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Figure 1. Minute time-lapse of The Egyptian Army (#_) hashtag, showing two suspicious spikes of tweets in a single minute.

We also found two suspicious spikes in account births. The number of accounts created on a single day can potentially indicate coordinated activity; an application or a person may create a large group of accounts at once in order to artificially inflate a hashtag. After analyzing all the accounts that tweeted this hashtag, we found two suspicious spikes in account births: 61 of the accounts were created on Jan. 5, 2017, and 62 of the accounts were created on June 8, 2020 (Figure 2).

After manually investigating these 123 accounts, we found suspicious similarities in the style of profile pictures included within each group. Many of the accounts were already flagged by Twitter for suspicious activity and shared the same or similar profiles and banner photos as other accounts.

Analysis of the relationships between these accounts found the network to be incredibly dense, meaning that all 123 accounts were equally retweeting each other, with no single or smaller group of influencer accounts dominating (Figure 5). The network is an incredibly dense echo chamber, retweeting only within its own network and rarely interacting with accounts outside of those that were created on the same day.

This coordinated, inauthentic campaign in support of the Egyptian army reflected changing dynamics on the ground. Whereas previous information operations strongly praised Haftar and supported his campaign for Tripoli, this online campaign did not focus on the Libyan generalindicating the departure of Haftar from the center of Egypts narrative on Libya.

As Haftar withdrew, Egypts emphasis shifted quickly to shoring up domestic support and promoting domestic interestsnamely, security along the western border. The specious promotion of the Egyptian military online demonstrates how digital manipulation is a low-cost alternative to direct military engagement. The most extreme language appears online, providing an outlet for nationalistic militarism at arms length from the regime. Domestically, this approach creates the perception that the regime is responding aggressively to threats to Egypts western border; for Egypts regional rivals, it clearly signals that these threats are Egypts red line. Bellicose rhetoric is reserved for the online theater and reflects Cairos underlying strategic objective: securing its porous western border.

Another hashtag, Erdogan is a war criminal, also exhibited suspicious characteristics. This tag trended on June 8, and we collected 12,995 tweets containing it between June 2 and 9. Tweets contained in the hashtag included vitriolic attacks on Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, with crude jokes and memes that often portrayed him as an ape. Users tweeting on the hashtag were located in Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the UAE; however, the importance given to this location data must be approached with caution as accounts self-report their own locations. As with the previous hashtag, there was a suspicious spike of 151 tweets in a single minute at 5:36 p.m. on June 8.

We also identified a spike in account births, with 133 accounts created on June 8, the day the hashtag trended (Figure 7).

Interestingly, we found that Ahmed Moussa, an Egyptian presenter on Sada El-Balad satellite channel, announced the creation of this hashtag live on his show (Figure 8). This could be part of a tactic called hashtag laundering, where traditional media announce and promote hashtags to obfuscate their inauthentic origins. This technique was identified in previous information operations targeting Libya. For example, Stanfords Internet Observatory found many examples of this technique, whereby media outlets would report on inauthentic hashtags in an effort to make them appear genuine and authentic. At the same time, it is also possible that a number of Egyptians saw the presenters plea to tweet the hashtag, signed up for Twitter immediately, and tweeted as they were told. This demonstrates how traditional media interact with information campaigns on social media to legitimize and normalize narratives.

The tactics and techniques identified in these trending hashtags reflect previous research conducted on information operations targeting Libya. In September 2019, Twitter removed 271 accounts linked to digital marketing firm DotDev based in both Egypt and the UAE. Researchers analyzed the data released by Twitter and found that these accounts repeatedly spread propaganda targeting the Libyan conflict. In December 2019, Twitter removed 88,000 accounts connected with another social media marketing firm, SMAAT, based in Saudi Arabia. Twitter alleged that these accounts were part of a large state-sanctioned information operation conducted by Saudi Arabia that would target Libya. In March 2020, Facebook removed 55 pages that the company said were affiliated with a digital marketing firm named Maat, based in Egypt. Another takedown by Twitter in April 2020 removed accounts tied to Egypt, the UAE and Saudi Arabia, all of which contained evidence of operations targeted at Libya.

