Mediaboss Marketing

Author and Page information

The crisis in Libya comes in the context of wider unrest throughout the Middle East and North Africa. The surge of what looks like spontaneous and ground up pro-democracy protests has been spreading throughout a region long controlled by authoritarian regimes from left and right of the political spectrum, and both pro and anti-West.

Since Libyas Muammar Qadhafi came into power over 40 years ago in a coup, he has been seen as an international pariah and his brutal willingness to kill civilians that threaten his position has been clear for all to see. Yet, until the recent crisis, the West had been opening up to him and was keen to do (mostly oil and some arms) business with him as they have been with various others in the region.

Peaceful protests against the Qadhafi regime in February resulted in a violent crackdown. As the situation quickly escalated ordinary citizens took up arms to help free themselves from Qadhafis brutal regime. Despite some military defections, the opposition has generally been a disorganized and out-gunned rebel force.

As Qadhafis forces increasingly targeted civilians the opposition appealed to the international community for a no-fly zone to limit or prevent the bloodbath that Qadhafi threatened.

The West appears to have responded with what looks like a genuine humanitarian intervention attempt. Yet, when looked at a bit more deeply, there are many murky often contradictory issues coming to the fore that complicate the picture.

(Side note about Qadhafi spelling: the UN Security Council resolution uses Qadhafi, while various reports using Qaddafi, Gaddafi, or some other variation. This article will try to be consistent but quotes may use variations.)

The current conflict comes as protesters demand an end to the current regime and democratic elections in Libya, a country ruled by Colonel Muammar Qadhafi for over 40 years when he lead a coup against King Idris and established the Libyan Arab Republic.

His rule has been oppressive, banning dissent and the formation of any other political parties, while also committing state-sponsored terrorism in the past. Oil revenues have accounted for a large portion of revenues, and his family is accused of amassing a large fortune (which is one of the reasons he supposedly overthrow the monarchy for).

Qadhafi had aligned himself with the Soviet Union in earlier years, and supported the idea of a Pan African movement for a United States of Africa (though probably with some notion of self-interest in any Pan Africa as he saw himself at the helm or at least with enormous influence). While claiming to be anti-imperialist he has been comfortable with his own forms of control, brutality and subjugation of others.

His support of terrorism abroad also resulted in the US bombing of Libya in 1986. In 1993 the UN imposed sanctions on Libya. It is possible these may have had some effect (though he did sponsor terrorist acts after the 1986 bombing too, possibly in retaliation) as Qadhafi eventually established closer economic and security relations with the West. He also agreed to end his nuclear weapons program and so the sanctions were lifted in 2003.

He also cooperated with some investigations of previous acts of terrorism and paid some compensation. The release of the Lockerbie bomber and return to Libya was perhaps more recently controversial.

In response to the 2011 uprising that was initially quite peaceful, he has been quite defiant threatening many civilian lives if needed. The uprising has since turned into an armed rebellion and numerous diplomats and military personnel have defected over the increasingly violent reaction by the ruling regime.

The generally untrained and disorganized rebel forces have, however, been out-gunned so far (though as a current conflict as of writing, the situation is of course volatile and could change quickly).

Qaddafis brutal response escalated the situation. The opposition, centered in Benghazi, worried about possible massacres from the regime. The international community, it seemed, were slow to respond, but eventually UN Security Council resolutions threatened the regime with war crimes prosecution if the situation worsened and eventually also allowed for a no-fly zone to be established to protect civilians.

Back to top

Into March, Qaddafi threatened to destroy those who resisted and some of his forces started to close in on Benghazi (where the opposition had created a Transitional National Council in the second city).

The West found themselves in a precarious situation. If they delayed, they would have been criticized for not aiding the civilians, and if they acted theyd be criticized for yet more military actions.

As calls for help from the beleaguered opposition grew, they decided they had to act, even as repression in other countries (though admittedly not threatening such imminent destruction as was thought in Libya) in the region were going on unchallenged.

The UN Security Council followed up on an earlier Resolution 1970 calling for restraint and reporting to the International Criminal Court for any human rights violations with Resolution 1973 in mid-March to authorize a no-fly zone to protect civilians.

The Resolution confusingly allowed all necessary measures, to protect civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of attack but explicitly exclud[ed] a foreign occupation force of any form on any part of Libyan territory.

All necessary measures caused confusion because Western powers insisted that the resolution was not to overthrow Qadhafi even though that is what many leaders were vocally calling for in the mainstream media and some initial bombing of Qadhafis compound seemed to imply (as Qadhafi was not threatening civilians in his compound). In addition, no ground troops excluded possible measures from all necessary measures, as some have argued that ground troops might be a more effective barrier to the Qaddafi forces.

At the same time, the Wests appetite for anything military that is more than a no-fly zone has been tainted or restrained by fear of public backlash given how stretched they are in Afghanistan and Iraq and how terrible those experiences have been. (The opposition had also stated they did not want ground troops, just protection from aerial bombing, hoping that would be enough to see the regime crumble.)

There has also been talk of arming the opposition with better arms as what they have is no match to Qaddafis forces. Yet, the resolution prohibits arms into Libya.

The resolution may have been intentionally vague to try and get broad support for it. It may have been weak because of the rush. This may have combined to create the contradictory messages but it was enough for Western forces to kick start the bombing campaign.

Back to top

The bombing campaign started very quickly after the Resolution authorized a no-fly zone and French jets started the first wave of attacks. The US was keen to be seen as just a part of an overall coalition, not the leader of it and so it joined later with a barrage of cruise missiles on various military targets.

Around the time the bombing commenced, Qadhafi seemed in a precarious position: the uprising seemed to be increasing, various high profile defections were occurring and he was sounding increasingly delusional in his defiant and bizarre speeches.

There were hopes this would be a short operation:

The military intervention that we had requested, we are quite confident that the moment that it is applied, that it isthat a step towards it is taken, the Gaddafi regime would fall within 48 hours. We dont expect it to survive more than that.

Maybe it was optimism or lack of full information but clearly the regime has carried on, perhaps even more resolute to act, now that it sees itself defying the West.

A useful infographic from Wikipedia shows what coalition forces have been involved in the no-fly zone enforcement/bombings:

The bombing campaign has also been met with criticism by initial supporters, perhaps surprisingly.

Back to top

The West was extremely keen to get Arab League support for any action. It would give a sense of legitimacy for the Wests actions as it would help avoid any military response look like yet more Western imperialism or Western attack on yet another Islamic country.

The corrupt, authoritarian and dictatorial tendencies of almost all the rulers from the countries that make up the Arab League makes them illegitimate in the eyes of their own populations, undermining Western claim of legitimacy from the Arab people by gaining Arab League support.

Furthermore, a full Arab representation has been described as a myth, as Asia Times Online noted:

As Asia Times Online has reported, a full Arab League endorsement of a no-fly zone is a myth. Of the 22 full members, only 11 were present at the voting. Six of them were Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) members, the US-supported club of Gulf kingdoms/sheikhdoms, of which Saudi Arabia is the top dog. Syria and Algeria were against it. Saudi Arabia only had to seduce three other members to get the vote.

Translation: only nine out of 22 members of the Arab League voted for the no-fly zone. The vote was essentially a House of Saud-led operation, with Arab League secretary general Amr Moussa keen to polish his CV with Washington with an eye to become the next Egyptian President.

In addition, when the bombing did commence, the Arab League voiced their concern at the bombing of various targets, as they believed it was not consistent with enforcing a no-fly zone. The leagues secretary general Amr Moussa said What is happening in Libya differs from the aim of imposing a no-fly zone. And what we want is the protection of civilians and not the shelling of more civilians. The Washington Post reporting this also added,

Moussas declaration suggested that some of the 22 Arab League members were taken aback by what they have seen and wanted to modify their approval lest they be perceived as accepting outright Western military intervention in Libya. Although the eccentric Gaddafi is widely looked down upon in the Arab world, the leaders and people of the Middle East traditionally have risen up in emotional protest at the first sign of Western intervention.

This goes back to the resolutions vagueness with the all necessary measures clause, while Western involvement implying no ground troops and a no-fly zone only was the assumption of the Arab League. In other words, the Resolution gave excuses for everyone to agree while still appealing to potentially opposing or hostile local opinions.

But, as US Secretary of Defense, Robert Gates made clear before the resolution,

If [the no-fly zone is] ordered [by the UN], we can do it. But the reality is a no-fly zone begins with an attack on Libya to destroy the air defenses. Thats the way you do a no-fly zone.

Back to top

Some fear the conflict could drag on for a while as the UN resolution is limited in its mandate, the opposition is not organized militarily and the implementation of that resolution by coalition forces does not appear to entertain any option for giving Qadhafi a way out to stop this (for now).

Instead, as noted earlier, Western powers insisted that the UN resolution did not authorize overthrowing Qadhafi even though that is what many leaders were vocally calling for in the mainstream media at the same time.

As US news anchorman, Chris Mathews fears Qaddafi will cling onto power if there is no way out, meaning more bloodshed:

We say we want to overthrow Gaddafi again but give him no place to escape. If thats the nature of this contest, he will fight to the death as most people would and that will mean the deaths of countless people who would survive if we had a quicker, smarter plan that promised a quicker, smarter ending to this thing.

I dont like the looks of this campaign for the simple reason it looks like so many others. In an effort to reduce our footprint, were making it a far longer, more bloody journey to where we're headed in the end.

Asli Bali, professor of International Law at the UCLA School of Law, also raises concerns that even the first UN Security Council resolution disincentivizes Qadhafi from stepping down quickly:

So, either, on the one hand, you exceed what the Security Council has authorized by pursuing regime change, or you pursue what the Security Council has authorizednamely, a ceasefireand you risk potentially freezing a situation on the ground that results in some form of partition.

There were many ways to get to that scenario that would not have entailed even the first Security Council authorization, since, for example, the ICC referral, the referral to the International Criminal Court, is counterproductive insofar as it says to the regime that youre going to face a form of international accountability that disincentivizes exile, that disincentivizes the regime from leaving rapidly. So, from the outset, I feel as if the Security Councils interventions in this instance have been, I think, poorly framed if the goal here has been rapid transition to a post-Gaddafi scenario with sparing of the civilian population, of killing.

