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Ms. Smith (not her real name) is a freelance writer and programmer with a special and somewhat personal interest in IT privacy and security issues.

At the outdoor hacker camp and conference SHA2017, which is taking place in the Netherlands, NSA whistleblower William Binney gave the talk, How the NSA tracks you.

As a former insider, Binney knew about this long before Snowden dropped the documents to prove it is happening. Although he didnt say anything new, Binney is certainly no fan of the NSAs spying he calls the NSA the New Stasi Agency. If you are no fan of surveillance, then his perspective from the inside about the total invasion of the privacy rights of everybody on the planet will fuel your fury at the NSA all over again.

In todays cable program, according to Binney, the NSA uses corporations that run fiber lines to get taps on the lines. If that fails, they use foreign governments to get taps on the lines. And if that doesnt work, theyll tap the line anywhere that they can get to it meaning corporations or governments wont even know about the taps.

The companies are involved at the next step the PRISM program, which includes collection directly from the servers of U.S. service providers. However, Binney said PRISM is the minor program when compared to Upstream, which includes collecting data from the taps on fiber-optic cables in hundreds of places around the world. Thats where they are collecting off the fiber lines all the data and storing it.

PRISM was for show-and-tell purposes, to show Congress and courts what the NSA was doing and to say we have warrants and are abiding by the laws. Upstream was the one that allowed the NSA to take everything off the line.

Regarding worldwide SIGINT, CNE (computer network exploitation) was the big one. Implants in hardware or software, lets say switches or servers, make them do anything they want because the NSA pwned them.

That feeds the NSAs Treasure Map, which provides a map of the entire internet in near real-time; any device, anywhere, all the time every minute of every day. As Binney put it, So its not just collecting what youre saying encrypted or not but its also monitoring where you are when you do it.

Treasure Map is also how intelligence agencies use GPS from cell phones to target drone attack victims. Binney noted there are at least 1.2 million people on the drone hit list.

He also mentioned the programs that include the input of all phone data, fixed, mobile, satellite any kind of phone which both the FBI and CIA can directly access so that when they want to see who did what, they have an index, all, to everything they ever said in their database.

All the data is collected without warrants so its a basic violation of the rights of every human, Binney said.

He also covered how other agencies can directly access the NSAs data, Five Eyes, CIA, FBI, DEA and DIA. The police can access it via the FBIs system.

The NSA could choose to look at the right targets, but doesnt. The NSA may collect it all, but thats not the same as intelligence, as understanding all of what was collected. If you use one of the hot keywords in an email, for example, it will get flagged for review. But planned attacks happen because analysts are so buried beneath the data they cant see the attacks coming. Binney previously tried to convince the U.K. that bulk data kills people.

While all this data isnt helping to stop attacks, having all the data gives the intelligence community the power to manipulate anyone they want. Its like J. Edgar Hoover on super steroids all the collected data gives intelligence agencies the means to target anyone. Then parallel construction is used after the fact to go back and build a separate basis for an investigation to cover up the fact that the data was obtained unconstitutionally.

Before taking questions from conference attendees, Binney pointed out an icon on a slide as a teaser to his startup, which will advise on ways you can do privacy and security by design. He came to Europe, since they cant get anything done in the U.S. The U.S. and U.K. are too dense to realize it can be done it also goes against their agenda for more money, power and control.

Can we expect more NSA employees to blow the whistle? Perhaps, but the people in power there are corrupt, Binney said. During the portion of the talk when attendees could ask questions, he talked about how the NSA has employed a lot of introverts, people with ISTJ personalities, making them easy to threaten. Binney added that the See Something, Say Something (about your fellow workers) program inside the NSA is what the Stasi did. Theyre picking up all the techniques from the Stasi and the KGB and the Gestapo and the SS; they just arent getting violent yet that we know of internally in the U.S.; outside is another story.