These state-backed campaigns are pervasive and are conducted through the relative safety of third-party digital marketing firms that provide states with discretion and the technical knowledge to conduct complex influence operations. This digital theater of the war is dominated by non-state companies, acting on behalf of their state backers. Influence campaigns on Twitter are often connected with those on Facebook, where fake pages masquerade as legitimate news sources to further spread disinformation and propaganda narratives. News pages, while appearing neutral, act to launder and legitimize propaganda. Finally, there is clear coordination and sharing of resources between states in this regional alliance.

While the Egyptian, Emirati and Saudi axis overwhelmingly dominates information operations targeting Libya, some campaigns and hashtags in support of Turkeys aims have surfaced as well. In June 2020, we observed two diametrically opposed hashtags, both of which exhibited suspicious behavior: Libya, graveyard of Ottomans and Libya, graveyard of Sisi[.] This phenomenon of battling hashtags with nearly identical language has been observed before in the Libyan context.

Uncovering these coordinated campaigns plays an important role in revealing foreign hands. Intervening states actively alter the discourse around important events in conflict to serve their interests; cutting through this propaganda enables a better understanding of the dynamics of these events and the views of those impacted on the ground. Moreover, uncovering these manipulated narratives leads to a better understanding of the interests these actors are pursuing.

Its important not to overemphasize the impact of these campaigns. Coordinated, inauthentic behavior orchestrated by foreign interveners occurs within a wider ecosystem of authentic online engagement, and assessing the extent to which these campaigns have impacted Libyan public opinion is difficult. More research is needed to understand the relationship between inauthentic activity and authentic activity, and how these contests shape domestic, regional and international attitudes toward the conflict. With only 9 percent of Libyans on Twitter, campaigns likely play out only within small circles of the countrys population. Instead, the primary target audience may have been international stakeholders, the media or perhaps the governments themselves.

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Coordinated Behavior in Libya's Regional Disinformation Conflict - Lawfare

The Greek Foreign Ministry late on Saturday announced its plan to reopen the Greek Embassy in Tripoli, the capital city of Libya, and the opening of a Consulate General in Benghazi, a major seaport and the second-most populous city in the Arabic country.

On Friday, members of the Libyan Political Dialogue Forum (LPDF) voted for a new prime minister and a new Presidency Council in UN-sponsored talks in Geneva.

In a statement published on its website, the Greek Foreign Ministry said in light of Friday's developments, by the decision of Foreign Minister Nikos Dendias, the Greek Embassy in Tripoli will reopen.

It also said that in parallel, the necessary procedures will be undertaken to open a Consulate General in Benghazi.

Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis welcomed the election of a new interim government in Libya, in a post on social media on Friday.

He wrote on Twitter: "The election of a new unified Libyan government by the Libyan Political Dialogue Forum in Geneva is an important step towards peace in our neighboring country. Congratulations to the new leadership. All actors should support the process towards democratic and free elections in December."

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Greece to reopen embassy in Libya - Region - World - Ahram Online

The Libyan 5+5 Joint Military Commission (JMC) agreed Saturday on clearing mines in Sirte and reopening all roads leading to the city starting next Wednesday.

The member of the 5+5 JMC for the Government of National Accord, Mukhtar Naqasa, told reporters in a press conference after the meeting in Ouagadougou Hall in Sirte, that the delegations had agreed to start remove mines to pave the way for reopening the coastal road: Sirte-Misrata road.

Naqasa said the measures agreed upon in the meeting will begin on next Wednesday, adding that both delegations had vowed to implement all points of the ceasefire agreement, which was signed last October in Geneva.

He reiterated the keenness of the 5+5 JMC to withdraw all foreign mercenaries and fighters from Libya, urging the Security Council and Libya stakeholders to help implement the ceasefire in the country.

5+5 JMC also welcomed the outcomes of the Libyan Political Dialogue Forum and the election of a new Presidential Council and Prime Minister, hailing the efforts of the UNSMIL in achieving this historic step, thanking as well the field military leaders for their commitment to the ceasefire, paving the way for releasing detainees and making the political process a success.

