the area

Interior Minister discusses with Benghazi MPs unification of state security organs of all regions

The Malta Navy rescues 180 migrants in the Mediterranean

Persons kidnapped by ISIS in Fuqahaa town released

Moldavian Cargo Aerotranscargo 747 ER-BAM departed Misrata Lybia landed today from Istanbul Turkey

Libya- photo of the 1 SIAI-Marchetti SF.260 in Kufra Airport preparing for night sortie against Chad ian militias

Libya: US Embassy condemns the terrorist attack on the Foreign Ministry in Tripoli

LNA spox says attack on the 10th Infantry Brigade in Taragin, near Murzuq, comes as a revenge over recent clashes in Saddada, near BaniWalid.

Chadian rebels attack base of the 10th Infantry (LNA) in Taragin, South of Sebha. Reports of casualties.

Gunmen storm into Man-Made River department in Hawari, Benghazi, demanding jobs

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Map of news of Libya conflict - libya.liveuamap.com

Informed, Nuanced Analysis on Libya.

Libya-Analysisis a one-of-a-kind consultancy organisation with years of experience producing evidence-based analysis, forecasting and research on Libya. We help our clients make sense of the latest political, economic, commercial and security developments in Libya and provide both background information and real time insights into the complex dynamics driving events in the country.

If you are investing or conducting business in Libya or are partnering with a Libyan entity on a project, then Libya-Analysis is for you. Libya-Analysis can draw upon its vast archives of knowledge and experience to provide targeted advisory services for your project.

Browse Our Services to find out more about the variety of high quality, analysis-driven monitoring, forecasting and threat assessment reports we can offer, as well as bespoke consultancy, research services and media appearances.

If you are investing or conducting business in or relating to Libya or are partnering with a Libyan entity on a project, then Libya-Analysis is for you. Libya-Analysis can draw upon its vast wellsprings of knowledge and experience to provide targeted advisory services for your project. BrowseOur Expertise to find out more about our team, our clients, and to access our publicly available articles, think tank reports and academic publications.

Libya-Analysis was founded by Jason Pack in 2011 and is a registered LLC in the USA. Over the years, the scope of the company and our work has grown and Libya-Analysis has established itself as the go-to consultancy on Libyan affairs. Browse Our Story to find out more about our history, our mission, and our approach.

Visit our blog (formerly the Libya-Analysis front page) which provides analysis and insight into the latest developments and articles on Libya, including publications and media appearances by Libya-Analysis staff and analysts. Our blog roll covers the last 7 years of Libyan developments.

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Libya Analysis | Informed, Nuanced Analysis on Libya

Author and Page information

The crisis in Libya comes in the context of wider unrest throughout the Middle East and North Africa. The surge of what looks like spontaneous and ground up pro-democracy protests has been spreading throughout a region long controlled by authoritarian regimes from left and right of the political spectrum, and both pro and anti-West.

Since Libyas Muammar Qadhafi came into power over 40 years ago in a coup, he has been seen as an international pariah and his brutal willingness to kill civilians that threaten his position has been clear for all to see. Yet, until the recent crisis, the West had been opening up to him and was keen to do (mostly oil and some arms) business with him as they have been with various others in the region.

Peaceful protests against the Qadhafi regime in February resulted in a violent crackdown. As the situation quickly escalated ordinary citizens took up arms to help free themselves from Qadhafis brutal regime. Despite some military defections, the opposition has generally been a disorganized and out-gunned rebel force.

As Qadhafis forces increasingly targeted civilians the opposition appealed to the international community for a no-fly zone to limit or prevent the bloodbath that Qadhafi threatened.

The West appears to have responded with what looks like a genuine humanitarian intervention attempt. Yet, when looked at a bit more deeply, there are many murky often contradictory issues coming to the fore that complicate the picture.

(Side note about Qadhafi spelling: the UN Security Council resolution uses Qadhafi, while various reports using Qaddafi, Gaddafi, or some other variation. This article will try to be consistent but quotes may use variations.)

The current conflict comes as protesters demand an end to the current regime and democratic elections in Libya, a country ruled by Colonel Muammar Qadhafi for over 40 years when he lead a coup against King Idris and established the Libyan Arab Republic.

His rule has been oppressive, banning dissent and the formation of any other political parties, while also committing state-sponsored terrorism in the past. Oil revenues have accounted for a large portion of revenues, and his family is accused of amassing a large fortune (which is one of the reasons he supposedly overthrow the monarchy for).

Qadhafi had aligned himself with the Soviet Union in earlier years, and supported the idea of a Pan African movement for a United States of Africa (though probably with some notion of self-interest in any Pan Africa as he saw himself at the helm or at least with enormous influence). While claiming to be anti-imperialist he has been comfortable with his own forms of control, brutality and subjugation of others.

