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WASHINGTON Today Congressmembers Ted W. Lieu (D-Los Angeles County), Donald S. Beyer Jr. (D-VA) and Ken Buck (R-CO) introduced the bipartisan Block Nuclear Launch by Autonomous Artificial Intelligence Act, legislation to safeguard the nuclear command and control process from any future change in policy that allows AI to make nuclear launch decisions. Senator Edward J. Markey (D-MA) is introducing companion legislation in the Senate.

The Department of Defenses 2022 Nuclear Posture Review states that current policy is to maintain a human in the loop for all actions critical to informing and executing decisions by the President to initiate and terminate nuclear weapon employment in all cases. The Block Nuclear Launch by Autonomous AI Act would codify the Departments existing policy by ensuring that no federal funds can be used for any launch of any nuclear weapon by an automated system without meaningful human control.

Furthermore, the National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence, established by Congress through the FY19 National Defense Authorization Act, recommended in their final report that the U.S. clearly and publicly affirm its policy that only human beings can authorize employment of nuclear weapons. This bill follows through on their recommendation.

Upon introduction, the Members said:

AI technology is developing at an extremely rapid pace, said Congressman Lieu. While we all try to grapple with the pace at which AI is accelerating, the future of AI and its role in society remains unclear. It is our job as Members of Congress to have responsible foresight when it comes to protecting future generations from potentially devastating consequences. Thats why Im pleased to introduce the bipartisan, bicameral Block Nuclear Launch by Autonomous AI Act, which will ensure that no matter what happens in the future, a human being has control over the employment of a nuclear weapon not a robot. AI can never be a substitute for human judgment when it comes to launching nuclear weapons. Im grateful to Representatives Beyer and Buck and Senator Markey for their work on this important, forward-thinking legislation.

As we live in an increasingly digital age, we need to ensure that humans hold the power alone to control, command, and launch nuclear weapons not robots, said Senator Markey. That is why I am proud to introduce the Block Nuclear Launch by Autonomous Artificial Intelligence Act. We need to keep humans in the loop on making life or death decisions to use deadly force, especially for our most dangerous weapons.

While U.S. military use of AI can be appropriate for enhancing national security purposes, use of AI for deploying nuclear weapons without a human chain of command and control is reckless, dangerous, and should be prohibited, said Congressman Buck. I am proud to co-sponsor this legislation to ensure that human beings, not machines, have the final say over the most critical and sensitive military decisions.

The full text of the legislation can be found here.

A one-pager on the Block Nuclear Launch by Autonomous Artificial Intelligence Act can be found here.

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REPS LIEU, BEYER, BUCK AND SEN MARKEY INTRODUCE ... - Congressman Ted Lieu

Construction of the $5.8 billion Ford Blue Oval SK Battery Park in Glendale, Kentucky, is one of the largest economic developments in the history of the Commonwealth. What many dont know, however, is that the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Louisville Districts Regulatory Division played a significant role in getting the project off the ground by ensuring the developer met necessary environmental and cultural resource requirements.

The new facility will produce batteries for the next generation of Fords electric vehicles, but even before construction could begin, USACE had to approve Fords permit application to ensure the avoidance, minimization and mitigation of impacts to Waters of the U.S., in accordance with Section 404 of the Clean Water Act.

The mission of our regulatory program is to protect the nations aquatic environment and navigation while allowing for reasonable development through fair and balanced decisions, said Eric Reusch, Chief, Regulatory Division, USACE Louisville District. Our team worked expeditiously through all facets of the permitting process to issue a permit in under 120 days, which allowed this historic project to continue on schedule.

USACE evaluates permit applications for essentially all construction activities that occur in the nations waters, including wetlands. When applicants are planning construction or development that would impact those waters, a permit is often required.

The construction project, which sits on 1,500 acres in Hardin County, Kentucky, disturbs approximately 728 acres, including streams and wetlands. To mitigate for impacts to those streams and wetlands, the permittee paid for compensatory mitigation credits at a cost of approximately $20 million dollars.

