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Amir Asmar is a Department of Defense analyst and CFRs 2019-20 national intelligence fellow. Throughout his intelligence career, his primary area of focus has been the Middle East. He has held a wide range of analytic, senior analytic, and leadership positions for the Department of the Army, the Defense Intelligence Agency, and the National Intelligence Council. The statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed in this blog post are strictly those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense (DoD) or the U.S. government.Review of the material does not imply DoD or U.S. government endorsement of factual accuracy or opinion.

Jacob Ware is a research associate for CFR's counterterrorism and studies program.

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With Iranian and Russian support, the Bashar al-Assad regime will succeed in capturing the last opposition stronghold and de-escalation zone in SyriaIdlib provinceunless all parties to the conflict can negotiate a solution to the civil war and prevent the upcoming battle. If a political resolution is not found, the regime will likely kill, wound, or displace hundreds of thousands of civilians as it seizes control over the rest of the province. Although the U.S. military has begun to pull back from the region, the outcome of the fight for Idlib should be a national security concern, particularly as the United States seeks to contain Iranian adventurism, Russian influence, and Turkish unilateralism in the region; combat terrorism; prevent a humanitarian disaster; and alleviate Syrian instability before it spreads. U.S. inaction could allow the Assad regimes Idlib campaign to continue and could be viewed as a green light by malefactors searching for any sign of U.S. intent to intervene before proceeding with their plans in Idlib and for Syria more broadly. Moreover, should the battle for Idlib continue, the coronavirus pandemic will amplify the tragedy.

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Rather than treating Syria as a discrete policy objective, the United States seems to have contextualized the Syrian conflict within two non-Syria military priorities that predate the civil war: combating terrorism and containing Iran. Indeed, sustained U.S. military involvement in the war occurred at only two junctures. First, Washington offered military assistancewhich ultimately proved inadequate to gain the upper handto the opposition early in the conflict. Second, when the Islamic State invaded eastern and northern Syria some three years into the conflict, Washington funded, trained, and armed Syrian rebels, including Kurdish forces, and supported their ground battles with air strikes against the Islamic State. Beyond these two instances, U.S. air strikes targeted convoys and bases of Irans Shia proxies in Syria to protect U.S.-allied forces and retaliate for Iranian-sponsored attacks against U.S. personnel in Iraq. However, even though the United States had begun looking for an exit before the Islamic State lost all its Syrian territory in 2019, Washington should consider leading a concerted, diplomatic effort to reach a negotiated agreement to end the war for the following reasons.

First, instead of allowing a lopsided victory for Assad and his supporters, a U.S.-led negotiation could limit Iranian, Russian, and Turkish gains and their tendency to interfere in the region. Iran, a decades-long ally of the Assads, entered the conflict early, helping the regime gain momentum by providing training, weapons, and intelligence. Tehran also arranged for Shia militias from across the region, including its strongest ally, the Lebanese Hezbollah, to support Assads forces. Absent an interruption in the conflict, Iran is on the verge of being more entrenched in Syria than ever before. Russia is using Assad to secure its military influence in the region, including an airbase in Latakia and a naval base in Tartus, both Syrian coastal provinces. Moscows intervention began in fall 2015 with airstrikes against rebel targetsand did not distinguish between Islamist terrorists and moderate oppositionists. Now, absent U.S. diplomatic intervention, Russia could remain emboldened to intrude in hot spots in the Middle East and elsewhere. Finally, although Turkey has backed opposition elements, its primary objective has been to block Syrian Kurdish territorial and political gains, and to exclude the Kurds from a safe zone along its shared border with northern Syria. Ankara carried out unilateral air and ground attacks against Kurdish forces in northern Syria, and a deconfliction agreement with Russia and Iran permitted Turkish troops to move into Idlib province, where they remain today. The current trajectory of the conflict could encourage Turkey to continue interfering in Syria and unilaterallypursue its interests outside of NATO.

Second, Idlib province remains the largest safe haven for al-Qaeda fighters since pre-9/11 Afghanistan, with several thousand fighters packed into an area smaller than Connecticut. Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, an umbrella organization that includes thousands of al-Qaeda fighters led by Abu Mohammad al-Julani, has long dominated the region; its fighters and allies remain capable and likely intent on striking the West. Moreover, Idlib is complicated by a fractured landscape with moderate opposition groups that seek Assads overthrow competing with al-Qaeda and other opportunistic extremists who have transnational ambitions. The Syrian opposition today is still led by Free Syrian Army factions, but the ongoing marbling of terrorists and insurgents, and their geographical proximity, makes targeting extremists and distinguishing between groups challenging.

