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Based on the info written in the documents, the CIA pre-installed ExpressLane in the systems of newer partners. For older ones, it gets installed by an agent personally visiting a partner site under the guise of installing a software update. ExpressLane disguises itself as a harmless exe file in Windows' System 32 folder, but it actually collects files of interest. When an agent inserts a thumb drive to run the fake software update, ExpressLane automatically uploads the compressed and encrypted files it gathered.

That thumb drive will also install a "kill date" that disrupts the system by a certain date, forcing the partner to call the CIA for service. This tactic guarantees agents can collect data even if a partner refuses the shady software update. It's unclear what the CIA plans to do with all that biometric data -- it could be using them for a secret operation, but it could also be collecting them for no particular reason. Either way, the more info it gathers, the more powerful it becomes, so it's not really surprising for the agency to ensure that nobody can keep secrets from it.

See the article here:
CIA uses a secret tool to spy on NSA, FBI and other intel partners - Engadget

The NSA has begun what is likely to be a determined PR campaign to retain mass spying laws as they head toward expiration at the end of the year.

In a post on its website titled "Section 702 Saves Lives, Protects the Nation and Allies," America's surveillance nerve center argues it "relies" on the controversial part of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) to "uncover the identities or plans of terrorists."

The law has "played both a unique and decisive role in national defense," it goes on, adding that it also "informs" the intelligence community's "cybersecurity efforts."

The post then goes on to claim that the NSA's interpretation of Section 702 enabled it to reveal the identities of "overseas terrorists" responsible for an unspecified attack that resulting in the death of more than 20 people last year and claims it enabled them to "refute the terrorist organization's denial of any involvement."

It claims that in that case, the extra intel enabled the US government to launch operations against the unnamed group in question and that its "contribution to the fight probably hadn't been factored into the adversaries' schemes."

The argument is a textbook example of how the intelligence services make their case for continued extraordinary powers even after it's shown they abused those same powers.

The details are sufficiently vague and limited to prevent any independent analysis while also allowing the snoops to claim necessary operational security. The case is also referenced as if it were but a single example of many times that the NSA's powers have been used to provide additional national security, but we have no way of knowing whether this was literally one case or one of many as the NSA and associate services refuse to provide broader context or statistics.

This approach of pointing only to the value of such extraordinary powers obscures the larger question of whether the same information could have been revealed by a different method, and ignores whether the resources and trade-offs with privacy and civil rights are sufficiently valuable to be worth continuing them.

However, when it comes to Section 702, the single case provided in this post does not address the biggest problem with the legislation: that, despite its name, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act has increasingly been used to spy on Americans.

Under the NSA's highly questionable interpretation of Section 702, the agency has gathered huge amounts of data on an unknown number of US citizens by claiming that it can grab and store information on anyone connected to a foreign target.

How many American citizens? The NSA refuses to say, and has done so for years. Having provided excuse after excuse for why it is unable to produce such a figure, in June the spy nerds gave up any pretense that it was going to do so.

That led to a fiery exchange between Senator Ron Wyden (D-OR), who has acted as a watchdog on the intelligence services' powers in his position as a member of the US Senate's Intelligence Committee, and director of national intelligence Daniel Coats back in June.

"You promised that you would provide a 'relevant metric' for the number of law-abiding Americans who are swept up in the FISA 702 searches," Wyden barked at Coats. "This morning you went back on that promise."

Coats responded: "What I pledged to you is I would make every effort to try to find out why we were not able to come to a specific number of collection of US persons There were extensive efforts on the part of the NSA to get you an appropriate answer they were not able to do that..."

Wyden angrily interjected: "Respectfully, that's not what you said. You said: 'We are working to produce a relevant metric...'"

"But we were not able to do it. Working to do it is different from doing it," retorted Coats.

It's not just the storing of information on US citizens a situation that goes directly against the actual wording of the FISA that worries lawmakers and privacy groups. Over time it has emerged that the NSA allows the FBI to access that database without limit and to use search terms related to US citizens including their names, email address and telephone numbers, to search for possible incriminating evidence in domestic crimes.

Under significant political pressure, the NSA vowed that it would stop gathering information on anyone and everyone that even mentions a foreign target but it has not said it will reduce its existing database of information or limit its access by other government agencies. There is also nothing to stop the NSA from changing its mind at a later date unless specific changes are made to the law itself.