His support of terrorism abroad also resulted in the US bombing of Libya in 1986. In 1993 the UN imposed sanctions on Libya. It is possible these may have had some effect (though he did sponsor terrorist acts after the 1986 bombing too, possibly in retaliation) as Qadhafi eventually established closer economic and security relations with the West. He also agreed to end his nuclear weapons program and so the sanctions were lifted in 2003.

He also cooperated with some investigations of previous acts of terrorism and paid some compensation. The release of the Lockerbie bomber and return to Libya was perhaps more recently controversial.

In response to the 2011 uprising that was initially quite peaceful, he has been quite defiant threatening many civilian lives if needed. The uprising has since turned into an armed rebellion and numerous diplomats and military personnel have defected over the increasingly violent reaction by the ruling regime.

The generally untrained and disorganized rebel forces have, however, been out-gunned so far (though as a current conflict as of writing, the situation is of course volatile and could change quickly).

Qaddafis brutal response escalated the situation. The opposition, centered in Benghazi, worried about possible massacres from the regime. The international community, it seemed, were slow to respond, but eventually UN Security Council resolutions threatened the regime with war crimes prosecution if the situation worsened and eventually also allowed for a no-fly zone to be established to protect civilians.

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Into March, Qaddafi threatened to destroy those who resisted and some of his forces started to close in on Benghazi (where the opposition had created a Transitional National Council in the second city).

The West found themselves in a precarious situation. If they delayed, they would have been criticized for not aiding the civilians, and if they acted theyd be criticized for yet more military actions.

As calls for help from the beleaguered opposition grew, they decided they had to act, even as repression in other countries (though admittedly not threatening such imminent destruction as was thought in Libya) in the region were going on unchallenged.

The UN Security Council followed up on an earlier Resolution 1970 calling for restraint and reporting to the International Criminal Court for any human rights violations with Resolution 1973 in mid-March to authorize a no-fly zone to protect civilians.

The Resolution confusingly allowed all necessary measures, to protect civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of attack but explicitly exclud[ed] a foreign occupation force of any form on any part of Libyan territory.

All necessary measures caused confusion because Western powers insisted that the resolution was not to overthrow Qadhafi even though that is what many leaders were vocally calling for in the mainstream media and some initial bombing of Qadhafis compound seemed to imply (as Qadhafi was not threatening civilians in his compound). In addition, no ground troops excluded possible measures from all necessary measures, as some have argued that ground troops might be a more effective barrier to the Qaddafi forces.

At the same time, the Wests appetite for anything military that is more than a no-fly zone has been tainted or restrained by fear of public backlash given how stretched they are in Afghanistan and Iraq and how terrible those experiences have been. (The opposition had also stated they did not want ground troops, just protection from aerial bombing, hoping that would be enough to see the regime crumble.)

There has also been talk of arming the opposition with better arms as what they have is no match to Qaddafis forces. Yet, the resolution prohibits arms into Libya.

The resolution may have been intentionally vague to try and get broad support for it. It may have been weak because of the rush. This may have combined to create the contradictory messages but it was enough for Western forces to kick start the bombing campaign.

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The bombing campaign started very quickly after the Resolution authorized a no-fly zone and French jets started the first wave of attacks. The US was keen to be seen as just a part of an overall coalition, not the leader of it and so it joined later with a barrage of cruise missiles on various military targets.

Around the time the bombing commenced, Qadhafi seemed in a precarious position: the uprising seemed to be increasing, various high profile defections were occurring and he was sounding increasingly delusional in his defiant and bizarre speeches.

There were hopes this would be a short operation:

The military intervention that we had requested, we are quite confident that the moment that it is applied, that it isthat a step towards it is taken, the Gaddafi regime would fall within 48 hours. We dont expect it to survive more than that.

Maybe it was optimism or lack of full information but clearly the regime has carried on, perhaps even more resolute to act, now that it sees itself defying the West.

A useful infographic from Wikipedia shows what coalition forces have been involved in the no-fly zone enforcement/bombings:

The bombing campaign has also been met with criticism by initial supporters, perhaps surprisingly.

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The West was extremely keen to get Arab League support for any action. It would give a sense of legitimacy for the Wests actions as it would help avoid any military response look like yet more Western imperialism or Western attack on yet another Islamic country.

The corrupt, authoritarian and dictatorial tendencies of almost all the rulers from the countries that make up the Arab League makes them illegitimate in the eyes of their own populations, undermining Western claim of legitimacy from the Arab people by gaining Arab League support.