Read the rest here:
NSA whistleblower discusses 'How the NSA tracks you' - CSO Online - CSO Online

On August 3, The American Conservative ran a lengthy piece of mine dealing with the whistleblower protection nightmare that is the Department of Defense. One of the subjects of that piece is now former NSA IG George Ellard, and because I had even more on his case than I could fit into the TAC piece, I wanted to share the rest of what I knowand dont knowabout the allegations against Ellard, the final disposition of the case, why the Obama administrations whistleblower retaliation fix is itself broken, and what might be done to actually provide meaningful protections for would-be national security whistleblowers in the Pentagon and elsewhere in the national security establishment.

Regarding what little we know about the specifics of Ellards case, I had this to say in the TAC piece:

As the Project on Government Oversight firstreportedin December 2016, a three-member interagency Inspector General External Review Panel concluded in May 2016 that the then-Inspector General of the National Security Agency (NSA), George Ellard, had, according to POGO, himself had previously retaliated against an NSA whistleblower[.] This apparently occurred during the very same period that Ellard hadclaimedthatSnowden could have come to me. The panel that reviewed Ellards case recommended he be fired, a decision affirmed by NSA Director Mike Rogers.

But there was a catch: the Secretary of Defense had the final word on Ellards fate. Outgoing Obama administration Defense Secretary Ash Carter, apparently indifferent to the magnitude of the Ellard case, left office without making a decision.

In the months after Donald Trump became president, rumors swirled inside Washington that Ellard had, in fact, escaped termination. One source, who requested anonymity, reported that Ellard had been seen recently on the NSA campus at Ft. Meade, Maryland. That report, it turns out, was accurate.

On July 21, in response to the authors inquiry, the Pentagon public affairs office provided the following statement:

NSA followed the appropriate procedures following a whistleblower retaliation claim against former NSA Inspector General George Ellard. Following thorough adjudication procedures, Mr. Ellard continues to be employed by NSA.

After Id finished the TAC piece, Ellards attorney, Terrence ODonnell of the Washington mega law firm of Williams & Connolly, sent me the following statement about his client, George Ellard:

The Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ASD) examined and rejected an allegation that former NSA Inspector General, George Ellard, had retaliated against an NSA employee by not selecting that employee to fill a vacancy in the OIGs Office of Investigations.

In a lengthy, detailed, and well-reasoned memorandum, the ASD concluded that Dr. Ellard had not played a role in that personnel decision or, in the terms of the applicable laws and regulations the ASD cited, Dr. Ellard did not take, fail to take, or threaten to take or fail to take any action associated with the personnel decision.

This judgment echoes the conclusion reached by the Department of Defenses Office of the Inspector General. An External Review Panel (ERP) later came to the opposite conclusion, leading to the ASD review. The ASD concluded that the evidence cited in the ERP report as reflective of [Dr. Ellards] alleged retaliatory animus toward Complainant is of a character so circumstantial and speculative that it lacks probity.

In assessing Dr. Ellards credibility and in rendering its decision, the ASD also considered Dr. Ellards distinguished career of public service, spanning more than 21 years of service across the executive, legislative, and judicial branches, culminating in almost 10 years of service as the NSA IG. Dr. Ellard, the ASD noted, has been entrusted to address some of our nations most challenging national security issues; successive NSA Directors have consistently rated Dr. Ellards performance as Exceptional Results and Outstanding; and he has been commended by well-respected senior officials with whom [he has] worked closely over the years for [his] ability and integrity.

Dr. Ellard is serving as the NSA Chair on the faculty of the National War College, a position he held prior to the ERP review.

Quite a bit to unpack in that statement. Lets start with the ASDs decision to overrule the External Review Panel (ERP), a key component of the Obama-era PPD-19, the directive designed to prevent in all government departments or agencies the very kind of thing Ellard allegedly did. Here are the key paragraphs of PPD-19 with respect to ERP recommendations:

If the External Review Panel determines that the individual was the subject of a Personnel Action prohibited by Section A while an employee of a Covered Agency or an action affecting his or her Eligibility for Access to Classified Information prohibited by Section B, the panel may recommend that the agency head take corrective action to return the employee, as nearly aspracticable and reasonable, to the position such employee would have held had the reprisal not occurred and that the agency head reconsider the employees Eligibility for Access to Classified Information consistent with the national security and with Executive Order 12968. (emphasis added)

An agency head shall carefully consider the recommendation of the External Review Panel pursuant to the above paragraph and within 90 days, inform the panel and the DNI of what action he or she has taken. If the head of any agency fails to so inform the DNI, the DNI shall notify the President. (emphasis added)

Taking the ERPs recommendations is strictly optional.

