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HICKORY, N.C.--(BUSINESS WIRE)--The U.S. federal government faces security challenges on multiple fronts which makes the ability to access solutions that have been pre-vetted even more important. CommScope today announced that its RUCKUS SmartZone controllers and RUCKUS access points have cleared the National Security Agency/Central Security Service (NSA/CSS) vetting process and are now available on the Commercial Solutions for Classified (CSfC) Programs list.

NSA/CSS's CSfC Program was established to enable commercial products to be used in layered solutions protecting classified National Security Systems (NSS) data. This gives the government the ability to securely communicate based on commercial standards. The evaluation was carried out in accordance with the Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme (CCEVS) requirements and guidance.

RUCKUS wireless LAN (WLAN) controllers are designed to eliminate the difficulties administrators experience with building and managing large-scale WLAN networks that can include hundreds of thousands of Wi-Fi access points and thousands of concurrent Wi-Fi clients. The RUCKUS carrier-class management system provides feature-rich management of access points, such as RF management, load balancing, adaptive meshing and backhaul optimization and secure connectivity to all wireless clients.

The protection of government information especially NSS data is critical to the national security of the United States, said Chris Collura, vice president, Federal business for CommScope. CommScopes wired and wireless networking products meet the stringent standards required to work within a government network. We made strategic investments in our wireless controllers and access points to meet the NSA/CSSs CSfC Program requirements.

To access the NSA/CSS CSfC approved products list, click here.

All product names, trademarks and registered trademarks are property of their respective owners.

About CommScope:

CommScope (NASDAQ: COMM) is pushing the boundaries of technology to create the worlds most advanced wired and wireless networks. Our global team of employees, innovators and technologists empower customers to anticipate whats next and invent whats possible. Discover more at http://www.commscope.com.

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This press release includes forward-looking statements that are based on information currently available to management, managements beliefs, as well as on a number of assumptions concerning future events. Forward-looking statements are not a guarantee of performance and are subject to a number of uncertainties and other factors, which could cause the actual results to differ materially from those currently expected. In providing forward-looking statements, the company does not intend, and is not undertaking any obligation or duty, to update these statements as a result of new information, future events or otherwise.

Source: CommScope

See the original post here:
CommScope's Wireless Solutions Added to the U.S. National Security Agency's Commercial Solutions for Classified Programs List - Business Wire

Last month, the private security firm FireEye discovered a widespread breach of government and corporate computer networks through a so-called "supply chain" exploit of the network management firm SolarWinds, conducted by nation-state-level hackers, widely thought to be Russia. Most coverage of the breach featured ominous headlines and quotes from current and former government officials describing it as the biggest hack of modern times. Occasionally, buried in one of the closing paragraphs, there was an official quoted admitting that, so far, only "business networks" were known to be compromisedsensitive but unclassified email systems and data on job descriptions and HR functions.

"Like our nuclear policy before it, the stated goal is deterrence, but the actual goal is to create a cover for unchecked aggression and dominance."

These stories lack context of the true state of cyber espionage over the last few decades. The SolarWinds hack is certainly a large and very damaging breach, but one could almost pick at random any five or ten of the hundreds of codename programs revealed in the Snowden documents that would top it. The mother of all supply chain attacks (that we know of publicly) may have been the clandestine American role behind CryptoAGwhich allowed the NSA to sell scores of foreign governments broken cryptographic systems through which it was possible to crack the encryption on their top-level government and military communications for decades. And of course the first, and one of the only, actual cyberattacks in history was the Stuxnet program conducted by Israeli and American services against Iranian nuclear centrifuges.

Yet the American public may be left with the impression that Russian hacking poses a uniquely aggressive and destabilizing threat to the international order, and therefore must be punished. News coverage has been leadened with apoplectic quotes from senior officials and lawmakers that the breach represents "virtually a declaration of war," that we need to "get the ball out of their hands and go on offense," that "we must reserve our right to unilateral self-defense," and even that "all elements of national power must be placed on the table" (All elements? Tanks? Nuclear weapons?). This kind of hyperbolic reaction cannot be driven by sincere shock at the idea of a government hacking into and spying on another governments networks. More plausibly, it is driven by outrage at the idea of any other nation challenging the United States' overwhelming dominance to date in network espionage.

