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NSA and CISA: Here’s how to improve your Kubernetes cluster security – ZDNet

The National Security Agency (NSA) and the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) have published updated guidance about how to harden Kubernetes for managing container applications.

Kubernetes is an open-source system that automates deployment, scaling, and management of applications run in containers.

The updated guidance refreshes the two agencies' first Cybersecurity Technical Report regarding Kubernetes hardening guidance from August 2021. CISA says the update contains additional details and explanations based on feedback from industry, including more detailed info on logging and threat detection in addition to other clarifications.

SEE: What is cloud computing? Everything you need to know about the cloud explained

Some of the updates are subtle but important for those who protect Kubernetes clusters. NSA and CISA do not list what the changes are in the updated guidance, but the initial recommendations weren't met with universal approval.

For example,NCC Group noted that advice about Kubernetes authentication was "largely incorrect when it states that Kubernetes does not provide an authentication method by default", whereas most customer implementations NCC Group had reviewed "support both token and certification authentication, both of which are supported natively." NCC Group advised against both for production loads because Kubernetes does not support certificate revocation, which can be a problem if an attacker has gained access to a certificate issued to privileged accounts. The updated guidance now says that "several user authentication mechanisms are supported but not enabled by default."

Otherwise, key points of the original document appear to be unchanged. It looks at hardening within the context of typical Kubernetes cluster designs that include the control plane, worker nodes (for running containerized apps for the cluster), and pods for containers that are hosted upon these nodes. These clusters are often hosted in the cloud and across multiple clouds in AWS, Azure, Google and elsewhere.

The agencies maintain that Kubernetes is commonly targeted for data theft, computational power theft, or denial of service. Historically, flaws in Kubernetes and various dependencies as well as misconfigurations have been used to deploy crypto miners on victim's infrastructure.

It also maintains that Kubernetes is exposed to significant supply chain risks because clusters often have software and hardware dependences built by third-party developers.

For example, security analysts last year warned of attacks against Kubernetes clusters via misconfigured Argo Workflows container workflow engines for K8s clusters.

Besides supply chain risks, other key actors in the agencies' threat model include malicious outsiders and insider threats. These help define its hardening recommendations.

For example, there is a common cloud case where workloads that aren't managed by a given Kubernetes cluster share the same physical network. In that instance, a workload may have access to the kubelet and to control-plane components, such as the API server. So, the agencies recommend network-level isolation.

The agencies provide advice on how to ensure strict workload isolation between pods running on the same node in a cluster, given that Kubernetes doesn't by default guarantee this separation.

Announcing the updated guidance, the NSA says: "Primary actions include the scanning of containers and pods for vulnerabilities or misconfigurations, running containers and pods with the least privileges possible, and using network separation, firewalls, strong authentication, and log auditing."

The agencies also recommend periodic reviews of Kubernetes settings and vulnerability scans to ensure appropriate risks are accounted for and security patches are applied.

SEE: There's a critical shortage of women in cybersecurity, and we need to do something about it

But patching is not easy in the context of Kubernetes. CISA regularly publishes alerts about new Kubernetes-related vulnerabilities. In February, for example, it warned of a critical (severity score 8.8 out of 10) privilege escalation flaw,CVE-2022-23652, which affected the capsule-proxy reverse proxy for Capsule Operator.

But as NCC Group points out: "patching everything is hard", partly because of the pressure to avoid downtime, but also because vulnerabilities span Kubernetes,Containerd, runc, the Linux kernel, and more.

"This is something that Kubernetes can help with, as the whole concept of orchestration is intended to keep services running even as nodes go on and offline. Despite this, we still regularly see customers running nodes that haven't had patches applied in several months, or even years. (As a tip, server uptime isn't a badge of honour as much as it used to be; it's more likely indicative that you're running an outdated kernel)," NCC Group noted.

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NSA and CISA: Here's how to improve your Kubernetes cluster security - ZDNet

UP Govt to Slap NSA Against Those Involved in Copying Rackets in School Exams – The Wire

Lucknow: The Uttar Pradesh government on Tuesday said action under the National Security Act (NSA) will be taken against those involved in organised copying racket in high school and intermediate exams conducted by the UP Board of Secondary Education.

The directives were given at a meeting held by chief secretary Durga Shankar Mishra with all divisional commissioners, police commissioners, district magistrates and SSPs through video conferencing, an official statement said.

He directed that zonal and sector magistrates should be deputed in districts to conduct copying-free examinations and they should regularly inspect and supervise the examination centres.

Action under the NSA should be taken against those involved in organised copying racket, the officer said, adding that special attention should be paid to those spreading rumours.

In the meeting, additional chief secretary (ACS), secondary education, Aradhana Shukla, said 51,92,689 candidates will appear for the UP board examination at 8,373 examinations centres in the state.

CCTVs have been installed in each examination hall.

The examinations will start from March 24.

