Archive for the ‘Ukraine’ Category

Putin, Trump, Ukraine: how Timothy Snyder became the leading interpreter of our dark times – The Guardian

Historians arent supposed to make predictions, but Yale professor Timothy Snyder has become known for his dire warnings and many of them have been proved correct

Last September, seven months after Russia launched a full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the Yale historian Timothy Snyder took a 16-hour train ride from Poland to Kyiv. Snyder knew the city well: hed been visiting since the early 1990s, when he was a graduate student and the newly post-Soviet Ukrainian capital was dark and provincial. In the decades that followed, Kyiv had grown bigger and more interesting, and Snyder, who is now 53, had become an eminent historian of eastern Europe. On disembarking at the Kyiv-Pasazhyrskyi station, he found the city transformed by war. There were sandbags everywhere, concrete roadblocks and steel hedgehogs designed to stop Russian tanks. Air raid warnings blared from phones in pockets and handbags.

Not everything was unfamiliar. The first months of the war had gone relatively well for the Ukrainians a fact that surprised many observers, but not Snyder and by September, Kyiv was no longer in imminent danger of occupation. Life, while not normal, was regaining some of its prewar rhythms. You could get a haircut at a barbershop, or hear standup at a comedy club, or sunbathe on the shores of the Dnieper River.

Snyder had come to speak at an annual conference, Yalta European Strategy (YES), which was founded in 2004 to promote ties with Europe. Funded by a Ukrainian oligarch, the conference had become an occasional stopover for the gladhanding global elite. Bill and Hillary Clinton, Gordon Brown, Elton John and Richard Branson had all participated in previous years, and the roster for the 2022 meeting included the American national security adviser, Jake Sullivan, and Eric Schmidt, the former CEO of Google.

Though he is not a natural gladhander, Snyder had attended the conference before. His first visit came in 2014, a few years after he published Bloodlands, a provocative and emotionally devastating account of Nazi and Soviet atrocities, which established him, in the words of one reviewer, as perhaps the most talented younger historian of modern Europe working today. The book was a crossover success, and in the years that followed Snyder began to write more about contemporary issues, including the climate crisis, healthcare and Ukrainian politics. But it was his writing about two figures, Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin, that turned him into one of the most prominent American intellectuals of the past decade.

Snyders mainstream breakthrough, in 2017, was On Tyranny, a bestselling little book that helped make him the house intellectual of the centre-left anti-Trump movement sometimes known as #resistance liberalism. The book earned him regular invitations to appear on television. (Whether or not you talked to your friends about it, everybody you know has been reading and re-reading On Tyranny, Rachel Maddow said on her show.) The news Snyder brought his audience was almost unremittingly bleak, yet it also offered a strange kind of reassurance. You are not wrong to feel that the situation is grievous, Snyder told them. Take it from an expert in political barbarism: things are exactly as bad as they seem.

Snyders dire warnings were easy to caricature as bourgeois-liberal doomerism, yet Trumps attempts to overturn the 2020 election allowed him to claim vindication for what his critics had seen as hyperbole. On 9 January 2021, three days after a mob laid siege to the US Capitol, Snyder published an essay in the New York Times that made another prescient prediction. Trumps failed putsch was more like the beginning than the end of something, Snyder argued. Since Trumps big lie that he won the election was now a sacred cause for which people had sacrificed, it would remain a potent force in American politics unless a concerted effort was made to stop it.

Snyders view of Putin was still more ominous. In Putins Russia, Snyder sees a corrupt autocracy that has turned to neo-fascism in an attempt to regain its imperial glory. He was one of the few anglophone commentators to anticipate Russias 2014 invasion of Ukraine a prediction that even his friends scoffed at and warned in his book Black Earth that a new Russian colonialism threatened European stability. In his opinion, the full-scale invasion that started last year was not, as some saw it, a minor regional conflict, but rather an atrocity of epochal significance: It is about the possibility of a democratic future, he wrote in Foreign Affairs.

Over the past year, Snyder has been one of the most eloquent interpreters of the war in Ukraine. He writes and speaks frequently about the conflict including, in mid-March, to the UN security council. He has established a project to document the war, and more controversially, has raised more than $1.2m for an anti-drone defence system. A course on Ukrainian history that he taught at Yale last autumn has had hundreds of thousands of views on YouTube, and he has become one of the most famous western intellectuals within Ukraine itself. He used to be a celebrity in historical circles and among intellectuals, his friend, the Ukrainian rock star Sviatoslav Vakarchuk, told me recently, but now even ordinary people know a lot about him.

It was a sign of Snyders standing that the YES conference was only the second-highest-profile stop on his Kyiv itinerary. The main reason for his trip, Snyder told me, during one of three long conversations we had recently, was a private meeting with Ukraines president, Volodymyr Zelenskiy. The Ukrainians, Snyder said, think Im much more important than I actually am. Zelenskiy, he went on, thought of me mainly as somebody who had some kind of voice. Im not under the illusion that Snyder stopped himself. Well, no, thats not true. He said: My wife and I have read On Tyranny. Thats the first thing he said when I met him.

Sitting in green leather wingbacks in Zelenskiys presidential office, the men talked for more than two hours. They discussed Shakespeare, the Czech playwright and politician Vclav Havel, and the Soviet physicist and dissident Andrei Sakharov. They talked about freedom, too, the subject of a new book Snyder is working on, and particularly about Zelenskiys decision to stay in Ukraine once the invasion began. Zelenskiy said that while most western observers had expected him to flee, he had never felt as if he had any real choice. Thats an argument that he helped me to make, Snyder told me. Being free means that you actually end up in situations where you wont actually feel like you have a whole bunch of options.

Snyders fascination with what he has described as Zelenskiys choiceless choice is not surprising: he had predicted that, too, on the eve of the war. As an academic and a public intellectual, Snyder has long operated on the belief that there are moments in the world where your actions are magnified. It may be that you can take things that were going to swerve in a particularly bad direction, and you can push them with relatively little effort. Zelenskiys decision, like the Ukrainian resistance writ large, was for him a vivid demonstration that this belief was well justified.

Unusually for a serious historian, Snyder often draws analogies between the past and the present. More unusually still, he routinely makes predictions about the future. What he calls his Cassandra mode is different from his historical work, but not entirely disconnected. History isnt the boring recitation of stuff that we all know but have forgotten, he says. Its a constant, exciting discovery of things that actually happened, which werent anticipated and which were probably considered wildly improbable at the time. The first world war, the Holocaust: a lot of the things which seem absolutely foundational were regarded at the time as ridiculous, absurd, impossible. And once you know that, then you can have the intuition that, well, maybe in this moment right now theres something happening which people arent seeing.