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Libya's 5+5 JMC agrees on clearing mines in Sirte - The Libya Observer

CAIRO The top U.N. official for Libya said Saturday that an advisory committee for representatives of Libya's different regions has proposed a way forward for choosing a transitional government that would lead the war-torn country to elections late this year.

The talks in Geneva, structured around the Libyan Political Dialogue Forum, have been taking place amid a heavy international push to reach a peaceful settlement to Libya's civil war. Previous diplomatic initiatives have all collapsed.

U.N. acting envoy for Libya Stephanie Williams told a news conference in Geneva that the advisory committee's members "have met their responsibility with a constructive spirit, cooperative efforts, and a great deal of patriotism."

The committee is part of a 75-member forum that represents all the three main regions of Libya. The 18-member committee has proposed that each region's electoral college name a representative to a three-member presidential council, Williams said. A prime minister would be chosen by the 75-member forum. A successful nominee should receive 70% of votes.

Williams said that the forum would resort to lists formed from Libya's three regions, with each list consisting of four names, nominated for the presidential council and a prime minister position.

She said a list should obtain 17 endorsements: eight from the western region, six from the eastern region and three from southern Libya. The wining list should receive 60% of the votes of the 75-member forum in the first round. A run-up is expected if no list received the required votes, she said.

Williams said the forum would vote on the proposed mechanism on Monday and the results are expected the following day.

The transitional government would be "a temporary unified executive staffed by Libyan patriots who want to share responsibility rather than to divide the cake," the U.N. acting envoy said.

The U.S. welcomed the breakthrough and urged all parties of Libya "to work with urgency and in good faith" to establish an interim government, according to a statement by the U.S. Embassy in Libya.

"It is time to move past the conflict and corruption facilitated by the status quo," it said.

The forum is part of the U.N. efforts to end the chaos that engulfed the oil-rich North African nation after the 2011 overthrow and killing of dictator Moammar Gadhafi. It has reached an agreement last year to hold presidential and parliamentary elections on Dec. 24, 2021.

The oil-rich country is now split east to west between two rival administrations, each backed by an array of militias and foreign powers.

The warring sides agreed to a U.N.-brokered cease-fire in October in Geneva, a deal that included the departure of foreign forces and mercenaries from Libya within three months.

No progress was announced on the issue of foreign forces and mercenaries since they inked the cease-fire deal almost two months ago.

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UN says breakthrough achieved in Libya transition talks - Minneapolis Star Tribune

There is a U.N. embargo prohibiting arms shipments to Libya, but it is an abject failure. Its decade-long prohibitions have been openly flouted by various countries, to include states who are members in good standing of the so-called international community and the U.N. Security Council itself. They are joined by an assembly of foreign commercial profiteers exploiting Libyas carnage for their own gain. Much of the furor around this failure is rightly focused on the Security Councils conspicuous failure to publicly identify and assign culpability to individual member state violators. Yet this surrender runs deeper. It is embedded in the embargos authorizing language, and in the textual exemptions that allow the uneven (and seemingly preferential) policing of the various weapons supply chains (and the foreign state actors) that equip Libyas rival warring factions. Nowhere have these textual handicaps been more exploited than in the aerial ecosystem developed by the Russian and Gulf-based supporters of renegade Gen. Khalifa Haftar in his bid to unseat the internationally recognized Government of National Accord.

Back in June 2016, the Security Council passed Resolution 2292, which authorized member states to inspect suspected weapons shipments entering Libya, but only through the high seas. This provision left open the aerial supply routes used by Russia and its Middle Eastern partners principally the United Arab Emirates to supply Haftar and his Libyan National Army. Resolution 2292 in its singular focus on deterring maritime weapons flows appeared to target the predominantly sea-borne weapons supplies provided to the Government of National Accord by its principal foreign sponsor: Turkey.

This resolution in its selective exclusion of air and ground-based supply routes seemed to empower Haftars Russian and Gulf-state sponsors. These countries have used both military and commercial aerial providers, some of which are implicated in previous embargo violations outside Libya, including in conflicts in Somalia and South Sudan. By failing to uniformly enforce embargo restrictions across all trafficking mediums land, air, and sea the council effectively allowed Haftar to maintain illicit access to Russian and Emirati weapons supplies an action that has contributed to the defeat of the embargo regime in Libya.

How Did We Get Here?

During the early days of the 2011 revolution, regional rivals Qatar and the United Arab Emirates entered the fray on the back of the American-led intervention to depose long-term dictator Muammar Gaddafi. The two joined the United States, the United Kingdom, and France in the deployment of special operations forces in a bid to mold and direct the character of the post-Gaddafi state. The conflict soon fractured into hyper-local contests for resources, territorial control, and patronage as Libyan elites scrambled to secure foreign sponsorship for weapons, training, refuge, and financial largesse. But as the United States, the United Kingdom and France prioritized counterterrorism interventions over post-conflict governance, Russia saw an opportunity to influence battlefield outcomes and cement its expanding continental foothold.

Russias rivals accommodated and, in the case of France,tacitly abetted the hegemonic and anti-Islamist ambitions of the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt, all of whom opposed the sway of pro-Islamist forces in a post-conflict Libya. This alliance had long backed Haftar and was opposed by Turkey and Qatar the regional standard bearers for pro-Islamist political groups and militant forces across the region. Russia, on the other hand, covertly supported Haftar through mercenaries and aerial support encouraged by American ambivalence and European accommodation for Haftar and his Gulf-based allies.

This dizzying array of competing interventions transformed once-localized conflicts into international contests. States poured in military equipment, trainers, and foreign fighters using a combination of military and commercial assets alike. Some, like Qatar, deployed military cargo planes and fighter jets as fault lines between Islamist and anti-Islamist forces crystalized into outright civil war in 2014. The United Arab Emirates, Russia, and Egypt followed suit, surging weapons deliveries to Haftar using both military and commercial aircraft. And as the tide of conflict shifted in Haftars favor in early 2019, Turkey shed the covert trappings of its military support to the Government of National Accord. It instead escalated maritime-based shipments of weapons, armored personnel carriers, drones, and Syrian mercenaries, backed by the deployment of Turkish military and intelligence personnel.

The Security Councils Lackluster Response

At the outset of the initial U.N. embargo on Libya in 2011, the Security Council authorized inspections of weapons shipments transiting through member state territories, and called upon all member states to cooperate. As post-revolution violence evolved into outright civil war in 2014, the council, through Resolution 2174, barred all arms shipments entering Libya without advance approval. This requirement, however, failed to curb the continuous trafficking of illicit weapons on both land and sea as documented in annual U.N. embargo inspection reports that date back to 2012.

The Security Council responded in 2016 with Resolution 2292, which authorized maritime inspections on the high seas off the coast of Libya. This resolution did not include similar provisions for air and ground-based trafficking. It all but ignored the aerial routes predominantly used by the United Arab Emirates and Russia. Resolution 2292 due to its singular maritime focus had the effect of selectively targeting weapons flows from Turkey to the Government of National Accord as a result of their dominant transit by sea. By the time the European Union launched Operation IRINI under the auspices of Resolution 2292 in early 2020, its maritime focus was roundly criticized as selectively focused on Turkeys materiel transfers to the Government of National Accord.

This uneven policing of maritime trafficking routes ostensibly left air- and ground-based movements unchecked. And while land-based smuggling is more easily hidden from public view, recent advances in open data research have simplified the detection of illicit aerial activity through open source techniques that are increasingly available to the broader public. In Libya, these techniques have exposed the role of commercial and military aircraft in embargo breaches that further reveal the inherent flaws of Security Council Resolution 2292.

Inside Libyas Illicit AerialCavalries

Despite the assertive use of military aircraft in the trafficking of weapons into Libya, commercial aircraft are similarly implicated. But, unlike their military counterparts, commercial aircraft are more vulnerable to public scrutiny due to domicile requirements that compel owners to register aircraft in publicly accessible national registries. Some of these aircraft are hidden behind opaque ownership structures, but must expose vital identifying information while in flight. These safety-based requirements create digital trails that reveal an aircrafts pattern of life, especially when implicated in potentially illicit activity.

These vulnerabilities have helped to expose aerial transfers from the Gulf to Haftar as documented by U.N. embargo monitors from 2011 through 2019. Some of the aircraft implicated were involved in other embargo violations during conflicts in Somalia and South Sudan. In at least two cases, one in 2011 and another in 2013, aircraft operated by a Libyan and Armenian airline transferred hundreds of thousands of ammunition rounds f into Benghazi reportedly on behalf of the United Arab Emirates. Once details of this transfer leaked to the public, the aircraft were promptly re-registered to a different United Arab Emirates-based commercial entity. In 2016, the same United Arab Emirates-based company appeared in a separate weapons trafficking incident in South Sudan, this time in violation of a separate U.N. embargo.

These aircraft cycled through different corporate owners, transiting through secrecy jurisdictions with lax scrutiny of prior illicit activity. In at least one case in 2015, U.N. investigators identified an aerial transfer of several million rounds of ammunition from Belarus to Tripoli brokered by Slobodan Tei, a weapons trafficker previously sanctioned by the United Nations for embargo breaches that date back to the Liberian civil war. The reappearance of these prior offenders in Libya underscores the folly in the Security Councils errant exclusion of aerial supply routes from its enforcement mechanism a decision that has decisively benefited Haftar and his Gulf-based sponsors based on their dominant use of aerial trafficking routes and networks.

Rebalancing the Scales

The failures of the U.N. embargo in Libya are in many ways self-inflicted. By leaving aerial trafficking outside the embargo monitoring mechanism, the council all but ensured that some foreign state actors would maintain unfettered aerial access to domestic combatants. The councils singular focus on maritime trafficking routes also undermined its legitimacy as an impartial mediator by seemingly targeting Turkish supply lines, while allowing Gulf-based aerial flows to continue unimpeded.

The Security Council has so far avoided public condemnation of individual member states and their embargo-related violations a reticence likely designed to preserve their diplomatic participation in the current peace process. This guarded approach does little to repair the councils eroded credibility and that of its embargo. To arrest this decline, the council can endorse several technical interventions that empower member states, either individually, or as part of regional organizations like the European Union to more stringently police aerial trafficking corridors.

The European Union has so far taken the lead in sanctioning commercial airlines for breaching the Libyan embargo. On Sept. 21, 2020, the European Union sanctioned Sigma Airlines, a Kazakhstan-based airline linked to the United Arab Emirates and implicated in prior material breaches of the Libyan weapons embargo. Kazakh authorities subsequently suspended its operating license alongside two additional airlines found in similar breach. These enforcement actions deprived each operator of critical financial and logistics facilities. Yet more such measures including airspace denial are urgently needed.

The threat of airspace denial compels commercial airlines to choose between access or exclusion from transit corridors that save both time and money in flight time. Airspace denial when backed by aggressive suspension of operational licenses and financial sanctions can impede, though not entirely disrupt, the ability for blacklisted aircraft to transit in and out of destinations in Libya. These actions do not obviate the urgent need for council resolutions that authorize the even policing of all trafficking mediums air, land, and sea. They do, however, provide practical enforcement pathways for a critical weapons supply pipeline utilized not just in Libya but in other regional conflicts.

Looking Ahead

The Libyan conflict has exposed dire deficiencies in the Security Councils approach to embargo enforcement. These flaws are the result of uneven treatment of the different weapons supply chains arming domestic combatants (and the foreign state actors that make use of them). These defects are not limited to the Libyan context but extend to other regional conflicts. They expose the peril of preferential approaches to embargo enforcement and the damage inflicted on the Security Councils own credibility. Some of these defects can be rectified through technical interventions but an enduring correction begins with the admission that in Libya, the Security Council is the author of its worst enforcement failures.

Peter Kirechu is the former program director of the Conflict Finance and Irregular Threats Program at the Center for Advanced and Defense Studies. He is a specialist on illicit transnational networks in the Middle East and Africa.

Image: State Department (Photo by Ron Przysucha)

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Profiteers, Vultures, and the Defeat of the UN Embargo on Libya - War on the Rocks