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Innovation powerthe ability to invent, scale, and adapt emerging technologieswill determine which country prevails in the great power competition of the 21st century. Export controls accordingly assume a central position in the U.S. foreign policy toolkit, carrying the ability to significantly impact an adversarys innovation potential. In October 2022, the Biden administration introduced semiconductor, artificial intelligence, and supercomputing-related export controls on China and has since hinted that similar restrictions on other technologies, including quantum information science, may soon follow.

U.S. policymakers are right to identify quantum information science as a critical technology area ripe for restriction, but introducing export controls now is likely to cause more harm than good.

Establishing U.S. leadership in quantum information science, which includes the subfields of quantum computing, quantum sensing, and quantum communications, ranks among the Biden administrations highest national security priorities. Quantum technologies promise to dramatically increase computing power and speed, enabling machines to solve problems beyond the capacity of current-generation computers. They are also inherently dual use, meaning they can be applied to both military and civilian contexts.

The potential strategic advantages of quantum technologies are numerous and significant. Quantum-enabled countries could crack an adversarys encryption methods, build unbreakable communications networks, and develop the worlds most precise sensors. The first country to operationalize quantum technologies will gain the ability to threaten adversaries corporate, military, and government infrastructure more quickly than an adversary can establish effective defenses. Beyond the direct military applications, quantum technologies could further deliver significant economic advantages in a range of industries, from aerospace and defense to pharmaceuticals and automotive.

Given its strategic importance, quantum technology has become a focal point in the ongoing competition between Beijing and Washington. In line with the protect pillar of the Biden administrations two-pronged technology strategy, U.S. policymakers have already implemented a number of narrowly scoped export controls on quantum technology in an effort to safeguard critical U.S. technological advances.

Quantum sensing is the only general category of quantum information science with U.S. export controls in place. Unlike other quantum technology categories, the potential defense applications of quantum sensors are relatively clear and achievable in the near- to mid-term. Within the next five years, for example, China could leverage quantum sensors to enhance its counter-stealth, counter-submarine, image detection, and position, navigation, and timing (PNT) capabilities. China could additionally build quantum-enabled high-precision gravimeters, enhancing its ability to identify camouflaged objects, as well as deposits of oil and minerals.

Other existing U.S. quantum technology controls target specific end users, rather than general technology categories. In November 2021 and March 2022, the U.S. Department of Commerce added three Chinese and one Russian quantum technology organization to its Entity List for attempting to acquire U.S.-origin quantum technologies for military purposes. The organizations inclusion on the list subjects them to supplemental license requirements for the export or transfer of certain quantum products.

The war in Ukraine has led to an expansion of quantum technology restrictions. In September 2022, the U.S. Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) prohibited Russian persons from receiving various quantum computing and cryogenic refrigeration services, including infrastructure, web hosting, data processing, computer systems integration design, and repair services. The ban does not apply to certain U.S.-owned or controlled entities located in Russia, nor to services provided in connection with the termination or divestiture of entities located in Russia.

In addition, the OFAC issued a separate determination that gives it the authority to designate any current or former operative in Russias quantum computing sector as a Specially Designated National. The assets of designated individuals or entities are frozen, and U.S. persons are generally prohibited from conducting any business or financial transactions with them.

While existing controls on quantum technology are relatively haphazard and disconnected, the White House is currently exploring a more unified and comprehensive round of controls intended specifically to blunt Chinas access to U.S. quantum computing equipment. When asked at a public event in October 2022 whether the Biden administration would subject quantum technology to additional export controls, Under Secretary of Commerce for Industry and Security Alan F. Estevez stated, If I were a betting person, Id put down money on that.

Forthcoming regulations on quantum technology could be structured in a variety of ways. U.S. policymakers could choose to expand existing controls targeting explicit end users and use cases, or they could opt for novel controls focused on quantum technology itself. I discuss these approaches in detail below.

U.S. policymakers could restrict the flow of quantum technologies to a broader base of end users, such as Chinas national laboratories, companies within the Chinese militarys supply chain, or companies accused of human rights abuses. This piecemeal approach mirrors existing controls on Russian and Chinese entities. It is a time- and resource-intensive endeavor, and leaves gaps that targeted entities can exploit to ultimately receive restricted items. Entity List designations, for example, do not capture subsidiaries unless such subsidiaries are specifically named as well. SenseTime, Chinas largest facial recognition startup, has leveraged this loophole to skirt the Biden administrations Oct. 7 export controls. Despite its inclusion on the Entity List, SenseTime reportedly bought advanced U.S. chips directly through its own subsidiaries in early 2023.