Third, beyond foreign intervention and the concentration of dangerous terrorists, the intensification of the humanitarian crisis is clearly concerning. Idlibs pre-war population of one and a half million has swelled to more than three million. Civilians in regime-conquered areas throughout Syria often fled because they faced arrest, torture, and conscription; thus, in addition to thousands of fighters and their families, hundreds of thousands of civilians relocated to Idlib. Should fighting resume, these peoplewill find themselves trapped against a closed Turkish border. With refugee camps already full, local, unofficial facilities run by nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), rather than the United Nations, have dotted up along the border; these facilities are already stretched thin as they struggle to accommodate the approximately nine hundred thousand refugees displaced by the latest fighting. Any worsening of the humanitarian conditions in Idlib could prove devastating: either a second migrant crisis results, further challenging and polarizing Washingtons European allies, or thousands more die from hunger, exposure, or bullets and bombs, with the United States looking the other way.

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Finally, the ongoing coronavirus pandemic presents a dangerous new threat in Idlib. Years ofwar have decimated the regions health care infrastructure. More than eighty hospitals arealready out of action and those that remain have extremely limited capacity to provide intensivecare. Health officials in the region have warned of as many as one hundred thousand deathsnearly as many civilians as have already died in the entire conflict. The regions overcrowdedrefugee camps are particularly under threat given the difficulty in maintaining social distancing and proper hygiene. Though the risk of outbreak may be delaying a return to hostilities, thepandemic could magnify the grave humanitarian conditions resulting from any continuation ofthe conflict.

Nearly twenty years into the global war on terror, exhaustion is understandably wearing on Western policymakers and publics. However, the conflict in Idlib demands a response, and the United States could take the lead on proposing a largely non-military solution. The United States could propose the following notional planor something similarto end the war: Assad could remain in power, but he would have to consult with a newly-elected legislature, demand that Iran and its proxies withdraw, and permit NGOs to conduct humanitarian relief activities. Syrian refugees could be allowed to return to their home provinces, and oppositioniststhose who do not belong to terrorist groupscould receive amnesty and be admitted into the political process. U.S. sanctionsincluding a prohibition on the delivery of oil to Syriacould remain in effect, but would be terminated if Assad implemented agreed-upon commitments. Russia could keep its bases, but would have to gradually withdraw combat troops from Syria. The Syrian Kurds could gain some autonomy in a region away from the border, and Turkey would then withdraw from Syria and refrain from further interference. Iran and Hezbollahboth of whom are resource challenged could be warned that their continued activities in Syria would be subject to increasing Israeli and possibly U.S. strikes. And, Russia and the United States could collaborate to gradually degrade the already fractured terrorism landscapethe one area where the two powers agreeworking together to kill or capture and return foreign fighters to their home countries for prosecution. This may be the only part of the initiative that cannot be conducted purely through diplomacy.

Irrespective of the terms of a proposed peace agreement, U.S. diplomatic involvement is necessary for a chance at a positive outcome. No other state can exercise the leadership needed to implement the diplomatic and political solutions necessary to avoid broadening, regional instability and the consequent need for more military involvement. An unstable Syria threatens to trigger regional volatility for another generation, opening the door for more Iranian interference and greater radicalization and terrorist activity.

The appearance of external hyperlinks do not constitute endorsement by the United States Department of Defense (DoD) for the linked websites, the information, the products, or the services contained therein. The DoD does not exercise any editorial, security, or other control over the information you may find in these locations.

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US Retrenchment Will Intensify Crisis in Idlib - Council on Foreign Relations

A floating barrier in the Aegean Sea to prevent refugees reaching Greeces islands from Turkey, will be installed in the next few days.

The 2.7 km project will be made of netting and flashing lights.

According to reports, the barrier will be built north of the island of Lesvos, where migrants often attempt to cross due to the short stretch of water.

Greeces Defence Ministry had invited private contractors to bid on supplying the long floating fence.

Tens of thousands of undocumented migrants have landed on several eastern Aegean islands since the crisis erupted in 2015, mainly ferried onto Greek territory by migrant-smuggling rings operating from Turkey.

The floating barrier is a part of efforts by the Greek government in dealing with an explosive increase in refugee flows over the summer as the favourable weather sets in.

At the same time, Greek Police in Evros are ready to face a new wave of tens of thousands of immigrants, who will try to illegally enter Greece, as reported by Greek City Times.

Turkeys (failed) asymmetric invasion attempt in March sounded the alarm to prepare intensively for any new attempts.

Greek police have stockpiled a huge supply of arsenal and logistical equipment to arm the forces taking part in the border protection operation.