The districts regulatory team was also involved with ensuring compliance of Section 7 of the Endangered Species Act and Section 106 of the National Historic Preservation Act.

Those are areas of the regulatory program that most people arent as familiar with, said Sarah Atherton, a project manager in the Louisville Districts Regulatory Division. As part of any Department of the Army permit, we determine whether or not the project would have an adverse effect on endangered species or historic properties. If it would cause an adverse effect, we must work with the resource agency and the applicant to mitigate for these impacts through a Biological Opinion or a Memorandum of Agreement.

During the permit process, USACE coordinates with federal, state and local agencies, interest groups, and the public.Our archaeologist, Leiellen Atz, who was assisting with the review, found that a family cemetery was located within the proposed footprint of the facility. Three marked graves had been relocated in 2003, however it was recommended at the time that additional survey work be conducted, said Atherton. Therefore, the Corps requested the applicant (Ford) work with a qualified archaeological consultant to determine if additional graves were indeed present in the indicated location.

During the consultants fieldwork, 19 additional unmarked graves were identified in March 2022.

There was a significant amount of public interest in the unmarked graves, but in a situation like this our primary concern is that we are being respectful of the family and ensuring that the situation is handled with the utmost care and respect, said Leiellen Atz, Archaeologist, USACE Louisville District. Once the graves were discovered, the district hosted a virtual press conference to ensure accurate information was being shared.

Because we were easily able to identify the descendants, all partiesto include the State Historic Preservation Office and the Kentucky Heritage Council (KHC) were able to quickly come together to agree on a path forward, said Atz. The site ultimately did not meet requirements to be registered on the National Register of Historic Places, but we needed to ensure that all human remains and associated burial items were appropriately relocated to another cemetery.

We held an in-person meeting with descendants of the individuals in the cemetery and representatives from the KHC to discuss the relocation plan prepared by Fords archaeological consultant to ensure that the family felt it was appropriate, said Atz.

The cemetery relocation, performed by Cultural Resource Analysts, Inc. (CRA), began on May 18, 2022. The graves, dating back to 1840-1900s, were relocated to an adjacent property owned by one of the descendants.

Representatives from the Louisville District visited the site while excavation was ongoing and observed that CRA was conducting the excavations with respect and care to ensure that all remains, and associated items were removed.

A special condition was included in the permit prohibiting Ford from working near the cemetery until archaeological excavation and removal of all interments was completed, Atherton noted. This coordination allowed the applicant to proceed with their aggressive timeline.

Atherton said the scale and complexity of this project is a testament to the breadth and depth of the Corps Regulatory Program.

We were also evaluating the permit application under Section 7 of the Endangered Species Act. Threatened and endangered species listed as potentially present in the project area included the gray bat, Indiana bat, northern long-eared bat, and snuffbox mussel. Tree clearing was proposed onsite which would remove potential roosting and foraging habitat for the listed bat species, said Atherton.

In instances like this, when a project is likely to have an adverse effect on the listed bat species through tree clearing, the USACE, in conjunction with the United States Fish and Wildlife Service, requires the permittee to perform mitigation through adherence with an existing intra-service Biological Opinion. The applicant made a voluntary contribution to the Imperiled Bat Conservation Fund to ensure the proposed tree clearing would not jeopardize the continued existence of the listed bat in accordance with Section 7 of the Endangered Species Act, said Atherton.

USACE issued a permit for the Ford Oval SK Battery Park on May 20, 2022, after all environmental and cultural consultations were completed and all permit conditions were met.

However, issuing a permit isnt the end of the story for the districts regulatory team.

After a permit is issued the regulatory team follows up with compliance checks to ensure the applicant is adhering to the permit conditions.

We go out and visit the site to see if they are building what was authorized and ensure they are not causing additional impacts to waters, said Atherton. For example, are sediment/erosion control measures being implemented, is the permittee in compliance with other requirements in the permit, those types of things.

