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Western countries on Thursday urged Libyas interim government to start preparations for the war-torn countrys planned elections in December.

Libya's interim government, which came into being in March through a U.N.-backed inter-Libyan dialogue, is mandated to lead the country to elections on Dec. 24, but formal preparations have not yet started.

"In addition to the political and security arrangements, the technical and logistical preparations will be critical," a joint statement of France, Germany, Italy, the United States and Britains embassies in Libya read, calling on the authorities to "agree the constitutional and legal basis for these elections by July 1."

"Now is not the time for any disruptive changes at the relevant bodies which enable that preparation to take place within the timescale set out."

The interim government replaced two rival administrations based in Tripoli and the country's east.

Both gave their backing to the new administration and the election timetable, generating cautious hope that Libya might move beyond the conflict and chaos that has entrapped it since the overthrow and killing of the longtime dictator Moammar Gadhafi in 2011.

This week, the U.N.s special envoy for Libya submitted a draft proposal clarifying the constitutional basis for the upcoming elections to the Libyan Political Dialogue Forum (LPDF) plenary.

The draft proposal was finalized by the LPDF's Legal Committee following their meeting in the Tunisian capital on April 7-9, the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) said in a statement.

Formed on Dec. 17 based on a road map approved by the LPDF, the Legal Committee consists of 17 members who are tasked with following the constitutional road map leading to elections.

Jan Kubis recently met with Libyan interlocutors and officials to advance the implementation of a cease-fire and the LPDF road map leading up to national elections in December. Kubis stressed that holding the national elections on Dec. 24 is critical for Libyas transition toward unity, democracy, stability and prosperity.

However, despite these positive political developments, foreign mercenaries and a constant supply of weapons by foreign powers remain obstacles to lasting peace in the country.

Foreign mercenaries and arms have poured into the country since putschist Gen. Khalifa Haftar launched his offensive, with Russia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) serving as the warlords top suppliers against the legitimate government in order to capture the capital Tripoli. According to the U.N., there are currently 20,000 foreign forces and/or mercenaries left in Libya.

The Russian Wagner Group, which is owned by businessperson Yevgeny Prigozhin, a figure close to Russian President Vladimir Putin, is known as one of the main groups that sent mercenaries to fight in Libya. Most of the foreign forces are concentrated around Sirte at Jufra air base held by Haftar's forces 500 kilometers (300 miles) south of Tripoli and further west in al-Watiya.

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West calls on Libya to start election planning in joint statement | Daily Sabah - Daily Sabah

Tripoli, 3 May 2021 - Special Envoy of the UN Secretary-General for Libya and Head of the United Nations Support Mission in Libya Jn Kubi continued his meetings with Libyan officials, political and security actors. Special Envoy stressed the importance of implementing in full the recently adopted UN Security Council 2570 (2021) and 2571 (2021) resolutions, including its call upon the House of Representatives and relevant state institutions to take the necessary steps to facilitate the holding of elections on 24 December.

Yesterday, the Special Envoy met with the Chairman of the High National Election Commission, Dr. Emad Sayyeh, at its HQ in Tripoli where he renewed the UN strong condemnation of the terrorist attack, which took place on the same date in 2018. The Special envoy and HNEC Chairman discussed preparations and steps needed for the holding of national elections on 24 December, in accordance with Security Council resolution 2570 (2021), including the coordination between HNEC, the Government of National Unity (GNU), the Presidency Council and the Ministry of Interior. Special Envoy Kubi renewed the UN and the international communitys readiness to continue to provide the necessary support to HNEC.

Special Envoy Kubis also met with the Central Bank Governor Siddiq ElKaberto discuss the economic and financial situation and the need to support the GNU and the institutions of Libya, enabling them to address the most pressing issues, such as the COVID-19 pandemic, the electricity crisis, as well as the financing of the NOC. Highlighting the importance of the smooth functioning of the CBL Board of Directors and of financial and state institutions, Special Envoy Kubis stressed the need to ensure transparent and adequate management of the countrys national resources and revenues for the benefit of the Libyan people. With Governor ElKabe, he also discussed the next steps following the conclusion of the international audit of the Central Bank.

