Libya war: Haftars high stakes oil gambit
In his latest article with Middle East Eye Jason Pack, the founder of Libya Analysis, discusses General Haftars latest series of move and how they have impacted Libya and the international community. While Haftars justification for his decision to handover the control of the al-Sidra and Ras Lanuf oil terminals to the Eastern- based National Oil Corporation (NOC) was to end the corruption and inequitable distribution of resources from the Tripoli-based Central Bank of Libya (CBL), Pack argues that Haftars true motive are to challenge the international community over who should be considered legitimate in the divided country. However, Pack identifies that this move could backfire:
Strategically, his projected image of military prowess combined with a joint federalist and nationalist political agenda (i.e. more resources for the east and ending corruption within the central bank which affects all Libyans) is finding resonance. However, Haftars gambit is likely to be short-lived if it doesnt culminate in economic reform. Libyas economy is on the verge of collapse and, with the hot summer months looming ahead, electricity blackouts, interminable lines at petrol stations, and food shortages will become even more common place.
According to Pack, Haftars decision could have severe consequences on Libya and its population, and push Haftar to adopt unexpected positions.
Yet by actively undertaking a step which promotes separate eastern institutions, there is a danger that if the move fails to quickly produce concrete results, Haftar will be forced to make an unexpected choice: either backdown by making a U-turn and relinquishing control to the NOC or embrace a separatist stance. Haftar is usually thought of as Libyas master strategist. Malicious, maybe, but certainly far-sighted. Compared to other major Libyan figures who completely lack political experience, this appraisal may be true, but in this instance, the rogue general has unleashed a range of forces that are beyond any single man to contain.
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In his latest article with Al-Monitor, Jason Pack, the founder of Libya Analysis, identifies the issues at stake in the dispute about the control of oil infrastructure between Western and Eastern institutions. Pack analyses that
Which NOC is deemed to have exported the crude is actually an issue of where the payment flows rather than what personnel produce and load the oil. The real NOC is Libyas most truly national institution with 65,000 employees. It is run by Libyas most respected technocrat, Mustafa Sanallah. Conversely, the Eastern NOCs handful of personnel are seen as crooks in the international community and have been on the verge of being sanctioned by the US government. The Eastern NOC can only produce or load crude by converting real NOC employees and pressuring others at gunpoint. [] Therefore, so long as Hifter doesnt attempt to smuggle oil, the current blockade remains about opposing the unpopular Tripoli-based CBL, rather than picking a losing battle with the respected Tripoli-based NOC.
Drawing from this analysis, Pack goes on to demonstrate how resolving this dispute could provide an opportunity for the West to broker an agreement that would protect the countrys wealth and resolve the political impasse,
Prominent Libyan commentators are stating that a deal could be arranged whereby Hifter would hand control of the oil ports back to the real NOC in exchange for the HCS finally approving Shukri as Kabirs replacement. []The West must now use its diplomatic wiles to provide Hifter, the GNA, HCS and the NOC a face-saving way out of this impasse: have them facilitate Kabirs replacement by Shukri and simultaneously request an international financial commission to safeguard Libyas finances.
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On 2 July, the Security Assesment of North Africa (SANA) Project associated with the Small Arms Survey Association issued a report untitled Capital of Militias: Tripolis Armed Groups Capture the Libyan State focusing on the role played by militias in Tripoli since the beginning of the Libyan crisis in 2011. The two authors, Wolfram Lacher and Alaa al-Idrissi, demonstrate that over the past seven years, four large militias, namely the Special Deterrence Force (SDF), the Tripoli Revolutionnaries Battalion (TRB), the Nawasi Battalion and the Abu Slim unit of the Central Security Aparatus, have gradually divided Tripoli between themselves. Lacher and al-Idrissi argue that these four militias have transformed into organised criminal networks and exert an unprecedented degree of influence over state institutions and resources. The report depicts how the progressive capture of Tripoli by such powerful armed groups pose a significant threat to the political progress in Libya. Lacher and al-Idrissi provide readers with a high-quality research, depicting with clarity and precision the evolution of militias in Tripoli and the tensions resulting from their growing influence.
On 1 July, the NOC published a detailed statement listing the specific impacts expected to hit each of its subsidiary companies and production from fields following the declaration of force majuere at Zueitina and Hariga ports. In addition to the 850,000bpd loss of crude exports, the NOC said output of natural gas used for local power supplies andoil and gas field operationswould fall by 710 million standard cubic feet per day, and that more than 20,000 bpd of condensate would be lost. The NOC said this would negatively impact power generation at the Zueitina and North Benghazi power stations as the NOC is already facing a deficit in thefuel import budgetand will not be able to compensate the lost gas by importing more liquid fuel from abroad. The statement added that once stored crude was used, refineries at Brega, Sarir and Tobruk would be forced to close. Brega port is expected to be shut under force majeure soon and at presentitis unclear why the NOC did not include it in the announcement.