The compliance and enforcement of permit decisions is an integral part of the process and ensures continued protection of the nations aquatic resources even after construction is complete, said Atherton.

More:
Regulatory Division permits crucial in construction of Kentucky's ... - lrl.usace.army.mil

The Victorian Farmers Federation (VFF) has called on the Victorian Government to step in and take over planning of the states transmission network following the consultation on the proposed VNI West project.

VFF President Emma Germano said the Australian Energy Market Operator (AEMO) had failed to take the impact on agricultural production into account in planning for transmission on behalf of the Victorian Government, and that the government needs to take back control.

Farmers have had a gutful over the disrespectful way in which these projects are being planned. AEMO is not up to the task of taking into account the impact of these projects on Victorias food and fibre production. It is an unelected agency which seems to answer to no-one.

Ultimately, the Victorian Government is responsible for delivering this public infrastructure. The government should take full control of planning the shift to renewable energy across the state to ensure the impacts on agriculture and regional communities is understood and mitigated.

As part of the VFF submission to AEMOs consultation on the VNI West project, Ms Germano said planning for the VNI West and Western Renewables Link (WRL) projects should be paused, with government needing to undertake a state-wide plan.

The VFF believes that an immediate halt to all planning for the VNI West and WRL projects must be undertaken. The powers for all transmission network planning must be vested in and executed directly by the Victorian Government. In addition, there must be a state-wide plan for renewable energy and transmission, that accounts for issues of agricultural production.

Ms Germano said farmers were being forced to bear the cost of transmission infrastructure because AEMO is only considering the cost of powerlines in terms of the cost to consumers electricity bills.

It is clear that AEMOs view on transmission planning is completely blinkered by the requirements it has to place energy consumers at the centre of investment decisions. This view has no regard for the interests of communities, landholders, businesses and families that are directly impacted by the construction and operation of transmission towers, and who bear costs that are not accounted for under the existing cost benefit arrangements.

Most concerning to the VFF, our members and all Victorians who value food and fibre production, AEMOs actions to date take no account of agricultural production and its importance to Victorias economy.

Ms Germano said the government needed to look at the submission put forward by Professors Bruce Mountain and Simon Bartlett and seriously consider its conclusions.

Their submission highlights the reasons why AEMO is not suitable to be planning Victorias transmission network and that it seems to be motivated by wanting to build a transmission link along the eastern coast of Australia. These are grave concerns that the Minister for Energy has a duty to investigate immediately.

Read more:
Government must take control of electricity planning infrastructure - Victorian Farmers Federation

Concise, pathogen-specific roadmaps will help guide healthcare facilities in outbreak response

Arlington, Va., May 1, 2023 To help infection preventionists (IPs) and epidemiologists operationalize prevention efforts for emerging infectious disease threats, APIC is launching a series of Playbooks that can be downloaded and customized for use in individual healthcare facilities.

Created by APICs Emerging Infectious Diseases Task Force, each playbook serves as a fundamental roadmap to swiftly guide infection prevention and control (IPC) personnel through preparation for, and management of, potential infectious disease outbreaks. The pathogen-specific playbooks outline recommended practices for outbreak response starting with pathogen identification, prevention of transmission, safe work practices, considerations for providing patient care, patient discharge, occupational health, and outreach to healthcare stakeholders. Links to clinical guidance and references are included throughout.

We tapped our top infectious disease experts to develop these consolidated playbooks so that IPs and epidemiologists would have an advantage for future threats, said APIC 2023 President Patricia Jackson, RN, BSN, MA, CIC, FAPIC. We do not want to repeat the experience of COVID-19, where IPs lacked a set of standard instructions and had to search through numerous websites on a daily basis to find guidance. Its critical that we use what we learned during COVID-19 to improve infectious disease outbreak response to protect the patients and staff in our nations healthcare facilities.