And that is ultimately what this unusual NSA public post is about: pushing back against efforts to rewrite the law to exclude the NSA from doing many of the things it has bent Section 702's wording to accommodate.

With Congress required to reauthorize FISA at the end of the year and with lawmakers due to hold hearings in its next session starting in September on what should be done, the NSA is pushing back against a growing consensus that radical changes need to be made to the law to prevent it from being abused.

Tech firms have already proposed five very specific changes to the law the first of which is to explicitly ban the broader targeting of anyone connected to a foreign target a permanent part of the law.

They also want: agencies like the FBI to get a warrant before searching the 702 database; the wording tightened up so the intelligence services have to specifically identify individuals rather than insist on access to all data within which they will search for individuals; better oversight of the process; and increased transparency over the number and type of requests made under this section of the law.

Recent investigations into declassified documents have also shown that the NSA and FBI routinely violated civil liberties laws during the Obama Administration by carrying out improper searches, sharing raw intelligence data and failing to delete unauthorized intercepts.

In the lead up to the new session of Congress where the future of Section 702 will be decided, a number of organizations have actively opposed the law.

The Electronic Frontier Foundation wants the Supreme Court to explicitly rule that the gathering of intelligence on US citizens through FISA is illegal bypassing Congressional wheeler dealing altogether.

Even security policy wonk publication Just Security has lambasted the misleading arguments put forward by Section 702 advocates who oppose reform.

We have checked with the Senate and House Judiciary Committees and so far there are no scheduled hearings on the reauthorization of FISA and Section 702 but there are indisputably coming and this week's post by the NSA is almost certainly just the first shot in a pitched battle that will be fought between now and the end of 2017.

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NSA ramps up PR campaign to keep its mass spying powers - The Register

WJBF-TV

Accused NSA leaker Reality Winner in court next week WJBF-TV AUGUSTA, Ga. (WJBF) Accused NSA leaker Reality Winner will be in federal court in Augusta next week. Winner, who worked for a defense contractor here in Augusta, is charged with leaking classified information to an online news site called The ...

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Accused NSA leaker Reality Winner in court next week - WJBF-TV

Cyberwar and cyber intelligence are diverging, as are Cyber Command and the NSA. Heres what that means for the man who leads both entities, the future of signals intelligence collection, and cyberwarfare.

The move to elevate Cyber Command to a full Unified Combatant Command and split it off from the National Security Agency or NSA shows that cyber intelligence collection and information war are rapidly diverging fields. The future leadership of both entities is now in question, but the Pentagon has set out a conditions-based approach to the breakup. That represents a partial victory for the man who directs both Cyber Command and theNSA.

The move would mean that the head of Cyber Command would answer directly to the Defense Secretary and the National Security Agency would get its own head. Its a move that many have said is long overdue, and its exact timing remains unknown. So what does the split mean for the Pentagon, for Cyber Command, and for the future of U.S. cybersecurity?

The split will give the commander of Cyber Command central authority over resource allocation, training, operational planning and mission execution. The commander will answer to the Defense Secretary directly, not the head of Strategic Command. The decision means that Cyber Command will play an even more strategic role in synchronizing cyber forces and training, conducting and coordinating military cyberforce operations and advocating for and prioritizing cyber investments within the department, said Kenneth Rapuano, assistant defense secretary for Homeland Defense and GlobalSecurity.

The Start of aProcess

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The move announced on Friday fulfills a mandate in the National Defense Authorization Act of 2017. Former Defense Secretary Ash Carter hinted at the split back in May 2016. But it wont happenimmediately.

Instead, Defense Secretary James Mattis and Joint Chiefs Chairman Gen. Joe Dunford will nominate a flag officer to take over the new Cyber Command as well as the NSA. That person could be Adm. Michael Rogers, who currently heads both, or someone else. Trump has reportedly asked Mattis to give him the name of a nominee. Speculation has focused on Army Lt. Gen. William Mayville as the nominee to head CyberCommand.

Once that new person is nominated and confirmed and once Mattis and Dunford are satisfied that splitting the two entities will not hamper the ability of either Cyber Command or the NSA to conduct their missions independently, only then will Cyber Command and the NSA actuallysplit.

What Does it Mean forLeadership?

Read one way, the announcement means Rogers will lose power. Even were he to become the nominee to the new elevated Cyber Command, he would still wind up losing the NSA eventually, or, as the eventual head of the NSA, lose CyberCommand.

Read another way, the lack of a concrete timetable for the split, despite such a requirement in the authorization bill, represents a partial win forRogers.

