Archive for the ‘Quantum Computing’ Category
National Security Memorandum on Promoting United States Leadership in …
NATIONAL SECURITY MEMORANDUM/NSM-10
MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
THE SECRETARY OF COMMERCE
THE SECRETARY OF ENERGY
THE SECRETARY OF HOMELAND SECURITY
THE ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT AND CHIEF OF STAFF
THE DIRECTOR OF THE OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT BUDGET
THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
THE DIRECTOR OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
THE ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL
SECURITY AFFAIRS
THE COUNSEL TO THE PRESIDENT
THE ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR ECONOMIC
POLICY AND DIRECTOR OF THE NATIONAL ECONOMIC
COUNCIL
THE DIRECTOR OF THE OFFICE OF SCIENCE AND
TECHNOLOGY POLICY
THE NATIONAL CYBER DIRECTOR
THE CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
THE DIRECTOR OF THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF
INVESTIGATION
THE DIRECTOR OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
THE DIRECTOR OF THE NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF
STANDARDS AND TECHNOLOGY
THE DIRECTOR OF THE CYBERSECURITY AND
INFRASTRUCTURE SECURITY AGENCY
SUBJECT: Promoting United States Leadership in Quantum
Computing While Mitigating Risks to Vulnerable
Cryptographic Systems
This memorandum outlines my Administrations policies and initiatives related to quantum computing. It identifies key steps needed to maintain the Nations competitive advantage in quantum information science (QIS), while mitigating the risks of quantum computers to the Nations cyber, economic, and national security. It directs specific actions for agencies to take as the United States begins the multi-year process of migrating vulnerable computer systems to quantum-resistant cryptography. A classified annex to this memorandum addresses sensitive national security issues.
Section 1. Policy. (a) Quantum computers hold the potential to drive innovations across the American economy, from fields as diverse as materials science and pharmaceuticals to finance and energy. While the full range of applications of quantum computers is still unknown, it is nevertheless clear that Americas continued technological and scientific leadership will depend, at least in part, on the Nations ability to maintain a competitive advantage in quantum computing and QIS.
(b) Yet alongside its potential benefits, quantum computing also poses significant risks to the economic and national security of the United States. Most notably, a quantum computer of sufficient size and sophistication also known as a cryptanalytically relevant quantum computer (CRQC) will be capable of breaking much of the public-key cryptography used on digital systems across the United States and around the world. When it becomes available, a CRQC could jeopardize civilian and military communications, undermine supervisory and control systems for critical infrastructure, and defeat security protocols for most Internet-based financial transactions.
(c) In order to balance the competing opportunities and risks of quantum computers, it is the policy of my Administration: (1) to maintain United States leadership in QIS, through continued investment, partnerships, and a balanced approach to technology promotion and protection; and (2) to mitigate the threat of CRQCs through a timely and equitable transition of the Nations cryptographic systems to interoperable quantumresistant cryptography.
(d) Additional guidance and directives may be required in the future as quantum computing technologies and their associated risks mature.
Sec. 2. Promoting United States Leadership. (a) The United States must pursue a whole-of-government and wholeofsociety strategy to harness the economic and scientific benefits of QIS, and the security enhancements provided by quantum-resistant cryptography. This strategy will require a coordinated, proactive approach to QIS research and development (R&D), an expansion of education and workforce programs, and a focus on developing and strengthening partnerships with industry, academic institutions, allies, and like-minded nations.
(b) The United States must seek to encourage transformative and fundamental scientific discoveries through investments in core QIS research programs. Investments should target the discovery of new quantum applications, new approaches to quantum-component manufacturing, and advances in quantumenabling technologies, such as photonics, nanofabrication, and cryogenic and semiconductor systems.
(c) The United States must seek to foster the next generation of scientists and engineers with quantum-relevant skill sets, including those relevant to quantum-resistant cryptography. Education in QIS and related cybersecurity principles should be incorporated into academic curricula at all levels of schooling to support the growth of a diverse domestic workforce. Furthermore, it is vital that we attract and retain talent and encourage career opportunities that keep quantum experts employed domestically.
(d) To promote the development of quantum technology and the effective deployment of quantum-resistant cryptography, theUnited States must establish partnerships with industry; academia; and State, local, Tribal, and territorial (SLTT) governments. These partnerships should advance joint R&D initiatives and streamline mechanisms for technology transfer between industry and government.