Through use of the playbooks APIC is hopeful that facilities will be able to mobilize more quickly when faced with a novel, unidentified threat. Playbooks for invasive group A strep (iGAS) and Polio are now available on APICs Emerging Infectious Diseases webpage. All materials are open-access and available to the public.

Similar documents are being created for measles, Candida auris, highly pathogenic Avian Influenza, Marburg and Ebola Virus Disease, Diphtheria, norovirus, RSV, and COVID-19 surges. APICs EID Task Force can quickly create new playbooks when faced with a new infectious disease threat. In addition, best practice guidance will be created to help IPs and epidemiologists manage patient surges and prioritize the role of infection prevention in emergency management.

Founded in 1972, the Association for Professionals in Infection Control and Epidemiology (APIC) is the leading association for infection preventionists and epidemiologists. With more than 15,000 members, APIC advances the science and practice of infection prevention and control. APIC carries out its mission through research, advocacy, and patient safety; education, credentialing, and certification; and fostering development of the infection prevention and control workforce of the future. Together with our members and partners, we are working toward a safer world through the prevention of infection. Join us and learn more at apic.org.

# # #

Media contacts: Liz Garman, egarman@apic.org, 202-365-7421; Aaron Cohen, aaroncohenpr@gmail.com, 301-633-6773

See original here:
APIC Creates Emerging Infectious Disease 'Playbooks' - APIC

May 1, 2023, 5pm ET

Click here to see ISWs interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to access ISWs archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Russian forces conducted another large-scale missile strike against Ukraine on the night of April 30 to May 1. Ukrainian sources reported that nine Tu-95 and two Tu-160 strategic bombers took off from Murmansk Oblast and near the Caspian Sea and launched 18 Kh-101/555 cruise missiles at Ukraine.[1] Ukrainian air defense shot down 15 of the missiles.[2] Geolocated footage from Pavlohrad, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, shows that one of the missiles struck the Pavlohrad Chemical Plant and caused a massive explosion on impact.[3] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on May 1 that the strikes targeted Ukrainian military-industrial objects and successfully disrupted the production of military resources.[4] The Russian MoD has recently shifted its rhetoric and is actively describing strike campaigns, likely in an effort to portray a proactive approach to growing concerns in the Russian information space regarding a Ukrainian counteroffensive. Russian milbloggers claimed that the missiles struck Ukrainian air defense systems and a transportation hub in Pavlohrad.[5] Ukrainian Air Force Spokesperson Yuriy Ihnat noted that the fact that both the Tu-95 and Tu-160s carried far fewer missiles than their maximum load suggests that Russia continues to struggle with adequate production of such munitions.[6]

The White House assessed on May 1 that Russian forces have suffered 100,000 causalities80,000 wounded and 20,000 killedin fighting for Bakhmut since January 2023.[7] US National Security Council Spokesperson John Kirby announced that half of the 20,000 killed in action were Wagner Group fighters. Kirby also assessed that Russias offensive on Bakhmut has failed.[8]

Ukrainian officials continue to signal Ukraines readiness for potential counteroffensive operations. Ukrainian Defense Minister Oleksii Reznikov stated on May 1 that Ukraine is reaching the finish line in terms of when it will be ready to launch counteroffensive actions.[9] Reznikov noted that the ratio of available ammunition still does not favor Ukraine but stated that Russian capabilities continue to be limited.[10] Ukrainian Main Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Head Kyrylo Budanov emphasized on April 30 that the main goal of the Ukrainian counteroffensive remains the liberation of all Ukrainian territory and stated that he hopes Ukraine will be able to improve its positions along the entire frontline in order to effectively threaten Russian logistics in occupied Crimea and Donbas.[11]

Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin is likely using his rehabilitated standing with Russian leadership to amplify his self-promotion efforts and his longstanding issues with the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD). Russian sources began circulating an alleged letter from the MoD to Prigozhin on April 30 responding to Prigozhin's Apil 29 interview wherein he threatened to withdraw Wagner forces from Bakhmut if the Russian military fails to provide more ammunition to Wagner.[12] The letter, dated April 23, lists all the artillery ammunition and equipment that the Russian MoD provides to Wagner.[13] A Russian official may have released the letter to stop Prigozhin from using the issue of artillery shortages to criticize the MoD as he has done in the past.[14] Prigozhin responded by stating that the figures provided by the unverified document are still not sufficient for what Wagner needs to complete its assigned tasks.[15] Prigozhin then claimed on May 1 that Wagner is in possession of large stocks of weapons it captured from Ukrainian forces during the seizure of Soledar in January 2023, and Prigozhin rhetorically boasted that he has enough arms to support a million-strong army.[16] Prigozhin suggested that he would offer to exchange these stocks of weapons for the resources that Wagner requires.[17] Prigozhin will likely continue to rely on his existing informational lines of attack to promote himself and seek further privileges from the Russian military as he retains a rehabilitated standing with Russian leadership.[18]

The Russian MoD confirmed on April 30 the replacement of Russian Deputy Minister of Defense for Logistics Colonel General Mikhail Mizintsev with Colonel General Aleksey Kuzmenkov. The MoD provided no justification for the replacement nor did it specify whether Mizintsev has a new role. Russian milbloggers began speculating about the replacement of Mizintsev with Kuzmenkov, who was then Deputy Head of the Russian National Guard (Rosgvardia), on April 27.[19] Regular changes to the Russian military command have resulted in increasingly factionalized Russian military and disorganized command structures that degrade Russias military capability, as ISW has recently assessed.[20]

The Russian MoD opposition faction is likely attempting to remove select MoD officials by publicly criticizing their war efforts. Russian milbloggers complained that Deputy Defense Minister Colonel General Yunus-bek Yevkurov visited the Kherson direction months ago and did not fulfill his promise to allocate 140 to 150 boats to Russian forces to defend the islands in the Dnipro River Delta.[21] One milblogger claimed that the lack of watercraft prompted Kherson Oblast occupation head Vladimir Saldo to order his administration in mid-April to start commandeering civilian boats for Russian military use.[22] Milbloggers criticism of Yevkurov follows the dismissal of the Russian Deputy Defense Minister for Logistics Colonel General Mikhail Mizintsev on April 27.[23] Mizintsev was reportedly dismissed after Commander of the Russian Airborne (VDV) forces and Wagner affiliate Colonel General Mikhail Teplinskys inspection of the Northern Fleet troops revealed significant issues with supply provisions.[24] Teplinsky reportedly assumed command of Russian forces in southern Ukraine in mid-April and may be using his new appointment to remove Russian MoD officials with the justification that they are failing to adequately supply troops. ISW assessed on April 30 that Teplinsky likely gained Russian President Vladimir Putins favor in late March, and the milbloggers criticisms against Yevkurov is likely an ongoing effort to weaken or remove a group of Russian military commanders and officials who are loyal to Russian Chief of General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov.[25]

Key Takeaways

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Russian Main Effort Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued routine fire and defensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on April 30 and May 1. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on April 30 that elements of the Western Group of Forces (Western Military District) struck Ukrainian forces that were conducting troop rotations northeast of Kupyansk.[26] Ukrainian National Guard Spokesperson Ruslan Muzychuk stated on April 30 that Russian forces are conducting fewer assaults in the Kupyansk direction but are still heavily using artillery.[27]

Russian forces continued ground attacks along the Svatove-Kreminna line on April 30 and May 1. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian troops conducted unsuccessful offensive operations in the direction of Novoselivske (15km northwest of Svatove) and Bilohorivka (10km south of Kreminna).[28] The Ukrainian commander of a UAV company, Yuriy Fedorenko, noted on April 30 that Russian forces have built three to four defensive lines within the city of Svatove itself.[29] Ukrainian Severodonetsk Military Administration Head Roman Vlasenko noted on April 25 that Chechen units have returned to Luhansk Oblast and that the heaviest fighting on this sector of the front is ongoing near Bilohorivka.[30] Russian milbloggers claimed on April 30 and May 1 that Russian forces unsuccessfully tried to advance south of Kreminna near Bilohorivka and the Serebrianske forest area (both about 10km south of Kreminna) and west of Kreminna near Torske (15km west) and Nevske (18km northwest).[31]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 Donetsk Oblast (Russian Objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russias proxies in Donbas)

