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After struggling with the migration crisis on European Unions (EU) eastern borders and Belarus attempts at provocation, 12 EU countries have proposed fast-tracking policy changes related to migration and the policing of external borders. Poland, Latvia, and Lithuania have begun building new border structures equipped with surveillance systems, as well as monitoring their borders with Belarus.

In turn, Hungarys Prime Minister Viktor Orbn has addressed an open letter to Ursula von der Leyen demanding reimbursement for maintaining Europes fragile stability and putting exemplary measures in place in order to protect it. This has raised the question of how long the European Union will continue to refuse to fund barbed wire and new border fences?

Over the course of the three decades following the end of the Cold War and the fall of the Berlin Wall, European countries have built fences and protective structures six times the length of the toppled Berlin Wall. In 2015, the construction of such structures on external borders cost EU countries 238 million. Hungary alone spent 1.64bn in 20152016 on keeping out migrants and refugees attempting to enter from the Balkans. In 20212022, the installation of barbed wire on the Belarusian border will cost Lithuania 152 million and Poland 353 million.

But how effective are these walls and fences in contemporary Europe? They are only effective as symbols demonstrating that politicians are taking measures to eliminate threats real and imagined posed by migration flows, migrant traditions, and lifestyles that do not fit the dominant local culture. However, in the long term, this strategy will be damaging to both the EUs economy and reputation.

In the minds of politicians and ordinary people who support such measures, defensive structures are intended to stop unwanted migration from countries where incomes are low to countries with higher living standards. They cannot, however, put an end to global inequality, solve the problem of poverty, or discourage people from seeking a better life. To put that in context, Reece Jones has shown that the GDP of countries which erect defensive structures around the perimeter of their borders is on average five times higher than the GDP of countries where migrants originate. To solve the problem of illegal migration, a long-term plan is needed, one that eliminates the motivations and reasons behind this movement.

European diplomacy has already succeeded far more than the armies of individual EU member states and their fences on the borders in curbing the threat of migration on the EU border with Belarus.

Experts proved long ago that increasing opportunities and routes of legal immigration, including regulated access to the labour market for foreign workers, is highly effective in the struggle against unauthorised migration, and that diplomacy is more effective in solving issues of security and border protection.

European diplomacy has already succeeded far more than the armies of individual EU member states and their fences on the borders in curbing the threat of migration on the EU border with Belarus. Following a meeting between the foreign ministers of Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan, the Uzbek government has confirmed that it is willing to cooperate with the European Union and ban transit flights carrying citizens of Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Syria, and Yemen to Belarus. Other countries in the region have also agreed to boost cooperation on security and border protection, curb people-smuggling according to the EU-Central Asian agreement and receive financial backing from the EU.

In 2019, the European Union Institute for Security Studies predicted that EU borders would be increasingly vulnerable because of growing migration flows and the criminalisation of cross-border movement. It warned that third countries may attempt to use mass mobility as an instrument of geopolitical influence, and called on the EU to reflect on methods of preventing hybrid attacks and provocations linked to migration, while also preserving freedom of movement within the Schengen Area.

The announced measures diverge in many ways from the declared goals. They also contravene EU humanitarian law.

Yet, as the situation on the border between the EU and Belarus has shown, no concrete scenarios, preventative measures, or mechanisms for fending off such hybrid attacks within the EU have been developed. In December 2021, the European Commission proposed measures for preventing the political manipulation of migration flows on its eastern borders for the first time. The plan aims to provide Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland with the operational support necessary for ensuring security and a humane, well-organised and dignified approach to managing migration flows that respects the fundamental human rights of those crossing through Belarus.

The announced measures diverge in many ways from the declared goals. They also contravene EU humanitarian law. In particular, the European Commissions plan allows Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland to increase the registration period for asylum seekers to four weeks, whereas the EU Qualification Directive on international protection sets out a registration period of three to six days in such cases (10 days in situations of mass migration).