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Reacting to Eastern-based General Haftars decision to handover the control of the al-Sidra and Ras Lanuf oil terminals to the Eastern- based National Oil Corporation (NOC), Mustafa Sanalla the chairman of the Western-based NOC issued a statement in The Financial Times on 28 June. In this statement, Sanalla denounces Haftars decision as illegal and argues that it threatens Libyas stability. The NOC chairman calls for the international community to support UN-backed Western-based institutions and force Haftar to comply to UN resolutions, claiming that the response of the international community to Haftars move will determine the future of the country.
Jason Pack, the founder ofLibya-Analysis, has published an article with Foreign Policy arguing that the Wests call for elections in the absence of stable institutions while simultaneously competing for diplomatic and comic influence wont rebuild Libya it will destroy it. To explore this Pack details French President Emmanuel Macrons so-called Paris summit in May of this year and suggests:
Like those earlier and more autocratic contenders for dominance over the Libya file, France has sought influence not so much by supporting Haftar against his enemies, but by trying to blindside other international players with surprise summits and establishing facts on the ground. The unique French twist is attempting to unsubtly manipulate the elections timetable and optics to get a specific outcome.
There is no doubt that Macrons May 2018 Paris summit further legitimized Haftar and puts him in the pole position in terms of name recognition heading into any electoral battle. Understandably, this ruffled feathers in London, Washington, and Rome as Frances allies were not notified about the summit until it was publicly announced.
Packgoes on to further explore the relationship between internal Libyan politics and foreign influence in the country, and while things appear dire he argues there is still a way forward:
Now is the time to learn from past mistakes. Britain and the United States must not allow yet another Libyan election to be constructed as a winner-take-all event. Rather than engaging in cheap talk about democracy, veteran diplomats in Washington and London should attempt to enforce rules of the game as a corrective to the zero-sum mentality in Libya whereby winners try to marginalize the vanquished and control all the spoils.
Issuing concrete pledges to protect Libyas crucial physical infrastructure, namely the electricity, water, and oil grids as well as the few brave Libyan technocrats willing to implement painful economic reforms is long overdue.
Without such a backstop, even the most courageous Libyan stakeholders will have difficulty safeguarding their countrys sovereign assets from predation. They know that if they stick their necks out to correct injustices, they will likely to be chopped off by the disgruntled militiamen who benefit from the corrupt status quo.
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On 26 June, David Axe published an article on The Daily Beast analysing a report by the Washington D.C. based New America Foundation and Airwars.org, an air-strike-tracking project affiliated with the University of London. The article explores the subject of the air war which has been taking place in Libya since the beginning of the turmoil in the country in 2011, drawing on a recent statement released by U.S Africa Command (AFRICOM) on 20 June refuting claims of civilian casualties from drone strikes near Bani Walid on 5 June that the US says killed four ISIS members. According to Axe, the New America Foundation and Airwars.org research demonstrates that a great number of airstrikes have been conducted by various Libyan factions and foreign countries between September 2012 and mid-June 2018, causing several hundreds of casualties throughout the country. The report argues that the various Libyan factions and foreign countries that have conducted the airstrikes have claimed responsibility for just half of the attacks.
On 25 June, General Khalifa Haftar announced the handover of Ras Lanuf and al-Sidra oil ports to the Eastern- based National Oil Corporation (NOC). The announcement came a few days after Haftar reclaimed control of the two oil installations from forces led by Ibrahim Jadhran, with the alleged support of the Benghazi Defense Brigade (BDB). Haftars handover of the oil facilities is widely perceived by analysts as an unexpected and risky move, which is likely to aggravate the existing divisions in Libya between the East and the West. Indeed, the handover of the oil facilities to the parallel, unofficial Eastern- NOC demonstrates Haftars intent to bypass the authority of the Government of National Accord (GNA) and its institutions. Supported by the international community, the Western-based NOC is supposed to be the sole legitimate institution in charge of the oil sector in Libya.
Drawing on the recent clashes and tensions in Libya, namely the attempt to seize control of infrastructure in Libyas Oil Crescent by armed forces led by the defected head of the Petroleum Facilities Guard Ibrahim Jadhran, Erin Neale argues in The Defense Post on 25 June that increased violence is to be expected in the coming weeks and months. The author foresees that rival armed groups and political parties are likely to resort to violence to gain more power and influence as elections approach. Neale also contrasts the growing instability prevailing on the ground with the continuous push by the international community to hold elections.