In the meeting with Minister of Justice, Ms. Halima R. Abdul Rahman, the Special Envoy discussed the overall human rights situation across the country in particular the issues of arbitrary detention, illegal detention centers, and detainees held without due process. They welcomed the recent release of detainees by various parties in eastern and western Libya. The Special Envoy and the Minister discussed the role of the judiciary in the electoral process, the need to revise the laws in order to enable the broadest possible participation in the elections, the protection of the civil space for women and youth as voters or candidates. The Special Envoy pledged UN support for the PC and the GNU efforts to proceed with a right based national reconciliation process and transitional justice. Finally, they confirmed the need to fully respect international humanitarian law, rights of migrants and refugees.

Special Envoy Jn Kubi continued his outreach in a meeting with the Minister of Oil and Gas Oil. Mohamed M. Oun and separately with the Chairman of the National Oil Cooperation Mustafa Sanalla. In both meetings, SE Kubis discussed ongoing challenges, notably the persistent lack of adequate and timely financing for maintenance and renewal of oil infrastructure and operational needs of the oil sector. He stressed the importance to safeguard the neutrality of Libyas oil sector without politicization, as well as to allocate the necessary funding to finance operations and implement the required maintenance and development plans to ensure continuity of oil production.

On Saturday, Special Envoy Jn Kubi met with the Commander of the Libyan Arab Armed Forces Khalifa Haftar. The meeting focused on advancing the implementation of the Ceasefire Agreement in full in compliance with the UN Security Council Resolution 2570 (2021), starting with the immediate reopening of the costal road and the withdrawal of all foreign forces and mercenaries from Libya without further delay. They also discussed the unification of Libyas military institutions, praising the work of the 5+5 Joint Military Commission (JMC). Both sides emphasized the importance to commit to the date for the holding of national elections on 24 December 2021 as a crucial step to reinforce the stability, independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and national unity of Libya. They considered the situation in the South of Libya in light of developments in Chad and the need to protect stability and security.

In a meeting today, the Special Envoy and members of the Presidency Council (PC), Musa Elkonyand Abdullah Allafi, reconfirmed the critical importance of the unification of Libyas military under the umbrella of the PC also in light of recent regional developments. They further discussed national reconciliation and the contribution of both the UN and the African Union in this regard.

On Friday, 30 April, The Special Envoy briefed the President of the High Council of State, Khaled Meshri on his engagements with national and international actors aiming at advancing peace process in Libya. They discussed recent developments with regards to the constitutional and legislative framework for the holding of parliamentary and presidential elections.

Special Envoy Kubis also met today with Mohamed Sawan and Nizar Kawan of the Justice and Construction party, to discuss the political situation in the country and the next steps towards the holding of elections on 24 December, as well as the important role of political parties in the electoral process.

These days Special Envoy Kubis held telephone calls with several Libyan and international partners, notably Prime Minister Dbeiba, following their meeting several days ago, and former Minister of Interior Fathi Bashaga. He also met with the newly arrived Ambassador of Egypt to Libya Mohamed Sarwat Selim.

Today, the Special Envoy also met with Minister of Foreign Affairs of Turkey avuolu, who is visiting Tripoli together with other high-level officials. In their discussion they notably focused on the withdrawal of foreign fighters and mercenaries, requests and requirements of Libya for training and capacity building, criteria for the UN ceasefire monitoring operation and situation around the elections envisaged for 24 December 2021.

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Secretary-General's Special Envoy for Libya holds a series of meetings with Libyan and officials and actors from different backgrounds and affiliation...

At this time last year, I wrote that Libya may become an arena for regional conflict if Turkey continued its military intervention there. But after Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi drew a red line warning Turkey to back off, the potential for regional escalation declined and diplomatic and political efforts were quickly revived .Conflict exhausted domestic constituencies and others weary of expanded regional conflicts accepted a United Nations roadmap focused on building effective institutions for a new Libyan state. These are a positive and welcome developments, even if its too early to rest assured and presume a desirable outcome to the Libyan crisis is easily within grasp.

This year we find ourselves again looking at the summer season with concern and anxiety given the escalating tensions in East Africa surrounding the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD). The tone of political rhetoric between the Egyptian, Sudanese, and Ethiopian leaderships has become strenuous. With the imminent summer rains, Addis Ababa remains stubborn in its determination to begin the second-stage filling of the dam reservoir without a binding legal agreement between the three riparian countries regarding matters of water administration and the reservoir filling schedule.