The plan also gives the migration agencies of Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland the right to accommodate asylum seekers in special centres, where only their basic rights are respected for a period of up to 16 weeks, and to limit their right of appeal. In light of the latest legislative changes introduced by the Latvian and Polish parliaments, which repeal the right to asylum in cases where the request is made immediately after crossing the border or where the border is crossed illegally, the mass movement of people on the external borders of the EU is very likely to become a destabilising force for Europe as a whole.

At present, Poland, Hungary, the Baltic nations, and other member states of the EU that share borders with non-EU countries see only one way of stemming the flow of migrants and securing their borders putting up new walls and fences since they have so little trust in EU diplomacy and economic leverage. But, without Europe-wide understanding and implementation of humanitarian procedures such as the right to asylum, the problem cannot be solved. The use of migration flows as an instrument of geopolitical influence over EU countries will only continue to gain momentum in the years to come.

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Fences on the border can't be Europe's future - IPS Journal

UK Border Force staff report that they find fake ID documents daily, for which there is a maximum penalty of ten years in jail.

Figures compiled from think-tank Migration Watch UK have revealed that more than 2,000 people a year use fake documents when attempting to enter the UK.

UK Border Force staff report that they find fake documents daily, with 21,256 false passports being discovered by Border Force in the decade leading up to 2020.

Immigrants found using fake passports could face up to ten years in prison if action is taken.

Prosecutions have decreased since the year 2013 from 1,200 to around 300 in 2021, when the UK ceased taking ID cards from the EU.

Alp Mehment, spokesperson for think-tank Migration Watch UK, said: Presenting false and fraudulent documents is nothing new.

"What is new and not lost on traffickers and fixers is that the absence of genuine documents, and even lying to an official, makes little difference to whether an illegal entrant is allowed to stay.

The Home Office said: People using false documents will be refused entry to the UK . . . Through the New Plan for Immigration we will be implementing an electronic travel authorisation scheme . . . to block the entry of those who present a threat to the UK.

Originally posted here:
Migrant crisis: Over 2,000 people a year use fake passports trying to enter UK - GB News

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In early 2021, 33-year-old Sri Lankan student Wishma Sandamali died while in a Japanese detention centre. Sandamali, who came to Japan in 2017, had sought protection from domestic violence, only to be arrested and incarcerated for overstaying her student visa.

While in the Nagoya Regional Immigration Services Bureau, a stress-induced stomach condition contributed to her losing 44 pounds. Sandamali was vomiting blood before she died, reportedly of emaciation.

Her tragic ending wasnt inevitable; medical professionals had advised granting her provisional release to relieve her stress. But immigration authorities ignored these pleas, denying her medical care.

In response, small numbers of Japanese took to the streets of Tokyo and Osaka to demonstrate against her treatment, and a petition signed by some 93,000 people demanded transparency on the conditions that led to her death. Recently released footage clearly showed Sandamalis physical decline and the authorities failure to seek treatment, even as she became unresponsive.

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Punitive approaches to managing immigration are damning from a human rights standpoint. But in Japan in particular, criminalizing asylum seekers and stigmatizing immigration is also contributing to an existential crisis comprising a fast-aging population, declining fertility, and a shrinking economy.

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Japans Asylum Problem

Since the end of World War II, when Japan shifted from being a multi-ethnic empire to a nation-state with a supposedly homogeneous population, foreigners have been subject to disciplinary regimes of persecution, deportation, and incarceration.

In the 1950s and 1960s, for example, Japanese police targeted Japans long-term resident Koreans, who numbered 650,000 at the time. Tokyo branded Koreans unassimilable. Ethnic Korean schools were forcibly shuttered, Korean men and women were subjected to stop-and-search practices, and the government pressed Korean families to self-deport for North Korea. Many who left for Kim Il Sungs DPRK were never heard from again.

Sandamalis death, which made her the 18th foreigner to die in Japanese immigration detention since 2007, continues a historical pattern of institutionalized malign neglect toward unwanted foreigners. Tokyos immigration policies are now characterized by the prolonged detention of asylum seekers (over a year in many cases) and woefully low asylum acceptance rates (0.4 percent of claims in 2019).