The effectiveness of the end user approach also hinges on multilateral support and cooperation. Unilateral U.S. export controlsmeasures taken without the approval or cooperation of other countriescould be effective in technology areas in which the U.S. maintains a decisive edge and unique capabilities. But multiple countries, including Singapore, Germany, the Netherlands, and Japan, are competitive in quantum technology. Unilateral U.S. controls thus afford foreign firms commercial incentives to backfill restricted technology to targeted entities.

Future controls could also focus on preventing adversaries application of quantum technologies to certain use cases, resembling existing controls on defense-relevant quantum sensors. U.S. policymakers might target quantum key distribution networks, which hold the potential to improve Chinas information security and multi-domain communications system. They may also take aim at quantum computers designed specifically to model nuclear materials or to augment Chinas nuclear command-and-control infrastructure.

All of this, however, is easier said than done. It is impossible to predict which quantum technologies will have immediate defense applications, and it is difficult to distinguish peaceful applications of quantum from military ones. This approach thus carries high intelligence requirements and demands processes that can quickly adapt to unexpected developments.

U.S. policymakers might alternatively pursue a new approach and target quantum technology itself. Policymakers could restrict entire integrated quantum systems, like functional quantum computers or quantum communications satellites, and the components required to build them. But a systems-level approach is currently difficult to impose. Few scalable quantum systems exist, and the technical benchmarks for characterizing their performance are still unfolding. China boasts that it possesses a 24-qubit quantum computer, for example, but quantum computers will likely require up to 1 million qubits to produce any meaningful real-world applications. Because existing quantum technologies remain at a low level of readiness, systems-level controls are not particularly necessary or impactful.

Narrower controls under a technology-centric framework could regulate specific quantum hardware and components. Similar to the United States recent export controls on graphics processing units, U.S. policymakers could restrict Chinas access to technologies that facilitate the refinement of qubit capacity, a necessary step toward the development of scalable quantum computers. Examples include quantum chips of a certain level of output or error correction rate, or specific types of processors that spatially separate qubits. Other potentially targetable assets include helium dilution refrigerators, cryogenic ion trap packages, and magneto-optical traps.

The challenge with a components-oriented approach is that there is currently no single supply chain for quantum, and the technology chokepoints are unclear. Quantum developers are pursuing at least 12 quantum computing modalities in parallel, each dependent on different critical components with very little overlap. For example, some modalitieslike superconducting qubitsrequire helium dilution refrigerators to function. Otherslike trapped-ion qubitsinstead rely on high-quality lasers and isotopically pure samples of various elements. Thus, the impact of blocking Chinas access to helium dilution refrigerators could be detrimental to its quantum development or completely irrelevant depending on which quantum computing modality prevails.

In short, each of the potential export control frameworks carry significant pitfalls and are unlikely to be effective in protecting the U.S.s strategic edge at this stage of development. Despite valid concerns about Chinas activity in the quantum sector, it is too early for export controls. The future trajectory of quantum technology is highly uncertain, and premature restriction carries more risk than reward.

Quantum information science is a field of international collaboration, and much of the top technical talent resides outside the United States. Export controls could limit the exchange of ideas, block U.S. scientists from accessing promising research and early-stage prototypes, and stifle the scientific advancement of quantum technology before it demonstrates any significant commercial benefit. Ill-timed export controls could stymie progress on a range of beneficial quantum computing applications, from drug design and discovery to financial fraud detection and port logistics optimization.

Export controls could also adversely affect the U.S. quantum industry. Many domestic quantum companies endured a sharp increase in interest rates in 2022 and lack clear revenue streams. Export controls could further diminish the already fragile financial health of the U.S. quantum startup environment, directly hindering Americas potential for innovation in the quantum sector.

Even export controls that specifically target China could prove counterproductive. China and the United States are each others top collaborators on quantum research. U.S. and Chinese-affiliated scientists co-authored several highly cited quantum publications in 2022. China also holds the highest number of patents across the full spectrum of quantum technology and currently leads in the development of quantum communications. Continued collaboration presents serious technology leakage, industrial espionage, and intellectual property risks that must be actively policed. But reducing cooperation now risks impeding U.S. innovation and losing visibility into Chinas research efforts.

U.S. outbound investment mechanisms may be better suited to address current challenges. Almost all quantum technology research and development in China is state controlled, but the countrys opaque private quantum technology ecosystem is growing slowly and appears to attract some U.S. investment. Screening tools, including the establishment of a mandatory notification regime for American investments in Chinas quantum technology sector, could offer policymakers a means to track the exchange of technology and expertise and monitor Chinas progress in the field.

Although export controls are not an immediately viable option, U.S. policymakers can take several steps to prepare for a future in which trade restrictions become more pertinent.

