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In the current tense climate, Russian President Vladimir Putin knows that he has true friends in the European Union. Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbn is certainly one. On February 1, he turned up in Moscow for talks with the Russian leader, as the threat of an invasion by some 100,000 Russian troops and heavy weaponry hung over Ukraine.

The official reason for his visit was to negotiate additional volumes of natural gas, following the signing of a 15-year supply agreement with Gazprom back in September last year. The Hungarian prime minister has brushed off criticism of the trip by the opposition and insisted that he was pursing the countrys economic interests and the cause of peace.

Orbn may appear to be breaking ranks with NATO and the EU in the hope of capitalising on his special ties to the Kremlin and there may be others in Eastern Europe that are careful not to displease Moscow. But that does not necessarily mean there is weakness in the alliances Eastern flank. If anything, the ongoing regional developments demonstrate the value of NATO membership to Central and Eastern European states, including Hungary.

For one, there is no support for Moscows demand that NATO move out its troops and military assets from the region, including in Hungary. In fact, according to media reports, the Hungarian defence ministry is currently negotiating the deployment of NATO forces in the country, in response to the crisis in Ukraine.

In the rest of Central Europe, Orbns political games do not seem to have resonance. The Polish government of the Law and Justice Party, which often joins its Hungarian counterpart in challenging the EU, has been one of the most vociferous advocates of a robust NATO response to Russias brinkmanship in Ukraine, going as far as criticising Germanys reluctance to supply arms to Ukraine.

On February 1, as Orbn was heading to Moscow, Polish Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki landed in Kyiv where he promised military assistance to Ukrainians.

Romania, another country where there is no love lost for Russia, has also stood firmly in support of a strong NATO response to Russian threats. President Klaus Iohannis was calling for more American boots on the ground well before the current crisis started heating up and applaudedUS President Joe Bidens recent announcement that 8,500 US troops would be put on alert for a possible deployment along the Eastern flank.

In the three Baltic states Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia Russia is also unequivocally seen as a major threat, especially after its 2014 annexation of Crimea. For this reason, since 2016, they have been eagerly hosting a multinational NATO force an initiative known in the military diplomatic lingo as forward presence.

Still, Orbn is not alone. There are other governments in the region which are loathe to pick fights with Putin. On January 25, Croatian President Zoran Milanovi threw a bombshell with his declaration that Zagreb will not participate in a NATO military operation in Ukraine (as if one was in the works), calling it one of the most corrupt countries in the world. Prime Minister Andrej Plenkovi had to dispel the ensuing confusion with a public statement and issue an apology to the Ukrainian people.

Bulgaria is another example. In recent days, Bulgarian Defence Minister Stefan Yanev has gone out of his way to make statements against NATO deployments in the Black Sea country. In a TV interview, Yanev declared that in case of an escalation in Ukraine, Bulgaria would be protected by Bulgarian forces under Bulgarian command.

Of course, such pronouncements are only halfway sincere. For one, military bases in Bulgaria, as well as in neighbouring Romania, already host US troops for training and force projection purposes, as part of a military cooperation agreement signed with the US in 2006. And as in the Baltics, NATO allies also carry out air policing in Bulgaria. In fact, on January 21, the Dutch defence ministry announced it would send F-35 fighter jets to beef up the mission. In other words, NATO is already present militarily in Bulgaria which it sees as a front-line state.

Regardless of public pronouncements and political games of some politicians from NATOs Eastern members, the ongoing standoff around Ukraine has proven to Central and Eastern Europeans the value of NATO membership. Had it not been for the security guarantees extended by the US and its allies, the countries of the former Warsaw Pact could have faced the same predicament as Kyiv. At the minimum, they would have been more vulnerable to what scholar Mark Galeotti describes as the Kremlins heavy metal diplomacy the use of military threats to coerce neighbouring governments into making concessions.

That applies as much to the hawks in Poland, Romania and the Baltic countries as it does to the doves in Budapest and Sofia. Orbn will no doubt continue to play his complex game, trying to win favours from the Russians, but he will do so from the security of being within NATO as well as the EU. The Bulgarian cabinet may take extra care not to provoke Russia but, in the end, it still depends on the extra layer of protection the Atlantic Alliance offers for its national security.

When the chips are down, all Central and Eastern European countries will go along with the Western response to Russia, whether it is tougher sanctions or additional troop deployments on NATOs borders. Some in the region might have second thoughts about it, complain in public, or keep their head down out of fear from Russian reprisals, but the direction of travel is clear.