Were alternatives possible? Asli Bali added that the International Crisis Group had suggested the option of peacekeeping forces on the ground before the UN Resolution. The force would act as a buffer between Qadhafi and civilians. Diplomatic pressure in the meanwhile could have been increased to get Qadhafi to step down or reform etc.

Are such peace-keeping forces still an option? Both Qadhafi and Coalition forces have been quite vocal about being against any form of ground troops. But that has typically been in the context of the current campaign.

Whether peoples positions would have been different if the military option had not developed so quickly is hard to know. Even if peacekeeping troops had been agreed to, who would the peacekeeping troops be? African Union and Arab League mandated forces?

There has been some concern that African Union forces may not have the clout, or may be influenced by Qadhafi as he has often funded them in the past. The Arab League is hardly representative of good governance. Western forces would likely be unwelcome even as peacekeeping troops. Would Latin America or Asian countries step in?

Another option being considered is arming the opposition further and officials from coalition countries are (perhaps intentionally) sending mixed messages on this option. On first thought it seems contradictory to the UN Security Council Resolutions 1970 and 1973 that both talked of an arms embargo on the whole of Libya (though clause 9(c) in 1970 talks of exemptions if approved by a Committee that would report to the Security Council). Resolution 1973 also talked of all necessary measures to prevent civilian deaths. Both aspects can be used to justify support for, or reasons against, arming the opposition.

Before those resolutions, Qadhafi had told supporters gathered in Green Square that he would arm them if needed. Whether that has since happened is not known for sure, but the arms embargo that later came was clearly addressed at that and similar threats, including the use of mercenaries.

Will the West rush to arm (directly or through proxy nations) rebel forces to better withstand and take on Qadhafi without Wests (visible) involvement, just as Qadhafi rushes to arm loyalists? If so, is this going to degrade into a protruded civil war?

A number of mainstream media outlets also reported that Obama had reportedly signed a secret order to help opposition fighters with covert operations. Al Jazeera added to their report on this (previous link) the views of William Hague, the British foreign minister, who implied that the USs action contradicted the UN arms embargo and that the restrictions in our view, apply to the whole of Libya while the French foreign minister, Alain Juppe, added: I remind you it is not part of the UN resolution, which France sticks to, but we are ready to discuss it with our partners.

(These contradictions could turn out to be intentional. A not-so-secret, or intentionally leaked report about such secret orders and mixed messages from coalition partners who you would expect to be united on this behind the scenes could be used to confuse the Libyan regime (as well as other audiences), or keep it guessing. The Fog of War clouds everything and truth is often the first casualty of war, as it is often said.)

John Norris, Executive Director of the Sustainable Security and Peacebuilding Initiative, lamented at the dilemmas long before the UN resolution and offered some options:

If we arm the opposition, what happens if some of those weapons fall into unfriendly hands? Do we really think that the situation in the Middle East requires more weapons on the ground? Or what if we impose a no-fly zone and attacks on the ground continue or escalate? Do we consider resorting to a ground offensive? Do we want the United States involved in three ground wars in three Islamic countries at the same time? Neither the rebels nor our national interest would benefit from a half-hearted intervention that does not achieve its goals.

With this in mind, here are the things that the administration should do right now. Fortunately, they appear to be trying to work through them already:

Although explaining the course of action to the public is always problematic (spin, propaganda, etc), it has been many weeks since the above. Even after the UN resolution, a lot of options appear to have remained on the table, so to speak, although there are various mixed messages from different circles. Perhaps public mixed messages also serves to keep Qadhafis regime guessing. More and more defections may also help to undermine Qadhafi.

Another blunt reason the West needs to think about diplomatic options is, as former head of UKs armed forces said, the UK is spreading its forces very thin and a political resolution in Libya must be found quickly.

As the BBC noted, he also warned against loose talks of arming the rebels which smacks of mission creep and could jeopardize support from Arab states.

We are on a high wire without any safety net and in the hands of opinion formers who could so quickly turn to our disadvantage these developments - are we not very close to being accused of involvement and taking sides in a Libyan civil war?

Back to top

As numerous journalists have reported, although the opposition forces are very passionate about the rebellion, they are generally not professional soldiers (some military personnel have defected and are slowly trying to instill discipline).

As a result, they have tended to be ineffective at pushing back Qadhafis forces who are professional soldiers (some may be mercenaries too).

In some cases, even after coalition bombing may have helped push back regime forces, the rebels have not been able to capitalize and have lost that gained ground, sometimes even pushed further back.

The other concern raised by many journalists and commentators before the bombing began was how coalition forces would know from the air who is enemy and who are rebels and who are civilians.

The reason is that rebel forces use civilian vehicles such as cars and pick-up trucks, as do civilians. But crucially, even Qadhafis army uses these vehicles so from the air, targets may be hard to verify.

It requires good ground intelligence, and with the coalition unwilling to have ground troops, the risk of hitting civilians or rebellions has long been feared.

Indeed, on April 2, NATO forces did just that, killing at least 13 rebels it is thought.

This is the last thing the coalition forces would want because any problem like this quickly threatens to escalate into opposition to coalition presence.

A few days earlier, a NATO strike on an ammunition truck sent shrapnel into nearby houses killing some civilians, including children. (A doctor interviewed on television described it but the journalist also said that talking to rebels, they wanted more strikes to take out such vehicles even if it meant some civilian deaths; that had those Qadhafi trucks got further the massacre would have been worse.)

Back to top

Perhaps in the context of the Iraq debacle, the global financial crisis, the shifts in world and economic power and the wider Middle East unrest, the crisis in Libya reveals a number of geopolitical issues.

Many question why the West is intervening in Libya militarily while other countries such as Bahrain or Yemen or Ivory Coast (with perhaps as many if not more killed in violence) are not getting such attention?

And this is not just a recent issue, but a common complaint for whenever there have been conflicts in the name of humanitarian intervention as they all appear selective.

Stephen Zunes of Foreign Policy In Focus adds that based on number of civilian deaths, Libya has been similar to other places that have been dealt with quite differently:

Even if one can justify the war on Libya on humanitarian grounds, this is probably not why its actually being fought.

It would nave to claim that foreign intervention is prompted by Western leaders concern about protecting civilian lives. The United States, Great Britain and France have each allied with governments such as Guatemala, Indonesia, Colombia and Zaire which, in recent decades, have engaged in the slaughter of civilians as bad or worse as had been occurring in Libya.

The number of civilian casualties from Gaddafis attacks is difficult to verify but most estimates put the number of civilians killed during the five weeks between the start of the uprising and the Western intervention country at approximately 1,700 people, roughly the same number of civilians killed during Israels 2006 war on Lebanon and its 2008 war on the Gaza Strip combined. Rather than referring those responsible to the International Criminal Court (ICC) or engage in military intervention to stop the slaughter, as has been the case of Libya, both the U.S. Congress and the administration vigorously defended Israels assaults of heavily-populated civilian areas and condemned UN agencies and leading international jurists for documenting Israeli violations of international humanitarian law and for recommending that officials of both Israel and its Arab adversaries suspected of war crimes be referred to the ICC.

Hypocrisy and double-standards regarding military intervention does not automatically mean that military intervention in this case is necessarily wrong. Though many of us familiar with Libya remain dubious, it cannot be ruled out that events could transpire in such a way that this intervention could prove to have saved lives, brought stability, and promoted a democratic transition. However, it would be nave to believe that the attacks on Libya are motivated primarily by humanitarian concerns.

There are also so many factors at play as Asli Bali, professor of International Law at the UCLA School of Law, alludes to:

We have, for the most part, the same coalition of forces that are prepared to intervene in the Libyan case are more or less supporting both the Bahraini and the Yemeni regimes strategies.

In addition, I think that there were considerations in the Libyan case: the isolation of the regime, the fact that it represents a relatively weak military force with very few allies in the region, the fact that it borders on the Mediterranean and gives rise to the possibility of major migration flows to Europe, should there be a long protracted conflict there, and that it sits atop energy sources that would destabilize energy markets. I mean, I think these are all important considerations that, frankly, we have to concede are among the motivations. Thats not to say that any intervention is bad because of mixed motivations; thats not the argument. But one has to be clear-eyed about why it is that this coalition has been willing to proceed in this instance and is not, on the other hand, prepared to intervene, let alone forcefully, in any way, really, politically, with response to the repression that were seeing in Bahrain and Yemen.

Bahrain, close ally to Saudi Arabia, is also home to the US navys fifth fleet, so that may partly explain their silence there. Despite peaceful pro-democratic protests, the crackdown by the authorities has been brutal and theyve even invited Saudi Arabian troops in to contain the protests further.

As The Guardian has noted, In 2003, Bahrain was named by George Bush as a major non-NATO ally. The US secretary of state, Hillary Clinton, during a visit to Manama in December, called Bahrain a model partner, not only for the US but other countries in the region. Clinton had added that America will continue working with [Bahrain] to promote a vigorous civil society and to ensure that democracy, human rights and civil liberties are protected by the rule of law.

Reuters recently reported that US Secretary of Defense, Robert Gates said Syria, Libya and Iran were examples of authoritarian regimes (that) have suppressed their people and have been willing to use violence against them. It is probably not surprising those 3 were mentioned as they are typically the anti-West ones; the pro-West regimes were not listed by him. Though Gates is not the only Western official to say something like this over the years.

In addition, as Pepe Escobar reveals in the Asia Times, there may be a deal of convenience behind the scenes:

Two diplomatic sources at the United Nations independently confirmed that Washington, via Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, gave the go-ahead for Saudi Arabia to invade Bahrain and crush the pro-democracy movement in their neighbor in exchange for a yes vote by the Arab League for a no-fly zone over Libya the main rationale that led to United Nations Security Council resolution 1973.

Escobar was describing what The Telegraph had reported: Saudi officials say they gave their backing to Western air strikes on Libya in exchange for the United States muting its criticism of the authorities in Bahrain, a close ally of the desert kingdom.

Former British Ambassador, Craig Murray, was the source for the second diplomatic source Escobar referred to and is worth quoting further:

Visit link:
Crisis in Libya Global Issues

The flag of the Kingdom of Libya was adopted when Libya gained full independence in 1951. It consisted of a white star and crescent on a triband red-black-green design, with the central black band being twice the width of the outer bands. The design was based on the banner of the Senussi dynasty from Cyrenaica, which consisted of a black field and star and crescent design, and was later used as the flag of the region.