With these necessary, and albeit expensive upgrades, Greek border forces are far more prepared for the next Turkish-induced border migration crisis that they have promised to restart.

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Floating Dam To Be Installed In The Next Few Days - GreekCityTimes.com

Cllr Chris Kennedy, cabinet member for health, adult social care and leisure. Photograph: Hackney Council

Cllr Chris Kennedy, cabinet member for health, adult social care and leisure, responds to anopen letterfrom local trade unions and health organisations about free NHS treatment for migrants during the coronavirus crisis:

We agree with the requests for Hackney Council in the open letter, and support the letters message to do everything within our collective power to help mitigate the disproportionate health impacts on disadvantaged communities caused by coronavirus.

We have been working to take action on these requests, such as including health access information for migrants in council communications such as Hackney Today and our social media channels. Its important for all non-UK nationals to know that there are no charges for Covid-19 NHS diagnosis or treatment. This applies to everyone, including anyone living in the UK without permission, and no immigration checks are required for overseas visitors undergoing testing or treatment for Covid-19, which is the same for many other infectious diseases.

As is mentioned in the letter, a big part of some people not accessing the NHS quickly during the pandemic is the effect of health charges. We have had conversations with Meg Hillier, Hackney South and Shoreditch MP and Chair of the Public Accounts Committee, around unfair NHS charging for migrants locally. She has highlighted these issues in Parliament, with evidence from the Public Accounts Committee finding that the government is not using an existing, established recharge system to repay the British taxpayer for NHS costs but has set up a separate system which penalises many tax-paying residents just because they are not British. No migrant worker should be expected to pay twice for their healthcare or their familys once through their taxes and once through this unjust surcharge.

Alongside highlighting health inequalities in Hackneys vulnerable and marginalised communities, this global pandemic has shown the importance of local public health structures in tackling them for the benefit of our society as a whole. In response, we have started community conversations with theHackney Council for Voluntary Servicesto address this, and are working together with our local voluntary sector to ensure people from all backgrounds are accessing testing and treatment for coronavirus.

Cllr Chris Kennedy, cabinet member for health, adult social care and leisure

If you have symptoms of coronavirus please call 119 to order a test or visit theNHS website. You can also call the NHS on 111 if you would like to discuss a medical concern you may have this service also has access to translators if needed.

In a medical emergency always call 999.

Visit the local coronavirus support pages for more informationon what help is available in Hackney.

The coronavirus outbreak has meant that the Hackney Citizen has been unable to print a monthly newspaper for the last three months.

The need for quality news and reliable reporting is crucial - however, this is an increasingly challenging time for local journalism.

Our main source of income, print advertising revenue, fell suddenly - and so we are asking you, the readers, for your help.A one-off donation from anyone who can afford it will help our small team get our newspaper back in print and keep the website and social media feeds running through this unprecedented crisis.

Find out how you can donate.

Thanks in advance for your support, and stay safe.

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Letter: 'No migrant worker should be expected to pay twice for their healthcare' - Hackney Citizen

Today, as part of the EU's global response to the coronavirus outbreak, the EU - through its Emergency Trust Fund for Africa (EUTF) - has adopted a new assistance package to protect migrants, stabilise local communities and respond to COVID-19 in North Africa. This package includes 80 million in new funds as well as 30 million reallocated from non-contracted actions under the EUTF.

In line with the Joint Communication on the global EU response to COVID-19, this new funding will also strengthen the immediate response capacity, reinforce the health systems and services in the North African partner countries, mitigate the socio-economic impact of the crisis, as well as allow for the continuation of actions to protect refugees and migrants and stabilise local communities.

Commissioner for Neighbourhood and Enlargement, Olivr Vrhelyi, said: With today's substantial and targeted assistance package we are responding to the urgent needs to fight the COVID-19 crisis and address the needs of some of the most vulnerable groups in North Africa, in particular refugees, migrants and displaced persons. In Libya, while the armed conflict continues, the EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa has already supported over 200,000 beneficiaries with hygiene kits and medical assistance and over 1.7 million people have now better access to basic services in local communities, thanks to the renovation of health centres.

Support to Libya

Libya remains the biggest beneficiary under the North of Africa window of the EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa, with 455 million in programmes, with the majority going to protection of migrants and refugees and community stabilisation, alongside actions for border management.

