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As Russian mercenaries fled the Libyan capital last summer, they left behind booby-trapped houses and yards. They attached explosives to toilet seats, doors, and teddy bears, designed to detonate upon touch, Libyan deminers say.

Most devious, perhaps, were the empty soft-drink cans.

Many young Libyans like to playfully crush them, and so the Russians designed the cans to explode upon pressure. They studied us, even how our kids played, says Rabie Aljawashi, the head of the Free Fields Foundation, a Libyan demining agency. They know how we think.

Now, Libya demining teams are scouring the war-scarred landscape to rid it of this lethal legacy, and theyre finding troves of unexploded munitions left behind both intentionally and unintentionally not just by the Russian mercenaries, who had backed renegade Libyan commander Khalifa Haftar, but by earlier waves of conflict.

Some of the ordnance dates back to Libyas Arab Spring revolution a decade ago, which led to the removal and killing of dictator Muammar Gaddafi and left his massive stores of weapons in the hands of numerous militias. In Tripolis war-battered southern neighbourhoods, such as Ein Zara, deminers are also discovering unexploded shells and mortar rounds, including American ones, from Gaddafis arsenals.

But the deadliest finds are Russian-made mines, according to the deminers. They say they had never seen anything like them before Haftars failed campaign in 2019 to seize the capital. Hundreds, perhaps thousands, of families are still unable to return to their homes because of mines and other explosives. Reports of casualties emerge on social media nearly every week.

Even our kids play on the grounds, everywhere. We just warn them not to get close if they see these weapons

Of all the conflicts in Libya since 2011, this one by far was the worst for us, says Moad Elarabi, operations manager for the Free Fields Foundation. From this conflict, we found a lot of new weapons, all brought from outside.

On a recent morning, a team of deminers in tan uniforms and blue surgical masks gathers at the Free Fields Foundation office. They have received two calls for help.

The families are waiting for us, team leader Mohammed Zlateni tells them. I wish you the best, and I hope we come back safely.

Their convoy of four vehicles, including an ambulance, pull out with emergency lights flashing. Half an hour later, they arrive at a farm off Tripolis Airport Road, a former front line of the war. Zlateni and his deputy put on blue protective gear and visors.

In a field lies an American-made 81-millimetre mortar shell, the fin still attached. Zlateni, wiry with short-cropped black hair, scrapes the dirt around the weapon and finds its safety pin still intact. He picks up the shell and carries it back to a pickup truck. His co-worker places it on a bed of sand inside a thick box.

Abdul Rahman al-Ghobailys children pictured outside their home. Al-Ghobaily was injured twice by booby traps left behind on the familys property

(The Washington Post)

The next stop is another farm. A large shell has been sitting in a field for nine months. Two others were found more recently.

This is very normal, says Khalid al-Zaroq, 43, a government employee, who had called the deminers. Even our kids play on the grounds, everywhere. We just warn them not to get close if they see these weapons.

Less than an hour later, Zlateni has safely disposed of all three shells. All were Russian-made.

Its a sad thing to see the worlds trash dumped in Libya, he says. Those who are responsible are those who backed the sides [in Libyas civil war]. If there was no outside support, this would not have happened. We Libyans are now paying the price.

Last summer, Free Fields Foundation teams were among the first deminers to enter areas that had been controlled by the Russian mercenaries of the Kremlin-linked Wagner Group. They discovered 107 improvised explosive devices on a single street in Tripolis southern enclave of Salahideen, says Aljawashi.

Ali Shama and his son Mahmoud stand on the spot where Abdulrahim died

(The Washington Post)

Inside houses, the deminers discovered bodybuilding equipment, imported bottles of water, and cans of fortified milk formula. Graffiti was scrawled on walls in Russian and Serbian. There were also instructions on how to open doors or go to the bathroom without triggering the explosive traps designed by the mercenaries. One toilet was designed with a sensor to ignite 9lb of TNT when a person sat on the seat, the deminers recall.