Omar Faiek Shennib, Chief of the Royal Diwans, Vice President of the National Assembly and Minister of Defense under King Idris Al Senussi is credited in the memoirs of Adrian Pelt, UN commissioner for Libya (1949 to 1951) for the design of the original flag of Libya.[citation needed]According to Pelt:"during deliberations of the Libyan National Constitutional Convention, a paper drawing of a proposed national flag was presented to the convention by Omar Faiek Shennib [distinguished member of the delegation from Cyrenaica]. The design was composed of three colors; red, black and green, with a white Crescent and Star centered in the middle black stripe. Mr. Shennib informed the delegates that this design had met the approval of His Highness Emir of Cyrenaica, King Idris Al Senussi [later to become King of Libya]. The assembly subsequently approved that design."[3][yearneeded][pageneeded]

This flag represented Libya from its independence in 1951 until the 1969 Libyan coup d'tat. The symbolism of the star and crescent in the flag of the Kingdom of Libya was explained in an English language booklet, The Libyan Flag & The National Anthem, issued by the Ministry of Information and Guidance of the Kingdom of Libya (year unknown) as follows: "The crescent is symbolic of the beginning of the lunar month according to the Muslim calendar. It brings back to our minds the story of Hijra [migration] of our Prophet Mohammed from his home in order to spread Islam and teach the principles of right and virtue. The Star represents our smiling hope, the beauty of aim and object and the light of our belief in God, in our country, its dignity and honour which illuminate our way and puts an end to darkness."[4]

In 2011, interviews with Ibtisam Shennib and Amal Omar Shennib, Omar Faeik Shennib's only two remaining children, were cited as confirming Pelt's account of the origin of the flag.[5] Ibtisam Shennib recalled the morning her father brought a draft of the flag to the breakfast table and showed it to her and her siblings, explaining the original intent behind the selection of the flag's colours and symbols. According to Omar Faiek Shennib, "red was selected for the blood sacrificed for the freedom of Libya, black to remember the dark days that Libyans lived under the occupation of the Italians and green to represent its primary wealth, agriculture, [Libya once being referred to as the 'agricultural basket' or 'breadbasket' of the Ottoman Empire] and the future prosperity of the country. The star and crescent were placed within the black central strip of the flag as a reference to the Senussi flag and the role of King Idris in leading the country to independence".[3]

During the Libyan Civil War against the rule of Muammar Gaddafi, the 195169 flag as well as various makeshift versions without the crescent and star symbol, or without the green stripe came back into use in areas held by the Libyan opposition and by protesters at several Libyan diplomatic missions abroad.[6][7][8]The National Transitional Council, formed on 27 February 2011, adopted the flag previously used in the Kingdom of Libya between 1951 and 1969 as the "emblem of the Libyan Republic".[9][10] The flag was officially defined in article three of the Libyan Draft Constitutional Charter for the TransitionalStage:

The national flag shall have the following shape and dimensions:

Its length shall be double its width, its shall be divided into three parallel coloured stripes, the uppermost being red, the centre black and lowest green, the black stripe shall be equal in area to the other two stripes together and shall bear in its centre a white crescent, between the two extremities of which there shall be a fivepointed white star.

On 10 March 2011, France was the first country to recognise the council as the official government of Libya, as well as the first to allow the Libyan embassy staff to raise the flag.[11] On 21 March, the flag was flown by the Permanent Mission of Libya to the United Nations and appeared on their official website,[12][13] and thereafter in late August by the Arab League[14] and by Libya's own telecommunications authority,[15] the Libya Telecom & Technology, on its own website. In the following months many other Libyan embassies replaced the green flag of Gaddafi with the tricolour flag.

This original flag of Libya is now the only flag used by the United Nations to represent Libya, according to the following UN statement: "Following the adoption by the General Assembly of resolution 66/1, the Permanent Mission of Libya to the United Nations formally notified the United Nations of a Declaration by the National Transitional Council of 3 August 2011 changing the official name of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya to 'Libya' as well as a decision to change Libya's national flag to the original."[16] All Libyan diplomatic posts, such as embassies and consulates, use the original flag of Libya.

The flag of Libya is described in Article 7 of the Constitution of 7 October 1951. It was officially adopted on 24 December 1951. The passage from the constitution reads:

Chapter 1, Article 7: The national flag shall have the following dimensions: Its length shall be twice its breadth, it shall be divided into three parallel coloured stripes, the uppermost being red, the centre black and the lowest green, the black stripe shall be equal in area to the two other stripes combined and shall bear in its centre a white crescent, between the two extremities of which there shall be a five-pointed white star.

Both the precise shade and legal construction is described in a booklet issued by the Ministry of Information and Guidance of the Kingdom of Libya in 1951.[17] The passage reads:

The exact particulars of the Libyan National Flag prescribed by Article 7 of the Constitution shall be as follows: The red shall be sign red, and the green permanent green. The Crescent shall be on the hoistward side of the star, and the centre of the circle of which the crescent forms a part shall be in the centre of the flag. The star shall be in the open end of the crescent and one point of the star shall point to the centre of the circle. The maximum width of the 270 crescent shall equal 16 of its outside diameter which is 14 of the width of the flag. The distance between the tips of the crescent shall equal that between the uppermost and lowermost point of the star measured along a perpendicular forming the hoistward sides of these two points. The perpendicular shall form a tangent to the outside circumference of the crescent at a point equidistant from the top and bottom of the flag.

The name "Libya" was introduced during colonisation by Italy in 1934.Before 1911, the Ottoman vilayet of Tripolitania (the "kingdom of Tripoli") included much of the same territory as modern Libya.

The short-lived Tripolitanian Republic in western Libya had its own flag, which had a light blue field and a green palm tree in the center, with a white star on top of it.[18] It was unilaterally declared in 1918 and claimed sovereignty over the entire former vilayet, but never had full de facto governance.

From 1934 to 1943, Libya was an Italian colony and adopted the flag of the Kingdom of Italy.

The areas of Libya under British military administration (Cyrenaica 19421949 and Tripolitania 19431951) did not have their own flag and thus, used the Union flag of the United Kingdom.

During the French Administration of the former Southern Military Territory, Fezzan-Ghadames had a red flag with a crescent and star, very similar to the flag of Turkey.

During World War II, Italian Libya was occupied by France and the United Kingdom. The Cyrenaica Emirate was declared in British-occupied Cyrenaica in 1949 with the backing of the British authorities. The "Emir of Cyrenaica", Idris of Libya, kept the emirate's flag which derives from flag of Turkey (a white crescent and star on a black background) as his personal flag after he became king of Libya in 1951.

Following the coup d'tat of 1969, the flag was replaced by the Pan-Arab red-white-black tricolour of the Arab Liberation Flag, first flown after the Egyptian Revolution of 1952 (which also formed the basis of the flags of Egypt, Iraq, Syria, and Yemen).

In 1972 when Libya joined the Federation of Arab Republics its flag was adopted by the country, linking it to Egypt and Syria. It featured a golden hawk (the "Hawk of Qureish"), holding a scroll with the Arabic name of the Federation.[19]

The flag of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya was adopted on 11 November 1977 and consisted of a green field. It was the only national flag in the world with just one colour and no design, insignia, or other details.[20] It was chosen by Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi to symbolise his political philosophy (after his Green Book).[21]

The green colour traditionally symbolises Islam, reflecting the historical green banners of the Fatimid Caliphate. In Libya, green was also a colour traditionally used to represent the Tripolitania region.

British Military Administration (19421951)

Kingdom of Libya (19511969)

Libyan Arab Republic (19691972)

Federation of Arab Republics (19721977)

Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya (19772011)

State of Libya (2011present)

See original here:
Flag of Libya - Wikipedia

Political divisions and armed strife continued to plague Libya as two governments vied for legitimacy and control of the country, and United Nations efforts to unify the feuding parties flagged. The UN backs the Government of National Accord (GNA), based in Tripoli, in the west, but not the rival Interim Government based in the eastern cities of al-Bayda and Benghazi.

Clashes between militias and forces loyal to these governments decimated the economy and public services, including the public health system, law enforcement, and the judiciary, and caused the internal displacement of over 200,000 people.

Armed groups throughout the country, some of them affiliated with one or the other of the competing governments, executed persons extrajudicially, attacked civilians and civilian properties, abducted and disappeared people, and imposed sieges on civilians in the eastern cities of Derna and Benghazi.

The extremist armed group Islamic State (also known as ISIS) lost control of its Libya capital Sirte in December 2016. In January 2017, remaining ISIS forces in Benghazi fled the city. ISIS-affiliated fighters remained present in areas south of Sirte and Bani Walid.

Most of the more than 200,000 migrants and asylum seekers who reached Europe by sea in 2017 departed in boats from Libya. Migrants and asylum seekers who ended up in detention in Libya faced beatings, extortion, sexual violence, and forced labor in unofficial and quasi state-run detention centers, at the hands of guards, militias, and smugglers. Coast guard forces also beat migrants they intercepted at sea and forced them back to detention centers with inhumane conditions. Between January and November, 2,772 migrants died during perilous boat journeys in the central Mediterranean Sea, most having departed from the Libyan shore.

The GNA struggled to gain authority and control over territory and institutions. Between February and May, militias aligned with it overran positions in Tripoli held by militias that supported a third authority, the Government of National Salvation (GNS).

In the east, Libyan National Army forces (LNA), under the command of General Khalifa Hiftar and allied with the Interim Government, continued to expand control over territory in the east and south. Libyas legislative body, the House of Representatives, remained allied with the LNA and Interim Government, and failed to approve a slate of ministers for the GNA.

In March, the LNA ended its siege of nearly two years on the Benghazi neighborhood of Ganfouda, which fighters of the Benghazi Revolutionaries Shura Council (BRSC) had controlled. When LNA forces entered, they committed what appeared to be war crimes, killing civilians and summarily executing and desecrating the bodies of opposition fighters.

On May 18, forces aligned with the GNA, including the Third Force from Misrata, the Benghazi Defense Brigades, and other local units from the south, attacked an LNA airbase at Brak Al-Shati, in the south of the country, summarily executing as many as 51 individuals, most of them LNA fighters captured during the attack.

Clashes between pro- and anti-GNA militias for the control of Tripoli lasted between March and May. Hostilities left many injured and resulted in the deaths of scores of fighters, and some civilians before militias and security forces aligned with the GNA took control of the capital.