Rogers took over the NSA and Cyber Command in the spring of 2014. He has been resistant to the idea of a split, telling lawmakers in September that U.S. national security benefitted from the dual-hat arrangement. This view was not shared by then-Director of National Intelligence James Clapper nor then-Defense Secretary Ash Carter. Rogers resistance was one of many issues that rubbed them the wrongway.

It got so bad that in November, unnamed sources told The Washington Post that Clapper and Carter were urging President Barack Obama to fireRogers.

The truth is a bit more nuanced. Clappers goal was to split the NSA from CyberCom. He was not a strong advocate of removal, but was willing to defer to [the Secretary of Defense] if Carter felt strongly about selecting new leadership at Cyber Command, a source inside the intelligence community said. There were other concerns unrelated to the potentialsplit.

Rogers outlasted both Clapper, who had long planned to retire at the end of the Obama administration; and Carter, a political appointee. Rogers attitude toward an NSA-Cyber Command split evolved. In May, he testified that he would support a split was done in a way that did not hamper either the NSA or CyberCommand.

The manner in which the split was announced is in keeping with what Rogers has said hewanted.

The move toward a conditions-based split also met with the approval of Sen. John McCain, R-Ariz, a longtime Rogers ally. I appreciate the administrations commitment today to ensuring that a future separation of the so-called dual hat relationship between Cyber Command and the National Security Agency will be based on conditions, rather than arbitrary political timelines, McCain said in a statement. While Cyber Command and the National Security Agency should eventually be able to operate independent of one another, the administration must work closely with the Congress to take the necessary steps that will make this separation of responsibilities successful, and to ensure that each agency will emerge more effective and more capable as aresult.

What It Means for Cyber Command, the NSA, and CyberOperations

The elevation of Cyber Command represents a big step forward for the militarys cyber ability, but it has yet to be catch up to the NSA in terms of collecting signals intelligence or creating network accesses, according to Bill Leigher, who as a rear admiral helped stand up Navy Fleet Cyber Command. Leigher, who now directs government cyber solutions for Raytheon, applauds the split because the NSA, which collects foreign intelligence, and Cyber Command, a warfighting outfit, have fundamentally different missions.This caused tension between the two organizations under one roof. Information collected for intelligence gathering may be useful in a way thats fundamentally different from intelligence for military purposes, he says. If you collecting intelligence, its foreign espionage. You dont want to get caught. The measure of success is: collect intelligence and dont get caught. If youre going to war, I would argue that the measure of performance is what we do has to have the characteristics of a legal weapon in the context of war and the commander has to know what he or she usesit.

This puts the agencies in disagreement about how to use intel and tools that they share. From an NSA perspective, cyber really is about gaining access to networks. From aCyber Command point of view, I would argue, its about every piece of software on the battlefield and having the means to prevent that software from working the way it was intended to work [for the adversary], hesaid.

The split will allow the agencies to pursue the very different tools, operations, and rules each of their missions requires, he said. Expect NSA to intensify its focus on developing access for intelligence, and Cyber Command to prepare to rapidly deploy massive cyber effects at scale during military operations and shut down the enemy. Both of this will likely leverage next-generation artificial intelligence but in very different ways saidLeigher.

The rest is here:
What the Announced NSA / Cyber Command Split Means - Defense One

The move to elevate Cyber Command to a full Unified Combatant Command and split it off from the National Security Agencyshows that cyber intelligence collection and information war are rapidly diverging fields. The future leadership of both entities is now in question, but the Pentagon has set out a conditions-based approach to the breakup. That represents a partial victory for the man who directs both Cyber Command and the NSA.

The move would mean that the head of Cyber Command would answer directly to the Defense Secretary and the National Security Agency would get its own head. Its a move that many have said is long overdue, and its exact timing remains unknown. So what does the split mean for the Pentagon, for Cyber Command, and for the future of U.S. cyber security?

The split will give the commander of Cyber Command central authority over resource allocation, training, operational planning and mission execution. The commander will answer to the Defense secretary directly, not the head of Strategic Command. The decision means that Cyber Command will play an even more strategic role in synchronizing cyber forces and training, conducting and coordinating military cyberforce operations and advocating for and prioritizing cyber investments within the department, said Kenneth Rapuano, assistant defense secretary for Homeland Defense and Global Security.