Russian forces have continued to make gains in Bakhmut as of May 1. Geolocated footage posted on April 29 and 30 shows that Russian forces made marginal gains on the T0513 Bakhmut-Siversk highway just south of Sakko i Vanzetti (14km north of Bakhmut) and within western Bakhmut.[32] Russian milbloggers claimed on April 30 and May 1 that Wagner Group forces advanced in western and southwestern Bakhmut at a maximum pace of one or two blocks a day.[33] Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin claimed that Wagner fighters advanced 230m in Bakhmut on April 30.[34] Russian milbloggers claimed on April 30 and May 1 that Russian and Ukrainian forces engaged in heavy fighting near Khromove.[35] The Ukrainian General Staff reported on April 30 and May 1 that Russian forces continued attacking in Bakhmut and conducted unsuccessful ground attacks near Bohdanivka (6km northwest of Bakhmut), Ivanivske (5km west of Bakhmut), Predtechyne (12km southwest of Bakhmut), and Oleksandro-Shultyne (14km southwest of Bakhmut).[36]

Ukrainian officials indicated that Wagner Group fighters and other Russian forces are struggling to maintain their pace of offensive operations in Bakhmut. Ukrainian Eastern Group of Forces Commander Colonel General Oleksandr Syrskyi stated that Russian forces in Bakhmut conducted numerous attacks but failed to advance, whereas Ukrainian forces conducted counterattacks and recaptured some Russian positions.[37] A local Ukrainian commander stated that Ukrainian forces have regained the battlefield initiative in some areas of Bakhmut, and Russian forces have failed to cut Ukrainian logistics lines into Bakhmut.[38] Ukrainian Eastern Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Serhiy Cherevaty stated that Russian snipers from an unspecified special counterterror service are operating in Bakhmut, suggesting that the Russian military command may be reallocating additional irregular military units to the Bakhmut front to compensate for overtired Wagner forces and ineffective Russian force organization in the area.[39]

Russian forces continued to conduct ground attacks along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line on April 30 and May 1. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on April 30 and May 1 that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian ground attacks near Avdiivka, Pervomaiske (11km southwest of Avdiivka), Marinka (27km southwest of Avdiivka), and Novomykhailivka (10km southwest of Donetsk City).[40] Russian milbloggers claimed on April 30 and May 1 that Russian forces attacked Sieverne (5km west of Avdiivka) and southwest of Avdiivka.[41] Another Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces attacked near Krasnohorivka (9km north of Avdiivka) and broke through Ukrainian defensive lines in western Marinka and that Ukrainian forces conducted counterattacks against Russian positions near Vodyane (7km southwest of Avdiivka).[42]

Russian forces did not conduct any confirmed or claimed ground attacks in western Donetsk Oblast on April 30 and May 1.[43] Geolocated footage shows that Russian forces have made a marginal advance on the eastern outskirts of Vuhledar as of April 29.[44]

Russian Supporting Effort Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Russian sources are continuing to claim that Ukrainian forces are conducting raids across the Dnipro River. A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces are trying to cross the Dnipro River to reach the left bank Kherson Oblast and claimed that Russian forces are repelling Ukrainian crossing attempts.[45] A Russian commander of an unspecified unit operating on the east (left) bank of Kherson Oblast claimed that Russian forces constructed a deeply echeloned defensive line on this bank and are regularly identifying and defeating Ukrainian forces.[46] Geolocated Russian footage published on April 30 showed Russian 126th Guards Coastal Defense Brigade of the 22nd Army Corps (Russian Black Sea Fleet) shelling Ukrainian forces on the Velykyi Potemkin island.[47]