As part of the EU's comprehensive approach and support on migration in Libya, three new programmes adopted today will improve the resilience of both Libyans and migrants for the health challenges arising from the coronavirus pandemic:

A 30.2 million protection programme will provide protection services to migrants and vulnerable groups, such as health assistance to treat tuberculosis, non-food items, emergency cash assistance and emergency evacuations outside of Libya (when travel restrictions are lifted);

A specific 20 million COVID-19 programme will strengthen immediate response to the virus, including personal protective equipment and training for health staff; the strengthening of laboratory capacities and intensive care response. It will also reinforce the health system and services in the country in the medium term;

A 25 million community stabilisation programme to continue to improve the living conditions in the Libyan municipalities, in particular in the South, by enhancing access to basic and social services.

In order to fund these essential new actions, 30 million has been re-allocated from existing Border Management programmes in Libya, which will now amount to 57.2 million. While Border Management in Libya remains a priority in order to continue to save lives at sea, the reallocation of funding reflects the need to adapt existing actions to the changing security situation on the ground. The revised Border Management programme will strengthen the Libyan Coast Guard and Port Security's capacity for search and rescue activities and prevention of migrant smuggling, support the maintenance of boats, provide further training as well as support the establishment of the Libyan Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre.

Support to Tunisia

In Tunisia, two new programmes will strengthen support to migrants and the most vulnerable groups, who may be particularly hard hit by the current crisis:

A 9.3 million governance and protection programme to provide protection services to vulnerable migrants, improve access to health services as well as to continue to support migration governance and to the Tunisian-led service for the reintegration of returnees hosted by the Office des Tunisiens l'tranger' (OTE);

A 5 million skills mobility programme built on two bilateral mobility agreements in place between France and Tunisia for young professionals and seasonal workers, based on the principle of circular mobility and for workers to gain needed skills in the country of origin.

Regional COVID-19 response

A new 10 million COVID-19 fast track emergency response programme has also been adopted to support the most vulnerable populations in North Africa tackling their emergency needs as well as the social and economic consequences of the crisis in order to contribute to the national efforts already in place.

Other regional initiatives

A 3.7 million regional child protection programme, with a focus on Libya and Egypt, has been adopted to improve the protection and expand access to sustainable solutions for unaccompanied and separated children and youth along the Central Mediterranean Route.

6.5 million was also adopted to fund a Technical Cooperation Facility to ensure effective monitoring and evaluations of all the actions implemented under the North of Africa window of the EU Emergency Trust Fund of Africa.

Background

The EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa was established in 2015 to address the root causes of instability, forced displacement and irregular migration and to contribute to better migration management. The Trust Fund covers three windows: the Sahel and Lake Chad, the Horn of Africa, and the North of Africa.

Today's assistance package brings the total funding mobilised through the North of Africa window of the EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa to nearly 888 million since its launch in 2015. The new funding was approved by the Operational Committee of the Trust Fund, which brings together the European Commission, the EU Member States, the United Kingdom, Norway and Switzerland. Observers of the Operational Committee include partner countries such as Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Morocco and Tunisia as well as Members of the European Parliament.

The Trust Fund is also reorienting ongoing interventions in key sectors in Libya to mitigate the impact of the coronavirus pandemic. Reallocation of existing actions in Libya allowed implementing partners to provide personal protective equipment, hygiene kits, training to medical staff as well as awareness campaigns to prevent the spread of the virus among vulnerable groups.

EU Institutions, EU Member States and other donors have so far allocated resources amounting to 5 billion to the EUTF.

With today's adoption, the EUTF now funds 246 programmes totalling close to 4.8 billion. The funding is divided between three regions as follows: Sahel/Lake Chad, 2 billion (104 programmes); Horn of Africa, 1.79 billion (99 programmes); North of Africa, 888 million (39 programmes).

For More Information

EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa website

Factsheet the EU support on migration in North Africa

Factsheet the EU support on migration in Libya

Factsheet the EU support on migration in Tunisia

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EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa: New assistance package to support vulnerable groups and address COVID-19 in North Africa - Libya - ReliefWeb

Dakar The Regional United Nations Network on Migration together with the Regional UN-SDG COVID-19 Executive Committee in West and Central Africa are concerned with the wellbeing of millions of migrants across the region amid the COVID-19 crisis. While they face the same health threats from COVID-19 as any other human being, migrants may be exposed to a higher level of vulnerability linked to discrimination and exclusion in their living and working conditions or in their access to basic services including healthcare. Under these difficult circumstances, migrants may be at risk of abuse and other human rights violations.

Over 30,000 migrants are currently stranded at borders and more than 2,000 are waiting to be assisted in overcrowded transit centers where they are at heightened risk of COVID-19 infection. Since the outbreak in the region, thousands were abandoned in the desert by smugglers and traffickers along migratory routes. Some were deported, putting their lives and health at risk and others are being targeted with discrimination, hate speech, and xenophobia.

