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We are already in week two of the deadly fighting between Sudans military and the paramilitary organization known as Rapid Support Forces (RSF) and the chaotic evacuation of Western citizens proves an end to the conflict is nowhere in sight.

The possibility of the battle escalating into a full-blown humanitarian crisis is growing by the hour. Sudan already accommodates some of the biggest refugee populations in Africa and the current instability could be a catalyst for a refugee crisis of unparalleled magnitude.

Already the current strife is expected to inflame tensions in the Horn of Africa. Countries like Chad, Ethiopia, and Libya, which are already grappling with internal conflicts, will be among the first to feel the impact before it reaches Europe and beyond.

But the West is not prepared. In fact, its decisions have led to this problem.

Back in 2014, the European Union (EU) entered into a contentious agreement with Horn of African nations to finance local initiatives aimed at regulating the influx of migrants from the sub-Saharan Desert into Europe. However, the Khartoum Process also funds groups notorious for human rights atrocities, including Sudans RSF.

In 2019, after the RSF killed more than 120 demonstrators at an anti-government protest, the EU halted its financial aid to Sudan. But it still provides support to countries like Libya, where migrants are subjected to brutal mistreatment.

With the Wests migrant strategies in the African region and at home failing, its clear it must rethink how it can prepare Africa and itself. After all, its only going to get worse. In the next 30 years, the climate crisis, of which Africa and the wider Global South have little responsibility for, will lead to 1.2 billion climate refugees.

While the conflict in Sudan is a showdown over Sudans long-anticipated transition to civilian governance, the reality is there is also a global surge in civil wars. However, these conflicts cannot be attributed solely to political volatility. Rather, the escalation of violence is also a consequence of climate-induced economic uncertainty, which the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) discovered has led to almost half of internal clashes globally over the last six decades, including Sudan.

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During the early 2000s, the RSF, known at the time as Janjaweed militias, were accused of perpetrating a genocide campaign in Darfur, Western Sudan which resulted in the deaths of approximately 500,000 civilians. The United Nations later declared this conflict was the first-ever to be directly influenced by climate change and resource shortages, cautioning climate wars would become the new norm.

Rather than ignoring what is happening in Africa as shown by the absence of EU leaders at a recent African climate summit the West must redirect its attention to the development and protection of African nations. Besides revisiting outdated and harmful migration policies, it is imperative we forge stronger connections with non-governmental organizations and civil society figures who can provide viable alternatives to volatile and fragile political systems.

For instance, climate interfaith NGO Faith For Our Planet (FFOP), which was established by Dr. Mohammed Al-Issa, the Secretary General of the Islamic NGO Muslim World League (MWL), brings together civil society leaders to find solutions to climate change in the Global South. Earlier this year, FFOP organized the Faith and Climate Forum in The Gambia, where they educated African civil society leaders on climate action and trained them to engage with their communities on the issue, effectively surpassing political influence.

It is urgent that we implement climate and refugee mitigation strategies in Africa and other parts of the Global South, not only through grassroots initiatives but also through larger international efforts. We must follow through on promises regarding the Loss and Damage Fund, while also prioritizing climate security, conflict prevention, and peacebuilding at upcoming COP and UN conferences.

Because without immediate action, Africa will be the epicentre of a multitude of intersecting crises, all of which will inevitably impact the wider world.

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Sudan conflict will trigger unprecedented refugee crisis and West is not prepared - Toronto Star

This administration has been asleep at the wheel on border security, and it has had a tremendous, negative impact on New York City, Lawler said in a statement to POLITICO. I would be more than happy to work in a bipartisan way with the mayor to force President Biden to secure our borders and reform the immigration system.

Since spring 2022, more than 57,000 migrants largely from Latin America arrived in New York after crossing the southern border. Some were sent from conservative states like Texas, where Republican Gov. Greg Abbott chartered as many as eight buses a day to carry migrants to Manhattan. Others arrived on their own.

The influx has strained the resources of one of the biggest cities in the world.

Services tied to housing, feeding, educating and providing health care to the newcomers are projected to cost $2.9 billion next year alone, an amount that exceeds the New York City Fire Departments entire operating budget. So far, Adams has mostly failed to get the White House to respond to his pleas for additional funds, easing of work requirements and better coordination at the border to resettle asylum seekers around the U.S.