Ukrainian officials reported that Ukrainian forces are continuing to engage Russian forces in a counter-battery fights in Kherson Oblast. Ukrainian Southern Operational Forces Spokesperson Nataliya Humenyuk stated on April 30 that Ukrainian counter-battery operations are forcing Russian forces to constantly maneuver on the east (left) bank of the Dnipro River.[48] Kherson Oblast Military Administration Advisor Serhiy Khlan reported on May 1 that Russian forces decreased the rate of artillery fire against west (right) bank Kherson Oblast over the past three days.[49]

Russian sources said that the situation in western Zaporizhia Oblast did not change as of May 1, denying unspecified Ukrainian claims about Ukrainian advances.[50] A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger published video of himself claiming that he is located near the Hulyaipole area and stating that Ukrainian forces did not break through Russian defensive lines southeast of Hulyaipole.[51] The milblogger claimed that he observed Ukrainian reports that Ukrainian forces almost liberated Marfopil, Stepanivka, and Novoselivka all withing 15km southeast of Hulyaipole - which he claimed were not true. ISW has been unable to find such Ukrainian claims, however, and has observed nothing to confirm the milbloggers observations about Ukrainian activities in this area. The milblogger amplified an interview with a commander of the grenade launcher squad of the 503rd Guards Motorized Regiment of the 58th Combined Arms Army (Southern Military District) claiming that Ukrainian forces are conducting reconnaissance-in-force and artillery fire in Zaporizhia Oblast.[52] Geolocated Russian footage also showed that unspecified elements of the 58th Combined Arms Army shelled Ukrainian positions with Polish-language leaflets which called on Ukrainian forces to surrender southwest of Orikhiv.[53] Russian sources also claimed that Ukrainian forces shelled Tokmak, damaging a railway depot and a service station.[54] A Kremlin-affiliated source claimed that Russian air defenses shot down two drones in Enerhodar.[55] None of these reports suggest unusual activity in this area.

Geolocated footage posted on May 1 showed smoke over Sevastopol Bay reportedly caused by a drone.[56] Sevastopol Occupation Governor Mikhail Razvozhayev claimed that Russian air defense shot down a drone in Sevastopol Bay.[57]

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

The recent increased prevalence of Russian private military companies (PMCs) operating in Ukraine may be necessitating certain changes in the overall command structure. Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Head Kyrylo Budanov stated on April 30 that Russian forces are attempting to create a unified command structure for Russian paramilitary companies (PMCs) operating in Ukraine under the control of the Russian General Staff.[58] A reliable Ukrainian reserve officer reported on April 30 that the emergence of additional PMCs such as Potok, Veterany, Yenisey, Skif, Tigr, Ibris, Rys, and Wolves has exacerbated challenges with logistics, command and control, intelligence, and operational coordination.[59] ISW has not seen any claims that the Russian military intends to include the Wagner Group alongside these other PMCs in this reported single command structure, although efforts to do so would likely intensify Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhins conflict with the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD), as Wagner has recently challenged other PMCs in the Bakhmut area[60]

The Russian MoD has reportedly intensified its prison recruitment campaign, although Wagner may still be benefiting from the effort. Head of the independent Russian human rights organization Rus Sidyashchaya (Russian Behind Bars) Olga Romanova stated on April 30 that the Russian MoD began increasing convict recruitment dramatically in April after barring Wagner from recruiting from prisons in February.[61] Romanova stated that the MoD is currently recruiting at a rate of roughly 10,000 convict recruits a month.[62] Romanova also stated that the MoD transfers surplus convict recruits to Wagner because many Russian commanders do not know how to command a contingent of convict recruits.[63] An alleged Russian convict recruit serving with the Russian military claimed that convicts sign six-month contracts with the MoD, the same contract periods that convict recruits served with Wagner.[64] The Russian convict recruit claimed that convict recruits form Storm-Z assault groups, further indicating that these irregular formations are likely meant to conduct attritional ground assaults.[65] The Ukrainian General Staff reported on May 1 that roughly 400 newly deployed Wagner convict recruits are training in Berdyansk Raion, Zaporizhia Oblast with another 200 training near Luhansk City.[66]