They say they also found a teddy bear that had six trip wires attached so it would explode when someone walked towards it from any direction. An empty drink-can bomb was designed with a pressure-plate system to be triggered by the weight of half an AK-47 bullet.

The problems we faced were not the items, but the way they placed them, says Elarabi. All the items were booby-trapped in a new way we didnt face before.

The deminers also report finding a range of innovative mines, including a Russian scattering mine that deploys itself and self-destructs in 100 hours, an anti-personnel mine with laser beams as trip wires, and sinister combinations of mines, such as an arrangement in which one mine is a decoy and another explodes.

Mortar shell packaging litters the side of the road at a farm in the suburbs of Tripoli. A militia was using this position to launch mortar rounds

(The Washington Post)

After identifying the munitions, the deminers sent photographs to consultants in the United States and Europe. One Ukrainian adviser said the devices resembled those used in the conflict in Crimea, where Wagner troops have also fought.

Over several weeks last summer, two members of the demining team reportedly cleared more than 400 mines and other explosive devices from more than 200 homes. But this success came at a high cost. In early July, the pair were killed when an improvised explosive device hidden inside a home blew up.

After Haftars forces fled last summer, Abdul Rahman al-Ghobaily, a 48-year-old telecommunications worker, returned to his family compound. As he opened the front door of his house, he was unaware of the peril that awaited. When I turned the doors handle and pushed, a grenade fell and exploded, recalls al-Ghobaily, a compact man with a grey-stubbled face. My leg was badly injured.

His brother, Muhanned, was behind him at the time, and escaped harm.

Fifteen days later, the two brothers were at their compounds entrance, along with another brother, Juwaili. Deminers spotted a thin wire connected to a stick on one side and a detonator on the other.

A recovered and unexploded artillery shell, which will be moved to a storage area and then disposed of in a controlled explosion

(The Washington Post)

They told the three brothers and another deminer to back up slowly toward the familys white Toyota Corolla. But one of them tripped the wire to another mine.

Muhanned and Juwaili were killed. So was the deminer. Shrapnel struck al-Ghobailys right forearm, fracturing it.

Tripolis children are being hit especially hard by the epidemic of mines and other munitions.

Abdulrahim, 9, and his cousin Muhammed, 10, played video games together. They liked the same soccer teams. They went to school together. They were inseparable, says Ali Shama, the father of Abdulrahim, the youngest of his six children.

The family had returned to their home a week earlier after fleeing Haftars offensive, and the boys were outside playing with firecrackers near a half-built wall, when a huge explosion occurred, most likely an unexploded mortar round, deminers would say later.

Mohammed Zlateni, left, and his colleagues at the Free Fields Foundation, prepare to collect an unexploded mortar round from a field in the suburbs of Tripoli

(The Washington Post)

Shama, who had been inside his house performing his afternoon prayers, ran out. When I came, I found my sons head, covered with blood, recalls Shama, his eyes red and tears flowing down his face. He was already dead.

My nephew was still alive, Shama continues. He had lost one hand. It was almost 50ft from his body.

He died in the ambulance.

That was when I knew the war had not ended, Shama says.

The Washington Posts Husen Gdora contributed to this report.

The Washington Post

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They know how we think: How Russian mercenaries left Libya lethally booby-trapped - The Independent

Mohamed* was just 14 years old when he left Somalia, entrusting his life to traffickers in hopes of reaching Europe. In Libya, he was tortured and almost died from tuberculosis. Thanks to a humanitarian corridor, the 17-year-old was able to transfer to Italy and receive medical care.

After two months of hospitalization for a severe form of tuberculosis that almost killed him, Mohamed* is now ready to begin a new life. However, it will not be easy for him to forget the past -- his arms are marked with scars from the torture to which he was subjected in Libya.

At just 14 years old, he left his home country in hopes of reaching Europe. He only told doctors about his plans, not his parents or his nine siblings. Before he arrived in Libya, he entrusted his life to a human trafficking organization and crossed through Ethiopia, Sudan, and Egypt.

In Libya, he was imprisoned and tortured by traffickers, first in a camp and then in a flat.