(PTI)

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UP Govt to Slap NSA Against Those Involved in Copying Rackets in School Exams - The Wire

Does the Free World Need a Global Cyber Alliance? – SecurityWeek

The increasing incidence of aggressive cyber activity from Russia, China, Iran and North Korea, together with heightened concerns over the war in Ukraine, raises an important question: should the free world unite with a global cyber alliance in response?

At Cybertech Tel Aviv 2022 (March 1-3, 2022), founder of VC firm JVP, Erel Margalit, called for a global cyber alliance in response to the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Leadership is required to establish a democratic cyber alliance, including NATO and other free countries, in order to lead values-based cyber that will support democracies and people, and will say enough! to dictators and to those who support them, he said.

At the same time, on March 2, 2022, Robert Silvers of the U.S. DHS and Israels National Cyber Directorate director-general Gaby Portnoy signed a cyber collaboration deal between the two countries. This followed a new agreement between the UK and Israel announced in November 2021 which was described by the UK government as something that will enable closer working in diplomacy, defense and security, cyber, science, technology, and many other areas.

Such agreements never publicly disclose the extent to which the intelligence agencies of the different countries will work together, but we can assume that it is part of the arrangement. A third new alliance, known as AUKUS, was more upfront about its design and ability to deliver offensive cyber operations, clearly focused on the Indo-Pacific region and Chinas activities.

It is important to understand what we have before asking what we need.

Israels emergence as a cyber ally

Israel is not known for its cyber relationships, but is well known for its cyber capabilities. It is generally thought that Israel worked with the NSA on the delivery of Stuxnet against the Iranian nuclear facility at Natanz in the early 2010s but it must be noted that the U.S. has never declared or admitted any involvement.

The continuous conveyor belt of new and innovative cybersecurity companies being formed by Israeli Defense Force (IDF) alumni also attests to the depth of cyber knowledge and training within the country.

The Belfer Center at the Harvard Kennedy School published a ranking of national cyber power in September 2020. It produced a list of the most comprehensive countries with the highest level of intent and capabilities comprising, in this order, the U.S., China, the UK, and Russia as the top four.

Belfer placed Israel at number 11 in the world. Its methodology was to add data to a mathematical model. The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) takes a different approach, and adds qualitative assessments to Belfers quantitative approach. IISS separates cyber power into three tiers. Tier #1 has the U.S. on its own as the sole world cyber superpower. Tier #2 includes China, the UK, Russia, Canada, Australia, France and Israel.

Clearly, the addition of Israel to the free worlds cyber alliances is a good thing.

AUKUS and theFive Eyes

AUKUS was announced on September 15, 2021. There are two parts to AUKUS a vehicle to provide nuclear submarines to Australia, and the formation of defensive and offensive cyber capabilities to counter Chinese activities in the Indo-Pacific region. There was some surprise at this new alliance since the three countries are three of the five countries comprising the existingFive Eyesalliance. However, theFive Eyesis primarily signals intelligence while AUKUS is likely to deliver offensive cyber operations where necessary. It was the U.S., UK and Australia that together performed cyber operations against the Islamic State.

The Five Eyes (U.S., UK, Canada, Australia and New Zealand) evolved as an extension of the UKUSA treaty that itself grew out of the informal agreement between the U.S. and UK during World War II. The agreement was formalized in March 1946, and expanded in subsequent years to include Canada, Australia and New Zealand. Other countries, such as Germany, the Philippines and some Nordic countries, have joined as third parties but the core remains the originalFive Eyes.

The Five Eyes intelligence relationship is probably the closest and most powerful intelligence relationship in history.

At first, the existence of theFive Eyesremained secret (just, in fact, as the very existence of the NSA and GCHQ remained secret for many years). The Prime Minister of Australia didnt learn aboutFive Eyesuntil 1973; it was not disclosed to the public until 2005; and it was only in June 2010 that the full text of the UKUSA agreement was made public.

This treaty is often considered to be the basis of the so-called special relationship between the U.S. and the UK.

NSA and GCHQ

The core of theFive Eyes remains the NSA and GCHQ. This is a complex relationship that is so close that the two organizations are sometimes described as twins. This is wrong. The two organizations have very different structures and primary purposes.

The NSA is run by a military officer currently General Paul Nakasone. Nakasone is a four-star general who also heads U.S. Cyber Command. For the first he reports to the undersecretary of defense for intelligence, and for the latter he reports directly to the secretary of defense. There is a strong military theme that runs through the NSA. Officially, its purpose is to secure DOD and U.S. military networks. More directly offensive operations are conducted by U.S. Cyber Command and the CIA.

GCHQ, on the other hand, is run by a civilian reporting to the Foreign Secretary. Its responsibilities support the military but go beyond this, working closely with law enforcement to go after serious organized crime within the UK such as pedophile networks.

The two agencies are different. The relationship is complex and close, and it is difficult to think of any closer intelligence alliance. But they do not automatically share all information between themselves nor the otherFive Eyespartners. There are things the NSA will want to do without sharing it with other agencies, and GCHQ is the same.