(e) The United States must promote professional and academic collaborations with overseas allies and partners. This international engagement is essential for identifying and following global QIS trends and for harmonizing quantum security and protection programs.
(f) In support of these goals, within 90 days of the date of this memorandum, agencies that fund research in, develop, or acquire quantum computers shall coordinate with the Director of the Office of Science and Technology Policy to ensure a coherent national strategy for QIS promotion and technology protection, including for workforce issues. To facilitate this coordination, all such agencies shall identify a liaison to the National Quantum Coordination Office to share information and best practices, consistent with section 102(b)(3) of the National Quantum Initiative Act (Public Law 115-368) and section 6606 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022 (Public Law 117-81). All coordination efforts shall be undertaken with appropriate protections for sensitive and classified information and intelligence sources and methods.
Sec. 3. Mitigating the Risks to Encryption. (a) Any digital system that uses existing public standards for publickey cryptography, or that is planning to transition to such cryptography, could be vulnerable to an attack by a CRQC. To mitigate this risk, the United States must prioritize the timely and equitable transition of cryptographic systems to quantum-resistant cryptography, with the goal of mitigating as much of the quantum risk as is feasible by 2035. Currently, the Director of the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) and the Director of the National Security Agency (NSA), in their capacity as the National Manager for National Security Systems (National Manager), are each developing technical standards for quantumresistant cryptography for their respective jurisdictions. The first sets of these standards are expected to be released publicly by 2024.
(b) Central to this migration effort will be an emphasis on cryptographic agility, both to reduce the time required to transition and to allow for seamless updates for future cryptographic standards. This effort is an imperative across all sectors of the United States economy, from government to critical infrastructure, commercial services to cloud providers, and everywhere else that vulnerable public-key cryptography is used.
(c) Consistent with these goals:
(i) Within 90 days of the date of this memorandum, the Secretary of Commerce, through the Director of NIST, shall initiate an open working group with industry, including critical infrastructure owners and operators, and other stakeholders, as determined by the Director of NIST, to further advance adoption of quantum-resistant cryptography. This working group shall identify needed tools and data sets, and other considerations to inform the development by NIST of guidance and best practices to assist with quantumresistant cryptography planning and prioritization. Findings of this working group shall be provided, on an ongoing basis, to the Director of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (APNSA), and the National Cyber Director to incorporate into planning efforts.
(ii) Within 90 days of the date of this memorandum, the Secretary of Commerce, through the Director of NIST, shall establish a Migration to Post-Quantum Cryptography Project at the National Cybersecurity Center of Excellence to work with the private sector to address cybersecurity challenges posed by the transition to quantum-resistant cryptography. This project shall develop programs for discovery and remediation of any system that does not use quantum-resistant cryptography or that remains dependent on vulnerable systems.
(iii) Within 180 days of the date of this memorandum, and annually thereafter, the Secretary of Homeland Security, through the Director of the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), and in coordination with Sector Risk Management Agencies, shall engage with critical infrastructure and SLTT partners regarding the risks posed by quantum computers, and shall provide an annual report to the Director of OMB, the APNSA, and the National Cyber Director that includes recommendations for accelerating those entities migration to quantum-resistant cryptography.
(iv) Within 180 days of the date of this memorandum, and on an ongoing basis, the Director of OMB, in consultation with the Director of CISA, the Director of NIST, the National Cyber Director, and the Director of NSA, shall establish requirements for inventorying all currently deployed cryptographic systems, excluding National Security Systems (NSS). These requirements shall include a list of key information technology (IT) assets to prioritize, interim benchmarks, and a common (and preferably automated) assessment process for evaluating progress on quantum-resistant cryptographic migration in IT systems.
(v) Within 1 year of the date of this memorandum, and on an annual basis thereafter, the heads of all Federal Civilian Executive Branch (FCEB) Agencies shall deliver to the Director of CISA and the National Cyber Director an inventory of their IT systems that remain vulnerable to CRQCs, with a particular focus on High Value Assets and High Impact Systems. Inventories should include current cryptographic methods used on IT systems, including system administrator protocols, non-security software and firmware that require upgraded digital signatures, and information on other key assets.