Mohamed got on boats headed toward Europe twice but both were stopped by Libya's coast guard. While at a detention center, he fell ill with tuberculosis -- a life-threatening disease -- and a node in his neck that prevented him from swallowing.

He was sent to a hospital in Libya, where a tube was inserted into his abdomen to artificially feed him. But after he was released from the hospital, his condition worsened rapidly.

What saved him was a humanitarian corridor -- a program that allows vulnerable migrants and refugees to be transferred from Libya to Italy because private charities (mostly Church organizations) sponsor their stay in Italy. Mohamed was able to travel to Italy, where he was treated at Meyer Children's Hospital in Florence.

"When he arrived at Meyer, he was in critical condition," said Lucia Macucci, a nurse from the international cooperation unit of the children's hospital. "He was very weak, malnourished, fainting and almost couldn't walk."

He has since been released from the hospital and will be welcomed into a foster home where he can begin his new life.

*name has been changed

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One teen migrant's story: Torture and tuberculosis in Libya, then saved by humanitarian corridor - InfoMigrants

Salif* has attempted to cross the Mediterranean Sea six times in the past four years in the hope of reaching Europe from Libya. The 19-year-old Sub-Saharan migrant told InfoMigrants how the departures from the Libyan coast work. He says traffickers and Libyan coast guard officers are sometimes the same people.

"The price to cross the Mediterranean is 3,500 Libyan dinars [about 640]. Prices have increased with the health crisis: before the pandemic, it cost 2,000 dinars [about 360 euros].

When an attempt fails and you manage to try again quickly, some smugglers do not charge again or they charge much less, about 1,500 dinars [about 275].

This is how the crossing attempts work: A few days before the boat's launch, the traffickers gather the migrants in abandoned buildings or large outdoor spaces near the sea. These places, called 'campos', are usually far away from residential areas.

There can be between 150 and 200 migrants staying in the 'campo', including women and children. The people in charge of guarding us and maintaining order are often [Sub-Saharan] Africans who work with the Libyans. They can sometimes be even more violent than the Arabs.

>> Also read: Libya: Alleged migrant trafficker Al-Milad freed

Life there is very difficult. Phones are forbidden and silence must be total. If we talk or make noise, the guards hit us violently. Sometimes we are also beaten for no reason. The women are taken away almost every day. We don't know exactly what happens to them, but I think many are raped.

At the 'campo', the traffickers give us very little to eat. So before being taken there, you have to stock up on food. I try to take enough cookies and bread to last several weeks, because you can stay there for a long time, waiting for good weather conditions. It is the smugglers who decide when to leave.

>> Also read: 'What has happened?': About 110 people potentially unaccounted for in the Mediterranean

'In the boat, the migrants have a well-defined role'

On the evening of the launch, the smugglers take us to the water's edge in small cars or in trailers, where we are hidden under tarps. On the beach, there are usually between five and ten Libyans. They are the ones who get the migrants into the boats.

Inside the dinghy, things are well organized: several migrants are given well-defined roles.

Before leaving, the smugglers entrust a satellite phone to an Arabic-speaking migrant. A few hours after departure, the smugglers contact him to make sure that there are no problems on board: that no water is entering the boat and that the engine is working properly.

There is also a migrant in charge of the compass, who has to follow the north towards the European coasts. Most of the time, they know the sea well, some were fishermen in their country of origin.

Finally, three or four migrants take turns driving the boat: either they have already used this type of inflatable boat and know how to steer it, or the smugglers train them a few days before the launch.

Typically, these people do not pay for the crossing because they have such great responsibilities: they are the ones who have to maneuver the boat, so they have our safety in their hands.

>> Also read: 'Worse than the devil': Migrants react to the release of alleged human trafficker Bija

'Migration is a lucrative business'

A few hours after leaving Libya, migrants are often stopped by the Libyan coast guard. When we are intercepted, it often happens that one or two of the 'Arabs' who had launched us into the sea a few days earlier appear on board their ship. This happened to me twice. If we tell them that we recognize them, they hit us.

