Ransomware and the NSA – Bloomberg
Some questions, admiral.
The effects of this months global ransomware attackseem to be fading, fortunately.But a crucial question the incidentraisedis only getting more urgent. When it comes to online security, the U.S. governments priorities -- preventing terrorism and protecting cyberspace-- are in permanent tension.Is there a way to resolve it?
The National Security Agency routinely seeks out flaws in common software and builds tools, known as exploits, to take advantage of them. Doing so is an essential part of the agencys mission of spying on terrorists and foreign adversaries, yet it comes with grave risks.
The latest attack --still evolving-- is an example. Researchers say it takes advantage ofa stolen NSA tool to exploit a flaw in some versions of Windows. Microsoft Corp.hassuggestedthat the NSA knewof the flaw for some time, yet didnt disclose it until the theft.
That may sound unnerving. Windows is ubiquitous, and governments are generally expected to respect online security, not undermine it. Microsoft is understandably unhappy. Worse, the initial attack crippled everything from banks to hospitals. Its fair to say that lives were at risk.
So why keep such a harmful vulnerability secret? Simple:Exploiting it proved hugely effective in swooping up intelligence -- like fishing with dynamite, as one former NSA employeeput it.
Deciding whether such intelligenceis worth the risk isa fraught and secretive process. When a significant new flaw is found by a federal agency, its shared among experts from the intelligence, defense and cybersecurity bureaucracies (among others), who debate whether to disclose or exploit it, according tonine criteria. A review board then makes a final decision. In almost all cases involving a product made or used in the U.S. -- more than 90 percent, according to the NSA -- the flaws are disclosed.
Although its an imperfect process, a better way isnt obvious. Simply disclosing all vulnerabilities, as some activistsdemand, would be nuts. Intelligence would dry up, investigations would be hobbled, and the Pentagon would lose crucial insight into foreign militaries, for starters. Other countries would continue exploiting such flaws to their advantage. To echo a Cold Warlocution, it would amount to unilateral disarmament.
Likewise, Microsoft hasproposeda digital Geneva Convention, or a global agreement to disclose flaws. But the worst actors online -- thieves, gangsters,North Korea-- would hardly feel constrained by such a protocol, while the restraints put in place could well eliminate crucial methods of tracking them.
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Abetter approachis to improve the current system. One problem is that the secrecy required makes it hard to know how well the stated criteria for retaining vulnerabilities are being followed. Reporting the total number found and disclosed each year might offer some reassurance to tech companies and the public, without divulging anything sensitive. Periodic audits of those that have been retained could help ensure that agencies arent hoarding dangerous stuff thats no longer useful. Most important, though, is to better secure these flaws -- and the tools meant to exploit them -- whilehaving a strategy tomitigate the risks if theyre once again leaked.
Failing that, the public may quickly lose confidence in this process. And that may be the biggest risk of all.
--Editors: Timothy Lavin, Michael Newman.
To contact the senior editor responsible for Bloomberg Views editorials: David Shipley at davidshipley@bloomberg.net.
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Ransomware and the NSA - Bloomberg