Snyder was raised in a Quaker family in south-western Ohio, and he retains a midwestern faith in the virtue of saying plainly what you mean. His unadorned prose has the sturdy simplicity that one associates with Shaker furniture. Unlike most academics, he also feels a deep responsibility to explain his ideas as straightforwardly as possible. Its very, very easy to hide behind the notion that, Oh, what I do as a philosopher or psychologist or cell biologist is just really complicated, he says. I honestly dont believe thats true.

Snyder dislikes the scholarly tendency to hide judgments under a cloak of pseudo-objectivity. He has a strong moral feeling his wife, Marci Shore, calls it a save-the-world impulse that can be traced back to his parents. Shore told me that Snyders mother has this very calming sense of moral clarity. Its like, there are no perfect decisions in the world. Theres no space of innocence. Given the situation as it is, you make the choice and you go forward. Snyder, she says, is much the same way.

Shore, who is also a historian at Yale, noted her husbands deep confidence in his abilities. Over email, she told me a story about the birth-preparation class she and Snyder had taken when she was pregnant with their son. They were living in Vienna, and the midwife spoke to the class in Wienerisch, the colloquial Viennese dialect. After the class, the couple agreed they had understood only about 60% of what theyd heard. The difference between us can be gleaned in this small but revealing detail, Shore wrote. Tim was calmly persuaded that the 60% we did understand was the important part, whereas I was convinced that the 40% we didnt understand was surely what was crucial.

As Snyders public profile has risen, he has attracted an increasing number of critics. His judgments have been controversial in part because his own politics are difficult to pin down. To Ukrainian nationalists, he sounds like an American leftist. To American leftists, he sounds like a Ukrainian nationalist. His books carry blurbs from an unlikely coterie that ranges from George Saunders, author of Lincoln in the Bardo, to Henry Kissinger, author of the bombing of Cambodia. In Snyders focus on the evils of nazism and Stalinism and his advocacy of US military support for Ukraine, some people see the makings of a barely reconstructed cold warrior, yet he opposed the Iraq war and is anything but blithe about the USs claims to moral supremacy. His memoir-diatribe Our Malady lambasted the USs privatised healthcare system, and lately he has been speaking out against Republican-sponsored laws that limit discussion of the USs racist history in schools.

Perhaps the most common critique of Snyder over the past decade has to do with the stridency of his public arguments, which often see him presenting beliefs, and even speculations, as incontrovertible facts. Earlier this year, after an FBI counterintelligence official was indicted for violating sanctions against a Russian oligarch, Snyder wrote on his Substack: We are on the edge of a spy scandal with major implications for how we understand the Trump administration, our national security, and ourselves. Two weeks later, he ridiculed discussions about a potential nuclear escalation in the Ukraine conflict as wrong, and embarrassingly so in moral and strategic terms. That is the most important thing to say about nuclear war: its not happening, he claimed.

This rhetorical self-assurance is a crucial feature of his mainstream appeal: for audiences disoriented by some of the most politically turbulent times theyve ever seen, Snyders authoritative tone suggests a firm hand on the tiller. Yet it also supplies grist for critics who think Snyder is too ready to see catastrophe lurking around every corner. The cultural critic Lee Siegel accused him of being a one-man industry of panic, a prophet whose profitability depends on his prophecies never coming true. The political scientist Daniel Drezner, in the New York Times, described On Tyranny as overwrought and potentially self-defeating because of its hyperbole. And in the Nation, Sophie Pinkham described The Road to Unfreedom, Snyders 2018 book about Putin and Trump, as the apotheosis of a certain paranoid style that has emerged among liberals in Trumps wake.

Shore told me that her husband possesses a kind of strange composure that allows him to absorb criticism without emotional disturbance. Snyder, for his own part, told me that he doesnt see much value in addressing his critics directly. He nevertheless makes no apologies for stating clearly what he thinks will happen. And while Snyder is proud of his foresight he has often been correct he also insists that his predictions are not a parlour game to rack up points. Central to his understanding of history is a conviction that events are not predetermined by broad structural forces such as economics or technology. His dire analogies and doomy premonitions are not meant to make people depressed or complacent. Quite the opposite. To make predictions is to emphasise the unpredictability of the future, to remind readers that they might still have the freedom to change history.

In February, I went to New Haven to watch Snyder teach at Yale. His morning class, on a cold and sunny Valentines Day, was an undergraduate seminar on mass incarceration in the US and USSR. He was teaching the course with the philosopher Jason Stanley, a close friend of his who had likewise become a pillar of the anti-Trump #resistance. The course was held in a classroom with dark wood wainscoting, a black marble fireplace, and gothic-arch windows inset with scenes from the Bible. Through the window it was possible to see the 14-storey tower that had been renamed in honour of the universitys recently deceased chief investment officer.

Though Snyder can sometimes seem, in print, like an author unfamiliar with the concept of self-doubt, in person there is still a trace of the lanky, somewhat diffident undergraduate that one of his professors recalls from his university days. He has a dry humour and a talent for extemporaneous eloquence, but no one would mistake him for a commanding presence. He speaks softly and dresses in textured grays and browns that might as well be camouflage on a north-eastern American college campus in winter. Amplifying this self-effacing air is a sense, which hangs about him like a penitential sackcloth, that there is too much to do, too many legitimate requests on his time. I cant physically process the email, he told me at one point. Im just a history professor. I dont have staff.

When he arrived in the seminar room, Snyder provoked no murmur or hush among the students. With his thinning white hair, his lively blue eyes, and his air of relaxed reticence, he made for a distinct contrast with Stanley, who showed up to the course in black clothes and black sunglasses, and quickly started cracking loud jokes with the students nearest his chair.

The subject for the days class was late-19th-century scientific racism, but Snyder said that he wanted to start with a reminder about some philosophical arguments connected to the subject at hand. Without notes, he launched into a brief lecture that touched on Platos Parmenides, the Book of Genesis, the idea of dialectic in Hegel and Marx, and the treatment of history by the French-American polymath Ren Girard, before wrapping around to WEB Du Bois. Shore had told me that socialising and speaking in public can be draining for Snyder, but it was clear in the seminar room that he was enjoying himself. He spoke quickly and fluently, gesturing with his hands and unspooling his arguments in transcription-ready sentences.

A few hours after the class ended, Stanley explained the detour to Plato. Earlier that morning, he told me, Snyder had texted to say that he wanted to remind the students of some earlier thinkers. I said, What are you talking about, Parmenides? as a joke, Stanley recalled. He took it as a dare. Thats very standard. Tim is extremely competitive.

