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At this time last year, I wrote that Libya may become an arena for regional conflict if Turkey continued its military intervention there. But after Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi drew a red line warning Turkey to back off, the potential for regional escalation declined and diplomatic and political efforts were quickly revived .Conflict exhausted domestic constituencies and others weary of expanded regional conflicts accepted a United Nations roadmap focused on building effective institutions for a new Libyan state. These are a positive and welcome developments, even if its too early to rest assured and presume a desirable outcome to the Libyan crisis is easily within grasp.

This year we find ourselves again looking at the summer season with concern and anxiety given the escalating tensions in East Africa surrounding the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD). The tone of political rhetoric between the Egyptian, Sudanese, and Ethiopian leaderships has become strenuous. With the imminent summer rains, Addis Ababa remains stubborn in its determination to begin the second-stage filling of the dam reservoir without a binding legal agreement between the three riparian countries regarding matters of water administration and the reservoir filling schedule.

Egyptian President Sisi has repeatedly warned about the careless misuse of river waters by some states and reiterated that Egypts water rights are inviolable and cannot be touched. He cautioned those who may doubt her resolve in defending its water rights are making an egregious mistake. Sudanese warnings adopt the same tone, promising that all options to protect Sudans security will be considered. This rhetoric follows Ethiopias recalcitrant position in talks about the mega-dam and its determination to commence the second-stage, much-larger filling of dam reservoir this summer without regard to the extent of progress in negotiations. Addis Abba has also emphasized Ethiopias capacity to protect itself from any danger or threat.

All signs indicate that Ethiopias stalling and intransigence has been a long-standing rule. It had declined to cooperate with the International Panel of Experts, whose 2013 report documented numerous concerns about the dams transboundary impact. In 2015 even after the three Nile Basin states signed the Declaration of Principles in Sudan Ethiopia continued to stall and delay attempts to reach a binding agreement. It has persisted in saying that any agreement would be a guidance document that reserves Ethiopias discretion to make independent and unilateral decisions about the dam, its operation, and the flow rate under a variety of climatological conditions, whether rains, floods, or multi-year drought. It has continued to drag its feet at the latest meetings in Congo, offering only perfunctory schemes to notify downstream parties of the measures it has unilaterally adopted.

We now shortly arrive at a highly sensitive juncture where existing alternatives and options do not inspire confidence. It is clear that the current tripartite talks under the auspices of the African Union will not lead to a desired outcome. Space for negotiations and time for political maneuvers no longer exist, as the scheduled filling of the reservoir rapidly approaches. Even were abundant rains to marginally reduce the damage inflicted on Egypt and Sudan, the danger of this next stage is that it prolongs the status quo and implicitly sets a precedent that sensitive decisions about the dam are for Ethiopia unilaterally without consulting the other two parties..

Dialogue is always a more preferable route to resolving conflict provided political will exists. Even if negotiations stall and the situation deteriorates, it is always better to work within the framework of the practical negotiating process. However, the gravity of the current situation reflects Ethiopias attempts to impose a principle of unilateral decision-making that flouts any meaningful, potential accord. Despite Emirati endeavors to mediate the dispute and Saudi Arabias stated intention to host a summit for the three parties, I do not believe theres a clear path forward while Ethiopia continues to act as a unilateral decision-maker. Rather, moving negotiations from the auspices of the African Union to that of the Saudi kingdom or in other fora may open the door for more posturing and stall tactics from Addis Abba.

Egypt and Sudan have the right to resort to a variety of international institutions such as the UN and African Union to gather broad-based support for their position. This is a right and obligation for the two states. However, I do not believe that Ethiopia will respond to calls and resolutions of an international nature particularly that the prevailing discord in the international community does not augur well for reliable enforced compliance.

One wonders if Russian and/or American intervention presents an exit from the dilemma, in light of Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrovs visit to Egypt this past April and the new American administration sending Senator Chris Coons, a visiting delegate in Sudan, to Egypt a few weeks ago followed this week by Jeffrey Feltman the special envoy to the Horn of Africa , I certainly hope these developments inject new political will into resolving the issue. But I am not optimistic. For one, Russias cards to pressure Ethiopia are few, and the statements from the U.S. Department of State appear to lean toward Ethiopia in their support for a proposed, voluntary exchange of information about the dam reservoir. Such proposals enshrine a principle of unilateral decision-making.