Several videos recorded between June 2016 and July 2017 emerged on social media seemingly implicating LNA fighters in summary executions and the desecration of bodies of captured enemy fighters in eastern Libya. On August 15, the prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (ICC) issued an arrest warrant against Mahmoud al-Werfalli, an LNA commander implicated in these recordings. On August 18, the LNA announced they had arrested al-Werfalli for questioning. As of September, the LNA had not provided any update on the status of the alleged investigation against him.

On August 23, unidentified gunmen beheaded nine LNA fighters and two civilians in an attack on a LNA-controlled checkpoint in al-Jufra region. According to the LNA, ISIS carried out the attack.

In August, the LNA intensified a 14-month siege against the eastern city of Derna, which remained controlled by the Derna Mujahedeen Shura Council (DMSC), an alliance of armed groups that opposed Khalifa Hiftar and the LNA. Local council members, activists, and journalists reported on an impending humanitarian crisis in the city, where the LNA intermittently imposed strict measures that included cutting delivery of cooking gas, food items, and fuel.

On October 4, unidentified armed men including a suicide bomber, attacked a courthouse in Misrata where regular criminal proceedings were taking place, killing at least four and injuring several people. ISIS claimed it carried out the attack.

In October, unidentified forces conducted air strikes in Derna killing 16 civilians, including 12 children. There was no claim for responsibility.

Also in October, armed groups loyal to the LNA appear to have summarily executed 36 men in the LNA-controlled eastern town of al-Abyar.

The criminal justice system has all but collapsed since 2014. Civilian and military courts in the east and south remained mostly shut, while elsewhere they operated at reduced capacity.

Prison authorities, often only nominally under the authority of the ministries of interior, defense, and justice of the two rival governments, continued to hold thousands of detainees in long-term arbitrary detention without charges. Militias that operated their own informal and often-secret detention facilities also held detainees in similar circumstances.

According to the Tripoli-based Judicial Police, the body responsible for managing prisons under the GNA Justice Ministry, 6,400 detainees were held in prisons managed by it in the east, west, and south of the country, of whom only 25 percent had been sentenced for a crime. The rest were held in pre-charge or pretrial detention. The Defense and Interior Ministries of both governments in Libya held an unknown number of detainees, in addition to militia-run secret detention facilities.

Hundreds of civilians, mostly women and children and including non-Libyan nationals, remain held without charge in two prisons in Tripoli and Misrata and in a camp run by the Libyan Red Crescent in Misrata for their apparent link to alleged ISIS fighters, without prospect for release due to their uncertain citizenship status and lack of coordination with countries of origin.

On May 26, The Tripoli Revolutionaries Brigade, a militia allied with the GNA Interior Ministry, overran the al-Hadba Correctional Facility in Tripoli and transferred from there to another location in Tripoli Gaddafi-era officials detained there, including former intelligence chief Abdullah Sanussi, former Prime Minister Abuzaid Dorda, and al-Saadi Gaddafi, a son of ousted Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi.

The ICC prosecutor has a mandate to investigate war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide committed in Libya since February 15, 2011, pursuant to UN Security Council Resolution 1970.

In April, the ICC unsealed an arrest warrant for Mohamed Khaled al-Tuhamy, a former chief of the Internal Security Agency under Gaddafi, for war crimes and crimes against humanity during the 2011 uprising. His whereabouts were unknown at time of writing.

Saif al-Islam Gaddafi, a son of Gaddafi, continued to be subject to an arrest warrant issued by the ICC to face charges of crimes against humanity. In 2015, the Tripoli Court of Assize sentenced Gaddafi to death in absentia for crimes committed during the 2011 uprising. The Abu Baker al-Siddiq militia in Zintan, which had held him since 2011, reported it released him on June 9, 2017, citing an amnesty law issued passed by Libyas parliament. His release could not be confirmed; independent international observers have not seen or heard from Gaddafi since June 2014.

The death penalty is stipulated in over 30 articles in Libyas penal code, including for acts of speech and association that are protected activities under international human rights law. Civil and military courts around the country have imposed the death penalty since the overthrow of Gaddafi in 2011, often after trials marred by due process violations. An unknown number of people were sentenced to death by Libyan civil and military courts since 2011, yet no death sentences have been carried out since 2010.

The International Organization for Migration (IOM) estimated that 217,000 people were internally displaced in Libya as of September. According to the IOM, most displaced people originated from Benghazi, Sirte, Misrata, and Ubari.

Militias and authorities in Misrata continued to prevent 35,000 residents of Tawergha from returning to their homes, despite the announcement on June 19 by the GNA that it had ratified a UN-brokered agreement between them and Tawerghans to end their disputes and allow Tawerghans to return to their homes. Misrata representatives, who accused Tawerghans of having committed serious crimes as supporters of Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi during the 2011 uprising that ousted him, demanded, as stipulated in the agreement, that the GNA establish a fund to compensate persons who had been detained and the families of victims who went missing or were killed, between February and August 2011. At time of writing, the GNA had yet to establish such a fund, and Misrata forces continued to block displaced families from returning to their homes in Tawergha.

According to the Benghazi municipal council based in exile in Tripoli, approximately 3,700 Benghazi families have been forcibly displaced since 2014 and have sought shelter in the western cities of Tripoli, Misrata, Khoms, and Zliten, after militias affiliated with the LNA threatened them, attacked, burnt or appropriated their homes, and accused them of being terrorists. Authorities in Misrata and Tripoli have detained a number of people displaced from Benghazi, often on dubious terrorism allegations. An additional 9,200 families from Benghazi were internally displaced in western Libya due to the conflict in the east.

Armed groups intimidated, threatened, and physically attacked activists, journalists, bloggers, and media professsionals.

Security forces affiliated with the LNA in Benghazi arrested AFP photographer Abdullah Doma twice within one weekon March 28 and April 2for a day each time. According to Domas family, the arrests were for his coverage of Earth Hour, a global event that took place on March 25 to raise awareness of climate change. Security forces also briefly arrested four of the organizers of the event, slamming it as offensive to Islam for allowing men and women to mix.

In August, members of militias and armed groups in both east and west Libya threatened in phone calls and on social media the contributors and editors of Sun on Closed Windows, a book of essays and fiction, accusing them of immoral content. Militias briefly arrested two participants in the book launch in the city of Zawiyah.

In November, a force affiliated with the GNA Interior Ministry, reportedly arrested participants of a comic book convention in Tripoli under the pretext that it breached the country's "morals and modesty."

Since 2011, militias and forces affiliated with several interim authorities, as well as ISIS fighters, have attacked religious minorities, including Sufis and Christians, and destroyed religious sites in Libya with impunity.

In July 2017, the Supreme Fatwa Committee under the General Authority for Endowments and Islamic Affairs, the religious authority of the Interim Government, issued a religious edict calling the minority Ibadi sect of Islam a misguided and aberrant group, and infidels without dignity. The Ibadi faith is practiced by many Amazighs, mostly in western Libya. Amazighs number between 300,000 and 400,000 of Libyas total population of 6.5 million. The GNA responded by condemning the religious edict.

In August, unidentified armed groups in Benghazi reportedly kidnapped or arrested 21 Sufi adherents, a minority Muslim group, at different times and different locations. As of September, none of the 21 had been released.

Libyan law does not specifically criminalize domestic violence. Personal status laws continue to discriminate against women, particularly with respect to marriage, divorce, and inheritance. The penal code allows for a reduced sentence for a man who kills or injures his wife or another female relative because he suspects her of extramarital sexual relations. It also allows rapists to escape prosecution if they marry their victim under article 424.

On February 16, Abdelrazeq al-Nadhouri, chief of staff of the LNA, issued an order requiring women who wished to travel abroad by land, air, or sea to be accompanied by a male guardian. Al-Nadhouri rescinded the order on February 23 after public pressure, and replaced it with another order requiring all men and women ages 18 to 45 to acquire clearance by relevant security agencies ahead of any international travel from east Libya.

The penal code prohibits all sexual acts outside marriage, including same-sex relations, and punishes them with up to five years in prison.

Militias linked with various government authorities in east and west of the country and criminal gangs kidnapped or forcibly disappeared scores of people for political gain, ransom, and extortion. Tripoli-based activist, Jabir Zain, remained missing after an armed group linked to the GNA Interior Ministery abducted him in Tripoli on September 25, 2016. Civil society activist Abdelmoez Banoon and Benghazi prosecutor Abdel-Nasser Al-Jeroushi, both abducted by unidentified groups in 2014, remained missing.

In August, an armed group affiliated with the GNA kidnapped former Prime Minister Ali Zeidan during a visit to Tripoli and released him nine days later.

Libya remained a major hub for refugees, asylum seekers, and migrants on their way to Europe. As of November, the IOM recorded over 161,010 arrivals to Europe by sea since January, most of whom departed from Libya. According to the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR), at least 2,772 died or went missing while crossing the central Mediterranean route to Europe. As of November, the IOM reported that 348,372 migrants and asylum seekers were present in Libya.

Since 2014, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) have filled a deadly gap in maritime rescue operations, patrolling in international waters close to the 12-nautical-mile line that marks Libyan territorial waters the area where over-crowded, unseaworthy boats are most likely to be in need.

Italy and the EU provided training and material support to Libyan coast guard forces to boost their capacity to intercept boats in territorial and international waters and return migrants and asylum seekers to Libyan territory, where many were exposed to physical abuse including beatings, sexual violence, extortion, abduction, harsh detention conditions, and forced labor.

In November, after revelations of alleged slave auctions, Rwanda offered to resettle 30,000 African slaves from Libya.

The Department for Combating Illegal Migration (DCIM), which is part of the GNA-aligned Interior Ministry, managed the formal migrant detention centers, while smugglers and traffickers ran informal ones.

The United States announced in September 2016 that it had ended its military campaign against ISIS targets in Libya. In September 2017, the US conducted what it called precision airstrikes against purported ISIS targets south of Sirte. There were no reports of civilian casualties.

In June, the UN Security Council extended an arms embargo on Libya, effective since 2011, for another 12 months. On June 1, the UN Panel of Experts of the Libya Sanctions Committee, established pursuant to UN Security Council resolution 1973 (2011), issued its report on human rights abuses, violations of the arms embargo, and misappropriation of funds.