On 21 June, Middle East Eye published a report on the clashes that took place in Libyas Oil Crescent region. On 14 June, tensions developed in Libyas Oil Crescent region when Ibrahim Jadhran, the former chief of the Petroleum Facility Guard (PFG), with support from some of the Benghazi Defence Brigade (BDB) and other tribal allies, attacked the Ras Lanuf and Es-Sider oil terminals. Jadhrans forces took control of the terminals, forcing the Libyan National Army (LNA) to withdraw. The subsequent clashes resulted in two of Ras Lanufs oil storage tankers being destroyed. According to Riccardo Fabiani, geopolitical analyst at Energy Aspects, Libyas oil output may be reduced by up to 40 percent as a result of the fighting, Middle East Eye reports. Given the strategic nature of the oil infrastructure, the LNA quickly retaliated against Jadhran, and announced on 21 June that the LNA had regained control of the infrastructure. Tensions in the area are likely to escalate in the near future as the two forces clash. It appears unlikely that Jadhran and his allies will be able to hold on to some positions in the Oil Crescent. In the past, attempts by other armed forces to overtake these strategic positions were quickly defeated by the LNA.
On 19 June , Frederic Wehrey and Wolfram Lacher published an analysis for Foreign Affairs of the potential impacts of holding elections in Libya in December, as planned by the recent non-binding agreement between Libyas major political figures which was fostered by the French government in May 2018. The two authors argue that holding elections could exacerbate the already existing tensions and divisions in Libya instead of fostering a climate of reconciliation. As a result, Wehrey and Lacher advocate for the development of a more durable approach, in the form of a transitional agreement which would allow time for reforming Libyan institutions and including a wider number of local political actors. This article echoes several other articles published over the past week, revealing a strong skepticism among scholars and practitioners regarding the internationally backed, UN agenda for Libya, which focuses on elections as a stabilization tool.
On 18 June, Libya Analysis Managing Director was a guest on Al-Jazeera Englishs Inside Story where she discussed the drivers and impact of the attack launched by Ibrahim Jadhran and allies on 14 June against the oil ports of Sidra and Ras Lanuf.
Libya Analysiss Managing Director Rhiannon Smith spoke to Le Monde about thecontinued presence of IS fighters in ungoverned areas of Libya such as the deserts south of Sirte and in the south-west region, and how the apparent revival of IS capacities in the country in recent months fits in with wider jihadist trends.
Depuis la fin de 2017, il y a une augmentationdunombredattaquesde lEIen Libye, dont certaines significatives, comme celle qui a vis la commission lectorale Tripoli, le 2 mai. Mme sil est difficile dattribuer cette hausse des combattants venus du Moyen Orient,estimeRhiannon Smith, directrice gnrale de Libya Analysis, think tank qui conseille les Etats et les entreprises. Ces rcentes offensives de lEI rpondent aussi probablement des directives de ses dirigeants qui veulent trouver un moyen de raffirmer linfluence du groupe.Cela sinscrit dans une tendance mondiale.
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Gregory Aftandilian wrote an article for Middle East Onlinepublished on 10 June analysing the US policy towards Libya in the aftermath of the French-brokered non-binding agreement between major Libyan figures. Aftandilian observes that with this event, it has seemed like the French President has been taking the lead on the matter of the Libyan crisis and questions the US strategy. He argues that in regards to Libya, President Trump has adopted a strategy similar to the one adopted by his predecessor, identified by the author as a leading from behind strategy. The article concludes that if the French initiative leads to results, it could signify that a US role in North Africa, or even in the Middle East, is not indispensable.
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Controversies around the issue of migration in Libya resurfaced around 9 June as Italy refused access to its ports by the Aquarius ship, which is operated by an non-governmental organisation (NGO) to rescue migrants crossing the Mediterranean Sea. The incident left over 600 migrants coming from Libya stranded at sea. This new incident adds on the debates on how to deal with the migration phenomenon in Libya, and the division between international powers in the matter. Libyas role of transit country in the migration crisis which has been affecting Europe explains in part the political agenda developed by some foreign powers such as France or Italy in Libya. Such countries appear to be deploying efforts to contribute to the stabilisation of the country as an attempt to reduce the migrant flow. The European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR) published an analysis of Italys approach to migration, underlining the hardening of the Italian position over the past months. The article also puts into questions the viability of the EUs security-focused management of migration.
In an article for Al-Monitor published on 8 June, Mustafa Fetouri analyses the recent agreement which was concluded between Libya, Chad, Niger and Sudan on 31 May to improve cross border security. The author indicates that the neighbouring countries have decided to reinforce their cooperation to deal with common threats such as goods and fuel smuggling, criminal activities and human trafficking which have become rampant in cross border areas, especially since the beginning of the Libyan crisis. Fetouri argues that this new agreement could represent a step forward in the stabilisation of border areas as it plans for a practical mechanism to be undertaken by the four countries such as mixed border patrols. The author also advocates for international powers to continue to support regional efforts to fight against illegal activities and prevent further destabilization in the porous border regions.