(vi) By October 18, 2023, and on an annual basis thereafter, the National Cyber Director shall, based on the inventories described in subsection 3(c)(v) of this memorandum and in coordination with the Director of CISA and the Director of NIST, deliver a status report to the APNSA and the Director of OMB on progress made by FCEB Agencies on their migration of non-NSS IT systems to quantum-resistant cryptography. This status report shall include an assessment of the funding necessary to secure vulnerable IT systems from the threat posed by adversarial access to quantum computers, a description and analysis of ongoing coordination efforts, and a strategy and timeline for meeting proposed milestones.
(vii) Within 90 days of the release of the first set of NIST standards for quantum-resistant cryptography referenced in subsection 3(a) of this memorandum, andon an annual basis thereafter, as needed, the Secretary of Commerce, through the Director of NIST, shall release a proposed timeline for the deprecation of quantum-vulnerable cryptography in standards, with the goal of moving the maximum number of systems off quantum-vulnerable cryptography within a decade of the publication of the initial set of standards. The Director of NIST shall work with the appropriate technical standards bodies to encourage interoperability of commercial cryptographic approaches.
(viii) Within 1 year of the release of the first set of NIST standards for quantum-resistant cryptography referenced in subsection 3(a) of this memorandum, the Director of OMB, in coordination with the Director of CISA and the Director of NIST, shall issue a policy memorandum requiring FCEB Agencies to develop a plan to upgrade their non-NSS IT systems to quantum-resistant cryptography. These plans shall be expeditiously developed and be designed to address the most significant risks first. The Director of OMB shall work with the head of each FCEB Agency to estimate the costs to upgrade vulnerable systems beyond already planned expenditures, ensure that each plan is coordinated and shared among relevant agencies to assess interoperability between solutions, and coordinate with the National Cyber Director to ensure plans are updated accordingly.
(ix) Until the release of the first set of NIST standards for quantum-resistant cryptography referenced in subsection 3(a) of this memorandum, the heads of FCEB Agencies shall not procure any commercial quantum-resistant cryptographic solutions for use in IT systems supporting enterprise and mission operations. However, to assist with anticipating potential compatibility issues, the heads of such FCEB Agencies should conduct tests of commercial solutions that have implemented pre-standardized quantum-resistant cryptographic algorithms. These tests will help identify interoperability or performance issues that may occur in Federal environments at an early stage and will contribute to the mitigation of those issues. The heads of such FCEB Agencies should continue to implement and, where needed, upgrade existing cryptographic implementations, but should transition to quantum-resistant cryptography only once the first set of NIST standards for quantum-resistant cryptography is complete and implemented in commercial products. Conformance with international standards should be encouraged, and may be required for interoperability.
(x) Within 1 year of the date of this memorandum, and annually thereafter, the Director of NSA, serving in its capacity as the National Manager, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense and the Director of National Intelligence, shall provide guidance on quantum-resistant cryptography migration, implementation, and oversight for NSS. This guidance shall be consistent with National Security Memorandum/NSM-8 (Improving the Cybersecurity of National Security, Department of Defense, and Intelligence Community Systems). The National Manager shall share best practices and lessons learned with the Director of OMB and the National Cyber Director, as appropriate.
(xi) Within 1 year of the date of this memorandum, and on an ongoing basis, and consistent with section 1 of NSM-8, the heads of agencies operating NSS shall identify and document all instances where quantum-vulnerable cryptography is used by NSS and shall provide this information to the National Manager.
(xii) Within 180 days of issuance by the National Manager of its standards on quantum-resistant cryptography referenced in section 3(a) of this memorandum, and annually thereafter, the National Manager shall release an official timeline for the deprecation of vulnerable cryptography in NSS, until the migration to quantum-resistant cryptography is completed.
(xiii) Within 1 year of issuance by the National Manager of its standards on quantum-resistant cryptography for referenced in subsection 3(a) of this memorandum, and annually thereafter, the heads of agencies operating or maintaining NSS shall submit to the National Manager, and, as appropriate, the Department of Defense Chief Information Officer or the Intelligence Community Chief Information Officer, depending on their respective jurisdictions, an initial plan to transition to quantumresistant cryptography in all NSS. These plans shall be updated annually and shall include relevant milestones, schedules, authorities, impediments, funding requirements, and exceptions authorized by the head of the agency in accordance with section 3 of NSM-8 and guidance from the National Manager.