In February, the UN Support Mission to Libya published a report on the 2014 and 2015 trial proceedings against 37 former members of the Gaddafi government who were accused of crimes during the 2011 uprising, concluding that proceedings violated both international fair trial norms and Libyan law.

Members of the European Council met in Malta in February, and pledged to train, equip, and support Libyan coast guard forces, and, together with UNHCR and the IOM, improve reception capacities and conditions for migrants in Libya. The EU pledged a total of 200 million for migration-related projects in Libya to support migrant detention centers and coast guard forces, despite evidence of abuse.

In July, the EU Council extended the mandate of its anti-smuggling naval operation in the central Mediterranean, Operation Sophia, until December 2018. Operation Sophias mandate is to disrupt migrant smugglers and human traffickers, including training Libyan Coastguard and Navy forces, and contributing to the implementation of the UN arms embargo in international waters off Libyas coast.

On July 25, Frances President Emmanuel Macron hosted a meeting between Libyan leaders Prime Minister Fayez Serraj and General Hiftar in a bid to break the stalemate between them. The meeting resulted in a declaration of principles, mainly to a conditional ceasefire, and plans for future elections.

In September, the EU renewed sanctions for six months against three Libyans seen as threatening the peace, security, and stability of Libya, and obstructive to the implementation of the LPA: Agila Saleh, president of the House of Representatives; Khalifa Ghweil, prime minister of the National Salvation Government; and Nuri Abu Sahmain, president of the self-declared General National Congress.

Read this article:
World Report 2018: Libya | Human Rights Watch

This discussion focuses on Libya since the 18th century. For a treatment of earlier periods and of the country in its regional context, see North Africa.

Largely desert with some limited potential for urban and sedentary life in the northwest and northeast, Libya has historically never been heavily populated or a power centre. Like that of its neighbour Algeria, Libyas very name is a neologism, created by the conquering Italians early in the 20th century. Also like that of Algeria, much of Libyas earlier historynot only in the Islamic period but even beforereveals that both Tripolitania and Cyrenaica were more closely linked with neighbouring territories Tunisia and Egypt, respectively, than with each other. Even during the Ottoman era, the country was divided into two parts, one linked to Tripoli in the west and the other to Banghz in the east.

Libya thus owes its present unity as a state less to earlier history or geographic characteristics than to several recent factors: the unifying effect of the Sansiyyah movement since the 19th century; Italian colonialism from 1911 until after World War II; an early independence by default, since the great powers could agree on no other solution; and the discovery of oil in commercial quantities in the late 1950s. Yet the Sansiyyah is based largely in the eastern region of Cyrenaica and has never really penetrated the more populous northwestern region of Tripolitania. Italian colonization was brief and brutal. Moreover, most of the hard-earned gains in infrastructure implanted in the colonial period were destroyed by contending armies during World War II. Sudden oil wealth has been both a boon and a curse as changes to the political and social fabric, as well as to the economy, have accelerated. This difficult legacy of disparate elements and forces helps to explain the unique character of present-day Libya.

The future of Libya gave rise to long discussions after the war. In view of the contribution to the fighting made by a volunteer Sans force, the British foreign minister pledged in 1942 that the Sanss would not again be subjected to Italian rule. During the discussions, which lasted four years, suggestions included an Italian trusteeship, a United Nations (UN) trusteeship, a Soviet mandate for Tripolitania, and various compromises. Finally, in November 1949, the UN General Assembly voted that Libya should become a united and independent kingdom no later than January 1, 1952.

A constitution creating a federal state with a separate parliament for each province was drawn up, and the pro-British head of the Sansiyyah, Sd Muammad Idrs al-Mahd al-Sans, was chosen king by a national assembly in 1950. On December 24, 1951, King Idris I declared the country independent. Political parties were prohibited, and the kings authority was sovereign. Though not themselves Sanss, the Tripolitanians accepted the monarchy largely in order to profit from the British promise that the Sanss would not again be subjected to Italian rule. King Idris, however, showed a marked preference for living in Cyrenaica, where he built a new capital on the site of the Sans zwiyah at Al-Bay. Though Libya joined the Arab League in 1953 and in 1956 refused British troops permission to land during the Suez Crisis, the government in general adopted a pro-Western position in international affairs.

With the discovery of significant oil reserves in 1959, Libya changed abruptly from being dependent on international aid and the rent from U.S. and British air bases to being an oil-rich monarchy. Major petroleum deposits in both Tripolitania and Cyrenaica ensured the country income on a vast scale. The discovery was followed by an enormous expansion in all government services, massive construction projects, and a corresponding rise in the economic standard and the cost of living.

Precipitated by the kings failure to speak out against Israel during the June War (1967), a coup was carried out on September 1, 1969, by a group of young army officers led by Col. Muammar al-Qaddafi, who deposed the king and proclaimed Libya a republic. The new regime, passionately Pan-Arab, broke the monarchys close ties to Britain and the United States and also began an assertive policy that led to higher oil prices along with 51 percent Libyan participation in oil company activities and, in some cases, outright nationalization.

Equally assertive in plans for Arab unity, Libya obtained at least the formal beginnings of unity with Egypt, Sudan, and Tunisia, but these and other such plans failed as differences arose between the governments concerned. Qaddafis Libya supported the Palestinian cause and intervened to support it, as well as other guerrilla and revolutionary organizations in Africa and the Middle East. Such moves alienated the Western countries and some Arab states. In JulyAugust 1977 hostilities broke out between Libya and Egypt, and, as a result, many Egyptians working in Libya were expelled. Indeed, despite expressed concern for Arab unity, the regimes relations with most Arab countries deteriorated. Qaddafi signed a treaty of union with Moroccos King Hassan II in August 1984, but Hassan abrogated the treaty two years later.

The regime, under Qaddafis ideological guidance, continued to introduce innovations. On March 2, 1977, the General Peoples Congress declared that Libya was to be known as the Peoples Socialist Libyan Arab Jamhriyyah (the latter term is a neologism meaning government through the masses). By the early 1980s, however, a drop in the demand and price for oil on the world market was beginning to hamper Qaddafis efforts to play a strong regional role. Ambitious efforts to radically change Libyas economy and society slowed, and there were signs of domestic discontent. Libyan opposition movements launched sporadic attacks against Qaddafi and his military supporters but met with arrest and execution.

Libyas relationship with the United States, which had been an important trading partner, deteriorated in the early 1980s as the U.S. government increasingly protested Qaddafis support of Palestinian Arab militants. An escalating series of retaliatory trade restrictions and military skirmishes culminated in a U.S. bombing raid of Tripoli and Banghz in 1986, in which Qaddafis adopted daughter was among the casualties. U.S. claims that Libya was producing chemical warfare materials contributed to the tension between the two countries in the late 1980s and the 90s.

Within the region, Libya sought throughout the 1970s and 80s to control the mineral-rich Aozou Strip, along the disputed border with neighbouring Chad. These efforts produced intermittent warfare in Chad and confrontation with both France and the United States. In 1987 Libyan forces were bested by Chads more mobile troops, and diplomatic ties with that country were restored late the following year. Libya denied involvement in Chads December 1990 coup led by Idriss Dby (see Chad: Civil war).

In 1996 the United States and the UN implemented a series of economic sanctions against Libya for its purported involvement in destroying a civilian airliner over Lockerbie, Scotland, in 1988. In the late 1990s, in an effort to placate the international community, Libya turned over the alleged perpetrators of the bombing to international authorities and accepted a ruling by the international court in The Hague stating that the contested Aozou territory along the border with Chad belonged to that country and not to Libya. The United Kingdom restored diplomatic relations with Libya at the end of the decade, and UN sanctions were lifted in 2003; later that year Libya announced that it would stop producing chemical weapons. The United States responded by dropping most of its sanctions, and the restoration of full diplomatic ties between the two countries was completed in 2006. In 2007 five Bulgarian nurses and a Palestinian doctor who had been sentenced to death in Libya after being tried on charges of having deliberately infected children there with HIV were extradited to Bulgaria and quickly pardoned by its president, defusing widespread outcry over the case and preventing the situation from posing an obstacle to Libyas return to the international community.

In the years that followed the lifting of sanctions, one of Qaddafis sons, Sayf al-Islam al-Qaddafi, emerged as a proponent of reform and helped lead Libya toward adjustments in its domestic and foreign policy. Measures including efforts to attract Western business and plans to foster tourism promised to gradually draw Libya more substantially into the global community.

In February 2011, in the midst of a wave of popular demonstrations in the Middle East and North Africa, antigovernment rallies were held in Banghz by protesters angered by the arrest of a human rights lawyer, Fethi Tarbel. Libyan security forces used water cannons and live fire against the crowds, resulting in a number of injuries and deaths.

As protests intensified, with demonstrators taking control of Banghz and unrest spreading to Tripoli and other areas of the country, the security forces and squads of mercenaries loyal to the government began to use lethal force freely, firing indiscriminately into crowds. The regime restricted communications, blocking the Internet and interrupting telephone service throughout the country. On February 21 one of Qaddafis sons, Sayf al-Islam, gave a defiant address on state television, blaming outside agitators for the unrest and saying that further demonstrations could lead to civil war in the country. He vowed that the regime would fight to the last bullet. The next day Muammar al-Qaddafi delivered an angry rambling speech on state television, condemning the protesters as traitors and calling on his supporters to fight them.

The governments use of violence against civilians drew condemnation from foreign leaders and human rights organizations. It also seemed to damage the coherence of the regime, causing a number of high-level officials to resign in protest. A number of Libyan embassies around the world signaled their support for the uprising by flying Libyas pre-Qaddafi flag.

Within days of the first protests, the anti-Qaddafi movement began to evolve into an armed rebellion as demonstrators acquired weapons from abandoned government arms depots. By late February, rebel forces had expelled most pro-Qaddafi troops from the eastern portion of Libya, including the city of Banghz, and from many western cities. The Libyan-Egyptian border was opened, allowing foreign journalists into the country for the first time since the conflict began. Pro-Qaddafi paramilitary units continued to hold the city of Tripoli, where Qaddafi and his inner circle remained.

International pressure for Qaddafi to step down gradually increased. On February 26 the UN Security Council unanimously approved a measure that included sanctions against the Qaddafi regime, imposing a travel ban and an arms embargo and freezing the Qaddafi familys assets. The measure also referred the case to the International Criminal Court (ICC). The United States, the European Union, and a number of other countries also imposed sanctions.