In 2019, Japan contributed more than $125 million to the UNHCR the U.N. agency tasked with protecting refugees putting it among the top five donors in the world. But its checkbook humanitarianism is at odds with the reality that Japan rarely accepts asylum requests.

In 2017, 19,000 individuals requested asylum in Japan, fleeing persecution, conflict, and hunger in places such as Myanmar, Syria, and Sri Lanka. Yet Tokyo granted refugee status to only 20 applicants. The Japanese public appears largely to support a tough approach to refugees, with only 18 percent of respondents to an immigration and refugees survey agreeing that refugees could successfully integrate into their country.

In short, Japan is one of the worlds least friendly nations for asylum seekers. And this is despite a demographic crisis that is already impacting the countrys social and economic realities.

Japans Demographic Time Bomb

Japan is experiencing a crisis. With a median age of 48.4 years, its population is the oldest in the world. In stores across the country, adult diapers now outsell baby diapers by 2.5 times.

Its also a shrinking country, with its population of 127 million expected to contract by over a quarter by 2065.

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These demographic shifts will have dramatic social and economic impacts. Fewer Japanese will be able and willing to work. Those who continue in the workforce will likely be older, less productive, and will hold tight to jobs that might otherwise be yielded to younger workers.

An aging population also means a larger percentage of society dependent on elder care. Specialized geriatric nursing is costly. Japan is already dependent on migrant workers to staff its agricultural, manufacturing, and caregiving sectors jobs unappealing to young Japanese. As the need for healthcare grows, so will the demand for low and semi-skilled caregivers, medical technicians, and nurses. Inevitably, the demand for workers to fill undesirable jobs will need to be met by increasing migrant labor.

So, how long can Japan hold off providing the solution to its demographic crisis?

Certainly, Tokyo doesnt yet appear ready to resort to migrant workers at the level required to make a difference to the lives of elderly Japanese. Policymakers are pursuing alternatives that include encouraging women to enter the workforce in greater numbers. Its possible that more women working jobs previously dominated by men will boost tax income and encourage economic growth. But its also possible that more women in breadwinning roles may further contribute to the countrys low fertility rate and long-term economic decline.

Another possible solution is the introduction of robot workers to do basic care-giving roles for geriatric patients. But while early studies report robots may relieve some loneliness in older adults, they are not designed to replace human carers who are capable of a range of important caregiving tasks besides basic entertainment.

Which takes us full circle. Without distinct policy level changes, Japans super-aging society is likely to continue its economic decline and demographic contraction. What this means for the future of the country is yet to be seen, but experts warn of a ticking time bomb counting down to financial collapse.

How these demographic shifts will impact national security is also unclear, with some predicting a security renaissance, comprising a more robust, capable military. Others note that a shrinking and aging populous will inevitably reshape security strategies; Tokyo has missed its military recruiting targets every year since 2014.

The contradictions are laid bare when, for example, Tokyo announces measures designed to attract young, low, and semi-skilled workers to theagriculture, construction, and hospitality sectors in rural Japan. At the same time, men and women like Wishma Sandamali are subject to treatment more suited to criminals than someone trying to escape an abusive relationship.

Never Again?

Ultimately, future policy solutions will need to encourage a shift in social attitudes toward immigration. Whether its international students, low skilled labor migrants, or asylum seekers, the long-term detention of foreign nationals facing deportation should not be acceptable.

On December 5, the day that would have been Sandamalis birthday, mourners gathered at Myotsuji Temple in Aichi Prefecture to celebrate her life. Holding Sandamalis remains, her sister Poornima lamented, If she were alive, today would have been a happy and enjoyable day. Id like for something like this to never happen again.

Migrants human rights must be protected, and migrant deaths in state care must not be considered business as usual. But with asylum applications likely to rise as the pandemic recedes, and no firm changes on the horizon with regard to Japanese refugee policy, theres no guarantee that Sandamalis will be the last death in custody.

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Japan's Self-Destructive Immigration Policy The Diplomat - The Diplomat

One of the stickiest challenges for Western governments has been how to deal with, or even understand, a Russian leadership that lies insistently and incessantly, even when it doesnt need to.