Adams new rhetoric, which drew praise from the conservative editorial page of the New York Post and mirrored remarks by Fox News contributor Sean Duffy, was even more eyebrow-raising given the moderate Democrat is a national surrogate for Biden.

The mayors comments came just days before the president announced his reelection bid and at a time when Republicans are gearing up to use voter discontent around immigration in their fight for the White House, the Senate and a larger majority in the House.

This is the second time in less than a year that Adams message on a highly contentious political issue has overlapped with Republican talking points. In 2022, he joined GOP calls for reforms to New Yorks bail laws and only changed his tune as the midterms neared and it became clear his party would take a beating over crime at the ballot box.

Though Adams words on immigration could now hurt fellow Democrats running for national office, particularly in New Yorks swing congressional districts where Lawler is facing a competitive race, Adams may be thinking more about protecting his own reelection bid in 2025.

One mayoral adviser, granted anonymity to discuss the administrations internal mood, noted most New Yorkers would rather see investments in schools, libraries and other city services than billions more spent to help the newcomers. Indeed, a February poll by Quinnipiac University found that 63 percent of voters including 53 percent of Democrats dont think New York City can accommodate the sanctuary-seekers.

Spokespeople for Adams strongly rejected criticism that hes parroting Republican talking points, saying hes done more to care for tens of thousands of migrants than any other Democrat in the country.

To personally show his support for asylum seekers, Mayor Adams has organized haircuts for migrants, book donations for kids, and clothing drives, as well as slept besides migrants at a humanitarian relief center while spending hours hearing their personal stories, mayoral press secretary Fabien Levy said in a statement.

Anyone falsely accusing Mayor Adams of using Republican rhetoric should stop criticizing the one person doing more than anyone else in this city for migrants and start pushing for more aid from Washington, DC and Albany, Levy said.

Adams visits a food and clothing distribution center for asylum seekers at PS 20 in Manhattan, on Feb. 11.|Michael Appleton/Mayoral Photography Office

But his language around the issue saying the migrant crisis has destroyed the city, directly blaming Biden for the situation and saying it has prevented New Yorks economic comeback is still jarring to many members of his party.

Its extremely disappointing and dangerous to hear anyone feed into anti-immigrant rhetoric, particularly the highest-ranking elected city official of one of the most diverse cities that is fueled by the contributions of the immigrant community, said Rep. Delia Ramirez, a first-term Democrat from Illinois who says her progressive stance is key to stemming GOP gains in the Latino community.

At the federal level, we need to utilize executive authority to ensure cities like Chicago and New York have the support they need to continue providing shelter with maximal flexibility, she said.

Added Florida state Rep. Anna Eskamani, a leading critic of Gov. Ron DeSantis immigration policies: We should tone down the rhetoric and focus on solutions.

Both Republican and Democratic strategists say Adams decision to amplify the rights messaging around immigration could be a gift to the GOP.

I think echoing Republican attacks when Biden is going to need every single resource from Democrats to back him up is not what good Democrats do, said Bill Neidhardt, a progressive political consultant.

Republican strategist Bob Heckman said its surprising that other Democratic mayors of places like Chicago, D.C. and Denver, which have also faced an influx of migrants, arent speaking out like Adams.

If you are the mayor of a city whos receiving the huge influx of migrants that are pouring across the southern border, its hard not to talk like that, Heckman said. The administration needs to get serious about it. They cant just ignore it and run on, We cant let Donald Trump get reelected.

A spokesperson for Biden declined to respond directly to Adams criticism but pointed to the presidents announcement in January about new border enforcement actions when he said extreme Republicans have always tried to use immigration to score political points but dont help solve the problem.

One of those so-called extreme Republicans, Rep. Chip Roy of Texas who has advocated for conservative immigration measures, wasnt quite ready to embrace the New York mayor.

Eric Adams is right to blame the Biden Administration for the border crisis, but this is the same guy who campaigned on his citys sanctuary status and extended childcare, colleague classes and other taxpayer-funded programs to illegal migrants, Roy said in a statement.