(xiv) By December 31, 2023, agencies maintaining NSS shall implement symmetric-key protections (e.g., High Assurance Internet Protocol Encryptor (HAIPE) exclusion keys or VPN symmetric key solutions) to provide additional protection for quantum-vulnerable key exchanges, where appropriate and in consultation with the National Manager. Implementation should seek to avoid interference with interoperability or other cryptographic modernization efforts.
(xv) By December 31, 2023, the Secretary of Defense shall deliver to the APNSA and the Director of OMB an assessment of the risks of quantum computing to the defense industrial base and to defense supply chains, along with a plan to engage with key commercial entities to upgrade their IT systems to achieve quantum resistance.
Sec. 4. Protecting United States Technology. (a) In addition to promoting quantum leadership and mitigating the risks of CRQCs, the United States Government must work to safeguard relevant quantum R&D and intellectual property (IP) and to protect relevant enabling technologies and materials. Protection mechanisms will vary, but may include counterintelligence measures, well-targeted export controls, and campaigns to educate industry and academia on the threat of cybercrime and IP theft.
(b) All agencies responsible for either promoting or protecting QIS and related technologies should understand the security implications of adversarial use and consider those security implications when implementing new policies, programs, and projects.
(c) The United States should ensure the protection of U.S.developed quantum technologies from theft by our adversaries. This will require campaigns to educate industry, academia, and SLTT partners on the threat of IP theft and on the importance of strong compliance, insider threat detection, and cybersecurity programs for quantum technologies. As appropriate, Federal law enforcement agencies and other relevant agencies should investigate and prosecute actors who engage in the theft of quantum trade secrets or who violate United States export control laws. To support efforts to safeguard sensitive information, Federal law enforcement agencies should exchange relevant threat information with agencies responsible for developing and promoting quantum technologies.
(d) Consistent with these goals, by December 31, 2022, the heads of agencies that fund research in, develop, or acquire quantum computers or related QIS technologies shall develop comprehensive technology protection plans to safeguard QIS R&D, acquisition, and user access. Plans shall be coordinated across agencies, including with Federal law enforcement, to safeguard quantum computing R&D and IP, acquisition, and user access. These plans shall be updated annually and provided to the APNSA, the Director of OMB, and the Co-Chairs of the National Science and Technology Council Subcommittee on Economic and Security Implications of Quantum Science.
Sec. 5. Definitions. For purposes of this memorandum:
(a) the term agency has the meaning ascribed to it under 44 U.S.C. 3502;
(b) the term critical infrastructure means systems and assets, whether physical or virtual, so vital to the UnitedStates that their incapacitation or destruction would have a debilitating effect on the Nations security, economy, public health and safety, or any combination thereof;
(c) the term cryptographic agility means a design feature that enables future updates to cryptographic algorithms and standards without the need to modify or replace the surrounding infrastructure;
(d) the term cryptanalytically relevant quantum computer or CRQC means a quantum computer capable of undermining current public-key cryptographic algorithms;
(e) the term Federal Civilian Executive Branch Agency or FCEB Agency means any agency except the Department of Defense or agencies in the Intelligence Community;
(f) the term high value asset means information or an information system that is so critical to an organization that the loss or corruption of this information, or loss of access to the system, would have serious impacts on the organizations ability to perform its mission or conduct business;
(g) the term high impact system means an information system in which at least one security objective (i.e., confidentiality, integrity, or availability) is assigned a Federal Information Processing Standards (FIPS) 199 potential impact value of high;
(h) the term information technology or IT has the meaning ascribed to it under 44 U.S.C. 3502;
(i) the term National Security Systems or NSS has the meaning ascribed to it in 44 U.S.C 3552(b)(6) and shall also include other Department of Defense and Intelligence Community systems, as described in 44 U.S.C. 3553(e)(2) and 44 U.S.C.3553(e)(3);
(j) the term quantum computer means a computer utilizing the collective properties of quantum states, such as superposition, interference and entanglement, to perform calculations. The foundations in quantum physics give a quantum computer the ability to solve a subset of hard mathematical problems at a much faster rate than a classical (i.e., nonquantum) computer;
(k) the term quantum information sciences or QIS has the meaning ascribed to it under 15 U.S.C. 8801(6) and means the study and application of the laws of quantum physics for the storage, transmission, manipulation, computing, or measurement of information; and
(l) the term quantum-resistant cryptography means those cryptographic algorithms or methods that are assessed not to be specifically vulnerable to attack by either a CRQC or classical computer. This is also referred to as post-quantum cryptography.