Whats so significant about the ERP recommendation in Ellards case was that the ERP not only apparently believed that the whistleblower in question should be given a fair chance at getting the position he or she originally applied for within the IG itself, but that Ellards actions werein the view of three non-DoD IGs who examined the caseso severe that they recommended he be terminated.

ODonnell quoted from a Pentagon memo clearing Ellard that is not public. The ERPs findings, along with their record of investigation, are not public. Nor do we know how thoroughor cursorythe ASDs review of the Ellard case was prior to the decision to clear Ellard. Given all of that, who are we to believe?

There are some key facts we do know that lead me to believe that the ERPs recommendations were not only likely soundly based, but that the whistleblower retaliation problem inside the Pentagon is deeply entrenched.

ODonnells statement also claimed that the ASDs decision to reverse the ERP and clear Ellard of wrongdoing echoes the conclusion reached by the Department of Defenses Office of the Inspector General. But its the DoD IG itself, as an institution, that is also under a major cloud because of other whistleblower retaliation claims coming from former NSA or DoD IG employeesspecifically former NSA senior executive service member Thomas Drake and for DoD Assistant Inspector General John Crane. As Ive noted previously, the independent Office of Special Counsel found adequate evidence of whistleblower retaliation and document destruction to refer the matter to the Justice Departments own IG; Cranes case is getting a look from the Government Accountability Office (GAO), Congresss own executive branch watchdog.

The DoD and NSA IGs have clear conflicts of interest when employees from within their own ranks are implicated in potential criminal wrongdoing. PPD-19 was supposed to be the answer to such conflicts of interest, but its lack of teeth from an enforcement standpoint renders it a badly flawed remedy for an extremely serious integrity problem.

And what about Congress? PPD-19 speaks to that as well:

On an annual basis, the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community shall report the determinations and recommendations and department and agency head responses to the DNI and, as appropriate, to the relevant congressional committees.

But Congress doesnt need to wait for the IC IG to tell it what is already publicly known about the Ellard, Drake, and Crane cases. It has ample cause to not only investigate these cases, but to take action to replace PPD-19 with a whistleblower protection system that actually protects those reporting waste, fraud, abuse, or criminal conduct and punishes those who attempt to block such reporting. Two options that deserve consideration are 1) empowering OSC to examine these kinds of cases and issue unreviewable summary judgments itself or 2) revive the expired Independent Counsel statute, rewritten with a focus on whistleblower reprisal case investigations.

One thing is beyond dispute. The PPD-19 process is not the answer for protecting whistleblower and punishing those who retaliate against them. We need a credible system that will do both. The only question now is whether anybody in the House or Senate will step up to the task of building a new one.

More:
The Curious Case Of Ex-NSA Inspector General George Ellard - Cato Institute (blog)

A federal judge has sided with prosecutors in the case against former Fort Gordon contractor Reality Winner, finding that her defense team should be muzzled from speaking about any information deemed classified by the government, even if it has been widely reported in local, national and international media publications.

Winner has pleaded not guilty to a single count of violating a provision of the espionage act. She is accused of leaking a classified document to online media news publication, The Intercept.

That document was extensively reported on by The Intercept and numerous other news media organizations in stories on Winner, who is accused of leaking a national security document she allegedly obtained through her job with a NSA contractor on Fort Gordon.

The document is an analysis of the extent of Russias efforts to hack into state election boards. Russian meddling is the subject of U.S. Senate and House intelligence committees investigations and a special prosecutor who is looking into possible collusion between Trump supporters and the Russians during last years presidential campaign.

In his order released Thursday, Magistrate Judge Brian K. Epps wrote that determining what is classified information is a function of the executive branch of government, not the judicial branch.