Egyptian President Sisi has repeatedly warned about the careless misuse of river waters by some states and reiterated that Egypts water rights are inviolable and cannot be touched. He cautioned those who may doubt her resolve in defending its water rights are making an egregious mistake. Sudanese warnings adopt the same tone, promising that all options to protect Sudans security will be considered. This rhetoric follows Ethiopias recalcitrant position in talks about the mega-dam and its determination to commence the second-stage, much-larger filling of dam reservoir this summer without regard to the extent of progress in negotiations. Addis Abba has also emphasized Ethiopias capacity to protect itself from any danger or threat.

All signs indicate that Ethiopias stalling and intransigence has been a long-standing rule. It had declined to cooperate with the International Panel of Experts, whose 2013 report documented numerous concerns about the dams transboundary impact. In 2015 even after the three Nile Basin states signed the Declaration of Principles in Sudan Ethiopia continued to stall and delay attempts to reach a binding agreement. It has persisted in saying that any agreement would be a guidance document that reserves Ethiopias discretion to make independent and unilateral decisions about the dam, its operation, and the flow rate under a variety of climatological conditions, whether rains, floods, or multi-year drought. It has continued to drag its feet at the latest meetings in Congo, offering only perfunctory schemes to notify downstream parties of the measures it has unilaterally adopted.

We now shortly arrive at a highly sensitive juncture where existing alternatives and options do not inspire confidence. It is clear that the current tripartite talks under the auspices of the African Union will not lead to a desired outcome. Space for negotiations and time for political maneuvers no longer exist, as the scheduled filling of the reservoir rapidly approaches. Even were abundant rains to marginally reduce the damage inflicted on Egypt and Sudan, the danger of this next stage is that it prolongs the status quo and implicitly sets a precedent that sensitive decisions about the dam are for Ethiopia unilaterally without consulting the other two parties..

Dialogue is always a more preferable route to resolving conflict provided political will exists. Even if negotiations stall and the situation deteriorates, it is always better to work within the framework of the practical negotiating process. However, the gravity of the current situation reflects Ethiopias attempts to impose a principle of unilateral decision-making that flouts any meaningful, potential accord. Despite Emirati endeavors to mediate the dispute and Saudi Arabias stated intention to host a summit for the three parties, I do not believe theres a clear path forward while Ethiopia continues to act as a unilateral decision-maker. Rather, moving negotiations from the auspices of the African Union to that of the Saudi kingdom or in other fora may open the door for more posturing and stall tactics from Addis Abba.

Egypt and Sudan have the right to resort to a variety of international institutions such as the UN and African Union to gather broad-based support for their position. This is a right and obligation for the two states. However, I do not believe that Ethiopia will respond to calls and resolutions of an international nature particularly that the prevailing discord in the international community does not augur well for reliable enforced compliance.

One wonders if Russian and/or American intervention presents an exit from the dilemma, in light of Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrovs visit to Egypt this past April and the new American administration sending Senator Chris Coons, a visiting delegate in Sudan, to Egypt a few weeks ago followed this week by Jeffrey Feltman the special envoy to the Horn of Africa , I certainly hope these developments inject new political will into resolving the issue. But I am not optimistic. For one, Russias cards to pressure Ethiopia are few, and the statements from the U.S. Department of State appear to lean toward Ethiopia in their support for a proposed, voluntary exchange of information about the dam reservoir. Such proposals enshrine a principle of unilateral decision-making.

For all these reasons, I fear that we have arrived at a perilous juncture, where all options are difficult, and delays on the diplomatic front leave us with an untenable status quo. The potential for collision carries with it great regional and international repercussions. In a tough situation, tough decisions are made. A strong state is one that has the wisdom to resolve conflict through peaceful means and dialogue, considering all potentialities and implications. Strong states are also however those which make decisive, timely decisions when necessary and those which are able to translate the forceful decisions made under difficult circumstances into concrete results.

So, will this summer witness a destabilizing escalation for which all will pay a high price? Or will a miraculous breakthrough save us from needless riskssurprising us with a burst of political will at the last moment? Suffice to say, summer 2021 will leave an indelible mark on the interests of the three Nile Basin states and on the future of East Africa.