The Pentagon has so far responded to the breach by proposing a rearrangement of the organizational chart for our cyber army. And if history is any guide, Congress will respond as they have to past intelligence failures: by throwing more money at the bureaucracy to feed its legion of private contractors. In other words: more of what contributed to this breach in the first place. The ever-growing feeding frenzy for beltway bandits not only increases the attack surface for foreign hackers, it ensures that Congress does not have the capacity (even if it had the will) to understand and oversee increasingly complex supply chains to ensure basic security standards for the very companies who will be called on to fix these vulnerabilities. Few were even aware of the ubiquity of SolarWinds presence across so many of our government networks, and the lax security practices of this key software provider have only come under scrutiny retroactively. According to reports, the update server for SolarWinds softwarean incredibly sensitive key piece of any software supply chainwas publicly accessible by a default password that had leaked to the internet in 2019, and the company had been warned both by its employees and by independent security researchers.

Here another tragic irony emerges: whatever internal channels were used to warn of these security lapses were clearly not effective, but if a whistleblower had taken this kind of sensitive national security information to the presspublication of which perhaps could have forced action and prevented a major act of espionage against our governmentthey would have put themselves at risk of prosecution under the Espionage Act.

"If reports are true that Russia was behind SolarWinds, and was using its access to case physical infrastructure networks in the U.S., their motivation may have been to gain a small measure of deterrence against the overwhelming superiority of American offensive capabilities."

So while the pundits clamor for retaliation and Washington bickers about rearranging the desks at Fort Meade, we still do not get a debate on alternatives that might better serve the American people. In secret, and without public consultation, the NSA long ago decided to use our privileged position sitting atop the internet backbone not to secure it; to level up the safety of key systems for all its users (but to poke more holes in it); and to stockpile exploits and hoard vulnerabilities in order to dip its hands into nearly every network, communications protocol, and computer system of consequence on the planet, both foes and allies alike.

Even our defensive strategy has become a policy of aggression. Dubbed "defend forward," it has us maintaining backdoors and software implants on key infrastructure systems around the world, as a way of keeping a loaded gun pointed at any real or potential adversary. Like our nuclear policy before it, the stated goal is deterrence, but the actual goal is to create a cover for unchecked aggression and dominance. If reports are true that Russia was behind SolarWinds, and was using its access to case physical infrastructure networks in the U.S., their motivation may have been to gain a small measure of deterrence against the overwhelming superiority of American offensive capabilities.

The wisdom of such an aggressive posture towards the global internet was one of the key questions Edward Snowden posed to the public after his disclosures. We should not fail to consider it as we increasingly get a taste of what the rest of the world has been subjected to by American spies for decades.

Go here to read the rest:
SolarWinds Is Not the 'Hack of the Century.' Its Blowback for the NSA's Longtime Dominance of Cyberspace - Common Dreams

[co author: Markus Speidel]

Berlitz and CLCI admitted to violating 18 U.S.C. 371 by discussing, agreeing to, and facilitating the submission of false and misleading information to the National Security Agency (NSA) between March and December 2017. The charges relate to a multiple award indefinite delivery, indefinite quantity (IDIQ) contract vehicle for foreign language instruction, under which the NSA awarded three prime contracts. To qualify as technically acceptable, offerors needed the capacity to provide language training in all six specified geographic areas. Following award of the IDIQ contracts, the awardees would then compete against each other for individual delivery orders to provide training in a particular language at particular locations.

According to their stipulations, Berlitz and CLCI submitted invoices and received payments based on non-competitive bids. In furtherance of the conspiracy, and to qualify as technically acceptable when it otherwise would have been ineligible for award, CLCI falsely and misleadingly claimed the capacity to perform training services at a particular facility in Odenton, Maryland a facility that turned out to be solely owned and operated by its competitor, Berlitz. Berlitz provided CLCI with a floor plan to the Odenton facility, which CLCI submitted as our Odenton, MD location in its proposal. In exchange for this favor, CLCI agreed not to bid against Berlitz for any delivery orders involving language training near the Odenton facility. CLCI memorialized the agreement with a draft letter in an email to Berlitz. On two separate occasions in August 2017, the companies maintained the agreement by email exchanges, confirming that CLCI would not bid on a delivery order NSA sent out for instruction in Maryland.