Sec. 6. General Provisions. (a) Nothing in this memorandum shall be construed to impair or otherwise affect:
(i) the authority granted by law to an executive department or agency, or the head thereof, to include the protection of intelligence sources and methods; or
(ii) the functions of the Director of OMB relating to budgetary, administrative, or legislative proposals.
(b) This memorandum shall be implemented consistent with applicable law and subject to the availability of appropriations.
(c) This memorandum shall also be implemented without impeding the conduct or support of intelligence activities, and all implementation measures shall be designed to be consistent with appropriate protections for sensitive information and intelligence sources and methods.
(d) This memorandum is not intended to, and does not, create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or in equity by any party against the UnitedStates, its departments, agencies, or entities, its officers, employees, or agents, or any other person.
JOSEPH R. BIDEN JR.
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National Security Memorandum on Promoting United States Leadership in ...
The Quantum Decade | IBM
We are progressing through the Quantum Decade, the decade when enterprises begin to see business value from quantum computingonce viewed as a futuristic technology that would change everything, if it ever moved from the fantastical to the practical.
What can and should farsighted leaders and organizations do to position themselves effectively in this brave new era? Our key learnings, explained in detail in the latest edition of The Quantum Decade, revolve around phases of organizational evolutionfrom Quantum Awareness to Quantum Advantage.
Whats new in the third edition of The Quantum Decade:
Quantum Advantage: A process, not a destination
When quantum demonstrates its superiority over traditional computing for a specific problem, thats Quantum Advantage. Its gradual, coming in waves that both progress and pause, but ultimately move the technology forward.
CEOs of Fortune 500 companies have a once-in-a lifetime opportunity. They cannot afford to play catchup.
Industry use case
By combining hybrid classical and quantum resources, IBM and Boeing are advancing quantum chemistry research on the mechanism for corrosion.
Designing corrosion-resistant materials is a critical task that could make airplanes easier to maintain, but performing experiments on these new materials is often very expensive or otherwise impractical. Numerical simulations present a much more practical alternative for researchers who wish to model and study the molecular systems that make up experimental materials. However, classical computers are only able to create approximate simulations of molecular systems, and those approximations become even less accurate when dealing with molecular systems that are large in size.
Quantum computers, by contrast, have the potential to compute precise simulations of even incredibly complex molecular systems. However, these systems may be too large for our current generation of quantum hardware to simulate them all at once. Thats why researchers use a class of techniques called circuit knitting to break up those larger molecular systems into smaller simulation problems.
A circuit knitting technique like quantum embedding, for example, makes it possible to focus the quantum computers efforts on a tractable partition of the full simulation problem. When researchers combine circuit knitting with classical pre- and post- processing techniques like active space selectionwhich serves to identify the portion of the chemical system that is active during chemical reactionsthey can extrapolate their solutions to understand properties of the entire system.
Researchers from IBM and Boeing collaborated to develop automated methods of active space selection suited to studying not only corrosion but all manner of chemical reactions that take place on surfaces. By leveraging local embedding methods with the designated active spaces, the researchers were able to use variational quantum algorithms to study the splitting of a water molecule on a magnesium surface. At the time of completion, this study represented one of the first ever instances of quantum algorithms being used to investigate surface reactions.
Your journey to Quantum Advantage awaits. Download The Quantum Decade to access the insights you need to prepare for the most significant computing revolution in 60 years.
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The Quantum Decade | IBM
US mulling bans to stunt Chinas quantum computing
Last November, IBM launched its 127-qubit Eagle, surpassing Chinas 113-qubit Jiuzhang to become the worlds fastest quantum computer. Now, China risks falling further behind in the quantum computing race as the United States reportedly weighs new export controls on the game-changing technology.
The new ban, if implemented, would target quantum computing, artificial intelligence software and other emerging technologies that could have security implications vis-a-vis China. The ban would mark a next salvo on the Biden administrations October 7 move to block high-end chips and advanced chip-making equipment exports to China.