Just because the defense team has expressed concern of accidentally mishandling classified information is no reason to relax the strict procedures required, Epps wrote. The defense is not prohibited in using classified information in Winners defense, but it must follow the strict procedures, he wrote.

Both sides have until Aug. 16 to weigh in on Epps proposed protective order that describes the closely guarded handling of materials in the case. A classified information security officer is in charge of ensuring such information is handled only by those on the defense team who have obtained security clearance, and only in a secured location.

The defense is to have free access to that location during regular business hours, although other times may be allotted with proper notice and consultation with the U.S. Marshals Service, according to the order.

Any notes or other papers the defense may create using classified information is not allowed outside of the security location. Any document filed with the court that contains or might contain classified information must be filed under seal. Only those portions deemed not classified by the classified information security officer will be unsealed for public review.

At the end of the case any such defense-prepared material will be destroyed by the classified information security officer. The confines of the protective order are a lifetime commitment and any violation is punishable not only by a finding of contempt but criminal prosecution.

The publication of any classified information does not change the classified status unless a member of the executive branch of government with the proper authorization declares the information to be declassified.

Winners trial is tentatively set to begin in October.

Reach Sandy Hodson at sandy.hodson@augustachronicle.com or (706) 823-3226

Continued here:
Judge sides with prosecution in Reality Winner NSA leak case | The ... - The Augusta Chronicle

(TNS) -- Further cementing its ambitions as a national powerhouse in cybersecurity education, Columbus State University announced Tuesday that it received a $174,000 grant from the National Security Agency to develop a new tool for rapid cybersecurity training and curriculum development.

The award makes CSU one of the top universities in the nation in providing technologies for cybersecurity workforce development to universities, government and private sector across the nation, said Shuangbao Wang, a professor in CSUs TSYS School of Computer Science in a press release.

The tool will be internet-based, allowing it to be accessed anywhere in the world. Wang expects it will eventually be used by global Department of Defense installations and other private and public organizations.

A key part of the tool will be the use of visual mapping, a technology developed by researchers at the university to assist in military decision making.

We are building a tool that people across the nation can use to develop cybersecurity training, which guarantees compliance with government and industry standards for cybersecurity workforce development, said Wang.

The grant is the latest in a string of awards the university has received for developing cybersecurity programs. Earlier this month, CSU announced that it had partnered with the Muscogee County School District to develop a yearlong cybersecurity course at Rothschild Leadership Academy with the help of a $50,000 grant from the NSA.

The university also hosted a weeklong cybersecurity summer camp in June with another NSA grant, this one for $28,000.

The investments may well pay off, with worldwide spending on cybersecurity estimated to reach more than $100 billion by 2020, according to research by the International Data Corporation. That spending is butting against an expected shortage of about two million jobs by 2019.

National cybersecurity workforce development is one of the key areas of this action plan, Wang said. Upon completion, universities, government, and private sector across the nation can use the tool to quickly develop training and curriculum that otherwise would not be possible due to lack of experts, knowledge and skills.

2017 the Columbus Ledger-Enquirer (Columbus, Ga.) Distributed by Tribune Content Agency, LLC.

Read the rest here:
Columbus State Awarded NSA Grant to Develop Cybersecurity Tool - Government Technology

Then-Deputy Security Advisor Ben Rhodes, shown talking to the White House press corps in December 2016, joins a growing list of former Obama officials under subpoena from the House Intelligence Committee. (Cheriss May/Zuma Press/Newscom)

'Unmasking' Scandal: Day by day, the scandal of the Obama administration's abuse of domestic intelligence gathered by the National Security Agency grows. Forget the phony Russia-Trump collusion charges the Obama White House looks increasingly to have committed a crime by using U.S. intelligence for political purposes.

The NSA's insatiable gathering of data and conversations on Americans make it a potentially highly dangerous enemy of Americans' freedoms. Who would want to have a federal government spy shop that knows almost everything you do in public, on the phone, by email, or by computer?

That's why the super-secret NSA, which is much bigger than the better-known CIA, has always operated under strict guidelines for how its intel could be used. In its reports, Americans who are surveilled without a warrant while speaking to a foreign citizen are routinely "masked" that is, their identity is kept secret unless there's an overwhelming national security interest in that person being "unmasked."