Under the deferred prosecution agreements, which resolved the charges, both companies agreed to cooperate fully in any related criminal investigation and prosecution, and to implement a compliance and ethics program to detect and prevent future violations. Both companies also agreed to pay criminal penalties, $147,000 for Berlitz and $140,000 for CLCI, and victim compensation to NSA to the tune of $57,000. Violations of 18 U.S.C. 371 carry a maximum company fine of $500,000.

Takeaway: Contractors and prospective contractors would do well to heed the lessons here. When submitting information to the government, truthfulness is paramount. And it should go without saying that colluding with other competitors to stifle competition is illegal. Companies that violate these legal and ethical norms not only face criminal penalties, but also may end up suspended or debarred from government contracting. Companies should ensure their regular ethics training addresses these and other aspects of integrity in the bidding process.

*Markus Speidel is a Law Clerk in our Washington, D.C. office and not admitted to the bar.

[View source.]

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Companies Pay Criminal Penalties And Compensation For Undermining Competition - JD Supra

Sports News of Friday, 29 January 2021

Source: Happy 98.9FM

The NSA has warned that anybody who flouts the COVID-19 protocols would be punished

The Director-General for the National Sports Authority (NSA), Professor Peter Twumasi, has disclosed to Happy Sports that there are plans to ensure that proper spacing is done at the various stadia across the country to prevent the spread of the COVID-19.

According to the NSA boss, the COVID-19 is on the rise and the Authority is putting in measures to ensure that there is strict adherence to the protocols on match days.

He stressed that the NSA will ensure strict adherence to the COVID-19 protocols in accordance with the 25 per cent capacity allowed to watch the games.

We are in tougher times during this COVID-19. So we are putting in measures to make sure everyone adheres strictly to the COVID-19 protocols when they come to the stadium, he told Odiasempa Kwame Oware on Wamputu Sports on Happy 98.9FM.

In order to ensure that there is proper spacing done at the venue, we have done a proper demarcation so the fans know where to sit. We will make sure we will replicate this around all the various stadia, he added.

Professor Peter Twumasi warned that anybody who flouts the COVID-19 protocols would be punished.

Read this article:
Coronavirus: NSA to extend demacation of seats across the various stadia - GhanaWeb

The Assam government has made its intention clear in no uncertain terms by arresting the states DIG Hiranya Kumar Bhattacharya under the National Security Act. Bhattacharya is an alleged sympathiser of the agitation on the foreigners issue. Professor Lakhinandan Bora of the Assam Agricultural University was also arrested under the NSA. Oil supplies from the state to the refinery in Barauni in Bihar have resumed. The developments signal that the hardliners in the Union cabinet on the Assam issue have won at a time when the resumption of talks between the agitators and the Centre was looking imminent. While resumption of oil supplies was always on the cards, the arrests, especially that of Bhattacharya. took everyone by surprise. The DIG, who is on leave, has apparently been taken to Ranchi.

Congress Leader

Laxmi Narain Induria, general secretary of Madhya Pradesh Congress (I), has been sacked. Induria belongs to the Vidya Charan Shukla group, which has been complaining to the Centre against Chief Minister Arjun Singh. He along with several other MLAs and MPs from Madhya Pradesh have been camping in Delhi to seek a meeting with Prime Minister Indira Gandhi.

Asiad Woes

The cost of the Asian Games may soar to Rs 700 crore taking into account the cost of flyovers, hotels, roads, railway lines. A hush-hush government study has revealed that the work on the main stadia is running behind schedule and theres a possibility that the games could be postponed by a year. Opposition parties are not too happy about holding the games in Delhi, but they dont want to appear churlish by starting an agitation. The Lok Dal, however, is determined to protest against the games. When the Janata government approved the Asian Games proposal, the estimated cost was around Rs 250 crore.

Go here to see the original:
January 30, 1981, Forty Years Ago: Assam DIG arrested - The Indian Express