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In an article published on 6 June in Atlantic Council, Karim Mezran discusses the existence of an alternative path to elections for Libya. Pointing out the many objections to holding elections in December 2018, which have been raised both in Libya and within the international community, Mezran brings to light an alternative solution, which was initially proposed by the Secretary General Special Representative Ghassan Salame in September 2017. The alternative would be the modification of the Libyan Political Agreement to allow for the creation of a smaller and more effective Presidential Council as well as a technocratic government. The plan was debated between the House of Representatives (HoR) and the High State Council (HSC) during an UN-led mediation in late 2017 but was abandoned as the mediation attempts failed. Mezran argues that such an option would allow time to make real progress in solving the Libyan crisis, and prepare the ground for elections.
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In an article for Bloomberg published on 11 June, Ghaith Shennib and Hatem Mohareb discuss the campaign launched by General Khalifa Haftar in Derna, Eastern Libya. Over the course of the past weeks, the armed forces led by Haftar, the Libyan National Army (LNA), have intensified their assaults on the Eastern city. The most recent media reports suggest that the LNA could soon be in complete control of the city. Consequently, the capture of Derna could increase Haftars power and influence. According to the authors, such a turn of events could also undermine the current efforts towards elections as the capture of Derna is likely to exacerbate tribal tensions.
In an article published on 4 June, the analysis website Stratfor argues that it is highly unlikely that Libyan elections will be held in 2018. The article draws on the recent political developments, the non-binding agreement concluded between Libyas major political figures in Paris on 29 May to hold elections by December 2018, arguing that the chances of success of elections are very low due to the countrys lack of unity. Stating that Western powers are forcibly pushing for elections, the author foresees two potential outcomes: either Libya will be unable to hold elections, or elections will be held but their results will be widely rejected. For the author of the article, the elections are a gamble with Libyas future and could deepen the prevailing instability instead of allowing for the stabilisation of the country.
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On 30 May, Vasily Kuznetsov published on Al Monitor an analysis of the developing ties between Russia and Libya. The author claims that Russia has adopted a new approach towards Libya that focuses on reinforcing the economic ties between the two countries. Russian-Libyan economic exchanges had almost ceased in 2011 due to the revolution. According to the authors analysis, Russias involvement in Libya could continue to increase in the near future, in the economic sector as well as in terms of a reinforced cooperation in fields such as health care and education. Kuznetsov analyses that such a cooperation, which would primarily serve Russias long term interests in North Africa, could also benefit Libyas stabilisation on the long term.
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In an op-ed published by the Libya Herald on 31 May, Azza Maghur, a Libyan lawyer and human rights activist, analyses the results of the high-level meeting between Libyan factions that took place in Paris on 29 May. In this article, the author puts into question the legitimacy of the political parties which were representing Libya at the Paris Conference, namely the Government of National Accord (GNA), the House of Representatives (HoR) and the High State Council (HSC), arguing that none of them adequately represented the Libyan population. Maghur also denounces the dysfunctionality of these parties, their corruption and their impact on the worsening economic situation in Libya. As a result, she advocates for the end of these institutions, arguing that the newly signed agreement should allow for the creation of new, viable parties which would have the capacity to address Libyas issues.
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Libya-Analysis Managing Director Rhiannon Smith recently spoke to the Voice of Americas Africa News Tonight program to discuss the implications of the May 29 meeting in Paris between Government of National Accord Prime Minister Fayez al-Serraj, President of the House of Representatives Agilah Saleh, President of the High Council of State Khaled Mishri, and General Commander of the Libyan National Army Khalifa Haftar. You can hear the interview at 4 minutes 12 seconds into the report below.
Libya-Analysis Managing Director Rhiannon Smith participated in a discussion on Al Jazeeras Inside Story program about the Libya summit held in Paris by French President Emmanuel Macron on 29 May that brought together Government of National Accord Prime Minister Fayez al-Serraj, President of the House of Representatives Agilah Saleh, President of the High Council of State Khaled Mishri, and General Commander of the Libyan National Army Khalifa Haftar. After the meeting, it was announced that the four leaders had agreed to hold credible, peaceful parliamentary and presidential elections on 10 December 2018, and to respect the results of the election. While Macron heralded the event as an essential step toward reconciliation, Smith suggests that:
If we look at the meeting between Serraj and Haftar hosted by Macro in July last year there were a lot of nice things said and a lot of agreements were made but actually on the ground nothing changed and I think that will be a similar reality here.