As governments in West and Central Africa are taking preventive measures such as border closures to protect their countries from the spread of COVID-19, migrants, including those in irregular situations, may find themselves disproportionately impacted, unable to access healthcare, social services or protect themselves. In addition, border closures further limit regular migration options including return, while forcing migrants to take more dangerous migratory routes and putting them at risk to be exploited, extorted, or abused.

Building on the principled commitments and actions outlined in the Global Compact for Safe, Regular and Orderly Migration (GCM), the Regional Network calls on governments to make every effort to address and reduce migrants vulnerabilities by incorporating their health and other vital needs in national and local responses and recovery, taking into consideration the special needs of women and children; by upholding human rights at international borders ; by confronting discrimination, xenophobia and anti-migrant narratives, and by operationalizing relevant recommendations on the human rights protection of migrants in vulnerable situations.

Member States should ensure that all migrants regardless of their migration status are able to protect themselves and their communities from COVID-19 and can avail themselves of COVID-19 testing and treatment without fear of detention, deportation or penalty. To that end, the Regional Network calls on Member States across the region to urgently expand the availability and flexibility of safe, regular pathways for migrants in vulnerable situations (GCM Objective 5), including pathways for entry and stay based on human rights, compassionate or humanitarian grounds; to cooperate in facilitating safe and dignified voluntary return of migrants on the basis of their free, prior and informed consent; to suspend all deportations during COVID-19, and to ensure that no one faces the risk of refoulement by being returned to places where their life, safety or human rights are threatened, including to uphold the prohibitions of collective expulsions and arbitrary pushbacks at borders (GCM objective 21).

Moreover, the Regional Network stresses the need for Member States to prioritize the protection of migrants rights, dignity and wellbeing, and to provide safe access to basic services, including COVID-19 treatment and integrated prevention services to all migrants, including those with pre-existing health conditions, and who may already have limited access to healthcare, including those in an irregular situation. All migrants, regardless of status, should be included in national COVID-19 preparedness, response, recovery and containment plans that guarantee non-discriminatory and equitable access to treatment, care, information, and social protection (GCM Objective 15).

Particularly for children moving unaccompanied or separated, prolonged family separation due to border closures, coupled with limited access to psychosocial support and protection services, increases their mental distress and their exposure to violence and exploitation. The Regional Network calls upon Member States to uphold the best interests of the child at all times, as a primary consideration in situations where children are concerned (GCM Objective 7).

The Regional Network reaffirms Members States commitment to eliminate all forms of discrimination, hate speech, xenophobia and intolerance against migrants and their families (GCM Objective 17). COVID-19 doesnt discriminate, and neither should we. To this end, the Regional Network stands ready to support Member States establish mechanisms to prevent, detect and respond to systematic instances of xenophobia and discrimination against migrants, and to raise awareness of COVID-19 to inform public perceptions of migrants and to reshape the narrative on migration.

Finally, the Regional Network underlines that mobility and other restrictions will need to meet the requirements of legality, necessity and proportionality, and be non-discriminatory (GCM Objective 11). The COVID-19 response does not have to be an obstacle to mobility in the region, and mobility is not an obstacle to mitigate the impact of this pandemic.

The United Nations Network on Migration was established to ensure effective, timely and coordinated system-wide support to Member States in their implementation, follow-up and review of the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration.

In releasing this statement, the Regional Network reminds States of their commitment in the GCM to address and reduce vulnerabilities in migration and to provide access to basic services for migrants. The COVID-19 pandemic has created momentum to promote an integrated and safe approach to border management as a viable and sustainable solution to mitigate public health challenges while ensuring the health and economic security for all.

The United Nations Network on Migration is committed to supporting all partners in pursuit of the implementation of the GCM, recognizing that this cooperative framework provides an invaluable tool for ensuring all in society can contribute to a collective response to COVID-19 and are protected equally against its impact.

Contact details:

IOM, Florence Kim: fkim@iom.int, Tel: +221 78 620 6213

OHCHR, Patrick Ifonge: consultant.ifonge@ohchr.org; Tel: +33 6 51 87 95 50

UNICEF, Sandra Bisin: sbisin@unicef.org, Tel +221 77 819 23 00

UNHCR, Romain Desclous: desclous@unhcr.org

ILO, Jennifer Patterson: patterson@ilo.org; Adam Bowers: bowers@ilo.org

UNODC, Alejandra Amaya Escoto: alejandra.amayaescoto@un.org; Henna Mustonen henna.mustonen@un.org

UNDP, Njoya Tikum: njoya.tikum@undp.org

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United Nations in West and Central Africa Concerned Over Increased Vulnerabilities of Migrants Amid COVID-19 - Benin - ReliefWeb