First, the Biden administration should clearly define its goals in quantum information science, which will inform the types of export controls it leverages down the road. The White House should consult with industry partners to determine which quantum technology areas carry the greatest economic potentialand consider whether leading across all quantum technology subsets is necessary to ensure U.S. national security. The goal-setting process will help direct U.S. research efforts, streamline resourcing, and identify areas ripe for future restriction. At this stage of development, a prudent guiding goal for quantum information science may involve ensuring U.S. influence over, and access to, every key part of the emerging quantum technology supply chain.

Second, the Biden administration should direct an organization to conduct quantum supply chain mapping on a continuous basis and resource it appropriately. The Quantum Economic Development Consortium and The Quantum Insider are well positioned to assume this responsibility. Many quantum startups lack the capacity to monitor supply chains themselves. White House-directed supply chain mapping can help mitigate the risk of dependence on competitor nations for critical quantum components and identify key bottlenecks as quantum technologies mature.

The Biden administration should also consider what level of supply chain dependence on allies and partners is acceptable for the United States. A completely domestic U.S. supply chain is prohibitively expensive and unrealistic given the number of potentially important components in play. The administration should leverage the Defense Production Act, as well as the Small Business Innovation Research and Small Business Technology Transfer programs, to boost domestic capacity for the production of quantum components that are deemed too sensitive to reside predominantly outside the United States. It should simultaneously develop an international forum to coordinate quantum technology supply chains with other leading quantum countries, including Australia, Canada, Finland, the Netherlands, Japan, and Israel.

Finally, U.S. policymakers need timely and accurate information about adversaries capabilities and intentions in order to determine when export controls on quantum technologies become necessary. They must therefore appropriately resource the intelligence community and the Department of Commerce to meet the quantum technology challenge.

U.S. government analysts working on quantum information science should develop metrics to assess the utility of export controls as the technology develops. The emergence of joint ventures between U.S. and Chinese state-linked quantum startups, for instance, might elevate the risks associated with open and collaborative research processes to an unacceptable level, introducing the need for greater oversight and regulation. Policymakers may also consider implementing export controls on quantum technologies once the U.S. secures a definitive lead over foreign competitors. Other useful metrics might illuminate Chinas efforts to commercialize quantum technologies, control the quantum market, or integrate quantum technologies into its national defense infrastructure.

Export controls are an increasingly useful tool to prevent adversaries acquisition of sensitive technology and advance U.S. security and economic interests. But they are not a silver bullet solution to U.S.-China technology competition and can even be counterproductive. Premature export controls could impede innovation and handicap U.S. companies. Export controls on quantum technologies may be necessary in the future but should serve as one component of a broader U.S. technology strategy, rather than an end in and of themselves.

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To Restrict, or Not to Restrict, That Is the Quantum Question - Lawfare

Following the EuroHPC Summit conference in Gothenburg, Sweden, last month, HPCwire asked Steve Conway, senior analyst at Intersect360 Research, to interview Anders Jensen, executive director of the EuroHPC Joint Undertaking since September 2020. This appointment continues Anders lifelong interest in supercomputers, starting with his time at the Technical University of Denmark, where he earned an MS and an MBA. After spending the first part of his career working in engineering and pioneering IEEE802.11 wireless network technology with Symbol Technologies, Anders joined Cargolux Airlines International as IT director and was instrumental in the spinoff of the Cargolux IT department into CHAMP Cargosystems S.A. In 2011, Anders became director of NATO Headquarters Information and Communication Technology Service, assuming responsibility for all of NATOs information and IT services as well as one of the largest classified networks in Europe.

HPCwire: An important goal of the EuroHPC Joint Undertaking (EuroHPC JU) is to establish European sovereignty in HPC and quantum computing. Why has establishing sovereignty become more important in recent years?

Anders Jensen: You are right! The primary raison dtre of the European High Performance Computing Joint Undertaking was precisely to increase the digital autonomy and sovereignty of the European Union. Building a European sovereign supercomputing ecosystem is critical on many levels.

Thanks to the fleet of the first world-class and top-ranked EuroHPC supercomputers, European scientists and industry are increasingly processing their data inside the EU. Such a trend is not only advancing science and boosting the innovation potential of companies and SMEs in Europe, but is also reinforcing the protection of the privacy, data protection, commercial trade secrets and ownership of data in Europe.

Fostering Europes technological leadership in HPC and quantum computing is also essential to bolster Europes competitiveness and resilience towards foreign technologies and imports.

All these elements were already true a few years ago when the EuroHPC initiative was launched but it is now even more obvious after recent international events such as the COVID-19 pandemic or the war in Ukraine, that establishing strong European digital and technological leadership and self-reliance in industry and science is of strategic importance for Europe.