To watch the discussion click here.
On 28 May, International Crisis Group (ICG) published an article analysing the conference organized on 29 May by French President Emmanuel Macron, which gathered together Libyas main political actors ostensibly in an attempt to push forward a unified political solution for the country. The article provides an overview of the potential outcomes of such an initiative, described by ICG as both audacious and risky. ICG argues that the French initiative, which resulted in an agreement by all parties to hold presidential and parliamentary elections on 10 December 2018, could work as a fresh push to provide solutions to the political crisis. However, ICG points out that it could contribute to polarizing divisions among Libyan actors as only four figures Faiez al-Serraj, head of Tripoli-based Government of National Accord (GNA); Khalifa Haftar, leader of the Libyan National Army (LNA); Aghela Saleh, speaker of the House of Representatives (HoR) elected in June 2014 and based in the eastern city of Tobruk; and Khaled Mishri, the recently elected head of the High State Council (HSC) were invited to actively participate in this summit. Moreover, the article highlights the different gaps of the agreement proposed by France, arguing that details of the draft agreement should be revised before seeking a binding agreement.
To read the article in full click here.
On 24 May, writer Kamel Abdallah published an article for Al-Arham Weekly analysing the competition for influence in Libya between France and Italy. According to the author, tensions between the two powers are growing, as they pursue different agendas in Libya. While Italy has been primarily focused on the control of migration, France has seemingly been developing further interests in Libyas oil sector as well as trying to become a central actor in the resolution of the political crisis. The author analyses Frances recent initiative to resolve Libyas political stalemate by holding a meeting in Paris between Libyan political rivals as another way to expand French influence in Libya and secure its interests in a post-crisis Libya. However, thus far, the extent to which France is capable of influencing Libyan politics appears limited as the previous meeting, which took place in Paris in July 2017, did not result in any major developments on the ground. Moreover, Frances calls for internationally supervised parliamentary and presidential elections before the end of the year have been met with reservations from the international community.
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In an article for the Washington Institute published on 21 May, Ben Fishman analyses what he identifies as Libyas Election Dilemma, arguing that the international community is focusing its efforts on holding elections in 2018, despite Libya not being ready for such a major political event. While elections are presented by the international community as the key tool for the stabilization of the country, it remains unclear what type of elections will be held, whether a constitutional referendum, parliamentary elections, or presidential elections, and how these three votes could be articulated. Demonstrating that core issues still need to be addressed, the author argues for a shift in focus, from national elections to alternative actions such as the National Conference and greater support to municipal elections.
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Early May in Libya was marked by the intensification of Libyan National Army (LNA) military operations and airstrikes against the Eastern city of Derna. According to media reports, LNA units advanced on villages four kilometers from Derna, targeting the remaining bastions of opposition which have thus far managed to prevent the LNA from seizing the city. This renewed intensity follows declarations by Haftar upon his return to Libya in late April after his mysterious illness that the alleged peace process with the Derna Protection Force (DPF), the recently renamed Derna Mujahideen Shura Council (DMSC),had failed. According to Chatham House analyst Tim Eaton, quoted in the National on 20 May, this indicates Haftars will to reassert his control over Eastern Libya by force. As a matter of fact, a military victory could help reaffirm his power following his recent absence and quash the rumours regarding the state of his health. In an article published on 16 May by Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Jalel Harchaoui analyses the current dynamics of Haftars strategy and the impact it could have on the different factions that compose the Libyan landscape.
In a phone interview with Al-Monitor published on 30 April, Government of National Accord (GNA) Finance Minister Osama Hamad discusses the Libyan economic crisis as well as the current efforts developed by Libyan institutions to tackle the crisis. Minister Hamad draws a link between the political division in Libya and the current economic situation, arguing that economic stabilisation cannot happen without political reconciliation. According to him, in a politically divided country, the successful design and implementation of economic reform programs is hindered by the absence of political will.
Click here to read the interview.
While the country faces political and security challenges, recent developments indicate that the subject of migration continues to be a central issue in Libya, not to be forgotten. A Voice of America article published on 9 May indicates that a group of 17 Nigerian migrant have filed a lawsuit against Italy in the European Court of Law, holding the European country responsible for the violence they were submitted to after their boat was intercepted by the Libyan Coast Guards and they were sent back to Libya. This initiative is likely to rekindle the controversies surrounding Italys policies towards migration from Libya, which were sparked most recently following reports on the inhumane living conditions in migrant detention centres in Libya.
To read the article in full click here.