Amid the current crisis over Ukraine, the Kremlin has made the situation both simpler and more confounding. On the one hand, the Russian leadership is stating its most important security concerns and demands more clearly and publicly than ever before. President Vladimir Putin has demanded formal guarantees that there will be no enlargement of NATO to the states of the former Soviet Union and no threatening military presence in Ukraine or elsewhere in eastern Europe.

On the other hand, the Kremlin continues to mask its intentions in a torrent of falsehoods. Senior Russian officials claim that Russian military forces pose no threat to Ukraine while inventing apparent pretexts for a potential invasionsuch as accusing Ukrainians of genocide and claiming that U.S. military contractors are deploying chemical weapons to the Donbas. The thuggish nature of the Kremlins demands and threats undercuts the hand of any Western officials who might want to engage with Moscow. What is the point of talking with a counterpart who has such blatant disregard for the truth?

The Kremlin, for its part, appears to expect that its messages and motivations are clear enough. It doesnt seem terribly bothered that its reliance on brazen lies leads interlocutors to doubt that anything it says can be trusted. Still, knowing what Moscow is trying to communicate with its various uses and abuses of the truth is important as the West contends with the very real threat of a large-scale Russian military operation in Ukraine. Like it or not, Western policymakers simply do not have the luxury of throwing up their hands and tuning out everything the Kremlin is saying.

The Russian leaderships frequent resorting to transparent lies, known in Russian as vranyo, has been widely analyzed. The Kremlin lies even though it either expects or doesnt care that others see through such deception. It lies to deflect blame for outrages in which its role has been exposed, such as the shootdown of Malaysian Airlines Flight MH17 over Ukraine in July 2014, the poisoning of former Russian military intelligence officer Sergei Skripal and his daughter in the city of Salisbury in the UK in March 2018, or the assassination attempt on opposition leader Alexei Navalny in Russia in August 2020. Russian officials lie to deflect blame from their allies and proxies too, like when they insisted that evidence of Syrian President Bashar al-Assads use of chemical weapons was utter nonsense and blamed Assads opponents instead.

The Kremlin also uses transparent lies to project brazenness at home and abroad. The lies enhance its powers of intimidation and demonstrate that Moscow sets its own rules. The attempted killing of the Skripals sent unmistakable messages to other would-be Russian intelligence service renegades and members of the elite. Trying to kill Navalny with an advanced nerve agent and then absurdly blaming Germany conveyed disdain both for Germany and for other aspiring opponents of the Russian leadership: not only can the regime kill you, it will mock you when it tries to.

Similarly, transparent lying is a way for the Kremlin to troll Western elites and turn the tables on them for supposed hypocrisy, policy mistakes, and attempts to impose their values on others. On such occasions, the Kremlin appears to be inviting its domestic supporters and foreign sympathizers to join in on the joke. At the height of the recent migrant crisis that Belarus created at its border with Poland, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov trolled European elites, blaming themnot Belarusfor starting the crisis and for supposedly being hypocritical in how they handle migrants and apply European values. Putin later echoed those points, probably envisioning that they would resonate not just at home but among anti-EU and anti-immigrant audiences in the West as well.

The Kremlin also expects foreign governments to be able to see through its lies when they are used in pursuit of underlying strategic goals. On those occasions, half of what the Russian leadership says is a lie, and the other half is the truth in a sensethat is, it indicates the goal that Moscow is seeking. Knowing which is which is not always as easy as the regime thinks.

The Kremlin has used the half-lie, half-truth formulation most prominently in the context of Russias involvement in eastern Ukraine. It uses the same approach on the subject of Russias interference in U.S. elections and Russias testing and deployment of a ground-launched cruise missile in violation of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. Each of its falsehoods is connected to a goalthat references to all three were included in its December 2021 proposed draft treaty containing itskey demandsof the United States (see text box 1).

To some degree, the Kremlins falsehoods about eastern Ukraine, electoral interference, and INF Treaty violations are all intended to deflect blamewhether anyone believes them or notand to warn or remind the West that Moscow has leverage if its offer of a bargain is rejected or ignored.