Furthermore, a full Arab representation has been described as a myth, as Asia Times Online noted:

As Asia Times Online has reported, a full Arab League endorsement of a no-fly zone is a myth. Of the 22 full members, only 11 were present at the voting. Six of them were Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) members, the US-supported club of Gulf kingdoms/sheikhdoms, of which Saudi Arabia is the top dog. Syria and Algeria were against it. Saudi Arabia only had to seduce three other members to get the vote.

Translation: only nine out of 22 members of the Arab League voted for the no-fly zone. The vote was essentially a House of Saud-led operation, with Arab League secretary general Amr Moussa keen to polish his CV with Washington with an eye to become the next Egyptian President.

In addition, when the bombing did commence, the Arab League voiced their concern at the bombing of various targets, as they believed it was not consistent with enforcing a no-fly zone. The leagues secretary general Amr Moussa said What is happening in Libya differs from the aim of imposing a no-fly zone. And what we want is the protection of civilians and not the shelling of more civilians. The Washington Post reporting this also added,

Moussas declaration suggested that some of the 22 Arab League members were taken aback by what they have seen and wanted to modify their approval lest they be perceived as accepting outright Western military intervention in Libya. Although the eccentric Gaddafi is widely looked down upon in the Arab world, the leaders and people of the Middle East traditionally have risen up in emotional protest at the first sign of Western intervention.

This goes back to the resolutions vagueness with the all necessary measures clause, while Western involvement implying no ground troops and a no-fly zone only was the assumption of the Arab League. In other words, the Resolution gave excuses for everyone to agree while still appealing to potentially opposing or hostile local opinions.

But, as US Secretary of Defense, Robert Gates made clear before the resolution,

If [the no-fly zone is] ordered [by the UN], we can do it. But the reality is a no-fly zone begins with an attack on Libya to destroy the air defenses. Thats the way you do a no-fly zone.

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Some fear the conflict could drag on for a while as the UN resolution is limited in its mandate, the opposition is not organized militarily and the implementation of that resolution by coalition forces does not appear to entertain any option for giving Qadhafi a way out to stop this (for now).

Instead, as noted earlier, Western powers insisted that the UN resolution did not authorize overthrowing Qadhafi even though that is what many leaders were vocally calling for in the mainstream media at the same time.

As US news anchorman, Chris Mathews fears Qaddafi will cling onto power if there is no way out, meaning more bloodshed:

We say we want to overthrow Gaddafi again but give him no place to escape. If thats the nature of this contest, he will fight to the death as most people would and that will mean the deaths of countless people who would survive if we had a quicker, smarter plan that promised a quicker, smarter ending to this thing.

I dont like the looks of this campaign for the simple reason it looks like so many others. In an effort to reduce our footprint, were making it a far longer, more bloody journey to where we're headed in the end.

Asli Bali, professor of International Law at the UCLA School of Law, also raises concerns that even the first UN Security Council resolution disincentivizes Qadhafi from stepping down quickly:

So, either, on the one hand, you exceed what the Security Council has authorized by pursuing regime change, or you pursue what the Security Council has authorizednamely, a ceasefireand you risk potentially freezing a situation on the ground that results in some form of partition.

There were many ways to get to that scenario that would not have entailed even the first Security Council authorization, since, for example, the ICC referral, the referral to the International Criminal Court, is counterproductive insofar as it says to the regime that youre going to face a form of international accountability that disincentivizes exile, that disincentivizes the regime from leaving rapidly. So, from the outset, I feel as if the Security Councils interventions in this instance have been, I think, poorly framed if the goal here has been rapid transition to a post-Gaddafi scenario with sparing of the civilian population, of killing.

Were alternatives possible? Asli Bali added that the International Crisis Group had suggested the option of peacekeeping forces on the ground before the UN Resolution. The force would act as a buffer between Qadhafi and civilians. Diplomatic pressure in the meanwhile could have been increased to get Qadhafi to step down or reform etc.

Are such peace-keeping forces still an option? Both Qadhafi and Coalition forces have been quite vocal about being against any form of ground troops. But that has typically been in the context of the current campaign.

Whether peoples positions would have been different if the military option had not developed so quickly is hard to know. Even if peacekeeping troops had been agreed to, who would the peacekeeping troops be? African Union and Arab League mandated forces?

There has been some concern that African Union forces may not have the clout, or may be influenced by Qadhafi as he has often funded them in the past. The Arab League is hardly representative of good governance. Western forces would likely be unwelcome even as peacekeeping troops. Would Latin America or Asian countries step in?