Nabil Fahmy, a former foreign minister of Egypt, is the foundingdean of the School of Global Affairs and Public Policy at the American University in Cairo. He served as Egypts ambassador to the United States from 19992008, and as envoy to Japan between 1997 and 1999. On Twitter: @DeanNabilFahmy.

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Summers of Strife: From Libya to Ethiopia The Cairo Review of Global Affairs - The Cairo Review of Global Affairs

The EU is mulling the use of a special budget, designed to deliver military aid, to support Libya's coast guard.

The idea was proposed in an internal document by the EU's foreign policy branch, the EEAS.

"The EU should engage more not only politically but also within the overall capacity-building initiatives," states the document, dated February this year, and seen by EUobserver.

The document was signed off by the commander of Operation Irini. Irini is the EU's naval mission in the Mediterranean Sea, intended to prevent weapons from entering Libya.

The document proposes using the so-called European Peace Facility as part of a deal to relaunch stalled Libyan coast guard training exercises. The European Peace Facility, brokered by the French, comes with a 5bn purse and allows the EU to shore up armies in Africa, and elsewhere.

The money is placed in an off-budget because the EU is banned from using EU funds to finance foreign military operations.

Last month, member states backed the proposal, which means the European Peace Facility is now up and running, allowing the EU to be more assertive abroad.

"These measures may include supplying military and defence related equipment, infrastructure or assistance," it said, in a press statement in March.

The EU says safeguards ensure military assistance, such as small arms and ammunition, will not end up in the wrong hands.

But not everyone is convinced - including German Green MEP Hannah Neumann.

"Although a strict control regime is mentioned, we have already seen in the past that rules are interpreted in a very lax way," she said in March.

The Libyan coast guard is already being used by the European Union to prevent migrants and asylum seekers from reaching European soil.

A recent investigation by Lighthouse Reports, with Der Spiegel, Libration and ARD Monitor, revealed the EU's border agency Frontex is collaborating directly with the guard.

But some of its members are also linked to various Libyan militias, known to torture and extort migrants for ransoms in detention centres.

The EU's naval operation Sophia was training the Libyan coast guard between 2016 and 2020, as part of wider effort to create a Libyan search and rescue zone.

The idea is to get the Libyans to intercept migrants within that zone, returning them to a country wrecked by war. Around 9,500 people were intercepted last year.

Sophia has since been replaced by Irini, which now also wants to shore up the Libyan coast guard to create a "safe and secure environment" at sea.

But the Libyans are demanding more patrol vessels and aircraft, a request that could see the EU use its new 5bn peace facility.

The EU's foreign policy chief, Josep Borrell, has been vocal about its potential use in the past. "We need guns, we need arms, we need military capacities," he had said early last year.

"And that is what we are going to help provide to our African friends because their security is our security," he added, in comments directed towards other conflict areas in Africa like the Sahel.

Excerpt from:
EU mulls using new 'peace' fund to help Libyan coast guard - EUobserver

By Sami Zaptia.

London, 7 May 2021:

The U.S. continued its supports for the unification of Libyas military institutions, for national reconciliation, for the withdrawal of foreign fighters and forces and for the holding of the 24 December elections.

The support came in a statement issued by the U.S. Embassy quoting its Ambassador Richard Norland after his meeting yesterday with Presidency Council member Al-Lafi.

I had a positive meeting with PC Member Al-Lafi yesterday, and was encouraged to hear of the steps the Presidency Council (PC) is proposing for unifying Libyas military institutions a crucial objective, as underscored by the recent events in Chad, and one which must be pursued in an agreed manner with the support of all parties.

We also discussed specific efforts the PC is undertaking to promote national reconciliation, and the critical importance of beginning the withdrawal of foreign forces and fighters and preparing for national elections on December 24 as called for by the LPDF Roadmap and UNSCR 2570.

U.S. supports Foreign Minister Mangoushs call

In a separate statement, Ambassador Norland reiterated the now oft repeated mantra about the withdrawal of foreign forces:

We fully support Foreign Minister Mangoushs unambiguous call for the departure of foreign forces in the interest of Libyan sovereignty and stability.

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US supports Libya military unification, national reconciliation, Mangoush's withdrawal of foreign forces call and 24 December elections | - Libya...