The Libyan coast guards are in league with the traffickers, some work directly with them. They know that by intercepting us at sea, they will receive money from the prisons.

When migrants are sent back to a Libyan port, they are transferred to a detention center. Again, they have to pay to get out. The sum is 3,000 Libyan dinars [about 550]. The first thing the guards ask us when we arrive is: 'Who has money to get out of prison?'

The trouble is that we don't have any cash on us because when we cross the border we leave with nothing. Those who anticipate getting arrested, before setting sail, they give money to friends in Libya just in case. They write down their phone number on their clothes or on a piece of paper.

Once in prison, the guards lend us their phone and we contact our friends [other migrants in Libya]. They give the money to a Libyan they know, usually their landlord or a member of his family. He is the one who gives the money to the prison guard in exchange for a commission of about 250 dinars [about 45 euros].

Migration is a lucrative business. Everything is very well organized in Libya.

Since I've been in Libya, I've had to spend a total of about 10,000, between the money for the smugglers and then the money for the guards to get released from prison."

*His first name has been changed.

Here is the original post:
Migrant in Libya: 'The coast guard is complicit with the traffickers' - InfoMigrants

The illegal Turkish-Libyan memorandum may be one of the main issues of friction between Greece and Turkey, but Greece was not invited to the Berlin conference on Libya.

Despite the fact that Greece is a member state of the EU , the Germans chose to invite Turkey and not Greece.

This move provoked the immediate reaction of the Greek side.

In fact, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Nikos Dendias, expressed the dissatisfaction of Athens.

We are extremely dissatisfied with the fact that Germany, insisting on a tactic, did not invite us to the meeting on Libya this time as well, he said.

It is worth noting that the previous conference on the issue was attended by Russia, the U.S., China, Turkey, France, Great Britain, the UAE, the Congo, Italy, Egypt, and the United Nations, delegations from the European Union, the African Union and the Arab League.

Then Greece shone again through its absence.

As historically happens in the context of this conference, since Greece did not participate in the previous conference, it would be very difficult to participate now, explained the director of the Institute of International Relations, Constantinos Filis.

It is obvious that since Greece does not have a strong economic and military footprint in Libya, some countries are developing the argument that Greece should not participate in the conference, said Filis, stressing that Germanys stance was negative.

This shows the intentions of Germany, which with communication tactics insists on this position of exclusion of our country, the professor pointed out.

The view that Germany has vested interests in the region which would be mixed by the Greek presence in the conference and in the region in general is expressed by the geostrategic analyst Efthymios Petrou.

The illegal Turkish-Libyan memorandum creates a situation in the Eastern Mediterranean, he said, adding: As Greece attempts to overturn this agreement, the Germans may see this as overturning a solution to the Libyan problem.

Let us not forget that the Germans have two centuries of relations with the Turks, he explained in more detail and added that Germany preferred the German-Turkish relations to the Greek-Turkish ones.

The Germans and the Turks are pressing for the fact that Greece was late to take an interest and they want the issue of the illegal Turkish-Libyan memorandum not to be internationalized, added Petrou.

At the same time, Filis makes it clear that even if the Germans consider that the presence of Greece can create problems due to the illegal Turkish-Libyan agreement, they forget that Greece, an EU member state, has opposite and adjacent coasts with Libya.

Turkey has no adjacent coasts and does not belong to the European Union, he continued.

But if Greece was finally at the conference, it might not have talked about the illegal Turkish-Libyan pact, as our country has shown, it would focus on a positive agenda for a solution in Libya, the expert explained.

The view that Germany wants to continue the beaten track from the previous conference in order not to displease Turkey, was expressed by Anthony Klapsis, Assistant Professor of Diplomacy and International Organization at the University of Peloponnese.

The Germans want to keep the balance in German-Turkish relations for obvious economic reasons, he added.

It is recalled that Turkey-Germany trade relations remain strong.

According to official data, Germany is the most important trade partner of Turkey and the biggest foreign investor.

At the same time, more than 7400 German and Turkish companies operating in Turkey use German investment capital.