We seem to be in an interim period where some European HPC suppliers are able to compete effectively with the best in the world while others havent reached that status yet. The interim strategy seems to be relying on non-European technology where needed and increasing the portion of European technology content in HPC systems procured under the JU. Is that correct?

As you know, in parallel with procuring and installing top-of-the-range supercomputers across Europe, the EuroHPC JU funds an ambitious research and innovation program to develop a full European supercomputing supply chain, from processors and software to applications and know-how.

Some initial progress is already tangible, such as the recent announcement made by SiPearl with the backing of our European Processor Initiative (EPI) project. The commercialization of Rhea, the worlds first energyefficient, HPC-dedicated microprocessor designed in Europe to work with any third-party accelerator GPU, artificial intelligence, quantum is now planned for next year.

But as you underlined, this is an ongoing process, and efforts are still needed before reaching a full European supercomputing supply chain. Currently some non-European technologies are still needed if we want to place Europe in a leading position in the global supercomputing race and equip European users with a broad range of technologies and world-class machines that can boost European research and innovation.

Once Europe attains comprehensive technology independence, will HPC suppliers based outside of Europe have a role to play, for example if they perform a lot of research in Europe?

As I said, the JU is just taking the first steps to fill some gaps in the European HPC ecosystem and supply chain. The JU is guided by the European Commission and 33 European participating states who are indeed promoting the concept of technological autonomy. It is for the JU to implement their policies in the shape of R&I projects and procurements as agreed by our governing board in the context of the Multi-Annual Strategic Program and the implementation of its Work Program.

This strategy is win-win for all as it is leading to more R&I in HPC globally. This means that the global HPC sector as a whole will grow as investment in HPC technologies increases. HPC suppliers are all welcome to invest in Europe, and are indeed doing so now that they see that Europe is investing heavily in HPC technologies. Equally important, when the time comes, Europe will be more competitive globally in HPC and able to deliver greener and more innovative HPC solutions. So the question really is, will European vendors also be able to compete with non-EU vendors outside their European home markets?

To ensure that this happens, the JU will continue efforts to develop a full European supercomputing ecosystem. Over the last few years, EuroHPC JU has already seen a major shift in the global HPC market place. Last year, for the first time, Europe was ranked among the worlds top 5 in the Top500 list with LUMI and Leonardo. Europe is now recognized as a global leader in HPC by its partners.

Protective barriers exist today for European suppliers attempting to win HPC business in the U.S., Japan and China. Once Europe has an independent HPC supply chain equal to the best in the world, do you think Europe might need to establish its own protective barriers?

Our mandate is clear. We have been asked to spend European money to build a European HPC ecosystem which involves investment in HPC and quantum computing infrastructure, research and innovation, building up HPC competencies in applications, technologies and skills and of course usage. To do this, we will work with partners who are willing to contribute to our programs. Europe has invested in a very large HPC infrastructure and we need to ensure that Europeans are the first to benefit from this. If reciprocal arrangements can be found with third countries to explore strategic research and innovation partnerships, then this will be welcome. For example, we are working with U.S. companies including Intel, AMD, Nvidia and HPE, who are helping us build our HPC Infrastructure. We also have a call open at the moment to strengthen our cooperation with Japan.

Another aspect of sovereignty is that success metrics in exascale initiatives now rely less heavily on Linpack and more heavily on targeted performance gains on end-user applications that are considered important for a specific country or region. Is the JU taking this formal approach? Are there applications or market domains that the JU recognizes as especially important for Europe?

European researchers have a long and successful track record of developing HPC applications for research and engineering. It is part of the mission of the JU to build on this ecosystem and support further developments, for example by providing infrastructure and research grants that address challenges in the relevant domains and communities.

In this respect, the JU, as well as our communities and stakeholders, are well aware of the limitations of a single number resulting from an HPL benchmark run to describe the capabilities of an HPC system for the existing diversity of HPC applications.

Although there are currently no specific plans to abandon the concept of ranking the worlds fastest supercomputers, we note that application-focused benchmarks oriented towards real use cases already play a prominent role in system procurements, making sure that the EuroHPC supercomputers can serve a broad range of application domains. On this aspect, there is an increased emphasis placed on artificial intelligence and machine learning benchmarks as we see an increased demand for applications integrating such approaches into users workflows.

Unlike the U.S., Japan or China, Europe isnt a single country with a single focus for sovereignty. Aside from advancing the HPC status of Europe as a whole, the JU serves 33 European states, each with its own language, culture and priorities for HPC use. Can you talk about the EuroCC initiative?

Indeed one of the challenges that Europe faces is that European countries are at very different levels of HPC expertise and experience, and the challenge is to even this out.