Snyders friends sometimes marvel that the eldest son of a veterinarian from Ohio with no familial ties to eastern Europe became a leading expert on the region. His family can trace its ancestry back many generations on each side in the US, and he grew up not far from the farms where his grandparents grew pumpkins, soya beans and corn. His parents were Quakers who served in the Peace Corps in the Dominican Republic and El Salvador before returning to Centerville, a prosperous suburb outside Dayton, to raise their family.

Snyder says that his parents were very leftwing, and not just by American standards, an inclination that set them apart from the conservatism that prevailed in the suburbs and countryside of south-western Ohio. In the midst of an overwhelmingly Republican milieu, they hung posters celebrating leftwing Latin American causes on their walls and regularly sat down with their three boys to write letters to prisoners for Amnesty International on Sunday afternoons. When Snyder was in the ninth grade, the family traveled to a Quaker dairy commune in Costa Rica. That was our idea of tourism, he said.

An alienated and mostly indifferent student in high school, Snyder bucked against his parents leftist politics by flirting with libertarianism. He remembers debating the virtues and vices of the Soviet Union with his mother. Her starting point would be, Well, they were on the right side with Nicaragua. They were on the right side with Cuba. It wouldnt be Hungary in 1956 or Czechoslovakia in 1968. Still, there were limits to his rebellion. I would have never thought, Im for Reagan. Even at my most midwestern buttoned-up, that would have been a different tribe.

When Snyder arrived at Brown University in 1987 as an undergraduate, he thought he might end up as a lawyer working on nuclear arms control. Two classes would get him interested in history. One was a survey of European intellectual history taught by Mary Gluck. The other, on postwar eastern European history, was taught by Thomas W Simons Jr, who would soon after be appointed ambassador to Poland. That course started less than two weeks after Nicolae Ceauescu, the Romanian dictator, was executed in Bucharest on Christmas Day 1989. I thought Id get 15 or 20 students, Simons told me. A hundred and thirty showed up. Snyder says he was obsessed with the course, so much so that he suggested Simons turn his lecture notes into a book. Simons hired him the following summer to help him do just that.

After graduating, Snyder attended Oxford on a Marshall Scholarship. Timothy Garton Ash, one of his DPhil advisers, recalled Snyder as a very reserved young man who nevertheless stood out from his peers for his moral intensity, analytical clarity and intellectual boldness which saw him pushing an argument as far as it would go, or possibly even a little farther.

In his dissertation, on the Polish Marxist thinker Kazimierz Kelles-Krauz, and especially in his second book, The Reconstruction of Nations, which hed largely completed by the time he got hired at Yale in 2001, it is already possible to see Snyder engaging with the major themes that would shape his subsequent work. The first was that eastern Europe was not an ahistorical no-mans land trapped between Europe and the Soviet Union, but a place with its own agency and its own history. The second was that history could be shaped by individual human choices. The third was the importance of ideas as a primary mover of historical events, particularly the fraught idea of the nation.

Since college, Snyder had nurtured what he describes as larger ambition to be it sounds very pompous, but to be an intellectual, a writer. Bloodlands, published in 2010, marked the first major inflection point in his public career. By that time, he had already been writing occasionally for non-academic audiences. But his powerful account of the human toll of Nazi and Soviet horror won him his first major audience among non-academic readers.

Snyder took as his subject the political mass murder of 14 million people that occurred between 1933 and 1945 in a swath of eastern Europe that stretched from central Poland to western Russia, through Ukraine, Belarus and the Baltic states. From this simple formula, Snyder drew several arguments. He suggested, for instance, that the Nazis and the Soviets treated the countries of the bloodlands the term alludes to an Anna Akhmatova poem as proximate colonies. He also argued that too much of the previous research on the killings had seen them through the eyes of the major powers. More fundamentally, his book proposed that the events that transpired in these countries ought to be seen as central to 20th-century European history.

Among academics, Bloodlands won praise for Snyders wide learning: he speaks five languages, reads five more, and belonged to the first generation of western scholars to gain widespread access to eastern European archives after the fall of communism. There was also criticism. Some reviewers balked at his juxtaposition of the Holocaust with Stalins crimes, while others notably Richard J Evans, in a particularly vehement article accused him of failing to explain the causes of the events he was describing. (In Black Earth, his far more controversial follow-up to Bloodlands, Snyder seemed to have both criticisms in mind: its subject was the causes of the Holocaust.) Yet Snyders provocative efforts to reframe European history brought new energy to what was already coming to be seen as settled history. That whole history had been told as a story of Russia and Germany, and of course, the Holocaust, Garton Ash told me. Bloodlands, he said, put the spotlight on east-central Europe in a way which changed the historical perspective.

Snyder believes that doing good history requires taking bad ideas seriously, and he applies the same principle to his writing on current events. Bad ideas matter, he says. They have their own coherence and their own power. Shortly after he published Bloodlands, he noticed that Putin, who was serving a term as prime minister, was speaking with concerning frequency about the essential unity of Russia and Ukraine. In 2013, Putin visited Kyiv for the 1,025th anniversary of the baptism of Prince Vladimir the Great. In Kyiv, Snyder says, Putin gave this wacky speech saying that Ukraine and Russia were one because of the baptism, and no one could do anything about it because it was beyond politics. It was a spiritual truth: basically God made it so.

The Maidan uprising began that November in Ukraine. It was sparked by the sudden refusal of Ukraines president, Viktor Yanukovych, under pressure from Russia, to sign an association agreement with the European Union. The protests grew to more than half a million people, and by January the protesters were locked in an increasingly deadly standoff with the state. On 3 February 2014, Snyder published an op-ed in the New York Times under the headline Dont Let Putin Grab Ukraine. Citing Putins increasingly vocal desire for a Eurasian Union to rival the EU, as well as Russian officials who had been openly discussing the partition of Ukraine, he warned that Putin might try to engineer a coup in Kyiv. If that failed, he suggested, Putin might see armed intervention as the only way to save face.

Snyder says his warning was a judgment call based on his sense that Putin was driving the Ukraine policy more than people realised. When I read those angry things that he published in Russian newspapers about civilisation, his anger didnt seem to be tactical. It seemed to somehow come from someplace deep. The other factor that triggered Snyders suspicion was a very visible uptick in anti-Ukrainian propaganda, along the lines of, Theyre Nazis. Theyre gay. Theyre gay Nazis. On Russian television, in November and December of 2013, it became very carnivalesque, and that got me thinking that something was in the works.

Snyders concern about Russian aggression was not widely shared. Western news reports from the time repeatedly assured their readers that Putin would not be so rash. (Most experts [] dismiss the possibility of military force, the Times said, a week after it ran Snyders op-ed.) Serhii Plokhii, a Ukrainian historian at Harvard who is friendly with Snyder, told me that hed been certain the op-ed went too far. Yet just a few weeks later, after Yanukovych fled the country, Russia seized Crimea and sent troops into eastern Ukraine. Plokhii, laughing at the memory, said he spoke to Snyder not long afterward. I told Tim: OK, I thought you were a complete nut.