Unfortunately, like a child with a dangerous new toy, the Obama administration apparently seems to have believed that the NSA could be used for narrow, political purposes.

As a result, a number of administration officials and Obama supporters, including former National Security Advisor Susan Rice, former U.N. Ambassador Samantha Power and former CIA chief John Brennan, have been subpoenaed by the House Intelligence Committee to answer some questions.

On Wednesday, the panel announced another subpoena had been issued for a former Obama official, this for former Deputy National Security Advisor Ben Rhodes. Our guess is it won't be the last.

This mega-scandal, by the way, has been building for months, though you would hardly know by the near-silence it's been treated with in the media.

But there are exceptions. Back on May 24, the online journal Circa reported that the scandal was far more serious than it first appeared.

"The National Security Agency under former President Barack Obama routinely violated American privacy protections while scouring through overseas intercepts and failed to disclose the extent of the problems until the final days before Donald Trump was elected president last fall, according to once top-secret documents that chronicle some of the most serious constitutional abuses to date by the U.S. intelligence community," wrote Circa investigative reporter Sara A. Carter.

Now, this week, Carter reports that the scandal is much bigger than suspected. A review of government documents found that "government officials conducted 30,355 searches in 2016 seeking information about Americans in NSA intercept meta-data, which include telephone numbers and email addresses," Carter wrote.

She notes that the election-year searches by Obama's political aides and other government officials jumped 27.5% from 2015, tripling the "9,500 such searches" in 2013."In 2016 the administration also scoured the actual contents of NSA intercepted calls and emails for 5,288 Americans, an increase of 13% over the prior year and a massive spike from the 198 names searched in 2013."

Before the Obama administration, under rules propagated by former President George H.W. Bush, "unmasking" incidental intelligence targets was strictly limited and frowned upon. Even after 9/11, despite increased surveillance of people with potential terrorist ties, the rules stayed in place. The potential for abuse, they knew, was too great.

But that ended in 2011 as Obama, using the pretense of fighting a War on Terror that he never even believed in, loosened the rules. As the Washington Examiner reported earlier this week, in 2013 National Intelligence Director James Clapper formally loosened the rules on "unmasking" the names of congressional staffers, elected officials and others.

That major violations occurred under this program seems clear. Last week, House Intelligence Committee Chair Devin Nunes in a letter to Director of National Intelligence Dan Coats noted that "the total requests for Americans' names by Obama political aides numbered in the hundreds during Obama's last year in office and often lacked a specific intelligence community justification," according to The Hill.

In particular, Nunes pointed out that "one official, whose position had no apparent intelligence related function, made hundreds of unmasking requests" in 2016. Speculation is that the official was U.N. Ambassador Samantha Power.

Is this a crime? We do know that the FISA Court, in a closed-door hearing last October, already censured White House officials for their violations of Americans' email privacy, citing an "institutional lack of candor" that had become a "very serious Fourth Amendment issue."

As a reminder, the Fourth Amendment states flatly that "the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated ..." Spying on, and then unmasking, hundreds if not thousands of Americans would seem to us to be a brazen violation of the Constitution.

Remember how the media ridiculed and shamed Donald Trump for tweeting out that he had been "wiretapped" by Obama? It's starting to look like that, or something like it, was very much the case.

If it turns out, as some suspect, that the "unmasking" was used for domestic spying on political foes such as Trump, it would constitute a serious crime and would require a special counsel to investigate it.

The immense size of the spying operation and the clear attempt to use the U.S.' intelligence apparatus for questionable personal purposes seems to be at minimum a violation of the law. If it further turns out that there was a coordinated effort by Obama and his aides to use the information in the 2016 presidential campaign, it will be a crime and scandal larger than even Watergate.

Yes, people will go to prison.

Is that what we have here, the political crime of the still-young 21st century? It would be nice if the mainstream media seemed at all interested in answering that question.

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Reality Winner Is A Loser, And So Is U.S. Security

Continue reading here:
In Abusing NSA Intelligence, Did Obama White House Commit A Crime? - Investor's Business Daily