A rebel leadership council emerged in Banghz in early March. Known as the Transitional National Council (TNC), it declared that its aims would be to act as the rebellions military leadership and as the representative of the Libyan opposition, provide services in rebel-held areas, and guide the countrys transition to democratic government.

In the weeks that followed, the conflict appeared to enter a stalemate and then to tilt in Qaddafis favour. Despite the rebels impressive gains in February, the Qaddafi regime still controlled enough soldiers and weapons to hold Tripoli and to stage fresh ground and air assaults which rebel fighters struggled to repel. Most fighting took place in the towns around Tripoli and in the central coastal region, where rebels and Qaddafi loyalists battled for control of the oil-export terminals on the Gulf of Sidra.

The international community continued to debate possible diplomatic and military intervention in the conflict. Countries worked to establish contact with the TNC and in some cases began to recognize it as Libyas legitimate government. At an emergency summit on March 11 the European Union unanimously called for Qaddafi to step down. However, the international community remained divided over the possibility of military intervention. Some countries, including France and the United Kingdom, sought the establishment of a no-fly zone over Libya to protect rebels and civilians from air attacks, while others, including the United States and Germany, expressed reservations, emphasizing the need for broad international consensus and warning against possible unforeseen consequences of military intervention. The African Union (AU) rejected any military intervention, asserting that the crisis should be resolved through negotiations, whereas the Arab League passed a resolution on March 13 calling on the UN Security Council to impose a no-fly zone over Libya.

On March 15 Qaddafi loyalists captured the eastern city of Ajdbiy, the last large rebel-held city on the route to Banghz. As they advanced on the remaining rebel positions in Banghz and Tobruk in the east and Mirtah in the west, the UN Security Council voted on March 17 to authorize military action, including a no-fly zone to protect Libyan civilians. Beginning on March 19, an international coalition led by the U.S., France, and the United Kingdom began to carry out air and missile strikes to disable Libyas air force and air defense systems so the no-fly zone could be imposed. Coalition missiles also struck buildings in a compound used by Qaddafi as a command centre.

Within a week Libyas air force and air defenses were out of commission. However, heavy fighting continued on the ground. Pro-Qaddafi units massed around the rebel-held city of Mirtah and the contested city of Ajdbiy, shelling both and causing significant civilian casualties. Attacks by coalition warplanes soon weakened pro-Qaddafi ground forces in eastern Libya, allowing rebels to advance and retake Ajdbiy, Marsa el-Brega, Ras Lanuf, and Bin Jawwad.

On March 27 the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) officially took over command of military operations in Libya from the United States, France, and the United Kingdom. The handover came after several days of debate among NATO countries over the limits of international military intervention; several countries argued that the coalitions aggressive targeting of pro-Qaddafi ground forces had exceeded the mandate set by the UN Security Council to protect civilians.

By April the conflict seemed to have returned to a stalemate; Qaddafis troops, though weakened by the coalition assault, still appeared strong enough to prevent the disorganized and poorly equipped rebels from achieving decisive victories. Diplomatic efforts to resolve the crisis intensified, with an AU delegation traveling to Tripoli on April 10 to present a cease-fire plan that was quickly rejected by both sides.

On April 30 a NATO air strike on a house in Qaddafis compound in Tripoli killed Qaddafis youngest son, Sayf al-Arab, along with three of Qaddafis grandchildren. Qaddafi was present at the site of the strike but avoided injury. More strikes in early May targeted government buildings associated with Qaddafi and Libyas senior military leadership, but NATO representatives denied claims that NATO had adopted a strategy of trying to kill Qaddafi and other high-ranking Libyan officials.

International pressure on Qaddafi continued to build. The ICC, which in early March had opened an investigation into alleged war crimes by members of the Qaddafi regime, announced on May 16 that it would seek arrest warrants against Qaddafi, his son Sayf al-Islam, and the head of Libyan intelligence, Abdullah Senussi, for ordering attacks on civilians in Libya.

In August 2011 rebel forces advanced to the outskirts of Tripoli, taking control of strategic areas, including the city of Zwiyah, the site of one of Libyas largest oil refineries. Rebels soon advanced into Tripoli, taking over some areas of the capital on August 22. The next day, rebel forces established control over most of the city and captured the Bb al-Azziyyah compound, Qaddafis headquarters. Rebels raised Libyas pre-Qaddafi flag over the compound while jubilant crowds destroyed symbols of Qaddafi, whose whereabouts were unknown.

By early September rebel forces had solidified their control of Tripoli, and the TNC began to transfer its operations to the capital. Qaddafi remained in hiding, occasionally issuing defiant audio messages. In the few remaining cities under loyalist control, rebels attempted to negotiate with loyalist commanders to surrender and avoid a bloody ground assault. In late September rebel forces began to advance into Ban Wald and Surt, the two remaining strongholds of Qaddafi loyalists. On October 20 Qaddafi was captured and killed in Surt by rebel fighters.

(For coverage of unrest in Libya in 2011 and the aftermath in 2012, see Libya Revolt of 2011.)

The TNC struggled to establish a functional government and exert its authority in the months that followed the fall of the Qaddafi regime. Local rebel militias that had fought autonomously during the uprising, especially those in western Libya, were reluctant to submit to an interim government formed in eastern Libya with little input from the rest of the country and were suspicious of some TNC officials past ties to the Qaddafi regime. The militias refused to disarm, and skirmishes between rival militias became commonplace.

Elections to choose the members of a 200-seat assembly, the General National Congress (GNC), were held in July 2012 in spite of occasional outbursts of violence caused by local and regional power struggles. The National Forces Alliance, a secular party led by Mahmoud Jibril, a former TNC official and interim prime minister, won the largest number of seats.

New concerns about Libyas stability arose in September 2012 when members of the militant Islamist group Ansar al-Sharia launched a surprise attack on the U.S. consulate in Banghz, killing four Americans including the U.S. ambassador to Libya, Christopher Stevens.

Within the GNC there were disputes over the assemblys functions and mandate, and boycotts threatened its overall viability. The divisions between armed groups continued to deepenwith steadily increasing bloodshedas the central government proved unable to control even those that were nominally aligned with government ministries. In an episode that seemed to encapsulate the disordered state of Libyan politics, Prime Minister Ali Zeidan was briefly kidnapped in October 2013 by militia members aligned with the ministries of defense and the interior. He was quickly released unharmed.

Groups also sought to exact concessions from the central government by disrupting oil production, its main source of revenue. Strikes by disgruntled oil workers caused fluctuations in production in early 2013. Later in the year, a militia commanded by Ibrahim Jathran, a former rebel commander, seized several oil terminals and demanded greater autonomy and a greater share of oil revenues for eastern Libya. Jathrans attempts to sell oil independently from the central government were thwarted in 2014 when the U.S. Navy seized a tanker carrying oil from one of the ports under his control, and he was ultimately forced to relinquish the oil facilities he held. Attacks on oil infrastructure by a variety of armed groups continued, however, and oil revenues fluctuated accordingly.

In May 2014 Khalifah Haftar, a general acting without authorization from the central government, led forces under his control in a campaign dubbed Operation Dignity against Islamists and other groups aligned with Islamists in eastern Libya. Haftar also condemned the GNC as dominated by Islamists, and fighters loyal to him made an unsuccessful attempt to seize the parliament building in Tripoli in May.

In June a new national assembly was elected to replace the GNC, whose 18-month mandate had officially expired in February. Security concerns and voter disillusionment held turnout to less than 20 percent. The election delivered a resounding victory for liberal and secular candidates, although the viability of the new assembly, called the House of Representatives, remained uncertain.

The emergence of Haftars Operation Dignity had the effect of heightening polarization between Islamist-aligned and non-Islamist forces, pushing the country closer to a new civil war. In western Libya a coalition of armed groups opposed to Haftars Operation Dignity began to appear in mid-2014. Operating under the name Libya Dawn, the new coalition was largely Islamist in orientation, and it rejected the authority of the newly elected House of Representatives in favour of the outgoing GNC. In August, with the backing of Libya Dawn militias, members of the GNC convened in Tripoli and declared themselves the legitimate national assembly of Libya. The House of Representatives, meanwhile, convened in the eastern city of Tobruk under the protection of Haftars troops.

The absence of central authority in Libya created an opening there for the militant extremist group Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). Fighters from the groups core territories in Iraq and Syria began to arrive in early 2014, and by the summer of 2015 the group had taken control of the central coastal city of Surt. In 2016 a coalition of western militias confronted ISIL with the help of U.S. air support, dislodging them from Surt and the surrounding area. ISIL fighters remained active, though, operating scattered small desert camps and staging occasional attacks.

In December 2015, delegates from Libyas rival factions signed a UN-brokered power-sharing agreement in Skhirat, Morocco, establishing a Government of National Accord (GNA), headed by a prime minister and a nine-member presidency council drawn from constituencies and factions throughout the country. Although the GNA received recognition from the UN Security Council as the legitimate government of Libya, it struggled to consolidate its authority in both the eastern and western halves of the country. In the east the House of Representatives, aligned with the forces of General Haftar, refused to endorse the GNAs proposed ministerial appointments, and in the west the GNA met with resistance from GNC-associated factions.

In September 2017 the UN Support Mission in Libya announced an effort to amend the 2015 agreement, with the goal of creating a workable arrangement for sharing power between the opposing factions. By the end of the year, though, prospects for an agreement looked dim, especially after Haftar gave a speech in December in which he dismissed the legitimacy of the GNA and hinted that he would seek the Libyan presidency for himself.

Read the original post:
Libya - History | Britannica.com

Geography

Libya stretches along the northeast coast of Africa between Tunisia and Algeria on the west and Egypt on the east; to the south are the Sudan, Chad, and Niger. It is one-sixth larger than Alaska. Much of the country lies within the Sahara. Along the Mediterranean coast and farther inland is arable plateau land.

Military dictatorship.

The first inhabitants of Libya were Berber tribes. In the 7th century B.C., Phoenicians colonized the eastern section of Libya, called Cyrenaica, and Greeks colonized the western portion, called Tripolitania. Tripolitania was for a time under Carthaginian control. It became part of the Roman Empire from 46 B.C. to A.D. 436, after which it was sacked by the Vandals. Cyrenaica belonged to the Roman Empire from the 1st century B.C. until its decline, after which it was invaded by Arab forces in 642. Beginning in the 16th century, both Tripolitania and Cyrenaica nominally became part of the Ottoman Empire.