EuroCC is one the JUs strategic initiatives to identify and address the skills gaps in the European HPC ecosystem and coordinate cooperation across Europe to ensure a consistent skills base. EuroCC has built a European network of more than 30 national HPC competence centers across Europe. The EuroCCs competence centers act as hubs to promote and facilitate HPC and related technologies across a range of users from academia, industry especially SMEs and public administration. The aim is to increase access to HPC opportunities and offer tailored solutions for this fast-evolving field.

By first identifying their available competencies, individual countries can maximize synergies to build national competence portfolios. To ensure these benefit the whole network, European-level activities are coordinated at a European level. The NCC network also cooperates with other EuroHPC projects, such as Centers of Excellence for HPC Applications, and external bodies including the ETP4HPC and PRACE.

EuroCC is one the JUs flagship projects and among the very first projects to get off the ground. With a second funding phase which started in January 2023, the NCCs will continue to boost synergies between the European and national levels to support a thriving European HPC ecosystem.

I understand that researchers in countries participating in EuroCC at the national level can also apply for access to European supercomputers. How does that work?

The access policy is currently the same for everyone: researchers from academia, research institutes, public authorities, and industry established or located in an EU Member State or in a country associated with Horizon 2020 can apply and access the EuroHPC supercomputers free of charge.

Currently three calls to access the EuroHPC supercomputers are open: the call for regular access, the call for extreme scale access and the call for benchmark and development access.

The calls are open for all fields of science and categories of applications (scientific, industry and public sector). The extreme scale access call is specifically distributing resources, from the EuroHPC pre-exascale systems LUMI, Leonardo and MareNostrum5 while the regular access and the benchmark and development ones also include the four petascale systems.

The calls are continuously open with several cut-off dates through the year. TheEuroHPC JUAccess Resource Committee, composed of leading international scientists and engineers, is ranking the proposals received and produces a recommendation to award EuroHPC JU resources based on scientific and technical excellence. More details on the access policy or the open access calls can be found on our website.

Do you see AI, HPDA and quantum computing mainly as accelerators of established HPC modeling and simulation applications or as important enablers of new applications?

First of all, most AI and HPDA technologies build on HPC by using HPC hardware, software and infrastructure. Quantum computers, on the other hand, provide a fundamentally new computing paradigm and a quantum computer integrated into a supercomputer may, indeed, be considered as an accelerator for specific algorithms similar to the current role of GPUs that perform certain operations more efficiently than general purpose processors

Currently we observe the adoption of, for example, concepts from AI in traditional simulation algorithms and applications, boosting performance and also potentially enabling novel use cases. The use of a quantum computing infrastructure in many cases requires a redesign or reinvention of existing algorithms and is expected to trigger the development of new HPC applications in the long term.

One of the JUs goals is to provide users with a hybrid classical-quantum computer. Is it clear yet which quantum technology the computer will use? Which quantum technologies does the JU definitely want to explore?

Indeed, at the end of last year the EuroHPC JU has selected six sites across Europe to host and operate the first EuroHPC quantum computers: Czechia, Germany, Spain, France, Italy, and Poland. These quantum computers will be integrated into existing supercomputers.

Currently, we are still finalizing the hosting agreements with the six selected sites but what I can share at this stage is that the selection was made to ensure a diversity in quantum technologies and architectures and give European users access to many different quantum technologies. The JU will thus have the luxury of exploring different types of quantum technologies.

These six quantum computers come on top of two quantum simulators currently being developed under our project HPCQS and based on the technology of neutral atoms, supplied by the French company PASQAL. HPCQS aims to develop and coordinate a cloud-based European federated infrastructure, tightly integrating two quantum computers, each controlling 100-plus qubits in the Tier-0 HPC systems Joliot-Curie of GENCI and the JUWELS modular supercomputer at the Julich Supercomputing Centre (JSC).

I was very impressed by the sessions I attended at the recent EuroHPC Summit 2023 in Gothenburg, which had strong in-person and remote attendance. What do you see as highlights of that conference?

Thanks! The event was a great success with around 600 participants throughout the week. It was an important milestone for us, as this was the first EuroHPC Summit planned by our small JU team. It was an opportunity for the EuroHPC JU to reflect on our achievements in recent years, present our program and activities, and define our future priorities.

The Summit represents a coming together of the European HPC community. The program was the result of a collaboration with all the EuroHPC members, to highlight various aspects of European HPC and facilitate discussions with our partners and stakeholders. With almost 500 participants joining us physically in Gothenburg, I was reminded of the added value of meeting and exchanging in person and seeing our community around us.