The Kremlin no doubt wanted the United States to remain bound by the INF Treaty in part because of its long-standing concern that the U.S. military could convert missile defense sites in Romania and Poland into offensive positions within range of Russia. After the U.S. withdrawal from the INF Treaty in 2019, the Kremlin offered a moratorium on intermediate-range ballistic missiles in Europe, backed up by mutual inspections, even as it continued to insist that Russia had not cheated on the treaty. In the intervening two years, Russian officials have repeatedly expressed irritation that the United States has ignored or rejected their offer. Yet they are not giving up and have inserted a clause on the moratorium in their draft treaty.

NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg recently stated that the Russians moratorium offer was not credible in light of Russias deceitfulness over the SSC-8, demonstrating once again that deception typically sets back rather than advances Russias strategic goals with Western counterparts.

The Kremlins recent rhetoric has emphasized that NATO enlargement and membership for Ukraine are red lines. By publicizing its ultimatum-like draft treaty, the Russian leadership is experimenting with a less deceptive approach to achieve its goals. This blunter approach, however, is not entirely new. When Putin and his subordinates want something that they consider strategically important, and which they think they can obtain with minimal subterfuge, they can be consistent and nondeceptive. They also indicate, with less specificity, that they will use countermeasures if their terms are not met.

Moscows response to U.S. missile defense capabilities is one example. For two decades, Putin has criticized the U.S. withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty in 2002. At first, he swallowed hard and called the withdrawal simply a mistake. As Russian capabilities improved and relations with the United States worsened, however, he brought up the withdrawal repeatedly as a core grievance. He warned of an arms race and unspecified countermeasures to defeat U.S. missile defense deployments. When he finally unveiled an assortment of new advanced weapons systems designed in part to neutralize U.S. missile defense in 2018, he made a point of reminding the United States of those earlier warnings: . . . [N]o one was listening to us before. Listen up now.

Putin has been similarly clear about his opposition to NATOs enlargement to Ukraine and Georgia. He struck a memorably defiant tone on the subject in his February 2007 speech at the Munich Security Conference. Russias short war with Georgia in August 2008 represented Putins way of linking rhetorical gestures with real world consequences. The same pattern recurred following the February 2014 revolution in Ukraine. Notwithstanding all his deceitfulness surrounding the seizure of Crimea in 2014, Putins claim after the fact that he had acted to prevent NATO from potentially taking over Russias naval base in Sevastopol was consistent with what he had said about NATO in Munich and what he had done in Georgia.

The fact that Putin has been so consistent about stopping Ukraine from becoming a Western-allied security threat and the way he went to war in 2014 to stop that from happening makes it harder to read his recent military moves as a mere bluff. Rather, they are further confirmation that he almost certainly will not let the issue go.

Few in the West are eager to take Putin up on his bargains, especially when theyre accompanied by falsehoods so brazen that they come across as blackmail. Even if Western governments could compromise on key positionsclosing NATOs open door for Ukraine, for instance, or refraining from criticizing human rights violations within RussiaPutins duplicitous packaging fosters an assumption that he is merely testing his interlocutors for signs of weakness and has no intention of fulfilling his end of the bargain.

Yet alongside Putin the deceiver there is also Putin the dealmaker. He and his spokespeople believe that the terms theyre offering are clear and that it should be self-evident to the West that they are willing to trade away things they dont needlike violence by so-called separatists or medium-range missiles in Europein return for something they really want, like a non-aligned Ukraine or verifiable limits on missile defense.

Putins recent public statements indicate that he may see space for reaching an understanding short of all-or-nothing outcomes. His repeated references to a hypothetical threat of U.S. hypersonic missiles being deployed on Ukrainian territory, for instance, suggest once again that limiting nearby deployments of offensive missiles, and systems capable of launching them, is a top priority for him.

The problem with any deal probably would not be the seriousness of Putins intent to bargain but rather the divergence between his expectations and reality. Even if Putin somehow managed to put in place the formal arrangements for the federalized, neutral Ukraine he seeks, many Ukrainians would not go along quietly and Russian-backed violence probably would resume. As for the agreement with the United States on mutual noninterference that the Russian leadership says it deeply wants, whenever independent Western actorsincluding the media, NGOs, or lawmakerssubsequently challenged or criticized the Russian regime in the future, its likely that Kremlin-backed influence actors would dial up their own activities against the United States.