Another option being considered is arming the opposition further and officials from coalition countries are (perhaps intentionally) sending mixed messages on this option. On first thought it seems contradictory to the UN Security Council Resolutions 1970 and 1973 that both talked of an arms embargo on the whole of Libya (though clause 9(c) in 1970 talks of exemptions if approved by a Committee that would report to the Security Council). Resolution 1973 also talked of all necessary measures to prevent civilian deaths. Both aspects can be used to justify support for, or reasons against, arming the opposition.

Before those resolutions, Qadhafi had told supporters gathered in Green Square that he would arm them if needed. Whether that has since happened is not known for sure, but the arms embargo that later came was clearly addressed at that and similar threats, including the use of mercenaries.

Will the West rush to arm (directly or through proxy nations) rebel forces to better withstand and take on Qadhafi without Wests (visible) involvement, just as Qadhafi rushes to arm loyalists? If so, is this going to degrade into a protruded civil war?

A number of mainstream media outlets also reported that Obama had reportedly signed a secret order to help opposition fighters with covert operations. Al Jazeera added to their report on this (previous link) the views of William Hague, the British foreign minister, who implied that the USs action contradicted the UN arms embargo and that the restrictions in our view, apply to the whole of Libya while the French foreign minister, Alain Juppe, added: I remind you it is not part of the UN resolution, which France sticks to, but we are ready to discuss it with our partners.

(These contradictions could turn out to be intentional. A not-so-secret, or intentionally leaked report about such secret orders and mixed messages from coalition partners who you would expect to be united on this behind the scenes could be used to confuse the Libyan regime (as well as other audiences), or keep it guessing. The Fog of War clouds everything and truth is often the first casualty of war, as it is often said.)

John Norris, Executive Director of the Sustainable Security and Peacebuilding Initiative, lamented at the dilemmas long before the UN resolution and offered some options:

If we arm the opposition, what happens if some of those weapons fall into unfriendly hands? Do we really think that the situation in the Middle East requires more weapons on the ground? Or what if we impose a no-fly zone and attacks on the ground continue or escalate? Do we consider resorting to a ground offensive? Do we want the United States involved in three ground wars in three Islamic countries at the same time? Neither the rebels nor our national interest would benefit from a half-hearted intervention that does not achieve its goals.

With this in mind, here are the things that the administration should do right now. Fortunately, they appear to be trying to work through them already:

Although explaining the course of action to the public is always problematic (spin, propaganda, etc), it has been many weeks since the above. Even after the UN resolution, a lot of options appear to have remained on the table, so to speak, although there are various mixed messages from different circles. Perhaps public mixed messages also serves to keep Qadhafis regime guessing. More and more defections may also help to undermine Qadhafi.

Another blunt reason the West needs to think about diplomatic options is, as former head of UKs armed forces said, the UK is spreading its forces very thin and a political resolution in Libya must be found quickly.

As the BBC noted, he also warned against loose talks of arming the rebels which smacks of mission creep and could jeopardize support from Arab states.

We are on a high wire without any safety net and in the hands of opinion formers who could so quickly turn to our disadvantage these developments - are we not very close to being accused of involvement and taking sides in a Libyan civil war?

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As numerous journalists have reported, although the opposition forces are very passionate about the rebellion, they are generally not professional soldiers (some military personnel have defected and are slowly trying to instill discipline).

As a result, they have tended to be ineffective at pushing back Qadhafis forces who are professional soldiers (some may be mercenaries too).

In some cases, even after coalition bombing may have helped push back regime forces, the rebels have not been able to capitalize and have lost that gained ground, sometimes even pushed further back.

The other concern raised by many journalists and commentators before the bombing began was how coalition forces would know from the air who is enemy and who are rebels and who are civilians.

The reason is that rebel forces use civilian vehicles such as cars and pick-up trucks, as do civilians. But crucially, even Qadhafis army uses these vehicles so from the air, targets may be hard to verify.

It requires good ground intelligence, and with the coalition unwilling to have ground troops, the risk of hitting civilians or rebellions has long been feared.

Indeed, on April 2, NATO forces did just that, killing at least 13 rebels it is thought.

This is the last thing the coalition forces would want because any problem like this quickly threatens to escalate into opposition to coalition presence.

A few days earlier, a NATO strike on an ammunition truck sent shrapnel into nearby houses killing some civilians, including children. (A doctor interviewed on television described it but the journalist also said that talking to rebels, they wanted more strikes to take out such vehicles even if it meant some civilian deaths; that had those Qadhafi trucks got further the massacre would have been worse.)

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Perhaps in the context of the Iraq debacle, the global financial crisis, the shifts in world and economic power and the wider Middle East unrest, the crisis in Libya reveals a number of geopolitical issues.