Texas has been bearing the brunt of this crisis for over two years now New York is getting a taste of their own medicine.

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Democratic mayor becomes unlikely GOP ally in battle over ... - POLITICO

Authorities in Tunisia are weighing the construction of new cemeteries amid a recent swell of migrants washing ashore after drowning in the Mediterranean Sea.

The United Nations has noted that the first three months of 2023 proved to be the most fatal for people escaping Africa for Europe since the migrant crisis in 2017, according to The Guardian.

Local morgues and cemeteries are reportedly overflowing as funerals are held every day for the many bodies that have been found on the Tunisian coast.

Many of the dead are children and pregnant women whose boats wrecked during the treacherous trek to Europe, the Guardian noted.

TUNISIA SAYS MORE THAN 2 DOZEN MIGRANTS DIED OFF COAST WHILE HEADING TO ITALY

Migrants from Sub-Saharan Africa sit in a makeshift boat that was being used to clandestinely make its way towards the Italian coast. (FETHI BELAID / AFP)

According to data from the Tunisian Red Crescent, more than 800 bodies washed ashore last year in the region of Sfax, a city located 170 miles southeast of Tunis and the capital of the Sfax Governorate. The number of bodies recovered in 2023 has already reached 300.

Approximately 12,000 migrants who reached Italy this year set sail from Tunisia, marking a 90% spike from the same period in 2022.

"Due to the influx of a large number of victims, more than 170 bodies have exceeded the capacity to accommodate the forensic medicine department of Habib Bourghiba university hospital," the Sfax Governorate said in a statement.

Migrants rescued by Italy's coast guard arrive in the harbor of the Italian Pelagie Island of Lampedusa on July 29, 2020. (ALBERTO PIZZOLI/AFP via Getty Images)

WAVE OF 640 MIGRANTS SMUGGLED TO TINY ITALIAN ISLAND FROM TUNISIA

Among the "radical solutions" to the public health crisis, authorities have proposed "quickly allocating a cemetery for immigrants and the provision of refrigerated trucks to transport often decomposing bodies."

People fleeing war-torn, poverty-stricken countries in Africa routinely hitch rides on boats from Tunisia headed for Europe, though the central Mediterranean is among the most dangerous migration routes in the world, according to the International Organization for Migration.

Police check a fishing boat with some 500 migrants in the southern Italian port of Crotone, early Saturday, March 11, 2023. (AP Photo/Valeria Ferraro)

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Tunisias coast guard prevented more than 14,000 migrants from departing in boats during the first three months of this year, compared with nearly 3,000 during the same period last year, according to statistics from the Tunisian Forum for Social and Economic Rights.

Fox News Digital's Bradford Betz contributed to this report.

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Drowned migrants washing ashore overwhelm African nation, 'radical solutions' sought as cemeteries fill up - Fox News

This is an excerpt from Policy and Politics of the Syrian Refugee Crisis in Eastern Mediterranean States, edited by Max O. Stephenson Jr. & Yannis A. Stivachtis. You can download the book free of charge from E-International Relations.

Roughly 865,531 (194,331 households) Syrian refugees registered by the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) reside in Lebanon (UNHCR 2021). However, the Lebanese Government states that the country has the largest per capita population of Syrian refugees in the world estimating the number to be 1.5 million Syrian refugees. They are located in the north, center, and south regions of the country (UNHCR 2021). The refugees live in informal tent settlements or camps, deserted buildings, or cramped spaces either in community housing or the countrys decades-old Palestinian camps (American Near East Refugee Aid 2021). This situation with the addition of the COVID-19 pandemic has put more burden on the countrys already struggling economy, infrastructure and social systems (Abdallah 2020; American Near East Refugee Aid 2021).

According to the latest statistics Lebanon hosts 15.5 per cent of the total registered Syrian refugees in the MENA region (UNCHR 2021). This situation has created a need for Lebanon in all its components, governmental and non-governmental entities, to address and respond to the large influx of people and safety seekers. The official governmental response during the early stages of influx could be described as a response of no response. On the opposite side, several nongovernmental Organizations (NGOs) and international institutions took the lead in helping the Syrian refugees to fulfill their basic needs. As the situation developed and the conflict continued, forcing more people to flee, the responses of the Lebanese government and NGOs also changed. This chapter discusses the Lebanese response to the Syrian refugees crisis from both governmental and non-governmental perspectives.