For all these reasons, I fear that we have arrived at a perilous juncture, where all options are difficult, and delays on the diplomatic front leave us with an untenable status quo. The potential for collision carries with it great regional and international repercussions. In a tough situation, tough decisions are made. A strong state is one that has the wisdom to resolve conflict through peaceful means and dialogue, considering all potentialities and implications. Strong states are also however those which make decisive, timely decisions when necessary and those which are able to translate the forceful decisions made under difficult circumstances into concrete results.

So, will this summer witness a destabilizing escalation for which all will pay a high price? Or will a miraculous breakthrough save us from needless riskssurprising us with a burst of political will at the last moment? Suffice to say, summer 2021 will leave an indelible mark on the interests of the three Nile Basin states and on the future of East Africa.

Nabil Fahmy, a former foreign minister of Egypt, is the foundingdean of the School of Global Affairs and Public Policy at the American University in Cairo. He served as Egypts ambassador to the United States from 19992008, and as envoy to Japan between 1997 and 1999. On Twitter: @DeanNabilFahmy.

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Summers of Strife: From Libya to Ethiopia The Cairo Review of Global Affairs - The Cairo Review of Global Affairs

The EU is mulling the use of a special budget, designed to deliver military aid, to support Libya's coast guard.

The idea was proposed in an internal document by the EU's foreign policy branch, the EEAS.

"The EU should engage more not only politically but also within the overall capacity-building initiatives," states the document, dated February this year, and seen by EUobserver.

The document was signed off by the commander of Operation Irini. Irini is the EU's naval mission in the Mediterranean Sea, intended to prevent weapons from entering Libya.

The document proposes using the so-called European Peace Facility as part of a deal to relaunch stalled Libyan coast guard training exercises. The European Peace Facility, brokered by the French, comes with a 5bn purse and allows the EU to shore up armies in Africa, and elsewhere.

The money is placed in an off-budget because the EU is banned from using EU funds to finance foreign military operations.

Last month, member states backed the proposal, which means the European Peace Facility is now up and running, allowing the EU to be more assertive abroad.

"These measures may include supplying military and defence related equipment, infrastructure or assistance," it said, in a press statement in March.

The EU says safeguards ensure military assistance, such as small arms and ammunition, will not end up in the wrong hands.

But not everyone is convinced - including German Green MEP Hannah Neumann.

"Although a strict control regime is mentioned, we have already seen in the past that rules are interpreted in a very lax way," she said in March.

The Libyan coast guard is already being used by the European Union to prevent migrants and asylum seekers from reaching European soil.

A recent investigation by Lighthouse Reports, with Der Spiegel, Libration and ARD Monitor, revealed the EU's border agency Frontex is collaborating directly with the guard.

But some of its members are also linked to various Libyan militias, known to torture and extort migrants for ransoms in detention centres.

The EU's naval operation Sophia was training the Libyan coast guard between 2016 and 2020, as part of wider effort to create a Libyan search and rescue zone.

The idea is to get the Libyans to intercept migrants within that zone, returning them to a country wrecked by war. Around 9,500 people were intercepted last year.

Sophia has since been replaced by Irini, which now also wants to shore up the Libyan coast guard to create a "safe and secure environment" at sea.

But the Libyans are demanding more patrol vessels and aircraft, a request that could see the EU use its new 5bn peace facility.

The EU's foreign policy chief, Josep Borrell, has been vocal about its potential use in the past. "We need guns, we need arms, we need military capacities," he had said early last year.

"And that is what we are going to help provide to our African friends because their security is our security," he added, in comments directed towards other conflict areas in Africa like the Sahel.

Excerpt from:
EU mulls using new 'peace' fund to help Libyan coast guard - EUobserver

By Sami Zaptia.

London, 7 May 2021:

The U.S. continued its supports for the unification of Libyas military institutions, for national reconciliation, for the withdrawal of foreign fighters and forces and for the holding of the 24 December elections.