Snyder says that at the time of the invasion, there had been a tendency to treat Russia as though it were merely a failed or corrupted version of a western liberal democracy. Both the American and the German view of Putin was about denied agency. Theyre like, Oh, well, theyre trying to have a transition, but its hard for them, poor souls, therefore they have to invade Georgia or Ukraine. By contrast, he said, if you say Putin is a guy who reads, and changes, and pulls in ideas, youre saying, OK, hes not an idiot. Hes not predictable. He makes moves we wouldnt expect. This is one of the reasons Snyder insists on calling Putin fascist: It sounds weird, but to say that he is influenced by fascism is to give him credit. Hes not just a historically determined piece in this story of transitions. Hes been doing something different for more than a decade.

Two years after the annexation of Crimea, Snyder noticed that Russian politicians and state media outlets were spreading the same kinds of propaganda and misinformation about the US that it had about Ukraine. Though it is not true, as Snyder claimed recently on Twitter, that he broke the story of Trump and Putin, he was early in devoting sustained attention to the incipient relationship between the two men. In April 2016, he argued that Trumps weakness and vanity made him an easy mark for Putin, who had already started cultivating him as a future Russian client.

By that autumn, it was becoming clear that Russia was behind the hack-and-leak campaign that generated weeks of unfriendly headlines for Hillary Clinton in the final stretch of the presidential campaign. Citing Putins rehabilitation of Ivan Ilyin, a 20th-century Christian fascist philosopher, Snyder argued that there was a logic, and even a political philosophy, behind the apparent chaos of the cyber-attacks. If democratic procedures start to seem shambolic, he wrote in the New York Times, then democratic ideas will seem questionable as well. And so the US would become more like Russia, which is the general idea. If Mr Trump wins, Russia wins. But if Mr Trump loses and people doubt the outcome, Russia also wins.

A few days before the election, Snyder flew back to his native Ohio to canvass for Clinton. They assigned me literally the neighbourhood where I grew up, he recalled. I was struck by how people didnt want to have a conversation. I mean, Im an introvert, but I was a harmless-looking white guy, and I had a lot of trouble getting people out to talk. When he got home, he told Shore that Trump was going to win Ohio. Still, he thought Clinton would prevail overall. I think there was a certain amount of white naivete, he says.

Tim always kind of believed in America more than I did, Shore says. Hes not used to being wrong, like really wrong. And he really didnt think Trump was going to win. When I told the kids the next morning, my daughter, who was four at the time, said, Maybe Daddy forgot to tell someone to vote for Hillary Clinton.

Snyder was stunned by Trumps victory, but it also provided the immediate impetus for On Tyranny. Flying home from Sweden after the election, he started writing a list of lessons for thwarting tyranny on an aeroplane napkin. The list included advice such as Do not obey in advance and Defend institutions. He posted it on Facebook when he got home, and the post went viral. Snyders editor told him they could publish it as a short book if he added some context to each lesson. The result which saw Snyders plain declarative sentences become plain imperative exhortations that drew from the history of European political terror more closely resembles a samizdat manifesto than one of his heavy historical volumes. Thanks to its urgency and its brevity, the book became a totem for Americans horrified by their new president. On Tyranny sold more than half a million copies during Trumps term of office, and spent nearly two years in total on the New York Times bestseller list.

The exaltation of Snyder among centre-left liberals prompted an equal and opposite reaction within certain quarters of the American left. For these critics, Snyders portentous analogies and breathless warnings smacked of historical naivete and ideological convenience. To imply that Trump was a Hitler in waiting was not only to overlook the native horrors that American politics had conjured in the past it was also to neglect the ways that a bipartisan programme of neoliberalism had created the conditions that led to Trumps election. Writing in August 2017, Samuel Moyn and David Priestland, historians at Yale and Oxford, criticised the views that democracy is under siege and totalitarianism is making a comeback as forms of hysterical and counterproductive tyrannophobia, a barely veiled shot at Snyder. The sky is not falling and no lights are flashing red, they wrote.

It is not hard to guess why On Tyranny became a target for leftists annoyed with efforts to draft them into an anti-Trump popular front. The 2016 election witnessed the first serious resurgence of socialism in the US in half a century, and many on the left were not in a mood to make nice with the mainstream liberals who had failed to stop Trump at the polls. Yet Snyder was never a neoliberal triumphalist. Nor was he complacent about the USs failures. I honestly think this is just something people want to be true, because it would be comfortable if true, he told me. In previous writings, he had denounced free-market fundamentalism, and in the epilogue of On Tyranny itself, Snyder wrote that the danger of Trump was that he would usher the US from a naive and flawed sort of democratic republic to a confused and cynical sort of fascist oligarchy. What Snyder hoped for was something different from either option a renewal, as he would put it in his next book, The Road to Unfreedom that no one can foresee.

Snyder admits that when he wrote On Tyranny, he did not sufficiently account for the ways in which Trump was a familiar type in American history: My take was that this was new and dangerous. I was probably a little bit wrong about the new part. But he says he was correct about the extent to which people would tell themselves, Americas exceptional and nothing bad can happen here. Throughout Trumps presidency, he continued to warn that Trump would try to hold on to power unlawfully, and in the essay he published a few days after the siege of the US Capitol, he didnt pass up the chance for a moment of self-congratulation. It was clear to me in October that Trumps behavior presaged a coup, he wrote, and I said so in print.

Even Moyn, who calls his colleague an extraordinarily gifted human being, doesnt dispute Snyders right to claim prescience. In their 2017 op-ed, he and Priestland had asserted that there is no real evidence that Mr Trump wants to seize power unconstitutionally, and there is no reason to think he could succeed. Moyn told me he still holds that view today, even after the 6 January siege. I dont believe that democracy was ever on the brink, he said. Yet he also acknowledged that It almost doesnt matter for me to say I dont think it provided that vindication, because everyone else thought it did. In the popular mind, he conceded, Snyder won the debate about Trump.

Right up until the attack came, Snyder was still unsure whether to expect another Russian invasion of Ukraine. There wasnt a propaganda rollout the way there had been in 2014, he says. My normal intuitions come out of Russian propaganda, and they were starving me. In late February, he was in New Haven, teaching two courses at Yale plus a third, on freedom, at a prison in central Connecticut. After the war began, on 24 February, he and Shore cancelled the family holiday theyd been planning. It didnt feel morally right, he said.