The Start of a Process

The move announced on Friday fulfills a mandate in the National Defense Authorization Act of 2017. Former Defense Secretary Ash Carter hinted at the split back in May 2016. But it wont happen immediately.

Instead, Defense Secretary James Mattis and Joint Chiefs Chairman Gen. Joe Dunford will nominate a flag officer to take over the new Cyber Command as well as the NSA. That person could be Adm. Michael Rogers, who currently heads both, or someone else. Trump has reportedly asked Mattis to give him the name of a nominee.Speculation has focused on Army Lt. Gen. William Mayville as the nominee to head Cyber Command.

Once that new person is nominated and confirmed and once Mattis and Dunford are satisfied that splitting the two entities will not hamper the ability of either Cyber Command or the NSA to conduct their missions independently, only then will Cyber Command and the NSA actually split.

What Does it Mean for Leadership?

Read one way, the announcement means Rogers will lose power. Even were he to become the nominee to the new elevated Cyber Command, he would still wind up losing the NSA eventually. If he were to stay on as head of NSA after the confirmation of a new Cyber Command head, as expected, he would briefly serve under Mayville until the formal split.

Read another way, the lack of a concrete timetable for the split, despite such a requirement in the authorization bill, represents a partial win for Rogers.

Rogers took over the NSA and Cyber Command in the spring of 2014. He has been resistant to the idea of a split, telling lawmakers in September that U.S. national security benefitted from the dual-hat arrangement. This view was not shared by then-Director of National Intelligence James Clapper nor then-Defense Secretary Ash Carter. Rogers resistance was one of many issues that rubbed them the wrong way.

It got so bad that in November, unnamed sources told The Washington Post that Clapper and Carter were urging President Barack Obama to fire Rogers.

The truth is a bit more nuanced. Clappers goal was to split the NSA from CyberCom. He was not a strong advocate of removal, but was willing to defer to [the Secretary of Defense] if Carter felt strongly about selecting new leadership at Cyber Command, a source inside the intelligence community said. There were other concerns unrelated to the potential split.

Rogers outlasted both Clapper, who had long planned to retire at the end of the Obama administration; and Carter, a political appointee. Rogers attitude toward an NSA-Cyber Command split evolved. In May, he testified that he would support a split was done in a way that did not hamper either the NSA or Cyber Command.

The manner in which the split was announced is in keeping with what Rogers has said he wanted.

The move toward a conditions-based split also met with the approval of Sen. John McCain, R-Ariz, a longtime Rogers ally. I appreciate the administrations commitment today to ensuring that a future separation of the so-called dual hat relationship between Cyber Command and the National Security Agency will be based on conditions, rather than arbitrary political timelines, McCain said in a statement. While Cyber Command and the National Security Agency should eventually be able to operate independent of one another, the administration must work closely with the Congress to take the necessary steps that will make this separation of responsibilities successful, and to ensure that each agency will emerge more effective and more capable as a result.

What It Means for Cyber Command, the NSA, and Cyber Operations

The elevation of Cyber Command represents a big step forward for the militarys cyber ability, but it has yet to be catch up to the NSA in terms of collecting signals intelligence or creating network accesses, according to Bill Leigher, who as a rear admiral helped stand up Navy Fleet Cyber Command. Leigher, who now directs government cyber solutions for Raytheon, applauds the split because the NSA, which collects foreign intelligence, and Cyber Command, a warfighting outfit, have fundamentally different missions.This caused tension between the two organizations under one roof. Information collected for intelligence gathering may be useful in a way thats fundamentally different from intelligence for military purposes, he says. If you collecting intelligence, its foreign espionage. You dont want to get caught. The measure of success is: collect intelligence and dont get caught. If youre going to war, I would argue that the measure of performance is what we do has to have the characteristics of a legal weapon in the context of war and the commander has to know what he or she uses it.

This puts the agencies in disagreement about how to use intel and tools that they share. From an NSA perspective, cyber really is about gaining access to networks. From aCyber Command point of view, I would argue, its about every piece of software on the battlefield and having the means to prevent that software from working the way it was intended to work [for the adversary], he said.

The split will allow the agencies to pursue the very different tools, operations, and rules each of their missions requires, he said. Expect NSA to intensify its focus on developing access for intelligence, and Cyber Command to prepare to rapidly deploy massive cyber effects at scale during military operations and shut down the enemy. Both of this will likely leverage next-generation artificial intelligence but in very different ways said Leigher.

More:
What the Announced NSA / Cyber Command Split Means