READ MORE: FM Dendias: We are extremely dissatisfied with Germany over Libya.

Read more:
Diplomatic feud between Athens and Berlin over Libya: Why the Germans "blocked" Greece - Greek - GreekCityTimes.com

On May 7, armed militiamen stormed the Corinthia Hotel compound that was being used as one of the headquarters for the interim government in the Libyan capital of Tripoli (al-Hadath, May 8). Social media videos showed militants searching cars and asking for the location of Libyan Foreign Minister Najla Mangoush (al-Marsad, May 7). The militants eventually departed and were later promised a meeting with the President of the Presidential Council, Muhammad Menfi (RT Arabic, May 8).

The militants were aligned with Burkan al-Ghadab (Volcano of Rage), a coalition of militias tasked by the previous Tripoli-based government, the Government of National Accord (GNA), to defend Tripoli from the assault launched by the eastern Libyan-based Libya National Army (LNA) in April 2019. [1]Earlier in the day on May 7, the militia had met to discuss recent statements by Mangoush and the appointment of Hussein al-Ayeb as the replacement for Imad Trabelsi as head of intelligence within the new unified Libyan government (Al-Ain, May 8).

In a statement posted by Burkan al-Ghadabs media office, the militia insisted that Mangoush should be dismissed for calling for the complete departure of all foreign forces and mercenaries from the country, without making an exception for the Turkish military (Burkan al-Ghadab, May 7). The statement, praising brotherly Turkey for being the only country to answer the GNAs call to intervene and protect civilians during the LNA assault, made clear Burkan al-Ghadabs proximity to Ankara. Burkan al-Ghadab also denounced both al-Ayeb and Mangoushs alleged previous alignment with General Khalifa Haftar of the LNA.

Libyas Continued Security Fragmentation

Libya made significant progress toward political unity after a ceasefire between the LNA and the GNA was brokered by the UN in October 2020, leading to a unity government headed by interim Prime Minister Abdul Hamid Dbeibeh (DW, March 10). The governments agenda was to reunify state institutions before nationwide general elections in December 2021.

Despite the progress in the political realm, the Libyan security environment remains fragmented among a multiplicity of various non-state actors. While in Tripoli the GNA has now been disbanded, the domestic militia groups that were aligned with and sponsored by the GNA remain. The GNA had used militia groups to provide law and order in Tripoli and they made up the bulk of the fighting force that repelled the LNA assault on the capital. In exchange, militias burrowed themselves into the Tripoli-based state infrastructure, accruing significant influence. [2]The Hotel Corinthia incident showcases the continued intent of these militias to exert similar influence on the new interim government.

Likewise, the foreign militia presence has remained largely unchanged since the October 2020 ceasefire. The expiration of the 90-day deadline for the complete withdrawal of foreign forces from Libya, which was contracted within October 2020s ceasefire agreement, passed without any reduction in foreign troop presence (al Jazeera, May 15). While the UN has since agreed to deploy a small ceasefire monitoring team, none of the international powers involved in the Libyan conflict, including Turkey, Russia, and the UAE, have shown any commitment to reducing military activity in the country (UN, April 16).

The Burkan al-Ghadab-Turkey Connection

Burkan al-Ghadabs attempted storming of the Corinthia Hotel represents Turkeys success in turning the militia group into a de facto Turkish proxy.

The Turkish government is keen to safeguard its economic interests in Libya, including almost $35 billion in Libyan contracts and a 2019 maritime border delineation agreement. Turkeys strengthened links to the GNA militias in the face of the LNA assault resulted in the GNA benefiting from increased Turkish financial support, arms supplies, and coordination with Turkish military advisors. Ankara also attached itself ideologically to the more Islamist-leaning militias by housing in Turkey influential Mufti Sadiq al-Ghariani. Turkey has used Ghariani to legitimize and praise the Turkish role in Libya. [3]Now with the GNA replaced by the interim unity government, Turkey has become the main patron of several once nominally GNA-aligned militias.