Bloomberg reported that US industry experts are now weighing in on the potential parameters of the restrictions, which are still preliminary, and that US allies are being consulted. Analysts say any such ban would further antagonize China, which strongly protested the October 7 bans, and could put the two rivals on a dangerous collision course.
Chinese media commentators say the US aims to strengthen efforts to slow Chinas development in emerging technologies, where the two strategic rivals are racing to lead the way. The commentators suspect the US will not only aim to block China from obtaining key quantum computing parts and software but also force other countries to uphold the bans.
The US is making no secret of how it views the emerging and sensitive technology.
US National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan said ina speech last monthon technology, competitiveness and national security that computing-related technologies, including microelectronics, quantum information systems and artificial intelligence as among developments set to play an outsized importance over the coming decade. He also noted the importance of export controls to maintain as large of a lead as possible over rivals.
Currently, Alphabets Google, Intel, Microsoft and IBM are all investing heavily in quantum computing projects. Other major players in the sector include US-based IonQ and Japans Fujitsu Ltd.
Quantum computers mark, well, a quantum leap over the speed and power of current supercomputers.
That means they will likely be able to crack and bypass the encryption technologies used to secure current computer communications. More broadly, the technology is expected to unleash waves of new innovation that will revolutionize industry, communications and, crucially, defense.
On September 15, US President Joe Biden signed an executive order urging the US Treasury DepartmentsCommittee on Foreign Investment into the US (CFIUS) to ensure more robust consideration of evolving national security risks.
What may otherwise appear to be an economic transaction undertaken for commercial purposes may actually present an unacceptable risk to US national security when conducted with foreign adversaries or countries of special concern, according to the Executive Order.
It said the committee should consider the transactions effect on US supply chain resilience and national security across the microelectronics, AI, biotechnology and quantum computing sectors.
The Biden administration is now working on an outbound investment review mechanism that would scrutinize money heading to certain Chinese technologies, and new quantum computing and artificial intelligence controls could be included, according to an anonymous source quoted by Bloomberg.
Biden has said the new curbs unveiled by the US Commerce Departments Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) on October 7 have already successfully blocked Chinas access to key US chip technologies. Thecurbshave also limited how US citizens and residents are allowed to work and collaborate with Chinese tech firms.
Secrss.com, a Shanghai-based research institute, noted in several articles this year that quantum computing can be applied in computing, communication, navigation, power and military defense industries. It said quantum computing had the potential to change the results of future wars.
One article said quantum computers can be used to initiate cyber warfare by decoding passwords and bypassing encryption used on current digital computers. It said quantum computing technologies can also be used to navigate drones and submarines.
Another article, citing a report in the European Physical Journal, said a quantum radar would be launched one day and used in space war.
China is making strong progress in the field in the current open trading environment. The 66-qubit Zuchongzhi 2, for instance, is reportedly 10 million times faster than Googles 55-qubit Sycamore.
In December 2020, a University of Science and Technology of China research team led by scientist Pan Jianwei launched Jiuzhang, a light-based or photonics quantum computer that can work at room temperature. It is said to be 10 billion times faster than Googles Sycamore.
In May 2021, Pan and his team launched Zuchongzhi 2, a superconducting quantum computer that needs to work at a temperature close to absolute zero. Jiuzhang and Zuchongzhi 2s details were published last November by the Physical Review Letters, a scientific journal of the American Physical Society.
Soon thereafter, IBMs Eagle surpassed Zuchongzhi 2 to become the worlds fastest superconducting quantum machine, underscoring the two sides budding rivalry in the filed.
Read: New US chip ban takes tech war to dire next level
Follow Jeff Pao on Twitter at@jeffpao3
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US mulling bans to stunt Chinas quantum computing
Podcast with Professor Peter Kogge from Notre Dame, Professor Geraldo Ortiz from Indiana University and Dr. David Stewart from Purdue about the new…
Podcast with Professor Peter Kogge from Notre Dame, Professor Geraldo Ortiz from Indiana University and Dr. David Stewart from Purdue about the new Center for Quantum Technologies Quantum Computing Report
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Podcast with Professor Peter Kogge from Notre Dame, Professor Geraldo Ortiz from Indiana University and Dr. David Stewart from Purdue about the new...