Jason Stanley told me that the war was not abstract to Snyder: One always has to remember that. These are his friends. Tim takes friendship extremely seriously. These are people hes known for decades. Yet it is also true that the war represents a stark illustration of the themes that have shaped Snyders work over the past three decades. Most obviously, Ukraines surprisingly successful defence efforts offer an instance of the sort of geopolitical agency that he has, in his work, tried to restore to the historiography of eastern Europe. Putins war has also provoked crucial questions about Ukrainian nationhood and the Ukrainian state, of precisely the kind that Snyder has spent his career investigating. And while Snyder predicted that the outcome will be decided by material factors humanitarian support, debt forgiveness, weapon deliveries he also sees the war as a fight about ideas. To Snyder, Putins repeated claims about the spiritual unity of Russian and Ukrainian nations are not mere propaganda meant to obscure a hard-nosed strategic calculation. They are part of a deeply held neo-imperial vision that Putin has cobbled together from his reading of Ilyin, from Soviet history, and from a more general sense of Russian greatness.

This emphasis on ideas has led Snyder to be criticised by some in the realist school of international relations. Emma Ashford, a senior fellow at the Stimson Center, a thinktank, counts herself an admirer of Snyders historical work, but she also says that his understanding of world affairs is almost indelibly shaped by what he thinks are the big important ideas, whereas I would say that Russias invasion of Ukraine was motivated as much by trying to prop up its falling security in the region. The dispute is not academic. If you believe, as Ashford does, that Russia is motivated by strategic fears, then every additional degree of western involvement risks exacerbating the original causes of the war and prolonging the conflict. By contrast, if you believe with Snyder that the wars roots lie in Putins fascist worldview, then victory on the battlefield becomes imperative. A lot of smart people have said it before me, but fascism was never discredited. It was only defeated, he says. The Russians have to be defeated, just like the Germans were defeated.

In 2004, as protests against corruption and electoral fraud were building into what would become the Orange Revolution, Snyder wrote that Ukraine today is the test for Europe. Nearly two decades later, it seems clear that he sees the war in Ukraine as a test not only of Europe and the US, but of himself. After he returned from Kyiv last autumn, he was asked to become an ambassador for United24, a crowdfunding effort that Zelenskiy had launched in the early days of the war. The campaigns organisers suggested that he might want to raise funds for the reconstruction of a library in Chernihiv, which had been destroyed by Russian shelling early on in the war.

I thought about that, Snyder says. I knew the library. I knew Chernihiv. I was there in September, and Id seen the ruins. It would have been a perfectly natural thing for me, as a historian, to do. No ones going to say, Oh, youre doing something wrong by raising money for the library. But Snyder didnt want to decide based on what felt politically correct or easiest for him personally. Instead, he asked his Ukrainian friends what would be most useful. They all said, Drones. The historians said, Drones. The humanists said, Drones. The peace activists said, Drones.

I asked Snyder whether hed have done the same had his friends in Kyiv said that an offensive weapon was needed a battle tank, say? No, Snyder said. You got me there. The anti-drone system was a weapon, he acknowledged. But its a weapon meant to save civilian lives at a time when Russia was openly threatening to take out the infrastructure, and to try to starve and freeze out as many people as they could. You cant stop that by rebuilding a library. You cant stop a drone by political correctness. But if they had said, Would you help us fund a tank? I would have said no. I think that probably just shows the limit of my willingness to take hits. It would probably be OK to raise money for a tank.

Even with the drone catcher, Snyder says, I knew, 100%, that people were going to say, Look at him. Hes an activist. Hes raising money for a government. He was thinking particularly of his critics in Germany, whose version of being a public intellectual is criticising other people for being public intellectuals. Snyder raised more than $1.2m for the anti-drone system in under three months. The criticism came as expected, and he says it only confirmed to him that he had made the right choice.

In Thinking the Twentieth Century, a book that Snyder helped the historian Tony Judt compose before he died in 2010, Judt argued that contemporary public intellectuals faced a choice between writing thoughtfully for a small audience or becoming what he called a media intellectual: This means targeting your interests and remarks to the steadily shrinking attention span of TV debates, blogs, tweets, and the like. These were alternatives, not complements, Judt insisted. It is not at all obvious to me that you can do both without sacrificing the quality of your contribution.

Not everyone would agree that Snyder has fully escaped the horns of Judts dilemma, but so far he has managed enough of what he calls professional hygiene to avoid too much cross-contamination. The Ukraine course he taught at Yale and on YouTube might fairly be described as pro-Ukrainian, in the sense that it offered a thoroughgoing rebuttal of Putins assertion that Ukraine is not a real country. But the millennium-long story it told was complex and surprising, nothing at all like the pithy, almost propagandistic appeals Snyder was writing on Substack.

Snyder says he feels no philosophical tension between his work as a historian and his advocacy. He also tends to downplay any concern about any potential effects of the war on his own reputation. Still, in tying himself so completely to the Ukrainian self-defence effort, he has put himself on the line in a way that is rare for a public intellectual of his stature. Wars are messy, after all, even wars that offer what he calls an unusual amount of moral clarity. And the questions that Ukraine will soon need to confront how to end the war, how to rebuild the country in its aftermath will probably need answers that cannot be provided by uncomplicated appeals to basic values.

Sviatoslav Vakarchuk, the Ukrainian musician, said of his friend, Some people think hes a romantic. I would say, hes not a romantic, hes an idealist. The distinction seems apt. Snyder is not Christopher Hitchens: he doesnt long for the existential thrill of whistling artillery and crossfire overhead. I certainly dont feel like the Ukraine war is a fulfilment of my destiny, or anything like that, he told me. Yet his faith in the power of ideas has an important corollary: an idea that costs you nothing is worth exactly what you paid for it. As he put it, during our last conversation in New Haven, good ideas arent real unless youre willing to do some little thing to act on them.

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Putin, Trump, Ukraine: how Timothy Snyder became the leading interpreter of our dark times - The Guardian

Ukraine war: More than 220,000 Russian troops and mercenaries killed or injured since start of invasion, UK defence sec says – Sky News

By Deborah Haynes, Security and Defence Editor @haynesdeborah

Wednesday 29 March 2023 14:15, UK

More than 220,000 Russian troops and mercenaries have been killed or injured in Ukraine, according to the latest US assessment, Britain's defence secretary has revealed.

Ben Wallace also confirmed the first British tanks have arrived in Ukraine but said there is "still quite some considerable amounts of training to go" before Ukrainian forces are ready to use them in battle.

The UK has given 14 Challenger 2 main battle tanks to Ukraine.

They are set to operate alongside German Marder infantry fighting vehicles within a brigade or a battlegroup that is being assembled to combine different weapons to punch through entrenched Russian lines.