International Crisis Group published on 8 May its latest report on Libya titled Libyas unhealthy focus on personalities. The report analyses two eventsthat it argues have recently shaken Libyan politics, namely the election of Muslim Brotherhood affiliate Khaled Misri as president of the High Council of State (HCS) and the mid-April hospitalisation of Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar, demonstrating the Libyan tendency to focus politics on individuals instead of institutions and the negative effects of such a dynamic. International Crisis Group argues that Libyan politics heavily focuses on four major figures, and that the potential absence of these figures could have serious consequences on the fragile political balance. The report advocates for a focus on institutionalised governance to avoid the deepening of tensions and polarisation which often results from politics centralized on major figures.
Read the report in full here.
Libya-Analysis Managing Director Rhiannon Smith recently spoke to the Australian ABC program The World about the vulnerability of the proposed elections given Libyas current instability. In the interview, Smith explains Elections at this stage are very technically difficult to hold and are likely to create more problems. Ultimately, what you have now is a Libya that is insecure, unstable, and divided. In that scenario, elections are only going to make it worse.
In the wake of Khalifa Haftars unexplained absence for two weeks in late April,Smith also explores potential scenarios should there be a vacuum in the senior leadership of the Libyan National Army and what effect they may have on national reconciliation efforts.
To watch the interview click here.
Libya-Analysis Managing Director Rhiannon Smith recently spoke to the Voice of Americas Africa News Tonight program to discuss the reports that Libyan National Army General Khalifah Haftaris being treated in a French hospitaland its implications on the Libyan conflict. You can hear the interview at 10 minutes 45 seconds into the report below.
Investigative journalist Mat Nashed has written an article for Al-Monitor exploring the rise in the number of missing persons in Libya since 2014. Nashed focuses on the rampant occurrence of kidnappings, where the motive ranges from ransom to political gain. The author interviews a series of activists who suggest that despite the regular occurrence of kidnappings, institutional efforts to addresses the issue has fallen short. Nashed explains:
In Tripoli, 189 people were abducted in March 2017, while 68 people were kidnapped in April, according to records obtained by the Interior Ministry of the GNA.
Worse still, the GNA has not established a committee to investigate the fate of the disappeared, which it was supposed to do by February 2016, according to Article 26 of the Libyan Political Agreement (LPA). Sami Shams, an activist with the ADHR, told Al-Monitor that their association is pressuring the GNA to adhere to the LPA.
Libya needs an independent committee to investigate the kidnappings, he said over the phone. The GNA is the legal government in the country according to the LPA, so they have the responsibility to protect its citizens.
Following recent pressure by the ADHR, the GNA has started to instruct militias to find the kidnappers. Yet Jalel Harchaoui, a doctoral candidate in geopolitics at Paris 8 University and a frequent commentator on Libyan affairs, said that armed groups charged with arresting kidnappers are also abducting people.
Kidnapping is an extracurricular activity for militias in Libya, he told Al-Monitor. If [militias] catch somebody who is useful, they will extort him. And if they catch somebody who isnt useful [for political gain], then they might ask for a ransom.
To read the article in full click here.
On 8 March, details started to emerge from the UN Libya Experts Panel report regarding not only the scale of corruption in Libyas banking and financial institutions, but also their administrative inadequacies. In particular, the report outlines that in 2012 the Libyan Investment Authority (LIA) had a total sum of assets of US$67 billion, which has now decreased to US$34 billion. It is claimed by the institutions responsible for safeguarding the funds that the assets freeze imposed by the UN is responsible for the deprecation of value of these assets due to, for example, a prohibition of the LIA from managing the assets that prevent ways to yield competitive returns, an inability to reinvest, and an inability to optimize investment opportunities and so forth. As a result of these findings, the Panel has reportedly stated that they are currently continuing to investigate the losses.
Amongst its many other findings, the UN report named both Libyas Jumhoriya Bank and the Libyan Foreign Bank (LFB) as conduits for major corrupt financial procedures and the provision of Letters of Credit to militias in Tripoli and elsewhere. Additionally, it revealed specific details relating to the involvement of militias in other money-making activities such as fuel smuggling and human trafficking. On 11 March, a leaked letter from the Central Bank of Libya (CBL) to the LFB reportedly revealed the substandard state of governance in the LFB and exposed major losses due to negligence and poor investments of over USD$400 million in the last year.
These revelations were compounded by a Belgian paper alleging that $10 billion of Libyas frozen reserves held at Euroclear Bank went missing in Belgium. The money reportedly disappeared sometime between 2013 and 2017 from four LIA and Libyan Foreign Investment Company (LAFICO) bank accounts, which at the end of 2013 held as much as 16 billion euros. This has triggered widespread scepticism of the LIA and the GNAs approach towards Libyas frozen funds. On 9 March, the LIA released a statement denying that assets had gone missing, as have the Belgian Foreign and Finance Ministers.