The support came in a statement issued by the U.S. Embassy quoting its Ambassador Richard Norland after his meeting yesterday with Presidency Council member Al-Lafi.

I had a positive meeting with PC Member Al-Lafi yesterday, and was encouraged to hear of the steps the Presidency Council (PC) is proposing for unifying Libyas military institutions a crucial objective, as underscored by the recent events in Chad, and one which must be pursued in an agreed manner with the support of all parties.

We also discussed specific efforts the PC is undertaking to promote national reconciliation, and the critical importance of beginning the withdrawal of foreign forces and fighters and preparing for national elections on December 24 as called for by the LPDF Roadmap and UNSCR 2570.

U.S. supports Foreign Minister Mangoushs call

In a separate statement, Ambassador Norland reiterated the now oft repeated mantra about the withdrawal of foreign forces:

We fully support Foreign Minister Mangoushs unambiguous call for the departure of foreign forces in the interest of Libyan sovereignty and stability.

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US supports Libya military unification, national reconciliation, Mangoush's withdrawal of foreign forces call and 24 December elections | - Libya...

The High Council of State (HCS) has expressed surprise at the joint statement issued by the embassies of Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom, France and the United States in Libya, regarding their indication that the current time is not appropriate for making changes in positions related to preparing elections in Libya.

In a statement Friday, the council considered the embassies statement an interference in the internal affairs of Libya. "The violation of Libyan sovereignty does not only mean the presence of foreign mercenaries on the ground but rather through an attempt to impose foreign political dictates that are categorically rejected," the HCS said.

The council stressed the need to hold the elections on time on solid constitutional foundations, insisting that the independence of the Libyan decision cannot be compromised.

It called on the ambassadors not to go beyond their tasks set by the diplomatic norms. "The foreign ambassadors hould observe the laws of the host country, abide by them, and not jump over them under any pretext," the statement read.

The embassies of the five countries have recalled in their statement the Security Council Resolution 2570 calling for the Libyan authorities and institutions, including the Government of National Unity and the House of Representatives, to facilitate the elections of December 24, 2021, and to agree on the constitutional and legal basis for the elections by July 1, 2021.

The statement added that in addition to the political and security arrangements, technical and logistical preparations are important and essential, stressing that now is not the time for any "disruptive changes" at the relevant bodies which have a fundamental role in preparing for the elections, within the timescale set out by the Security Council Resolution.

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HCS: Statement of western embassies is interference in Libyan internal affairs - The Libya Observer

A Maltese man was arrested in Libya a month ago and his partner has raised concerns about his wellbeing as she faces a bureaucratic wall of silence.

Jesmond Vella, aged 45, known as Il-Bulgaru, was arrested at Zuwarah on suspicion of human smuggling and drug trafficking on April 5.

The operation was carried out by the Rada Special Deterrence Forces, in what was initially feared to be a kidnapping. But it later transpired that the order of the arrest came from the Libyan Attorney General, sources told Times of Malta.

Vella, who has been living in the coastal city of Zuwarah with his Maltese wife for eight years, is also known to the Maltese police.

When contacted, the Maltese ambassador to Libya, Charles Saliba, who is closely following the case, said Vella has not yet been formally charged with the crime.

Lovin Malta reported that Vella, a mechanic, may have suffered a beating or torture in a country still reeling with unrest.

Vella's wife said he had been kidnapped and is currently being held by a militia outside of Tripoli and that bureaucracy and a breakdown in communication are proving troublesome for Maltese authorities and the family, who fear he is in grave danger and may never return home.

She recalled the day when her husband went missing on April 5, saying she returned home when she discovered her husband's car parked in the driveway. His keys were still in the ignition and his cigarettes were left on the driver seat.

The next day she raised the alarm with the Maltese authorities who believe Vella is being detained at Rada's headquarters at Mitiga airport.

Confronted by the claims, the ambassador said: There is a process we need to follow. We have nothing to back claims that he has been tortured. But we will give all the assistance we can.

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Wall of silence one month after Maltese man is arrested in Libya - Times of Malta