"At the same time their (Ukrainian military) leadership needs to exercise and train in fighting at brigade or a battlegroup level - fight in the NATO manner or the western way," Mr Wallace said, speaking at a press conference with his Swedish counterpart in London.

"That's quite important. I can't speculate on when, where or how the [Ukrainian] offensive may happen but I think it is no secret that Ukraine is keen to start the process of rolling back Russian forces in the conflict."

Russia warns Sweden may become 'legitimate target' - follow live war updates

On a trip to London earlier this week, Ruslan Stefanchuk, the speaker of Ukraine's parliament, signalled that this moment would start soon.

"Of course, I cannot talk about any specifics regarding the counteroffensive," he said in an interview with Sky News.

"But I hope that already very soon, thanks to the help and support of our partners, Ukraine can make a substantial progress towards achieving this goal: to reach the borders of 1991 and restore our sovereignty on the temporarily occupied territories.

"And to restore peace, which so many dream about, and independence on the whole territory of Ukraine."

In February, British intelligence said Russia and its private military contractor forces had likely suffered between 175,000 to 200,000 casualties since the start of the invasion in February 2022.

They added this likely included between 40,000 and 60,000 killed.

As for Russia's prospects, the British defence secretary has now said President Vladimir Putin's troops were making "almost no progress whatsoever" and "suffering huge casualties".

"The Russian forces have some really significant and deep systemic problems at the moment in their efforts. The latest US assessments I have seen now put casualty figures over 220,0000 of dead or injured," Mr Wallace said.

Ukrainian forces have been attempting to repel a months-long push by Russian troops and Wagner mercenaries to capture the shattered city of Bakhmut in eastern Ukraine.

While a brutal killing ground for the Russians, the battle is causing heavy casualties for the Ukrainian side as well.

Read moreRussian whose daughter drew anti-war picture flees after being sentencedOlympic chiefs provide pathway for Russian to compete at Paris 2024 games

Military commanders are simultaneously preparing to launch new counteroffensives elsewhere against Russian positions in the east and the south.

It looks set to be an even harder challenge than previous offensive operations by Ukraine in the northeastern Kharkiv region and Kherson city in the south.

Ukrainian troops will need to use tanks, armoured vehicles, artillery and aircraft - all operating together - to punch through well-defended Russian lines and keep going to force without being outflanked.

"Ukraine has one goal: to restore our territorial integrity within the border when Ukraine became independent in 1991," the speaker of the Ukrainian parliament said.

"Today Ukraine is standing on the frontline of the battle for democracy, for freedom, for international principles. And this is our aim. This is our goal. And we can achieve it."

In May 2022, Ukraine collected hundreds of dead Russian soldiers and stored their bodies inside a refrigerated train in order to send them back to their families.

Ukraine's internal affairs minister Anton Garashenko said there were more than 250 dead soldiers piled on the train because Russia "is still not picking up the bodies".

Read more:
Ukraine war: More than 220,000 Russian troops and mercenaries killed or injured since start of invasion, UK defence sec says - Sky News

Ukraine calls Wimbledon’s decision to lift Russian and Belarusian players’ ban ‘immoral’ – Sky News

By Tom Gillespie, News reporter @TomGillespie1

Friday 31 March 2023 18:38, UK

Ukraine's foreign minister has branded Wimbledon's decision to allow Russian and Belarusian players to compete as "immoral".

Dmytro Kuleba urged the UK to deny the athletes visas to enter the country.

"Has Russia ceased its aggression or atrocities? No, it's just that Wimbledon decided to accommodate two accomplices in crime," said Mr Kuleba in a statement.

Russian and Belarusian players will be allowed to compete at Wimbledon in the summer after the All England Club reversed the ban it imposed last year.

Athletes from the two countries must sign declarations of neutrality and not express support for Russia's invasion of Ukraine in order to compete.

Players who receive funding from the Russian or Belarusian states, including sponsorship from state-owned or controlled companies, will remain barred.

Around 30,000 Russians 'killed or wounded' in fight for Bakhmut - follow live war updates

The same conditions will apply for the other British grass-court tournaments including Queen's in west Kensington, London.

The move reverses the decision made by the All England Club and Lawn Tennis Association (LTA) 12 months ago. The two governing bodies were heavily penalised as a result, with Wimbledon stripped of its world ranking points, meaning Wimbledon was essentially rendered an exhibition event, with players unable to earn the ranking points they do at all other official tournaments.

Meanwhile, the Lawn Tennis Association was handed a seven-figure fine and threatened with losing its tournaments.

Ian Hewitt, chairman of the All England Club, said of the move to lift the ban: "We continue to condemn totally Russia's illegal invasion and our wholehearted support remains with the people of Ukraine.

"This was an incredibly difficult decision, not taken lightly or without a great deal of consideration for those who will be impacted. It is our view that, considering all factors, these are the most appropriate arrangements for the Championships for this year.

"We are thankful for the government's support as we and our fellow tennis stakeholder bodies have navigated this complex matter and agreed on conditions we believe are workable.

"If circumstances change materially between now and the commencement of the Championships, we will consider and respond accordingly."

The threat of further sanctions against the British game was undoubtedly a major factor in the U-turn, with an LTA statement saying: "The effect on British tennis of the LTA being expelled from the tours would be very damaging and far reaching for the game in our country.

"The impact would be felt by the millions of fans that follow the sport, the grass roots of the game, including coaches and venues which rely on the events for visibility and to bring new players into the game, and of course professional British players."

Both governing bodies reiterated their disappointment with tennis' reaction to last year's ban, and Wimbledon chief executive Sally Bolton said: "We absolutely stand by the decision that we took last year in the circumstances we found ourselves in."

The tournament organisers have also updated their conditions of entry to specifically bar Russian and Belarusian flags and symbols.

Read more:Russian espionage charges against US reporter are 'ridiculous'Moscow wants to trade food for weapons with North Korea, US says

Players and their support staff will not have to expressly condemn the Russian or Belarusian authorities but must declare they are not using the tournaments as a way of supporting those governments.

The prospect of a winner from one of the two countries at Wimbledon is fairly high, with Belarusian player Aryna Sabalenka a strong performer on grass, while Russian star Daniil Medvedev has won more matches than any other player on the men's tour so far this season.

The ATP and WTA welcomed the decision, saying in a joint statement: "We are pleased that all players will have an opportunity to compete at Wimbledon and LTA events this summer.

"It has taken a collaborative effort across the sport to arrive at a workable solution which protects the fairness of the game."

There has also now been a year of players from the two countries competing around the world under a neutral flag without any instances of overt support for the conflict.