Tripolitania was one of the outposts for the Barbary pirates who raided Mediterranean merchant ships or required them to pay tribute. In 1801, the pasha of Tripoli raised the price of tribute, which led to the Tripolitan war with the United States. When the peace treaty was signed on June 4, 1805, U.S. ships no longer had to pay tribute to Tripoli.

Following the outbreak of hostilities between Italy and Turkey in 1911, Italian troops occupied Tripoli. Libyans continued to fight the Italians until 1914, by which time Italy controlled most of the land. Italy formally united Tripolitania and Cyrenaica in 1934 as the colony of Libya.

Libya was the scene of much desert fighting during World War II. After the fall of Tripoli on Jan. 23, 1943, it came under Allied administration. In 1949, the UN voted that Libya should become independent, and in 1951 it became the United Kingdom of Libya. Oil was discovered in the impoverished country in 1958 and eventually transformed its economy.

On Sept. 1, 1969, 27-year-old Col. Muammar al-Qaddafi deposed the king and revolutionized the country, making it a pro-Arabic, anti-Western, Islamic republic with socialist leanings. It was also rabidly anti-Israeli. A notorious firebrand, Qaddafi aligned himself with dictators, such as Uganda's Idi Amin, and fostered anti-Western terrorism.

On Aug. 19, 1981, two U.S. Navy F-14s shot down two Soviet-made SU-22s of the Libyan air force that had attacked them in air space above the Gulf of Sidra. On March 24, 1986, U.S. and Libyan forces skirmished in the Gulf of Sidra, and two Libyan patrol boats were sunk. Qaddafi's troops also supported rebels in Chad but suffered major military reverses in 1987. A two-year-old U.S. covert policy to destabilize the Libyan government ended in failure in Dec. 1990.

On Dec. 21, 1988, a Boeing 747 exploded in flight over Lockerbie, Scotland, the result of a terrorist bomb, killing all 259 people aboard and 11 on the ground. This and other acts of terrorism, including the bombing of a Berlin discotheque in 1986 and the downing of a French UTA airliner in 1989 that killed 170, turned Libya into a pariah in the eyes of the West. Two Libyan intelligence agents were indicted in the Lockerbie bombing, but Qaddafi refused to hand them over, leading to UN-approved trade and air traffic embargoes in 1992. In 1999, Libya finally surrendered the two men, who were tried in the Netherlands in 20002001. One was found guilty of mass murder; the other defendant was found innocent. Libya had hoped its fainthearted cooperation would lead to suspended sanctions, which had severely affected the Libyan economy. The UN did suspend its sanctions, but they were not formally removed for another four years, not until Sept. 2003, when Libya finally admitted its guilt in the Lockerbie bombing and agreed to pay $2.7 billion to the victims' families. In 2004, Libya also agreed to compensate the families of the victims of the UTA airliner bombing ($170 million) and the Berlin disco bombing ($35 million).

After months of secret talks with the U.S. and Britain, Qaddafi surprised the world in Dec. 2003 by announcing he would give up the pursuit of weapons of mass destruction and submit to full UN weapons inspections. After inspections at four secret sites, the International Atomic Energy Agency concluded that Libya's progress on a nuclear bomb had been in the very nascent stages. In May 2006, the U.S. announced it would restore full diplomatic relations with Libya after a 25-year hiatus.

In Dec. 2006, five Bulgarian nurses and a Palestinian doctor working in Libya were sentenced to death after being convicted of infecting hundreds of Libyan children with AIDS. The evidence used to convict the medical workers is considered highly specious, and many believe that Libya is attempting to deflect the blame for the 1998 outbreak of AIDS in a Libyan hospital. In July 2007, Libya's Supreme Court upheld the death sentences. Days later, however, the country's High Judicial Council commuted the sentences. On the same day as the commutations, the government agreed to pay $1 million to the families of each of the 460 victims.

Abdel Basset Ali al-Megrahi, the Libyan terrorist convicted of bombing of Pan Am Flight 103, was freed from prison on compassionate grounds by Scotland in August 2009. (He is suffering from terminal prostate cancer.) His return to a hero's welcome provoked outrage from victims' families, and the White House opposed this decision, stating that Megrahi should finish his sentence in Scotland.

Anti-government demonstrations gripped several countries in the Middle East in early 2011, and protests in Libya followed those in Egypt, Tunisia, and Bahrain. The crackdown by the government in Libya, however, was the most vicious. The protesters took to the streets on Feb. 16 in Benghazi, the country's second-largest city, demanding that Qaddafi step down. The next day, declared the Day of Rage, saw the number of demonstrations burgeon throughout the country. Security forces began firing on protesters, and by Feb. 20 Human Rights Watch estimated that as many as 200 people had been killed by troops. Several government officials and diplomats defected, and members of the military joined the ranks of the opposition as the government attacks on civilians grew increasingly brutal. Some reports had fatalities numbering near 1,000 or more. Qaddafi refused to resign, but offered to double the salaries of public workers and freed some Islamic militants from jail. Protesters dismissed the move as a hollow gesture and continued their actions throughout the country. Qaddafi enlisted the help of mercenaries as the number of defections by troops swelled. He cast blame for the uprising on the West, which he claimed wants to assume control of Libya's oil, and Islamic radicals who want to expand their base.

On Feb. 27, the UN Security Council voted to impose sanctions on Qaddafi and several of his close advisers. The sanctions included an arms embargo on Libya, a travel ban on Qaddafi and other leaders, and the freezing of Qaddafi's assets. The Security Council also requested that the International Criminal Court investigate reports of "widespread and systemic attacks" on citizens. The UN sanctions followed unilateral action by the U.S., and the European Union also sanctioned Libya. By Feb. 28, rebels had taken control of Benghazi and Misurata and were closing in on Tripoli. The rebels organized a military and formed an executive committee, the Transitional National Council, illustrating that they could establish a transitional government if given the opportunity. The Libyan Air Force and security forces, however, attacked the rebels from both the air and the ground, weakening the rebellion and wresting control of rebel-held towns, including Zawiya and Zuwara, cities west of Tripoli, and Ajdabiya in the east. The rebels fought on, clinging to the rebel strongholdand capitalof Benghazi, but Qaddafi's forces continued their march toward the city, attacking from both the ground and the air. The rebels, outnumbered, poorly armed, and inexperienced, seemed on the brink of defeat.

As the assault on rebel areas by Qaddafi's troops intensified, the Arab League turned to the international community for assistance. On March 17, the UN Security Council approved a resolution that authorized military action against Libya, including air strikes, missile attacks, and a no-fly zone, and two days later, Britain and France led a military action against Libya, launching attacks from the air and sea on Libya's air defenses. The U.S. participated in the action, but did not initiate it. Qaddafi railed against the intervention, calling it "a colonial crusader aggression that may ignite another large-scale crusader war." By March 21, the mission to implement a no-fly zone over Libya and cripple its air defenses was considered a success. In early April, two of Qaddafi's sons, Seif and Saadi, put forth a proposal in which their father would step down and allow the country to transition toward a constitutional democracy. The move would be managed by Seif. The rebels rejected the offer, and Qaddafi never fully endorsed the plan.

NATO took over control of the air strikes, which continued for weeks, and by May the rebels gained ground and momentum in cities in both the east and west of the country. Qaddafi refused to participate in talks mediated by South African president Jacob Zuma. In June, the International Criminal Court issued arrest warrants for Qaddafi, his son, Saif al-Islam, and his intelligence chief, Abdulla al-Senussi. They were charged crimes against humanity for the attacks on civilians in the first two weeks of the revolt.

In July, the U.S. and 30 other countries officially recognized the Transitional National Council (TNC) as Libya's government and gave the council access to the $30 billion in Libyan assests that had been frozen by the U.S. Later in the month, the council's military leader, Gen. Abdul Fattah Younes, was killed by fellow rebel soldiers. Younes, a former interior minister under Qaddafi, never gained the trust of the rebel movement and some questioned his loyalty.

In August 2011, rebel fighters opposing Qaddafi made progress on several fronts. They seized Zawiyah and gained control of the city's oil refinery. Zawiyah, a port city just 31 miles west of Tripoli, was a key gain. Rebel forces soon advanced into Tripoli and foreigners tried to flee the city. On August 21, with the rebels meeting little resistance from loyalists, residents in Tripoli took to the streets to celebrate the end of Qaddafi's 42 years in power. Two days later, rebels seized Qaddafi's compound. Qaddafi and his family fled and remained at large. Mustafa Abdul Jalil, the chairman of the TNC and Qaddafi's former justice minister, became the country's leader and the rebels began transferring their administration from Benghazi to Tripoli.

Rebels continued to make gains in loyalist strongholds throughout the country into the fall. By October, they had advanced on Surt, Qaddafi's hometown, and captured Bani Walid. The fight for Surt proved to be more challenging for the rebels, with loyalist forces fiercely committed to maintaining control of the city. Both sides suffered significant casualties. On October 20, 2011, the interim government of Libya announced that Qaddafi had been killed by rebel troops in Surt. Initial reports were unclear on the cause of death.

With Qaddafi dead, the interim government could turn its attention to rebuilding the country and setting the stage for elections. The role and influence of Islamists in government and day-to-day life were unknowns for the future of Libya. During the turmoil in Libya, the Islamists became a powerful force in the country. At the very least, they are poised to form a political party, and Islamist leaders signaled that they would participate in the democratic process. In addition, it remained unclear how the many rivalaries in the countryIslamists vs secularist, geographic, inter-tribe, and between the educated elite and tribal populationwill affect the political climate in the country. At the same time, there was growing concern about the increased activity of militant groups.

At the end of October 2011, the Transitional National Council elected Abdurrahim al-Keeb, an engineer and opponent of Qaddafi, as interim prime minister. In July 2012, Libyans voted in its first national election since Col. Muammar Qaddafi was ousted. The National Forces Alliance, a secular party led by Mahmoud Jibril, a Western-educated political scientist, prevailed over Islamist parties, including the Muslim Brotherhood, in the election to form a national congress. The win by the National Forces Alliance is a sign that Libya, unlike Egypt and Tunisia, is not trending toward Islamist rule. Turnout was over 60%, and international observers declared the election largely fair, despite reports of election-related violence. In August, the Transitional National Council handed power to the newly elected General National Congress, a 200-seat body. Mohammed Magarief, a longtime opposition leader and head of the National Front Party, was elected chairman of the Congress and thus Libya's head of state. In September, Mustafa Abu Shagur, deputy prime minister, prevailed over Jibril in the second round of voting by the Congress to become prime minister.