The lack of trust would cut both ways. Many in the West would be ready to walk away from an agreement on mutual restraint in cyberspace, for instance, the first time a Russian criminal group attacked a key Western firm with ransomware. And reasonably so, thanks to Moscows routine use of deniable proxies. The 1933 U.S.-Soviet noninterference agreement, in fact, fell apart when the Soviet Union didnt stop meddling in the United States.

With his embrace of falsehoods and deception, Putin has dug himself a hole. Few are willing to bargain with a serial deceiver. But the costs of ignoring his offers and seeking to deter him through punitive measures alone are potentially high too. If he does not get the deal he seeks, or at least a counteroffer that he thinks addresses his interests, he will continue to use or ratchet up his leverage until he either gets what he wants or sees that the West is willing to out-escalate him. As Putin has shown when he is telling the truth, he doesnt threaten countermeasures idly.

The author is a paid employee of the U.S. government and conducted this research under a government-funded fellowship at an external institution. All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis are those of the author and do not reflect the official positions or views of the U.S. government. This does not constitute an official release of U.S. government information. Nothing in the contents should be construed as asserting or implying U.S. government authentication of information or endorsement of the authors views.

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Why The Kremlin Lies: Understanding Its Loose Relationship With the Truth - Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

Workers from Myanmar have long sought employment in Thailand. In the days before the pandemic, a little more than two million Myanmar people lived and worked in the kingdom.

After the borders were closed in March 2020, migrants had no choice but to travel illegally.

While there is no official data on the size of the inflow, experts say one indicator is how many migrants have been caught by authorities.

Also read |Myanmar's Aung San Suu Kyi jailed for four years for inciting dissent against military

According to Thai government figures, the number of arrests tripled after Myanmar's February 1 coup.

The number of migrants intercepted peaked in November 2020 at more than 6,000, an increase of more than tenfold from the 560 people arrested in January.

Geraldine Ansart, the chief of the International Organization for Migration's Thailand mission, said for each person arrested, "it is realistic to assume that... at least one other Myanmar national could cross the border without being apprehended".

Roisai Wongsuban, a Thai migrant rights activist, said the spike in arrivals was due to the economic crisis in Myanmar after the coup, which saw inflation soar and job opportunities disappear.

Also read |'Situation has not improved': US threatens new measures against Myanmar junta

Food prices doubled as the value of the kyat plummeted against the US dollar, and fuel costs soared, she said. Many people became destitute.

"It is hard for ordinary people."

As a result of Covid-spurred border closures, seasonal workers who had travelled in and out of Thailand for years were left in limbo.

"The border has been closed for so long that there is no legal pathways for workers who want to come back to Thailand," Roisai added.

General Santipong Thammapiya, a spokesman for the Thai army, said it was mainly Thailand's reopening to tourists in November that had attracted workers from Myanmar -- many of whom work in the kingdom's vital industries, including the service sector.

"Workers... wanted to come back," he said while speaking to AFP. "They also trust the Thai healthcare system, which can provide treatment for Covid."

In Thailand, the demand for Myanmar workers is high; however, given their status, they are forced to accept lower wages.

Thailand is facing a shortage of 200,000 workers, according to the labour ministry.

Also read |Gravitas: What is India's Myanmar strategy?

However, according to Santipong, Bangkok does not tolerate illegal migration, and those arrested are sent to the courts for legal proceedings, followed by repatriation.

Despite obstacles, two people smugglers who operate near the Three Pagodas Pass border crossing in Kanchanaburi province told news agency AFP that they have been doing well.

Desperation drives thousands to pay 13,000 baht to 25,000 baht ($380 to $750) to cross.

"Some are arrested, but there are even more people who are not," said one smuggler on condition of anonymity.

(With inputs from agencies)

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`Hard for ordinary people`: High prices, poverty forces thousands in Myanmar to illegally cross into Thailand - WION