Link:
Ukraine calls Wimbledon's decision to lift Russian and Belarusian players' ban 'immoral' - Sky News

The problem with how the West is supporting Ukraine – The Atlantic

For the past four months, people around the world have witnessed the macabre process of Russian forces making repeated assaults near the Ukrainian city of Bakhmut for only the tiniest of gains. By some counts, Russia has lost about five of its soldiers for every Ukrainian soldier lostto say nothing of massive equipment losses. Although in theory a country can win a war by using its military forces to make forward assaults against an enemys forces, thats just not a smart way to fight. Military technology long ago evolved to arm both sides in conflicts with extremely lethal weaponry, and any army that tries to approach this machinery head-on is likely to suffer major, and in some cases horrific, losses.

Far more effective is to weaken your opponents forces before they get to the battlefield. You can limit what military infrastructure theyre able to build, make sure what they do build is substandard, hamper their ability to train troops to operate what they build, and hinder them from deploying their resources to the battlefield. These steps are doubly effective in that they save your own forces while degrading the other sides. Over the past two centuries, the powers that have emerged triumphant have been the ones that not only fought the enemy on the battlefield but also targeted its production and deployment systemsas the Union did by controlling the waters around the Confederacy during the Civil War and as the United States and Britain did from the air against Nazi Germany.

Eliot A. Cohen: The shortest path to peace

In light of such dynamics, the manner in which the West is supporting Ukraines war effort is deeply frustrating. Though NATO countries have a variety of systems that can target Russian forces deep behind their lines, recent aid has been overwhelmingly geared toward preparing Ukraine to make direct assaults against the Russian army. The most widely discussed forms of equipmentsuch as Leopard 2 tanks, Bradley armored personnel carriers, and even Archer long-range artilleryare not the kinds of systems that can disrupt or degrade Russian forces far behind the front lines.

In short, Ukraine is being made to fight the war the hard way, not the smart way.

Ukrainian forces have indeed been pushing back against Russia at the front. But when they have been able to create or obtain the right technology, they have also attacked Russian supply and troop-deployment chains. This approach to war was probably most evident last summer, when the Ukrainians, as soon as they gained access to HIMARS rocket launchers and other Western multiple-rocket-launcher systems, embarked on a highly effective campaign against Russian supply points from Kherson to the Donbas. They managed to wreck a logistics system that had been supplying the Russian armies with huge amounts of firepower daily.

Almost immediately the Russians had to move their large supply depots out of range of the Ukrainians new rocket launchers, keeping essential equipment much farther from the front. This has severely limited Russias operations. It can fire significantly fewer shells each day and apparently can concentrate fewer vehicles on the front. The area where the Russians can properly supply their forces for operations has shrunk.

This overall approach led the Ukrainians to one of their great successes last year: the liberation of the west bank of the Dnipro River in Kherson province. When faced with a large, relatively experienced Russian force around the city of Kherson, the Ukrainians tried two different tacks. One involved direct armed assaults against the Russian salient west of the river. These assaults achieved at best modest results. The Ukrainians were able at points to push the Russian front back a few miles, but they were never able to break the line for any major gain.

Yet, in the end, the Russian army withdrew from Kherson last fall. Why was that? Because the other tack had made its supply situation more and more tenuous: After a months-long Ukrainian campaign targeting Russian-held depots, bridges, and river crossings, Russian commanders decided that Kherson was not strategically valuable enough to be worth the effort to hold it. The attacks on Russian supplies and logistics, which sapped their ability to deploy and maintain forces, were what made the difference.

Eliot A. Cohen: Western aid to Ukraine is still not enough

The tanks and other assistance that Ukraine is currently receiving will help it attack the Russian army directlywhich appears likely in the next few months. Ukrainian troops are training for such an operation in many partner countries and in Ukraine itself. They might well end up breaking the Russian line and advancing into the gapthe Ukrainian military has proved extremely resourceful and determined so farbut any success will likely be at significant cost to Ukraines own forces.

Their task would be easier if their allies had given them a stronger capacity to attack Russians from a greater distance. They clearly want to do it. One of the most extraordinary abilities the Ukrainians have shown is developing homegrown long-range systems, often incorporating drones, to attack Russian forces many miles from the front. Yet these homegrown systems are limited. NATO states could have given Ukraine longer-range equipmentincluding a missile system known as ATACMS and advanced fixed-wing aircraftor made a massive effort to help the Ukrainians develop and improve their own ranged systems.

Unfortunately, NATO states, including the U.S., have been reluctant to provide the Ukrainians with missile systems with too long of a range, seemingly for fear of escalating tensions with Russia. Instead of allowing the Ukrainians to degrade Russian forces far from the front line, Ukraine is being prepared to attack that line. The Ukrainians fortitude and ingenuity up to this point suggest that they could indeed accomplish their taskbut its been made much harder than it needs to be.

Read more here:
The problem with how the West is supporting Ukraine - The Atlantic

Russia’s tank force is better than Ukraine’s, but mistakes tip scales – Business Insider

A Russian T-72 tank is loaded on a truck by Ukrainian soldiers outside the town of Izyum on September 24, 2022. Photo by ANATOLII STEPANOV/AFP via Getty Images

With several models of tanks to choose from, a large supply of armored vehicles, and an undeniable numbers advantage, Russia's fleet of tanks should ostensibly be decimating Ukraine's on the battlefield.

Instead, the struggling superpower has racked up error after error more than a year into the war, resulting in staggering equipment and battle losses as Ukraine attempts to even the playing field ahead of an influx of Western tanks expected to arrive in the coming months.

While the current state of the conflict a brutal stalemate in Bakhmut has not been defined by tank warfare, earlier in the war tank battles captured international attention, including when Ukraine used abandoned Russian tanks to shore up its counteroffensive in Kharkiv last year, and during Russia's failed siege of Vuhledar earlier this year, which was the site of the largest tank battle yet.

The armored vehicles' great strength on the battlefield is three-fold, according to Mark Cancian, a retired US Marine Corps colonel and a senior advisor with the Center for Strategic International Studies security program. Tanks provide mobility, firepower, and protection, Cancian told Insider, offering soldiers the luxury of moving and shooting at the same time.

But when it comes to tanks, practicality is only part of the equation. One of their key capabilities, according to Jeffrey Edmonds, a Russia expert at the Center for Naval Analyses and former US Army armor officer, is the psychological impact they have on the enemy, known as the "shock effect."

Symbolic or not, tank warfare remains a vital aspect of the ongoing war for both sides with Russia reportedly returning to storage to restock its depleted supply and Ukraine continuing its crusade for further aid.

Throughout the war, Russia has primarily relied on four different models of tanks: T-64s, T-72s, T-80s, and T-90s, with T-72s making up the bulk of their fleet thanks to years of Soviet-era production and more modern updates to the vehicles.