Many question why the West is intervening in Libya militarily while other countries such as Bahrain or Yemen or Ivory Coast (with perhaps as many if not more killed in violence) are not getting such attention?

And this is not just a recent issue, but a common complaint for whenever there have been conflicts in the name of humanitarian intervention as they all appear selective.

Stephen Zunes of Foreign Policy In Focus adds that based on number of civilian deaths, Libya has been similar to other places that have been dealt with quite differently:

Even if one can justify the war on Libya on humanitarian grounds, this is probably not why its actually being fought.

It would nave to claim that foreign intervention is prompted by Western leaders concern about protecting civilian lives. The United States, Great Britain and France have each allied with governments such as Guatemala, Indonesia, Colombia and Zaire which, in recent decades, have engaged in the slaughter of civilians as bad or worse as had been occurring in Libya.

The number of civilian casualties from Gaddafis attacks is difficult to verify but most estimates put the number of civilians killed during the five weeks between the start of the uprising and the Western intervention country at approximately 1,700 people, roughly the same number of civilians killed during Israels 2006 war on Lebanon and its 2008 war on the Gaza Strip combined. Rather than referring those responsible to the International Criminal Court (ICC) or engage in military intervention to stop the slaughter, as has been the case of Libya, both the U.S. Congress and the administration vigorously defended Israels assaults of heavily-populated civilian areas and condemned UN agencies and leading international jurists for documenting Israeli violations of international humanitarian law and for recommending that officials of both Israel and its Arab adversaries suspected of war crimes be referred to the ICC.

Hypocrisy and double-standards regarding military intervention does not automatically mean that military intervention in this case is necessarily wrong. Though many of us familiar with Libya remain dubious, it cannot be ruled out that events could transpire in such a way that this intervention could prove to have saved lives, brought stability, and promoted a democratic transition. However, it would be nave to believe that the attacks on Libya are motivated primarily by humanitarian concerns.

There are also so many factors at play as Asli Bali, professor of International Law at the UCLA School of Law, alludes to:

We have, for the most part, the same coalition of forces that are prepared to intervene in the Libyan case are more or less supporting both the Bahraini and the Yemeni regimes strategies.

In addition, I think that there were considerations in the Libyan case: the isolation of the regime, the fact that it represents a relatively weak military force with very few allies in the region, the fact that it borders on the Mediterranean and gives rise to the possibility of major migration flows to Europe, should there be a long protracted conflict there, and that it sits atop energy sources that would destabilize energy markets. I mean, I think these are all important considerations that, frankly, we have to concede are among the motivations. Thats not to say that any intervention is bad because of mixed motivations; thats not the argument. But one has to be clear-eyed about why it is that this coalition has been willing to proceed in this instance and is not, on the other hand, prepared to intervene, let alone forcefully, in any way, really, politically, with response to the repression that were seeing in Bahrain and Yemen.

Bahrain, close ally to Saudi Arabia, is also home to the US navys fifth fleet, so that may partly explain their silence there. Despite peaceful pro-democratic protests, the crackdown by the authorities has been brutal and theyve even invited Saudi Arabian troops in to contain the protests further.

As The Guardian has noted, In 2003, Bahrain was named by George Bush as a major non-NATO ally. The US secretary of state, Hillary Clinton, during a visit to Manama in December, called Bahrain a model partner, not only for the US but other countries in the region. Clinton had added that America will continue working with [Bahrain] to promote a vigorous civil society and to ensure that democracy, human rights and civil liberties are protected by the rule of law.

Reuters recently reported that US Secretary of Defense, Robert Gates said Syria, Libya and Iran were examples of authoritarian regimes (that) have suppressed their people and have been willing to use violence against them. It is probably not surprising those 3 were mentioned as they are typically the anti-West ones; the pro-West regimes were not listed by him. Though Gates is not the only Western official to say something like this over the years.

In addition, as Pepe Escobar reveals in the Asia Times, there may be a deal of convenience behind the scenes:

Two diplomatic sources at the United Nations independently confirmed that Washington, via Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, gave the go-ahead for Saudi Arabia to invade Bahrain and crush the pro-democracy movement in their neighbor in exchange for a yes vote by the Arab League for a no-fly zone over Libya the main rationale that led to United Nations Security Council resolution 1973.

Escobar was describing what The Telegraph had reported: Saudi officials say they gave their backing to Western air strikes on Libya in exchange for the United States muting its criticism of the authorities in Bahrain, a close ally of the desert kingdom.

Former British Ambassador, Craig Murray, was the source for the second diplomatic source Escobar referred to and is worth quoting further:

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