Neither the NSA nor GCHQ are officially charged with offensive cyber operations but both have done so in the past. A more recent development in the UK has been the formation of a National Cyber Force (NCF), which brings UK cyber operations more in line with the U.S. model and for the first time acknowledges that GCHQ may have some offensive responsibilities. Plans were announced in 2018, but it wasnt effectively established until 2020.

NCF is part of the MoD, the Defense Science and Technology Laboratory, the Secret Intelligence Service, and GCHQ. The government describes it as a partnership between defense and intelligence, it is responsible for operating in and through cyberspace to disrupt, deny, degrade and contest those who would do harm to the UK and its allies, to keep the country safe and to protect and promote the UKs interests at home and abroad. It clearly has the remit to direct offensive cyber operations against the enemy in justified cases.

NCF is the equivalent of the U.S. combining the cyber operations of Cyber Command, CIA, FBI, and the cyber operations of the military forces into a single organization. But there is also an element of necessity the UK simply doesnt have the budget to maintain the separate number of 3-letter agencies that exist in the U.S.

Long-term relationships and short-term politics

There is one surprising element of the major international intelligence treaties their longevity and persistence. They survive political change with a broader collective interest that transcends the coming and going of individual politicians.

In recent years there was concern that the U.S./UK special relationship (the one based on the NSA and GCHQ relationship) might fail with the U.S. change from Trump to Biden. It was generally acknowledged that President Biden had scant regard for Prime Minister Johnson because of the mutual admiration between Trump and Johnson. And Biden even issued warnings to Johnson over the sanctity of the Good Friday Agreement in Ireland following Brexit.

The Good Friday political agreement was signed in April 1998. It brought an end to the so-called Troubles in Northern Ireland between loyalists wanting to stay within the UK, and the Irish Republic-favoring republicans. Now Northern Ireland is part of the UK while Southern Ireland is part of the EU and the potential for new tensions has returned. But despite Bidens less-favorable view of the UK, UKUSA just continues.

A similar concern now occurs for GCHQ the fear that Brexit would break the ties with EU national intelligence agencies. The European Commission has had concerns over GCHQ and personal privacy ever since Snowdens leaks about GCHQ and the NSA; and has even threatened legal action. But the individual relations between GCHQ and the individual EU member state intelligence agencies seems to be persisting aided, perhaps, by the absence of national security from the EUs political remit.

Where are we now?

Out of necessity, we have concentrated on the major international free world cyber and intelligence relationships. In reality, there is a global patchwork of individual agreements between different nations throughout the free world; many of them ultimately coalescing around theFive Eyeshub. For the most part, these are security information sharing arrangements relatively few nations have the ability or confidence or political will to engage in offensive cyber operations. In this sense, there are two separate networks: gathering intelligence (for example,Five Eyes), and responding offensively to that intelligence (for example, AUKUS).

Does the free world need a single global cyber intelligence organization? The answer is almost certainly No. Firstly, such a move would likely drive Russia and China closer together perhaps including Iran and North Korea and Russian and Chinese satellite nations into their own special relationship.

Secondly, it would be unworkable. Friends keep secrets from friends when the economic or political necessity demands. Just consider the French reaction to the AUKUS announcement. France described it as a stab in the back, and within a couple of days recalled its ambassadors to both the U.S. and Australia. France lost a multi-billion euros submarine deal over AUKUS.

Related: Russia, Ukraine and the Danger of a Global Cyberwar

Related: Russia-Ukraine: Threat of Local Cyber Ops Escalating Into Global Cyberwar

Related: Talking Global Cyberwar With Kaspersky Lab's Anton Shingarev

Related: The United States and China - A Different Kind of Cyberwar

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Does the Free World Need a Global Cyber Alliance? - SecurityWeek

NSA on the road at the Women in Cybersecurity (WiCyS) Conference 2022 – National Security Agency

FORT MEADE, Md. Cleveland is home to the Rock and Roll Hall of Fame and the International Women Air & Space Museum. For three days it'll also be home to over 1,000 outstanding women in cybersecurity - and the National Security Agency (NSA) will be there.

The 9th annual Women in Cybersecurity (WiCyS) Conference is in-person from March 17-19 at the Huntington Convention Center of Cleveland.NSA's presence will be highlighted at booth #300 at the conference career fair in addition to a trio of speakers. BGen Lorna Mahlock, United States Marine Corps, will provide insight into her trailblazing career as the first African American Brigadier General in the Marines. From the NSA Cybersecurity Collaboration Center, our women in cybersecurity will talk about their work that impacts and shapes the field today and into the future.

NSA Speakers at WiCyS 2022:

Visitors can learn more about NSA's mission, how it addresses the hardest problems facing the nation, and meet some of the people making it all happen.

Bring your resume! If you're looking for a rewarding career in the fast-paced world of cyber, and you're passionate about federal service, stop by booth #300 for more information. We'll have folks ready to conduct interviews and help grow our team.

We hope to see you in Cleveland to help highlight some of the incredible women who drive cybersecurity at NSA.

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NSA on the road at the Women in Cybersecurity (WiCyS) Conference 2022 - National Security Agency