A particular highlight of the Summit for me was the presence of our EUMaster4HPC students throughout the conference. Joining us as HPC Ambassadors, they were a big help to us from a logistical perspective, but it was also a huge boost to see these enthusiastic bright young faces attending their first HPC conference, learning about the community, making connections, and even securing internships and jobs for the future. We had a lot of positive feedback regarding the involvement of the students and we hope this will help to boost the visibility of this brand new program currently recruiting its second wave of students. By the way, the next deadline to apply online is the 31st of May.

Is there anything important about the JUs plans that we havent discussed yet? When can we expect the next big announcements?

The JU staff is currently very busy with the procurement of JUPITER, the first European exascale system, to be installed in Julich, Germany. We are very excited about this new step as this next-generation supercomputer represents a significant technological milestone for Europe and will have a major impact on European scientific excellence.

As the installation of MareNostrum5 is already well under way, we also look forward to officially welcoming this new system to our fleet! We will also announce more systems as two calls for expression of interest recently closed, including a call for the selection of a Hosting Entity for another exascale system.

In addition, we will launch by the end of the year a call for Expression of Interest for the selection of a Hosting Entity to acquire and operate an industrial grade EuroHPC supercomputer, as the objective is to widen the access to our EuroHPC supercomputers. In parallel, the JU contributes to the European Unions ambitions in European microprocessor technology on the basis of open standards, in particular the RISC-V instruction set architecture.

Another ambition of the JU for 2023 is to boost the development of the skills needed to widen the use of HPC in Europe. Several calls have been launched to boost European HPC training activities, such as an HPC Summer School, professional traineeships and a training platform. The calls closed earlier this month and the R&I team with external experts will now be busy evaluating the received proposals.

The JU has also launched a call to continue to support HPC applications with up to four additional Centers of Excellence (CoE) for HPC Applications addressing the exascale challenge. The call is currently still open. The objective is for the new CoEs to be launched early next year.

As you can see, many things are ongoing and there is never a dull moment at the JU!

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EuroHPC Executive Director Talks Europe's Supercomputing Future - HPCwire

By Lt. Gen. Dr. S.P. Kochhar, Director General, COAI

Quantum technologies represent a paradigm shift in the world of computing and telecommunications. It is not simply an incremental upgrade over classical computing, but rather a new approach that promises to provide unprecedented levels of speed, security, and efficiency.

Quantum communications can be used to transmit data securely and efficiently. Unlike classical communication, where information is transmitted in bits, quantum communication can transmit information in quantum bits, or qubits, which can be both 0 and 1 simultaneously. This property allows for much more efficient data transfer as well as the ability to perform calculations exponentially faster than classical technologies, allowing quantum computers to perform many calculations simultaneously, drastically reducing the time required to perform complex calculations

Additionally, quantum communication is inherently secure, as any attempt to eavesdrop on the communication will disturb the quantum state, alerting the sender and receiver to the intrusion. This makes quantum communication ideal for transmitting sensitive information, such as financial transactions and government communications.

Quantum technologies have the potential to revolutionize 5G networks by enhancing security, increasing network capacity, and reducing latency. Some of the applications of quantum technologies in 5G include quantum key distribution, quantum cryptography, and quantum sensing.

Quantum key distribution (QKD) is a technique that uses quantum mechanics to distribute encryption keys securely. QKD is a promising technology for 5G networks as it can provide unbreakable encryption, which is essential for securing critical communications. By using QKD, 5G networks can prevent eavesdropping and data tampering, which are major concerns in modern communication systems.

Quantum cryptography is another technology that can be used in 5G networks. It uses the principles of quantum mechanics to create unbreakable encryption codes. Quantum cryptography can ensure the integrity and confidentiality of data transmitted over 5G networks.

Quantum sensing is a technology that uses quantum mechanics to detect and measure physical parameters with high precision. Quantum sensors can be used in 5G networks to monitor the environment, detect anomalies, and optimize network performance.

Blockchain technology can also be used simultaneously with quantum technologies in 5G networks. Blockchain is a distributed ledger technology that can provide secure and transparent transactions. By using blockchain, 5G networks can ensure the authenticity of data, prevent data tampering, and enable decentralized trust. Blockchain can also enable secure peer-to-peer transactions, which can be useful for micropayments and other use cases in 5G networks.

There are several examples of the use of quantum technologies in 5G networks, although commercial deployment of these technologies is still in the early stages. Here are some examples:

1. In 2020, China Mobile partnered with QuantumCTek to deploy a 5G network that uses quantum cryptography to provide secure communication between two government agencies in Shanghai. The network uses QKD technology to encrypt data transmitted between the agencies, ensuring the security of the communication.

2. In 2021, SK Telecom, a South Korean telecommunications company, partnered with ID Quantique to deploy a 5G network that uses quantum cryptography to secure critical communication between its headquarters and data center. The network uses QKD technology to provide unbreakable encryption for data transmission.