The views expressed in this article are the authors own and do not necessarily reflect Al Jazeeras editorial stance.

Originally posted here:
Is there a weakness in NATOs Eastern flank? - Al Jazeera English

Russias military buildup around Ukraine has triggered the most serious crisis in relations between Russia and the West since the end of the Cold War. Over 100,000 Russian troops are deployed near the border with Ukraine, poised to launch a major military assault at a moments notice. While these developments appear only to affect European security, American commentators have been quick to draw parallels to Taiwan. The similarities seem obvious. Like Ukraine, Taiwan faces an existential threat from one of Eurasias great autocratic powers, and it is also a Western-oriented democracy that the United States has an interest in keeping free from coercion. Both Ukraine and Taiwan are being framed as critical test cases of Americas willingness to uphold global norms against the use of military force to seize territory. Some observers have even gone so far as to argue that their fates will be linked: a failure to respond to military action against Ukraine would weaken American credibility and invite an attack on Taiwan by the Peoples Republic of China.

Put simply, this is lazy analysis. In the current geopolitical moment, the differences between Ukraine and Taiwan are far more important than their similarities and linking together the security threats that the two countries face can make both situations worse. The United States should not continue to divert limited resources away from the Indo-Pacific, where the military balance is shifting in Chinas favor over the next decade, to a region that is both less crucial to American interests and where the balance of power is more advantageous to Washington. U.S. prioritization, not reputation, is what really matters for Taiwans security.

Taiwan Is a Different Kind of Partner

To see why this comparison obscures more than it clarifies, first consider the history of U.S. involvement with each country. American security support for Ukraine is recent, limited, and subsumed under broader concerns about Russias challenge to the post-Cold War European security order.

In Taiwan, however, American interests run deep. Taiwan exists today as a de facto independent state only because the Truman administration intervened in June 1950 to prevent a Chinese invasion across the Taiwan Strait. Ever since, the United States has been the islands primary security partner and source of military aid, training, and arms sales. The United States also helped Taiwan transform from a poor military dictatorship into a prosperous liberal democracy: aid in the early 1950s constituted 10 percent of Taiwans gross national product, and U.S. advisers played an important role in promoting land reform and economic stabilization. Later, the United States granted Taiwanese exporters preferential access to American markets, helping to set Taiwans economy on a rapid upward trajectory that has now brought its per-capita gross domestic product level with Germanys, adjusted for purchasing power.

This long history of engagement means that Americas global reputation and influence have far more at stake in the event of a Chinese attack on Taiwan than a Russian one on Ukraine.

China Is Not Russia

Next, consider the adversaries. Russias interests, strategies, and tactics on the world stage are all fundamentally different from Chinas. As a declining power ruled by a single strongman since 2000, Russia under Vladimir Putin has had a weak hand to play. Putins aggressive foreign policy actions have been motivated primarily by the need to bolster his domestic standing, not to enhance Russian security. While he has sought to undermine existing institutions and encourage divisions within the European Union and NATO, he has mostly failed to prevent the reorientation of much of Eastern Europe away from Russia and toward the West. That we are talking about Russian threats to Kyiv, rather than Warsaw, Prague, or Budapest, is ample proof of that.

By contrast, China is a rising power, and its leaders have reason to believe that time is on their side. The Chinese economy is already the largest in the Indo-Pacific and the second largest in the world, and it has benefited immensely over the last three decades from the existing global economic and security architecture. In a stark departure from Russian behavior, Chinas moves to revise the international order have mostly involved working through existing global institutions and creating supplemental ones that it can control that is, building up rather than tearing down.

These divergent trajectories have led to fundamentally different strategies to advance their interests in the two cases. Russia has already seized and annexed Ukrainian territory in a blatant violation of international law and norms, and it has supported proxy forces fighting a conflict in eastern Ukraine that has cost over 14,000 lives, taking an enormous toll on its global reputation and national interests.

China has not done anything remotely similar to Taiwan, and the threat it poses is as much economic and diplomatic as it is military. For instance, the Peoples Liberation Army could quickly seize the vulnerable offshore islands of Kinmen and Matsu the former only 30 kilometers from downtown Xiamen if it wanted to destabilize the region and try to force concessions from Taiwan or the United States, but these territories remain under Taiwanese jurisdiction. Likewise, the Chinese militarys regular, high-profile exercises near Taiwans airspace are intended primarily to send signals to leaders in Taiwan and the United States, not seize and maintain territory or foreshadow an invasion. So far, they have also not resulted in any loss of life or direct conflict.

Instead, