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A Libyan spy who worked for Colonel Muammar Gaddafi's brutal secret police has a legal battle to be granted asylum in the UK.

The 30-year-old man, named only as MS in court documents, was a member of Libya's feared Internal Security Service (ISS) and reported on students and neighbours suspected of opposing the regime.

A UK court has upheld his claim that if he is deported to Libya he faces persecution and torture in his home country.

The case follows revelations in Sunday Telegraph that the Home Office has secretly excluded from Britain the prime suspect in the murder of WPC Yvonne Fletcher.

Libyan Saleh Ibrahim Mabrouk, who had claimed asylum in 2011 after the fall of Gaddafi, was stopped from returning to the UK after he visited Libya last year.

Last night Andrew Bridgen, Conservative MP for North West Leicestershire, told the Sunday Telegraph: 'The British sense of fair play is being stretched beyond its elastic limit by what appear to be ludicrous judgments granted to refugees and asylum seekers.'

In the new case, MS, who worked in one of Gaddafi's prisons, fled Libya for the UK after the fall of the regime.

He sought asylum in 2013 claiming protection under the Human Rights Act, saying if he returned to Libya he would suffer retribution from those whom he had informed on.

He also said he feared being tortured by Gaddafi's enemies.

Initially, his claim for asylum was refused by the Home Secretary on the grounds that he had 'aided and abetted crimes against humanity' through his work with the secret police.

Home Office lawyers argued that four students, a university lecturer and a neighbour were all arrested by Gaddafi's feared Internal Security Service after MS passed on his intelligence.

Some of them were held in Jdeida Prison were MS later worked.

The Home Secretary said that the Gaddafi regime 'engaged in widespread or systematic attacks directed against the civilian population, namely by detaining, torturing and killing (in particular by the ISS) opponents of the regime with particular reference to the period leading up to the Libyan Revolution in 2011'.

Government lawyers argued that MS's involvement in crimes against humanity meant he fell outside the protection of the international conventions for the protection of refugees.

But MS appealed the decision, arguing that he did not know that Gaddafi and the ISS were involved in torture and murder.

Now a judge has ruled in MS's favour, upholding his appeal in the Upper Immigration Tribunal.

In his written judgement Judge Andrew Grubb said: "I am satisfied that the judge [the first to hear his appeal] reached a rational finding for sustainable reasons that the appellant was to be believed and that, as a result, it had not been established that there were "serious reasons" to consider that he was guilty of a crime against humanity through his involvement in the ISA (ISS) between 2010 and 2011.

The judge was entitled to reject the Secretary of State's reliance on Art 1F(a) [of the Refugee Convention] and to allow the appellant's appeal on asylum grounds."

Last week Boris Johnson told the House of Commons that he will consider reopening the criminal inquiry into the prime suspect linked to the murder of WPC Yvonne Fletcher.

The Prime Minister made the pledge after The Sunday Telegraph reported that Saleh Ibrahim Mabrouk had been arrested on suspicion of conspiracy to murder in 2015, but the case against him was controversially dropped on the grounds of national security in 2017.

WPC Fletcher was shot dead outside the Libyan embassy in London in 1984. Mabrouk is the only person that was ever arrested in connection with WPC Fletcher's murder.

Hewas a senior member of the 'revolutionary committee' that ran the Libyan embassy at the time of the murder.

He was expelled from Britain in the aftermath but allowed back in 2000 after Tony Blair restored relations with Libya.

In 2011 Mabrouk returned to live in Berkshire after claiming asylum in the UK. He was arrested in 2015 in connection with the murder but was told two years later the case would not go forward.

Excerpt from:
Libyan spy who worked for Colonel Gaddafi's regime in legal battle to remain in UK - Telegraph.co.uk

The Libyan General Staff proposed to the Head of Presidential Council Fayez Al-Sarraj, as the Chief Commander of the Army, the formation of National Guard to contain the backup forces and to ensure Libya remains a civilian state.

The proposal came in a letter sent by the Chief of Staff Mohammed Al-Sharif to Al-Sarraj on Wednesday.

The proposal says the National Guard would be tasked with confronting threats to the civilian state and help Libyan Army forces defend Libya's sovereignty and unity, as well as being headquartered in Tripoli and headed by an officer with a rank of Colonel, at the lowest, to be appointed by Libya Army Chief Commander.

"Joining the National Guard would be through recruitment, appointment, transfer, mandate or circulation." The proposal adds.

The Libyan Interior Ministry held meetings with the General Staff over the last period to come up with proposals to allow armed factions that helped defend Tripoli to join state security and military institutions.

The formation of a National Guard has been circulated in Libya since 2012, yet some parties have been hindering its formation for partisan and ideological reasons.

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Libyan General Staff proposes formation of National Guard to contain armed factions - The Libya Observer

In 2020, the humanitarian community will aim to reach around 345,000 people, 39 per cent of the 893,000 people identified to be in need of humanitarian assistance. These are people that have met the extreme and catastrophic categories under the HNO severity scaling (indicating acute severity) as a result of a partial or total collapse of living standards and basic services, increased reliance on negative coping strategies, and widespread physical and mental harm. The response will target five groups identified as particularly vulnerable IDPs, non-displaced conflictaffected Libyans, highly vulnerable returnees, and migrants and refugees impacted by the crisis across the 22 mantikas of the country. Based on assessed needs, the response prioritizes the provision of life-saving food, shelter, health, protection and WASH assistance, livelihoods support and improved access to basic and essential services. Additionally, capacity building and technical training and awareness raising with national and local authorities and humanitarian partners, are priority activities; as well as strengthening coordination and evidence-based needs analysis. Protection remains at the core of the response. Specific protection activities and services complement interventions in health, shelter, food and non-food items, water, hygiene and sanitation and education, 5 ensuring a response that seeks to reduce protection risks while addressing needs. Integrated response modalities, such as the Rapid Response Mechanism (RRM), will remain a key feature to strengthen intersectoral complementarity and maintain the flexibility and speed required in Libyas volatile operating environment. Integrated response approaches are also built around key thematic areas of intervention or geographical locations of people in need, such as detention centres and areas of displacement. This includes increased focus on a more people-centered and more accountable response through the establishment of an Inter-Agency Common Feedback Mechanism.

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Libya | HumanitarianResponse

There has been mildly encouraging news out of Libya in recent months, almost nine years after the overthrow of Muammar Qaddafi led to chaos rather than an improvement in governance and stability. The international community has ignored many chances to help the country get back on its feet. Now it has another opportunity that should not be squandered, lest a humanitarian tragedy ensue, and Libya once again becomes a gateway of numerous refugees streaming into Europe, as well as extremists making their way to the conflicts of the broader Middle East region.

The immediate reasons for this renewed opportunity come from a series of military setbacks by the forces of Khalifa Hafter and his Libyan National Army, which is essentially one large militia operating out of strongholds in the east. Last spring, Hafter and his forces moved south then west, taking much of the country, including the central regions where oil is produced, ultimately knocking on the door of the capital of Tripoli, a city otherwise generally spared of the fighting until then. Haftar benefited from Russian mercenaries and United Arab Emirates airpower, and quieter assistance from countries such as Egypt, France, and Saudi Arabia.

Fortunately, various militias operating in support of the Government of National Accord, led by Prime Minister Fayez Sarraj and blessed by the United Nations, have managed to push Haftar back, first out of the city center, then out of nearby strongholds, and now entirely out of the west. The situation is still fluid, to be sure, and Russian warplanes have been seen in the country, raising the prospect of an escalation. With material assistance from Turkey, however, the tide has now turned.

Libya again resembles what had been the norm for a number of years, with a well intentioned but weak government effectively controlling only parts of Tripoli, various militias dominating in one city or another, some oil flowing with production, and the population generally managing to scrape by, at least more so than people in other war torn Middle East lands such as Yemen and Syria can. This means there is an opportunity.

Tracking a similar state of affairs in 2018 as part of a working group led by the Brookings Institution, we advocated a form of governance based on cities for Libya. Rather than a strong central state with its own powerful military, we favored effectively stitching the country together piece by piece from the ground up. Militias and other local power brokers that tolerated outside observers, minimized use of violence, and provided security or services to local populations would, under this concept, qualify for a prorated share of the oil revenue in Libya.

An oversight board composed of Libyans as well as outside technical experts would make the determinations about who qualifies for such funding, and who should be at least temporarily docked from some of it based on bad behavior. A United Nations observation force could also deploy to the country in small numbers, not to keep the peace, but to report on violations and thus incentivize the militias to keep the peace between themselves and within the areas they control.

The situation in Libya does not suggest that all armed groups in the area can lay down their weapons. Their existence is not only a phenomenon related to power. It goes much deeper. Young men, without a state grid capable of giving them a critical citizenship dimension, have found their economic and social realization in the militias, a sense of belonging that will be difficult to unhinge. Over time, this system could evolve into a set of municipal governments and small armies or paramilitaries that would then join the coast guard as a truly national security service. The effort would happen from the bottom up and not the top down.

But there are some problems. Haftar may not yet have accepted his return to a regional power broker in just part of Libya. If he is hatching plans to retake much or all of the country again, he will have to be stopped. But the challenge is that this kind of idea is not going to emerge from the Libyans themselves. There is not enough trust, and there are too many disparate actors, all of whom are relatively weak. None except perhaps Sarraj are in a position to request the economic and security assistance, along with a United Nations observation force, that would most likely be needed for such a concept of recovery and reunification.

At a time of uncertainty at home and abroad, and with diplomatic efforts from North Korea to Afghanistan and elsewhere mostly dead in the water, the administration should consider arbitrating a new peace process to promote a vision of cooperation in Libya. The United States more than other parties is still seen by most Libyans as neutral and relatively well intentioned. The moment is ripe to give this problem another try, while being more realistic about what it will take to bring some semblance of order to Libya than other previous efforts have attempted.

Michael OHanlon is a senior fellow and Federica Saini Fasanotti is a nonresident scholar in foreign policy with the Brookings Institution.

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The next steps in Libya | TheHill - The Hill

By Salma El Wardany on 6/25/2020

CAIRO (Bloomberg) --Libyas oil industry is crumbling after more than nine years of neglected maintenance amid a civil war thats killed thousands and destroyed towns across the country.

The lack of basic, nuts-and-bolts servicing has left pipelines corroding and storage tanks collapsing. Remedial work at wells alone could cost more than $100 million, the head of the state-run National Oil Corp. told Bloomberg, and thats money the government can ill afford.

The damage means that Libya, despite having Africas largest crude reserves, will struggle to ramp up production quickly even if the conflict abates soon. Fighters are poised now for what could be a decisive battle at Sirte, a city just a two-hour drive from the so-called oil crescent -- a cluster of export terminals for most of the nations crude.

Libya produces about 90,000 barrels a day. Thats a fraction of the 1.6 million that companies such as Eni SpA and Repsol SA pumped in partnership with the NOC before the ouster of strongman Moammar Al Qaddafi in 2011 and the catastrophic war that followed. Until now, the NOC has usually succeeded in restoring operations quickly after regaining control of oil facilities shut due to fighting. That resilience, however, is fraying.

The longer we wait, the greater the damage and the higher the cost, NOC Chairman Mustafa Sanalla said in a written response to questions. It is a tragedy for the people of Libya that political game-playing has been allowed to cause such damage to our countrys critical national infrastructure.

The political turmoil has left Libya divided between a United Nations-recognized government in the capital Tripoli, where the NOC has its headquarters, and a competing administration based in the east. Since January, when supporters of the eastern-based commander Khalifa Haftar shut most of the countrys oil fields and ports, daily output has plunged by more than a million barrels.

The Tripoli government of Fayez al-Sarraj, backed by Turkey, appears for now to have the upper hand on the battlefield. Its troops repulsed Haftars western offensive and have advanced as far as Sirte, on the central coast, which the rebels still control. When Haftar, who has support from Russia and Egypt, called a cease-fire this month, the government rejected it, saying it would first capture Sirte and an air base called Jufra.

Armed groups forced Libyas biggest oil field of Sharara to stop production twice this month, and they also closed the nearby El-Feel deposit. Both southwestern fields had only just re-opened after halting in January.

The NOCs lack of access to Sharara prevented workers from injecting chemicals into a pipeline to stop corrosion. A 16,000-barrel tank that handles overflows, or surges, collapsed last month as a result, Sanalla said.

We are deeply concerned about corrosion in the pipelines, he said. Due to the disruption of exports, crude oil has stayed in the pipelines, which has environmental and other implications that will not be easy to address in the future.

Harouge Oil Operations, a joint venture between the NOC and Canadas Suncor Energy Inc., blames corrosion for at least 80 leaks at its facilities from January to May, Sanalla said. Harouge exports crude from Libyas third-largest oil port at Ras Lanuf.

Throughout the last nine years, Libyan production has been able to rebound, said Mohammad Darwazah, an analyst at consultant Medley Global Advisors. But many fields require urgent maintenance, and damage sustained to storage depots at the eastern terminals has not been fully repaired, limiting how quickly fields can ramp up.

Prolonged shutdowns have reduced the pressure that wells need to spout oil. On earlier occasions when Sharara re-opened, it took just a few days to restore production to around 300,000 barrels a day. This time, the field will need around three months to recover, according to the NOC.

How to pay for the repairs is an open question; the NOC said Sunday that blockades of fields and ports by Haftars supporters have deprived Libya of $6 billion in potential oil revenue since January.

Sustained under-funding of the state operator and multiyear delays to field and asset maintenance will make the challenge of a resumption greater this time around, said Bill Farren-Price, a director at consultant RS Energy Group Canada Inc.

Any increase in Libyan supply could jar efforts by the OPEC+ coalition to limit global production. The Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries and allies such as Russia are seeking to rebalance crude markets and prop up prices after they crashed with the spread of the coronavirus early in the year. Brent crude has more than doubled since late April, but at around $40 a barrel its still down 40% this year.

Libya, an OPEC member, is exempt from the output cuts, due to the nations strife.

For energy analysts and traders, the rot in Libyas oil facilities makes it that much tougher to predict when production will pick up.

Even if a peace deal is reached, its durability and impact on oil production remain uncertain, analysts at Citigroup Inc., including Francesco Martoccia, said in a note this month. The NOC is also confronting a steep natural decline rate of roughly 8% per year, which requires capital expenditures to at least marginally offset it.

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Civil war's end won't be enough to revive Libyan oil production - WorldOil