Lebanese Government Response

Lebanon has not signed the 1951Geneva convention and also does not have precise asylum laws (Lenner and Susanne 2016). Collaboration with the UNHCR has been based on a memorandum of understanding (MOU) (Lenner and Susanne 2016). There is a lack of an updated MOU regarding Syrian refugees in Lebanon, which means that the Lebanese government does not recognize UNHCR registration as a type of legal status (Janmyr 2016). Consequently, most Syrian refugees are unprotected legally and vulnerable to arrest as unauthorized immigrants (Janmyr 2016). In 2015, the Lebanese government directed UNHCR to temporarily suspend registration for both new guests and those already inside the country (Frangieh 2015). This led refugees to leave Lebanon (Lenner and Susanne 2016).

The Lebanese government was non-functional with weak state establishments; therefore, UNHCR has led the crisis response (Janmyr 2016). In 2014 the Lebanese administration issued new visa and residence regulations to replace its open-door policy and reassert itself (Frangieh 2015). The new laws made entry into Lebanon and the renewal of residence permissions extremely difficult (Frangieh 2015). Consequently, about half or more of the displaced Syrians in Lebanon are now considered to be without valid status documents (Frangieh 2015). This precarity greatly raises the vulnerability of refugees in Lebanon and blocks access to healthcare, education, and other services and limits mobility inside the country (Lenner and Susanne 2016).

Lebanon does not have official camps for Syrian refugees; nonetheless, new laws have strongly curtailed mobility in the country over the years (Lenner and Susanne 2016). The Lebanese government mostly gave the humanitarian response to various local and international organizations (Janmyr 2016). Due to security concerns, the government maintained a firm stance against building formal refugee camps for Syrians (Atallah and Mahdi 2017). The non-camp policy is also connected to demands for a readily available Syrian workforce (Lenner and Susanne 2016).

This disorganized management has led Syrians to mobilize their long- standing social relationships and work connections inside Lebanon (Lenner and Susanne 2016). Syrians live across the nation, mainly in the Bekaa Valley, the west/central region, and north Lebanon (Reliefweb 2017). Living conditions vary broadly, while some refugees live in informal tented settlements, others live in ruins, building shells and garages, and more than half rent an apartment or house. This flexibility of settlement and movement has become more limited. In 2014, a few cities imposed curfews, and during 20152016, numerous individuals lost their legal status documents and mobility (Frangieh 2015; Lenner and Susanne 2016); As a result, many now stay inside their living area, fearing being stopped at a checkpoint (Lenner and Susanne 2016).

The Lebanese healthcare system is largely private, and that fact has had a great impact on the Syrian refugee crisis (Parkinson and Behrouzan 2015). Private facilities as the American University Hospital provide excellent care; nevertheless, those facilities are accessible only with good insurance or extensive financial means (Parkinson and Behrouzan 2015). The Lebanese government has played a minimal role in building and managing healthcare (Batniji et al. 2014). Diverse providers control the health system, most of them connected to political parties who usually favor their supporters in health and social assistance (Batniji et al. 2014; Parkinson and Behrouzan 2015).

The Ministry of Public Health (MoPH), with the support of the World Health Organization (WHO) and the UNHCR, made a partnership with international and national NGOs to increase the accessibility of basic primary health care services (Blanchet, Fouad, and Pherali 2016; Truppa et al. 2019). Syrians registered with the UNHCR are given healthcare insurance; insurance covers

75 per cent of costs, and Syrians pay 25 per cent. Payment for the unsubsidized portion of care has imposed an additional burden on Syrians. While some poor refugees received financial aid from Islamic associations, others have gone into debt (Atallah and Mahdi 2013). Those who cannot pay have had their legal papers confiscated by hospitals, exposing them to detainment and deportation by Lebanese authorities (Parkinson & Behrouzan, 2015; Truppa et al. 2019). Syrian refugees have entered a fragmented, complex, and uncoordinated healthcare system that was already strained in Lebanon and has been put under additional pressure because of the abrupt influx of Syrian refugees (Blanchet et al. 2016). The system is informally discriminatory against non-citizens and many Lebanese citizens with limited financial resources (Blanchet et al. 2016; Parkinson & Behrouzan 2015). Therefore, Syrian refugees living in the North, the Bekaa Valley, Mount Lebanon, Beirut, and the South reportedly had trouble accessing healthcare (International Rescue Committee and Norwegian Refugee Council 2015).