As for factual figures, it is worth noting that quantum technologies are still in the early stages of commercial deployment in 5G networks, and it is difficult to provide exact numbers. However, it is estimated that the global market for quantum cryptography could reach $2.2 billion by 2026, driven by the growing demand for secure communication in 5G networks and other industries. Additionally, according to a report by ResearchAndMarkets, the market for quantum sensors is expected to grow from $278 million in 2020 to $1.1 billion by 2025, driven by the increasing adoption of quantum technologies in various applications, including 5G networks.

India has also been actively exploring the use of quantum technologies in various industries, including telecommunications. The Indian government announced the establishment of the Quantum Communication Application and Technology (Q-CAT) lab in Delhi, which is a joint initiative of the Department of Telecommunications (DoT) and the Indian Institute of Technology (IIT) Delhi. The lab is expected to develop indigenous technologies for secure communication, including QKD for 5G networks. The Indian Institute of Science Education and Research, Pune (IISER) also established a Technology Innovation Hub (TIH) on Quantum Technology with support from the Department of Science and Technology (DST), which will work towards development of novel computing and quantum materials, sensors, quantum communication devices and systems along with quantum computers.

Recently, the Union Cabinet of the Indian Government approved the National Quantum Mission (NQM), which aims to accelerate research and development in quantum technologies and establish India as a leader in this field, and involves a cost of INR 6,003.65 crore from 2023-24 to 2030-31. With this, India becomes the sixth country in the world to have a dedicated quantum mission.

The import of these initiatives is significant as they reflect Indias recognition of the importance of quantum technologies in various industries, including telecommunications. The establishment of the Q-CAT lab and the NQM are expected to accelerate the development and adoption of quantum technologies in India, which could have implications for the global quantum technology landscape. Furthermore, the indigenous development of quantum technologies in India could lead to the creation of new jobs and the growth of the domestic technology industry. It is an exciting time to be at the forefront of this quantum revolution, where the possibilities for discovery and advancement are endless.

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Envisioning a Quantum leap for the future of Telecom - Express Computer

When you visit the doctor or have a hospital stay, you and your patient data become elements in a vast, highly complex digital technology ecosystem. This is because you (as the patient) generate enormous volumes of data which is stored and analyzed across interconnected systems. The goal of all of this is improved health care outcomes, but the current health care digital landscape also represents a critical cyberattack surface. This is particularly true of medical devices and the internet-of-medical-things (IoMT). Security is serious matter in health care, and most organizations involved in health care technology are busy implementing countermeasures against prevailing cyberthreats. More work is needed, especially considering the looming quantum computing threat to data encryption. This article examines the quantum threat to health care data and technology and offers some ideas on how this serious risk can be mitigated.

Healthcare is a field that runs on digital technology. Healthcare organizations deploy millions of connected medical devices that store personal patient data and real-time biometric data. These devices allow doctors and patients to communicate faster, more efficiently and, in some cases, more inexpensively than is possible with past communication methods. For instance, a direct digital heartbeat transmission is far faster and cheaper than a fax machine. In addition, back-end systems handle medical records storage, billing and operations.

Every medical device, computer server, network and storage array is vulnerable to cyberattack. Today, this means anything from ransomware to zero-day attacksany threat vector that enables a malicious actor to interfere with health care processes or steal data. In the near future, this digital healthcare landscape will also be vulnerable to attacks from quantum computers.

Briefly, a quantum computer is a new generation of computing technology that utilizes sub-atomic particles and the principles of quantum mechanics to deliver exponentially faster computation capabilities than existing computers. There are many exciting potential uses for quantum computing, including in health care, such as protein folding. However, the technology is also expected to break todays unbreakable cryptographic keys that secure data and critical systems.

Security experts are worried, with good reason, that within a few years, todays current forms of cryptography will be rendered useless by the quantum threat. At that point, virtually all data and systems will be exposed to threats, including those systems that manage health care information. This would be catastrophic on multiple levels. The quantum crisis threatens patient health, the large and lucrative health care industry, society and even the United States national security.

If all cryptography protecting the security and privacy of medical technology becomes inoperable, then patient health is at risk. Attackers could disrupt hospital networks and delay patient care. They could cause pacemakers, defibrillators, insulin pumps and other critical health devices to stop working. This could cause people to get sick or even die. Indeed, this type of thing has already happened. For example, in 2019 a ransomware attack on a hospital resulted in the death of a newborn.

Health care is a multi-trillion-dollar industry. The quantum threat puts this enormous slice of the economy at risk. Even just one sector, the IoMT market, is rapidly accelerating, expected to go from a $14 billion valuation in 2017 to $158 billion this year.