Allegations of deep-seated corruption and administrative shortcomings within Libyas formal and informal financial institutions are nothing new. However, this latest UN report provides significant detail on the nature of the corruption and key entities and individuals alleged to be involved. As a result, this could lead to a backlash by or against some of these institutions, both domestically and internationally, and could lead to further economic instability within Libya. Nevertheless, the Libyan authorities do not currently have the capacity to launch an investigation into these allegations nor do they have they have the capacity or tools through which to try to halt such activity. Consequently, the levels of corruption and inefficiency are unlikely to change any time soon.
Istituto Affari Internazionali has published an article by Karim Mezran that explores the confused conditions on the ground in Libya and the UN effort to conduct a process of negotiation between rival governments and groups in the country. The author argues that while international actors have been involved in the UN-led negotiations they have also pursued their own geopolitical and economic interests and in doing so have supported one faction over another, much to the detriment of the UN process. Mezran argues:
The case of Egypt is emblematic. The support Cairo has given to Haftar was intended to keep Islamist groups out of power in Libya and away from the border between the two countries. It was also aimed at re-establishing order in Libya so as to initiate the process of economic reconstruction, of which Egypt planned to obtain a lions share. This has not happened and is looking less and less likely, thus causing a possible shift of strategy in the Egyptian capital. How this change will be expressed is still unclear.
There are rumours that the recent reshuffling in the security cabinet could lead to a change in policy vis--vis Libya and specifically regarding Haftar. Egypt could pressure Haftar to effectively collaborate with the UN toward the realization of a sound negotiated solution to the countrys crisis. Because Egypts role in the Libyan conflict is so important, this is the only case in which a consensus-driven government to replace that led by Sarraj today becomes a realistic scenario.
Although Egypt is the clearest tangent, other regional actors also played a role in diplomatic negotiations by inviting the various parties to their capitals and conducted negotiations. These were in theory connected to the national mediation of the UN but, in reality, undermined these efforts by creating different and overlapping fora for the discussions, while pursuing their own particular interests.
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Elissa Miller has written an article for the Journal of Middle Eastern Politics and Policy detailing the perpetuating cycle of crime and civil war in Libya. In the article Miller argues that any efforts to improve governance in Libya have to address the underlying roots of instability that fuel both criminality and violence. The author goes on to explore how militia groups have taken advantage of the power vacuum and instability that ushered in after the removal of Qaddafi in 2011, suggesting:
In Sabratha, for example, the smuggling economy offered militias critical financial returns. Notably, a June 2017 UN report identified the Dabbashi brigade as one of the main facilitators of migrant smuggling in the city. The August 2017 deal which enlisted Dabbashi to prevent smuggling threw off the balance of power in Sabratha. Dabbashis decision to shift its activities from smuggling to preventing departures was likely driven by more than just financial interests, as it greatly benefited from the smuggling trade. One Sabratha resident suggested the Italy-Dabbashi deal was attractive because it allowed the militia to garner legitimacy as the only possible interlocutors to ensure city security and the only ones able to block human trafficking from both Libyas Government of National Accord (GNA) and Italy. Italys reported funneling of cash and logistical support to Dabbashi through the GNA therefore benefited all parties; the GNA appeared to exercise control over Dabbashi, the militia received political legitimacy, and Rome avoided accusations of direct engagement with armed criminal groups. In effect, the Italy deal turned yesterdays traffickers [into] todays-trafficking force.
However, while Dabbashi gained legitimacy from this deal, other militias engaged in migrant trafficking suffered. The prevention of migrant departures impacted the interests of the al-Wadi militia, whose smuggling activities and income were subsequently threatened. Al-Wadi and its allies reacted strongly to Dabbashis interruption of the smuggling trade; violence broke out, and al-Wadi succeeded in pushing Dabbashi out of Sabratha after several weeks of fighting.
The clashes are significant because they demonstrate the manipulation of national ideological narratives in local disputes in Libya. The fighting in Sabratha was not confined to Dabbashi and al-Wadi; alliances crystalized that reflected the broader ideological divide in Libya. Al-Wadi and its allies took advantage of an anti-terrorist narrative that is heavily propagated by strongman Khalifa Haftar, the key eastern leader in Libyas east-west split. Haftar regularly labels his foes, including GNA officials, as terrorists in order to delegitimize their positions and bolster his credentials as a bastion against extremism.It came as little surprise that al-Wadi, which has ties to Haftars forces, leveraged this anti-terrorist rhetoric against Dabbashi. Al-Wadi used the civil war narrative of a legitimate battle against extremists to counter the threat to its smuggling operation posed by Dabbashi and to undercut the rival militias legitimacy. As a result, the motivations behind the violence expanded from mere militia rivalries to ideological interests. The head of Sabrathas Military Council summed up the clashes, noting that this is a war that started between human traffickers, then snowballed into an ideological and political one.