In Lebanon, Syrian refugees encounter obstacles in accessing formal work opportunities and education (Lenner and Susanne 2016). The pledge for UNHCR-registered refugees work prohibition has led to full reliance on aid assistance. Limited access to formal work opportunities puts refugees at risk of being blocked from obtaining jobs or pushed towards informal and exploitative labor (Janmyr 2016). The Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) field assessment (2014) proved that restricted legal status for Syrian refugees doubles the risk of abuse and exploitation, also diminishes their ability to seek redress and access justice (NRC 2014). Syrian nationals are exposed to the same risks in the sponsorship system, which builds upon Lebanons sponsorship system for other migrants (Janmyr 2016). Under sponsorship, Syrian refugees can be subjected to state-sanctioned exploitation (Janmyr 2016). The sponsorship system was created to provide a legal relationship between employer and employee; however, this system has not improved legal or social security for Syrian employees (Lenner and Susanne 2016; Janmyr 2016). The sponsorship system has increased reliance on the employer, creating harsh work conditions due to fear of expulsion and deportation (Janmyr 2016; Lenner and Susanne 2016).

The Lebanese Ministry of Education and Higher Education (MEHE) is the only entity in charge of managing education in Lebanon and prohibits any handling or opening of schools by other entities, even NGOs. The MEHE facilitated the access of Syrian refugees into the schools by mandating Syrian students to be enrolled irrespective of their legal status. Moreover, it mandated the waiving of school fees (Reliefweb 2013). The Ministry also introduced second shift classes to public schools for refugee students (Charles and Denman 2013). However, access to formal education came with many challenges for these refugees, including transport costs, bullying, verbal and physical abuse, and adapting to the language of instruction (Charles and Denman 2013; Mahfouz et al. 2020). These challenges, caused many of the Syrian refugees students to drop out of school (El-Ghali, Ghalayini, and Ismail 2016; Mahfouz et al. 2020). With all its efforts the MEHE schools and the education system was not able to accommodate the large numbers of refugees due to cost burden and lack of capacity (Reliefweb 2013; Mahfouz et al. 2020).

Nongovernmental Organizations Response

As the Syrian refugee crisis gained momentum in Lebanon over the years, several NGOs and international institutions took the lead in helping Syrian refugees to address their basic needs. This section presents how NGOs and international entities responded to this crisis. The complexity of the donors and sources of funding makes it hard to get a clear picture of the actual number of donors and total donations that has come to Lebanon related to the Syrian refugees crisis. In the early phases of the Syrian refugee crisis, the Lebanese government authorized the UNHCR to take charge of the response (Anholt 2020).

One of the areas that donors worked on is to reduce the tension between the Syrian refugees and the host communities in Lebanon and assist local communities. For example, the UN-Development Program (UNDP) implemented a project called Support to Integrated Service Provision at the Local Level (known as 4M) with the help of the European Decentralized Cooperation, to address issues in the health, social, and educational sectors. The project also supported the development of regional health services and plans with the aim of improving vulnerable local communities access to excellent primary health care (Ministry of Public Health 2015). ODriscoll (2018) reported on donors response to the refugee crisis. According to that report the UNHCR has introduced a variety of community support initiatives in regions with high poverty and refugee populations, including new wells, community centers with water, sewage, and waste management systems, and enhanced medical facilities. Another form of the response funded by the EU is supporting a number of initiatives, attempting to enhance waste collection, water distribution, public health delivery, and community services, which have helped to reduce tensions between host and refugee populations to some extent. In addition, the Department for International Development funds were used by humanitarian organizations to support both refugees and Lebanese by implementing initiatives that include vaccination and food for livestock, work schemes for Lebanese and refugees, water and sewage infrastructure, repair, and school upgrades (ODriscoll 2018).