The interim government, which remains based in Tripoli, has a fading interest in appeasing the militias based in the city, such as Burkan al-Ghadab, as the ceasefire continues to hold and the frontline has solidified around Sirte, which is 400 kilometers east of the capital. This has significantly increased militia motivation to counter its waning influence by further aligning with Turkey.

Burkan al-Ghadabs strong reaction to Mangoushs call for the absolute departure of foreign military troops from Libya is likely to have been directed by Turkey. Burkan al-Ghadabs statement in condemnation of Mangoush mimics Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglus defense of the Turkish military presence in Libya almost word for word. [4] A day before the incident at the Corinthia Hotel, Turkey-based Ghariani launched a verbal assault on Mangoush, describing her as insolent and an agent of the enemy before calling on Burkan al-Ghadab to equally denounce her (al-Arabiya, May 7). Media linked to the Libyan Muslim Brotherhood movement, which has itself been strongly backed by Turkey since 2012, also published edited clips of Mangoush criticizing previous GNA Prime Minister Fayez al-Sarraj at a 2019 seminar. Mangoush in the same seminar equally criticized Haftar (al-Marsad, May 8).

Mangoushs statements regarding the departure of foreign forces cannot be seen as particularly controversial to anyone, except for Turkey. The withdrawal of foreign forces is contracted within the October 2020 ceasefire agreement and has been backed by two unanimous UN Security Council resolutions.

Unintended Consequences Ahead

For Turkey, influence over Tripolis militia groups is seen as vital to maintaining its economic and military interests in the country in the longer term. Turkeys military presence and the maritime border delineation agreement, both agreed upon by the former GNA administration in 2019, have received both tacit and explicit support by interim Prime Minister Dbeibeh (Andalou Agency, March 9). However, Turkey knows that Dbeibeh is likely to remain an interim leader and Decembers elections could lead to a very different Libyan position on both fronts. Turkey knows even if a new Libyan executive power or mounting international pressure forces it to withdraw either its own troop presence or the portion of the roughly 13,000 Syrian militants that it sent to fight in Libya, it could still wield leverage in the country through its domestic militia groups.

However, increasing alignment with Turkey is likely to have unintended consequences for Burkan al-Ghadab. Many Tripoli militias attained their local legitimacy by defending the city from the LNA assault of 2019 and from participation in the 2011 revolution. If the militias fighters continue to act as a tool used by a foreign country, Turkey, to exert pressure against decisions or statements considered unfavorable, then they risk losing any remaining domestic credibility. This could lead to renewed inter-militia conflict in Tripoli, particularly if the ceasefire continues to hold.

Turkey simply does not have the soft power to attract support from all of Tripolis militias, several of which have contrasting ideological orientations and loyalties. [5] Without the existential threat posed by the LNAs assault, militias jealous of Burkan al-Ghadabs clout could use Turkish influence over it as a pretext to commence hostilities. In sum, despite the political progress made in Libya since October 2020, without significant security sector reform leading to the monopoly of state control over armed force, long-term stability in the country remains unlikely.

Notes

[1]See Jason Pack, Kingdom of Militias: Libyas Second War of Post-Qadhafi Succession (Italian Institute for International Political Studies, May 2019)

[2]See Wolfram Lacher, Tripolis Militia Cartel (German Institute for International and Security Affairs, April 2018)

[3]Ghariani publicly supported the GNA-Turkey Maritime Memorandum (Andalou Agency, December 12 2019), called upon Libyans to stage demonstrations in support of Turkeys cooperation with the Libyan government (Andalou Agency, July 9 2020), and claimed that anyone who denies Turkeys benevolence does not deserve respect (Arab Weekly, May 12)

[4]Both claimed that the Turkish presence in Libya cannot be compared to foreign mercenary groups fighting in the country (Associated Press, May 3)

[5] See Karim Mezran, Libya 2021: Islamists, Salafis and Jihadis (Wilson Center, March 2021)

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Burkan al-Ghadab Militants' Display of Force Highlights Deepening Turkish Influence in Libya - Jamestown - The Jamestown Foundation