On Sept. 11, 2012, militants armed with anti-aircraft weapons and rocket-propelled grenades fired on the American consulate in Benghazi, killing U.S. ambassador to Libya Christopher Stevens and three other embassy officials. Stevens was a widely praised diplomat and an advocate for the opposition in Libya, and had helped the new government in its transition to power. He was the first U.S. ambassador to be killed in the line of duty since 1979.

The attack coincided with protests at the U.S. embassy in Cairo over the release of a crude YouTube film, Innocence of Muslims, that insulted the Prophet Muhammad and criticized Islam. U.S. officials initially said the attack was also in response to the video, but later said they believed that the militant group Ansar al-Shariah orchestrated the attack. The Obama administration was criticized for the lack of security at the consulate that left diplomats vulnerable and for not immediately acknowledging it was a premeditated terrorist attack. During the 2012 U.S. presidential campaign, Republican nominee Mitt Romney repeatedly accused Obama of releasing misleading statements to downplay the role terrorists played in the attack. Susan Rice, U.S. ambassador to the UN, was also drawn into the controversy. After the presidential election Republicans in the U.S. Senate threatened to derail her potential nomination as secretary of state because, they claimed, in the days following the attack Rice said it was a spontaneous reaction to the release of Innocence of Muslims, rather than a terrorist attack. Obama and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, defended Rice, saying she was relaying the notes she received from the CIA. However, Rice withdrew herself for consideration in December.

Clinton appointed an independent panel to investigate the attack, and in its highly critical report, the panel said the U.S. State Department failed to provide adequate security at the American Embassy in Tripoli and the consulate in Benghazi, overly relied on local militias for security, and did not fulfill requests for safety improvements at the compounds. It also cited "systemic failures and leadership and management deficiencies at senior levels." The report listed 29 recommended actions and improvements, and Clinton said she would act on all of them. Several State Department officials resigned after the release of the report.

The Libyan government condemned the attack and vowed to track down the perpetrators, though it proved too weak and ineffectual to do so. Indeed, the attack proved how little control the government has over the country's disparate militias, which act as the country's police yet operate independently of each other and the government. Ten days after the attack, several thousand Libyan citizens descended upon several militia headquarters and demanded that the government break up the groups. President Mohamed Magariaf rejected the demandan acknowledgement of the important role the militias play in the country's security. In mid-October the Libyan government said Ansar al-Sharia leader Ahmed Abu Khattala organized the attack. However, it did not detain the suspect.

In October 2012, the National Congress fired recently elected prime minister Mustafa Abushagur, citing its disapproval with the government he assembled. Ali Zeidan, a career diplomat who served under Qaddafi before going into exile, was then elected prime minister. Zeidan prevailed over an Islamist candidate. The political upheaval further illustrated the weakness of the fledgling government.

The New York Times reported in December that the Obama administration privately approved to transfer of weapons from Qatar to Libyan rebels in 2011, but later expressed concern that the arms ended up in the hands of Islamic militants. The concern gained urgency as the civil war intensified in Syria and the Obama administration mulled arming rebels in that country.

The National Congress passed a broad law in May 2013 that bans from taking public office anyone who served in a senior position under Qaddafi between 1969 and 2011. As written, the law threatens the standing of several current elected officials, including congress chairman Mohammed Magarief and Prime Minister Ali Zeidan. Secular opposition leader Mahmoud Jibril is also vulnerable under the new law. Magarief resigned weeks after the law passed, and his deputy, Giuma Attaiga, became acting chairman of the General National Congress. In June Congress elected Nouri Abusahmen as chairman. An independent member of Parliament, Abusahmen is a Berber, a minority group that suffered discrimination under Qaddafi.

By September 2013, Libya had deteriorated economically and politically. Oil production dropped from about 1.6 million barrels per day before the civil war to 150,000, costing the country about $5 billion in revenue from exports. Strikes were mainly responsible for the reduction. Prime Minister Zeidan came under fire for failing to stem tribal fighting. In addition, the government lacked a reliable armed force, making Zeidan dependent on militias for security. These militias exploited the situation for their own gain. The country's top cleric, Mufti al-Sadiq al-Ghiryani, called on Zeidan to resign.

U.S. commandoes captured Nazih Abdul-Hamed al-Ruqai, a high-ranking al-Qaeda operative who is known as Abu Anas al-Libi, in Tripol in early October 2013. He was indicted in New York in 2000 for helping to plan the 1998 bombings of the U.S. Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. U.S. authorities had been pursuing Abu Anas for about 15 years. U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry said "the Libyan government was aware of the operation." However, Prime Minister Zeidan denied that he had any prior knowledge of the raid. Days after the abduction of Abu Anas, members of a militia that has served as a government security force kidnapped Zeidan, presumably in retaliation for allowing the U.S. operation. He was held for several hours before being released. The incident revealed the increasing fragility of the country.

In July 2013, the Cyrenaica Political Bureau, a militia led by Ibrahim Jathran, began a blockade of Libya's major oil ports and demanded expanded autonomy for Cyrenaica, a province in eastern Libya, and a greater share in oil revenues. The government did little to end the blockade, despite the loss of oil revenuethe lifeblood of Libya's economy. In March 2014, the group loaded a tanker with 234,000 barrels of crude oil (valued at about $30 million) to sell on the black market. Prime Minister Zeidan said the move was an act of piracy and threatened to blow up the ship. The militants, however, defied the threats and the tanker left the port. Parliament voted to dismiss Zeidan, citing his weakness and inability to control the militia. Abdullah al-Thinni was named interim prime minister. U.S. Navy SEALS raided the ship days later and captured three Libyans said by crew members to be hijackers. The ship was set to return to Libya. The raid was a major setback to Jathran's militia.

In May, former general Khalifa Heftar organized a group of anti-Islamist nationalists, calling it the Libyan National Army, and led a campaign against a coalition of Islamic militias, Libya Dawn, in eastern Libya that he said had thrown Libya into disarray. Fighting continued for several weeks, and Heftar gained the support of the country's military. Heftar served under Qaddafi but split from him in the 1980s. He also accused Prime Minister Maiteg of being under the sway of the Islamic militias.

Libya's transitional Parliament elected Ahmed Maitiq, a prominent businessman from Misurata, as prime minister in May 2014. The Supreme Court, however, ruled that the election was unconstitutional, and he resigned. Thinni remained in office as interim prime minister.

Parliamentary elections were held in late June 2014, and because the populace had largely lost confidence in government as militias continued to yield tremendous power, turnout and interest in the race were low. In light of the violence between rival militias in Tripoli, the new Parliament convened in the eastern city of Tobruk, which is controlled by Heftar. However, many of the Islamist MPs refused to attend. Members of the former Parliament, which is the preferred body of the Islamists, reconvened in Tripoli and on Aug. 25 appointed Omar al-Hassi as prime minister, further complicating the political landscape. Heftar's government is recognized by the majority of the international community.

Violence between Libya Dawn and Heftar's fighters intensified in Tripoli during the summer of 2014. In July, they battled for control of the city's international airport, and the barrage of shelling threatened the U.S. embassy, forcing the U.S. to evacuate embassy staff. Most other nations also withdrew their embassy personnel. After a month of fighting, Libya Dawn won control of the airport, and Heftar's troops fled Tripoli. Egypt and the United Arab Emirates launched airstrikes on the Islamic militias in Tripoli several times in late August. Neither nation informed the U.S. about the attacks, and U.S. officials were reportedly irate that they were kept in the dark. The ongoing violence illustrated that any hope of stability in Libya was quickly fading, and the threat of civil war loomed. In early September, the government acknowledged that Libay Dawn controlled government ministries in Tripoli. By October, some 100,000 people fled the Tripoli area. UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon made a surprise visit to Libya in October to try to broker peace between the groups. His efforts bore little fruit. The fighting escalated at end of 2014, with the government launching airstrikes on Misrata, which is under the control of Libya Dawn.

The instability was blamed for an influx of refugees into Italy from Libya. More than 5,300 Libyans arrived in Italy during the first six weeks of 2015, a 60% increase over 2014.

The rival militias agreed to a UN-brokered cease-fire in January 2015. The vaguely worded truce left ample room for interpretation and doubts that it would hold.

U.S. special operations troops captured Ahmed Abu Khattala in a secret raid in Benghazi on June 15, 2014. He is believed to be the mastermind of the Sept. 11, 2012, attack on the U.S. consulate that killed four Americans, including U.S. ambassador to Libya Christopher Stevens. In July 2014, the U.S. Attorney in the District of Columbia charged Abu Khattala and several others with the felony counts of "killing a person in the course of an attack on a federal facility involving use of a firearm," providing "material support to terrorists resulting in a death," and possessing a firearm during a crime. He pleaded not guilty to the charges in July.

As Libya's stability continued to deteriorate, at least three militant groups, one in each of Libya's three regions, pledged allegiance to ISIS. In February 2015, a group of the militants aligned with ISIS beheaded 21 Egyptian Coptic Christians who had been kidnapped from Sirte. Egypt responded by launching airstrikes on weapons depots in Derna, a militant stronghold in eastern Libya. In May, ISIS militants shot or beheaded at least 20 Ethiopian migrant workers, most of whom are believed to be Christian.

About 1,800 migrants fleeing countries in North Africa died in the Mediterranean Sea, many off the coast of Libya, during the summer of 2015. The migrants were hoping to reach Europe. European countries struggled to deal with the influx of hundreds of thousands of migrants during the crisis.

A court in Tripoli sentenced Saif al-Islam Qaddafi, a son of the former dictator, in absentia to death for his role in the violence against protesters during the 2011 uprising. Eight others, including former head of intelligence, Abdullah al-Senussi, received the same sentence. The sentence will not be carried out because the officials are being held by a militia in the town of Zintan. The militia has refused to release them into government custody.

See also Encyclopedia: Libya .U.S. State Dept. Country Notes: Libya

See the original post:
Geography,Government,History,Libya - InfoPlease