The NGO response covered multiple areas including health care, education, food security, housing, and employment. The response for health care took many shapes and activities. The majority were to sport local communities and addition to the refugees. HelpAge International (HAI); AMEL Association International, Medical Teams International, and the Center for Public Health Practice at the American University of Beirut (AUB) implemented a program to improve primary healthcare services that are introduced for both Syrian refugees and Lebanese local host communities. This program targeted patients with Diabetes Miletus (DM) and Hypertension (HTN) for individuals older than 40 years. The interventions were carried out at six of AMELs healthcare facilities: three Primary Health Centers and three Mobile Medical Units situated in deprived areas in Lebanon: North Bekaa, West Bekaa, and Beirut suburbs. The interventions were divided into three components: 1) logistics and technical support Centers, which included supplying the facilities with essential technologies and tools such as blood pressure devices, glucometers, stethoscopes, weight/height scales, blood glucose test strips for managing and screening HTN and DM; 2) human resource development and the promotion of good practice through training the medical and pharmaceutical staff on HTN and DM management; and 3) improving patient knowledge by on-site patient educational and awareness-raising events.

In 2013, a Mdecins Sans Frontires clinic was established as a nongovernmental primary healthcare center at Shatila Refugee Camp, south of the capital Beirut. It provided care for refugee patients and vulnerable host communities who suffer from non-communicable diseases such as DM, HTN and other cardiovascular diseases. Although this center allowed both host community and refugee patients to benefit from its program, this descriptive cohort study showed that from 3,500 patients who visited the center at the end of 2017, 76 per cent of them were Syrian refugees and they were not only from the catchment area of Shatila, but they came also from other different areas (Kayali et al. 2019). The other major organization contributing to the health care response was the UNHCR. The agency primarily covered the costs of entering primary health care centers in Lebanon for registered Syrian refugees. However, the UNHCR has criteria of eligibility for health care coverage with a payment scale of $1,500 (Akik et al. 2019).

The NGOs response to other areas was provided in the form of cash assistance which covered education, food security, housing, and employment. The cash assistance program consisted of providing Syrian refugees with financial aid in the form of monthly multi-purpose cash assistance with unconditional cash transfers. This package provided each refugee with $27 per person to cover food needs and $173.50 per household to meet other basic needs, for an average of $332 per household per month (Bastagli et al. 2021).

The NGO sector considered a main source of support for the Lebanese government and public to handle the Syrian refugee crisis impact on the Lebanese Education System. The involvement of the NGOs in education assistance included offering alternative classes to school aged students within the public schools, fast-tracked learning curricula to facilitate refugee students integration in the Lebanese system, and basic literacy and proficiency for children who have never been to school (El-Ghali, Ghalayini, and Ismail 2016). Another method NGOs followed to aid is opening schools for the Syrian refugees, but those often had to risk operating without accreditation and certification by the Ministry of Education and Higher Education which prohibited such activities as it is the only authority in charge of managing education in Lebanon (El-Ghali, Ghalayini, and Ismail 2016). Moreover, help to cover their fees and transportation costs was provided by the UNHCR and other NGOs (UNHCR 2013).

Food security is another sector in which NGOs have aided and responded to refugees needs. This aid and response came in the shape of providing a monthly food card or multipurpose cash card by the World Food Bank and other international agencies (Medina 2020; Bastagli et al. 2021), food items and care-packages by individuals and private donors (Medina 2020). Over the years of the refugee crisis and the COVID-19 pandemic burden hit them hard and high percentage of them survive on less than $2.90 per day (Medina 2020). According to the Country Director of the UN World Food Program (WFP) the hardship of the pandemic that was added to the collapsed Lebanese economy has pushed many refugees to adopt coping strategies like reducing health expenses, borrowing money from acquaintances and relatives living abroad, or withdrawing children from school. In the words of the WFT Director, If they had been eating meat twice per month, now they would not eat meat even once and they skip meals. The WFP also reported plans to deliver in-kind food parcels to the families of school students who were included in the WFP school snack program (Medina 2020).