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Jalel Harchaoui has written an article for the Syndication Bureau suggesting a new narrative has emerged in northwest Libya to facilitate the emergence of so-called anti-crime militias. The author argues these armed groups identified the publics fatigue of conflict and pounced upon an opportunity to gain legitimacy and power through cynical opportunism more than a real desire to combat crime. Harchaoui suggests:
Tripolis so-called anti-crime militias form a powerful condominium when they coordinate against a common enemy, as was illustrated last year when they expelled several key Islamist and Misrati hard-line figures from the capital. Today, the anti-crime stance continues to be attractive to pragmatists, since it enables those previously associated with Islamists to distance themselves from the latter without having to pledge allegiance to Marshal Haftar, a polarizing strongman still unsure of his nationwide popularity.
The latest leader to jump on the bandwagon is Usama Al-Juwaili, the head of Zintans military council. The 57-year-old commander, who is aligned with the GNA and based 160 kilometers southwest of Tripoli, carried out the advance on Warshefana and the attempt to take control of a key border crossing with Tunisia. In both cases, Al-Juwaili emphasized the necessity to combat crime in those areas. As his men approached Tripoli in November, Haythem Al-Tajuri, an anti-crime figure at the helm of one of Tripolis most powerful groups, accommodated from his end.
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Elissa Miller and Karim Mezran have written an article for the Cairo Review of Global Affairs exploring how efforts to mediate peace in the Libyan crisis have, rather than end hostilities, seen conflict persist. Miller and Merzan detail the series of UN led attempts since 2014, criticizing United Nations Special Representative and Head of UNSMIL Bernardino Leons 2014 political dialogue as weak, and suggest that in general regional mediation efforts in Libya have contributed little to legitimizing the UN process. The authors argue:
The plethora of mediation efforts led by various regional and international actors has overall hindered legitimate progress toward a negotiated solution for Libya. On the face of it, Libyas neighbors and international stakeholders rhetorically support the UN process and the LPA (although there exists a general consensus that the LPA must be amended). Yet these actors have simultaneously pursued their own interests in Libya and to varying degrees hijacked the negotiation process. The UN Support Mission to Libya has candidly acknowledged the threat that these multiple-negotiation tracks pose to the UN process in Libya. As Special Envoy and current head of UNSMIL, Ghassan Salam of Lebanon, said in September 2017 following Pariss efforts, Too many cooks spoil the broth. The UN mission cannot credibly work with Libyans to find a solution to the conflict while its nominal supporters engage in actions that ultimately undercut its efforts. Indeed, Macron and others purport to support UNSMIL but their maneuvers weaken UN authority. It also strengthens Haftars position, as Cairo, Abu Dhabi, and Paris appear to have aligned themselves with the strongman. This is probably why the UN has not been able to seize ownership over the process or change the current course.
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On 23 January, a dual bombing in Benghazi led to at least 40 deaths, with many of those critically injured in the initial attack subsequently dying from their wounds. The first bomb went off outside the Bayaat al-Radwan mosque in the central al-Salmani district, as worshippers were leaving evening prayers. Around 10 to 15 minutes later, after security and health officials had arrived on the scene, a second more powerful blast was reportedly detonated from a Mercedes parked on the opposite side of the street. The victims include both Libyan National Army (LNA) fighters (who control the city) and civilians. No one has claimed responsibility for the attack.
This shocking attack triggered another atrocity reportedly perpetrated by Mahmoud al-Werfalli, the field commander of the LNAs Special Forces division. On 24 January, Werfalli publicly executed twelve people imprisoned by the LNA, who were accused of being jihadists. The video of the executions shows a man who resembles Werfalli shooting the prisoners at the site of the bombings. On 26 January, five more bodies were discovered in a dump in the Lithi area of Benghazi, with notices attached to their bodies accusing them of being jihadists. On 28 January, LNA fighters also arrested a terror cell in Jalou near Ajkherra after walls were vandalised in support of the bombing attack in Benghazi.
These developments sparked widespread local and international condemnation, with UNSMIL and a number of Western countries calling for the implementation of the International Criminal Court (ICC) arrest warrant for al-Werfalli. The ICC issued an arrest warrant for Werfalli in August 2017 due to video evidence of his orchestration and participation in the execution of prisoners in Benghazi, which amounts to war crimes. After the ICC issued the warrant, the LNA announced it was investigating him and had detained him, though his whereabouts were unclear. However, it is now clear that the LNA has so far been unable to arrest Werfalli due to public support for his actions in Benghazi.
Continued here:
Libya Analysis