While each tank type has its own distinct style, Cancian and Edmonds told Insider that the vehicles are part of a similar lineage, with each generation of tank representing an updated version of the last.

As a general rule of thumb, "the newer the tank, the more capable it is," Cancian said of Russia's fleet.

But there are exceptions to the rule, the military experts said. The Russians relied on the T-72 so heavily during the Cold War that countless updates and refurbishments rendered the model's capabilities comparable or even superior to that of its direct successor, the T-80, which is generally considered less successful and reliable than the T-72 or the T-90, the latter of which is thought to be Russia's most advanced tank, Edmonds and Cancian said.

Russia's tank design is the product of lessons learned in World War II, according to Edmonds, and as a result, the vehicles tend to be smaller and lighter than Western tanks, as well as lower to the ground, which makes them harder to hit, but also less powerful in a matchup against a heavily-armored, NATO-sized vehicle.

Not accounting for wartime losses, Russia is believed to have started the conflict with an army fleet of about 3,000 tanks, according to several reports citing the International Institute for Strategic Studies nearly double the number of Ukraine's estimated 1,500-strong pre-war fleet.

Even with thousands of tanks on the battlefield, however, diversity among the vehicles has been slim, with Ukraine relying exclusively on its collection of T-64s and T-72s, the same types of tanks that Russia is using.

Enemies forced to face one another using near identical tanks is a result of the countries' shared Soviet history. When the war started, both sides were armed primarily with the same Soviet equipment. But even with the overlap, Cancian and Edmonds said the Russian versions of these tanks, in particular the T-72s, are likely more advanced than their Ukrainian counterparts, given years of updates that Ukraine never had reason to make.

On paper, Russia undoubtedly has the better specs. But the battlefield tells another story.

"The lethality of the system depends on much more than the system itself," Edmonds said of tanks. "It depends on the crew, but it also depends on how it fits into the battlefield and how it integrates with other components of combat power."

Not only has the Russian military been struggling to properly utilize its tanks, but it has also had one hell of a time trying to maintain them.

Stunning February updates from the International Institute for Strategic Studies and Oryx, an open-source intelligence analysis platform, estimated that Russia has lost about half of its operational tank fleet more than 1,500 tanks since the war began. The staggering losses reportedly hit Russia's store of T-72s and T-80s especially hard, with IISS suggesting the country's supply has been depleted by two-thirds, according to reports.

"The conventional wisdom is that the Russians aren't following their own doctrine," Cancian said. "They have not been using their tanks as part of a combined team."

A key part of effective tank warfare is using the vehicles in tandem with infantry, air support, artillery, and engineers a tactic known as combined arms, according to Cancian and Edmonds.

In one of the earliest displays of dysfunction, the Russians sent a convoy of unprotected tanks straight into an ambush in Bucha just weeks into the war. Then, earlier this year, the Russians repeated the very same mistake in Vuhledar, leading to the loss of more than 100 tanks, several of which were seen smoking and blazing in the Ukrainian snow.

Had the Russians practiced combined arms, they might have sent an infantry team ahead of the tanks to clear the terrain for incoming vehicles and scout possible attack points. But that type of cohesion takes training, and lots of it, Cancian and Edmonds said, a particular struggle among the Russians, who receive most of their training on the job.

"They clearly came into this with a lower level of tactical training than we thought," Edmonds said of the Russian military.

Cohesion among Russian soldiers is unlikely to improve as Russia sustains more than 220,000 casualties, a top UK defense official said this week, citing US intelligence. That number represents a stunning figure that has undoubtedly exacerbated already-existent personnel problems within the military.

Not only do the Russians have too few people to provide proper infantry support, the army seems to be running out of people to operate the remaining tanks. In Vuhledar earlier this year, Ukrainian troops said they captured a Russian medic who was forced to drive a tank, despite his medical background.

Russia's repeated mistakes have been costly, forcing the country to rely on older tanks they've since pulled from storage, including T-62s, T-55s, and T-54s, some of which date as far back as the 1940s.

These decade-old replacements are slower and lack the fire control of modern tanks, Edmonds said; they are generally less effective than their updated counterparts, though still have the capacity to be lethal.

Ukraine, meanwhile, has contributed to Russia's depleted supply, having captured several advanced T-72s ,T-80s, and even some T-90s from the enemy, though the country has also lost between 450-700 tanks itself, according to reports citing the IISS. The Ukrainian military seems to be better at operating their tanks on a tactical level, Edmonds said, citing the army's greater flexibility and initiative.

Following months of pleading from President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, Ukraine finally secured the promise of a long-desired tank haul from several Western countries earlier this year.

The US has pledged to send Ukraine 31 M1A1 Abrams tanks in the coming months; the UK is preparing 14 Challenger 2 tanks to send; Germany promised 14 Leopard 2 tanks; and several other European countries have also pledged to send tanks from their fleet of German-made Leopard 2s.

It's a hefty haul of Western tanks which boast better armor and fire control than the Russian T-72s, Cancian said. All three Western tank models are larger than most Russian tanks and are "quite survivable" thanks to their advanced armor, according to Edmonds.

"Those three tanks are all essentially equivalent," Cancian said, though he gave the slight edge to the American-made Abrams tanks, which have been upgraded more often than the Leopards and Challengers.

It's still unclear when the Western tanks will arrive or what role they will ultimately play in Ukraine's future offensives. Tank usage in the conflict has been minimal in recent weeks as the battle of Bakhmut an ongoing slog of attrition rages on.

"This stalemated frontline where we are right now, this is not a good environment for tanks," Cancian said. "Tanks need to break into the open."

The incoming vehicles could help shake up the current state of the war, according to Edmonds.

"Tanks were designed precisely for that," he told Insider. "To be brought in to make something staticvery fluid."

The much anticipated Ukrainian spring or summer offensive will likely be an attempt to break into the open and upset the Russians' lines, Edmonds said, a goal that would be aided by a fleet of tanks.

But the number of incoming Western tanks less than 150 is unlikely to change the tides of war. Cancian predicted that the tanks will be enough for the Ukrainians to execute "one good" attack as part of their counteroffensive.

"You just have a numbers problem. Even if they're really good, which they are, the numbers are just too small to fundamentally change tank warfare," he said.

The Russians, despite their flailing tank usage thus far, are believed to have thousands of old tanks still in storage to which they can return even, and especially, if they continue to sustain significant equipment losses.

"The Russians, like the Soviets, never threw anything away," Cancian said.

But the promise of incoming Western tanks sets the stage for possible additional equipment assistance to Ukraine in the future, Edmonds said.

"The longer this war goes on, the more effective this type of support will be," he said.

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Russia's tank force is better than Ukraine's, but mistakes tip scales - Business Insider