In terms of the NGOs response to the refugee employment, at the early stages of Syrians residing in Lebanon they were allowed to work until early 2015 based on the 1993 Lebanese-Syrian bilateral agreement for Economic and Social Cooperation (Errighi and Griesse 2016). Starting in 2015, the Lebanese authorities suspended all Syrians work rights under mounting social unrest and problems with public services provision. Since these changes Syrians who were displaced to Lebanon were required to sign a pledge not to work in the country (UNHCR 2015). This resulted in them only sustaining their livelihoods through humanitarian assistance provided by the Lebanese government and NGOs (UNHCR 2015). However, in some cases Syrian refugees were able to obtain sponsorship and a work permit, but their legal status was changed to migrant workers. Nevertheless, they were employed without permit with less pay, facing harmful working conditions, and exploitation (Rescue 2016). Also, it was reported that they were able to work in three restricted sectors, construction, agriculture, and cleaning services, because of Lebanese nationals labor shortage in these sectors as these occupations do not match the income expectations and skills of the Lebanese labor force (Rescue 2016). In a report by the International Labor Organization (ILO) (ILO 2020), the COVID-19 crisis has resulted in a high number of permanent and temporary job lay-offs in Lebanon, particularly among informal workers, which Syrian refugees made the majority. Additionally, 60 per cent of the Syrian refugees were permanently laid-off and 31 per cent were temporarily laid-off (ILO 2020).

In conclusion, the Lebanese response can be described as complex, strategic at times, unresponsive at other times, with total reliance on international agencies and donors. The response covered multiple sectors including health care, education, food security, housing, and employment. The economy and health care system were hard hit by the crisis. Moreover, the response appeared not to be strategically planned. It was also evident that the response appears to have been based on perceived short-term political imperatives, and the availability of donor funds.

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The Syrian Refugee Crisis and the Lebanese Response - E-International Relations

By David Wilcock, Deputy Political Editor For Mailonline 09:44 01 May 2023, updated 13:01 01 May 2023

Albania's prime minister has launched another scathing attack on the UK for accusing his country of fuelling the Channel migrant crisis.

Edi Rama said the UK was in 'a bad place' and having a 'nervous breakdown' over the flow of thousands of people from the Continent in small boats.

He has already attacked the language used by Home SecretarySuella Braverman in the Commons last year when she blasted 'Albanian criminals' sneaking into the UK.

Speaking at an economic event in Greece, Mr Rama said the UK was targeting his nation 'to feel like they still have muscle'.

'We have fought against [this language] and now we see they have calmed down a bit. But they are going through something of a nervous breakdown as a country so we have to understand them,' he told the Delphi Economic Forum, according to the Independent.

'It is not something we can't understand, we have to understand them. They have lost a lot of points of reference and they are really in a bad, bad place.'

It came as a Border Force boat carrying 80 migrants picked up in the Channel arrived in Dover this morning.

Figures showed that at least 13,000 Albanians entered Britain on small boats last year - just under a third of all arrivals.

Mr Rama signed a bilateral deal with Rishi Sunak in December designed in part to help tackle illegal immigration.

But he has made no secret of his distaste for remarks made by Ms Braverman and others.

Butfigures obtained by The Mail on Sunday show 75 per cent of Albanian nationals who have arrived illegally have since committed at least one criminal offence in the UK.

And 30 per cent of Britain's class-A drug trade is now controlled by Albanian gang lords.

Albanians many of whom arrived illegally in Britain on lorries and small boats are now the biggest contingent of foreign prisoners in UK jails, with 1,582 locked up here.

This year so far, 93 Albanians have been jailed at a cost to the taxpayer of 17million for serious offences such as murder, rape and kidnapping and burglary, including 14 in the past week.

They include six killers, one rapist, a kidnapper, five class-A drug dealers and 56 cannabis growers.

Of the 93 jailed, at least 53 came to the UK illegally, either on small boats or in the back of lorries.

Albanians made up the biggest proportion of the more than 45,000 people who crossed the Channel illegally last year.

At one stage last summer, they represented 60 per cent of arrivals in small boats.

Thousands sought asylum, even though Albania is considered 'safe and hospitable' by the Foreign Office.

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Albanian prime minister Edi Rama accuses UK of having a 'nervous breakdown' over Channel migrants - Daily Mail