Medical information is also valuable. Research suggests that it can be valued up to 50 times more than a stolen credit card on the black market. This is an attractive target for hackers.

Regarding legal liability and ethics, unsecured devices or device exploit comprise a violation of trust to patients. Device manufacturers have a fiduciary responsibility to protect patient data. Adding in regulatory penalties, such as HIPAA violations, the quantum threats potential costs appear to be astronomical.

Risks to individual patients are bad enough, but overall health care cyber risk exposure threatens the broader society. If health care systems, especially emergency services, are unavailable during a crisis, the public could be in danger. This is not as far-fetched a scenario as people might imagine. After all, ransomware attackers have targeted municipal government and law enforcement in tandem with hospitals. A quantum attack that devastates all such systems could destabilize the public order.

Health care information also figures into geopolitics and the world of intelligence. This may seem a bit cloak-and-dagger, but the reality is that adversarial nation-state intelligence services are stealing hundreds of millions of American health records. The 2015 Anthem breach is cited as an example. Its unclear exactly why they are doing this, but possible explanations include a desire to create a social map of the United States to identify spies. There is also a theory that the Chinese artificial intelligence (AI) industry is hacking American medical data to develop training data sets for medical AI software, which is considered a strategically important industry. The fascinating Wall Street Journal article What Does Beijing Want With Your Medical Records? explores this issue.

The government is taking a strong interest in cybersecurity for health care. U.S. federal agencies are expected to start mandating cybersecurity requirements through legislation such as the 2022 Protecting and Transforming Cyber Healthcare (PATCH) Act, which requires a software bill of materials (SBOM), as mandated by president Bidens May 2022 executive order. These measures also expect medical devices to have greater cryptographic agility.

The pending Healthcare Cybersecurity Act of 2022 is a further call-to-action from the government. The bill wants to make cybersecurity a primary goal of health care organizations and equipment manufacturers. This includes the critical step of protecting legacy devices incapable of withstanding todays cyberattacks. The bill is poised to impose financial constraints, with Medicare payment policies incorporating cyber expenses.

Quantum defense still needs to be added to the legislative agenda for health care, but it will almost certainly be included soon. The government is starting to mandate mitigations of the quantum threat in government systems. For example, the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) published guidance called Preparing for Post-Quantum Cryptography in 2022 in collaboration with NIST. Health care will likely follow.

It is important to start defending against the quantum threat now. Or, at a minimum, health care organizations can start preparing by assessing their cybersecurity to look for areas that will be vulnerable to a quantum attack. If health care companies want to follow the CISA/NIST guidance, they should start by inventorying their critical data and systems, including device operating systems. They ought to create an inventory of their cryptographic technologies and internal standards. This includes public key cryptography, which is most vulnerable to quantum attacks.

Health care organizations then need to move toward what is known as post-quantum cryptography, a new approach to cryptography that changes the way keys are generated, managed and used. Using advanced mathematical techniques, post-quantum cryptography methods can protect health care data from even quantum decryption processes.

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Protecting Patient Data: Why Quantum Security is a Must in Health Care - Security Boulevard

Yall, as a child of the 90s, I will forever quote Ian Malcolm fromJurassic Park when he says that the scientists there were so preoccupied wondering if theycould do something they didnt stop to wonder whether or not theyshould.

And honestly, I feel like there are way too many stories where scientists arent worried enough about setting up the new hit disaster movie.

Because creating a wormhole in a lab honestly seems like a recipe for disaster.

Hatim Saleh, a research fellow at the University of Bristol and co-founder of DotQuantum, obviously doesnt think so, because claims to have created The first ever practical blueprint for creating in the lab a wormhole that verifiably bridges space.

He calls his invention counterportation, which reconstitutes a small object across space without any particles crossing.

Heres the thing, though: its still all conceptual, as the computers needed to make this happen havent been designed or built yet.

If counterportation is to be realized, an entirely new type of quantum computer has to be built: an exchange-free one, where communicating parties exchange no particles.

Saleh says hes not worried, though, as he has plans underway to build the technology described in his paper.

While counterportation achieves the end goal of teleportation, namely disembodied transport, it remarkably does so without any detectable information carriers traveling across.

It relies on an aspect of quantum physics called quantum entanglement. This allows entirely separate quantum particles to be correlated without ever interacting.

According to University of Bristol professor John Rarity,

This correlation at a distance can then be used to transport quantum information from one location to another without a particle having to traverse the space, creating what could be called a traversable wormhole.

If this sounds like a long shot, thats because right now, it definitely is.

But you know. That might not be a bad thing.

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Scientists Say They've Got A Blueprint For Creating A Wormhole In A ... - Twisted Sifter