Cadets at command academies throughout Russia graduated several months ahead of schedule, and some Russian sources claimed that these graduates may be deploying to Ukraine. Russian sources reported that command cadets from the Ryazan Guards Higher Airborne Command School, the Novosibirsk Higher Military Command School, the Far Eastern Higher Combined Arms Command School, the Military University of the Russian MoD, the Military Medical Academy, and the Tyumen Higher Military Engineering Command School graduated on April 29, either two or three months ahead of schedule.[67] A Russian milblogger claimed that graduates from the Ryazan Guards Higher Airborne Command School immediately deployed to Ukraine and will likely participate in the Russian militarys effort to form new Airborne Forces (VDV) brigades.[68] ISW has not yet observed confirmation that recent graduates from Russian command schools are deploying to Ukraine. The Russian military is likely attempting to quickly generate a new pool of lower and mid-level commanders to address the degradation of the Russian command cadre in Ukraine.

Russian commanders are reportedly increasingly punishing Russian servicemen for insubordination in an effort to strengthen discipline. The United Kingdom Ministry of Defense (UK MoD) reported on April 30 that Russian commanders have started punishing breaches in discipline by detaining Russian servicemen in improvised cells made of holes in the ground c[69]overed with a metal grill.[70] The UK MoD reported that Russian commanders have been instituting increasingly draconian initiatives to improve discipline among Russian forces in Ukraine since Autumn 2022.[71]

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian civilians into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

Russian officials and occupation authorities continue efforts to integrate occupied territories into the Russian socio-economic system. Zaporizhia Oblast occupation head Yevgeny Balitsky stated on May 1 that he and Russian Labor Union Association Sergey Vostretsov discussed ways to develop labor unions in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast.[72] Representatives of occupied Kherson Oblast Ministry of Industry met with Vostretsov and Russian Minister of Industry and Trade Semyon Mashkautsan on April 27 to identify opportunities to develop labor unions and workers satisfaction in occupied Kherson Oblast.[73]

Russian occupation authorities continue to target Ukrainian children in an effort to consolidate societal control of occupied territories. Occupied Kherson Oblast Vice Governor Tatiana Kuzmich stated on April 29 that Russian occupation authorities plan to bring high school students from Kherson Oblast to Sevastopol, occupied Crimea, by Russias May 9th Victory Day holiday to promote Russian patriotism and historic education.[74]

Significant activity in Belarus (ISW assesses that a Russian or Belarusian attack into northern Ukraine in early 2023 is extraordinarily unlikely and has thus restructured this section of the update. It will no longer include counter-indicators for such an offensive.)

ISW will continue to report daily observed Russian and Belarusian military activity in Belarus, but these are not indicators that Russian and Belarusian forces are preparing for an imminent attack on Ukraine from Belarus. ISW will revise this text and its assessment if it observes any unambiguous indicators that Russia or Belarus is preparing to attack northern Ukraine.

Belarusian maneuver elements continue conducting exercises in Belarus.[75] The Belarusian Ministry of Defense (MoD) announced on May 1 that the final stage of the brigade tactical exercise is underway.[76]

Belarusian Security Council Secretary Lieutenant General Alexander Volfovich stated on April 29 that Belarusian brigades are training for offensive, defensive, and special operations and that a set of measures to transfer the brigades from peacetime to wartime has been underway for the last few weeks.[77] Volfovich claimed that it is necessary for all Belarusian forces to maintain combat readiness due to the current military-political situation on Belarus borders.[78]

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

View Citations

Link:
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, May 1, 2023 - Critical Threats Project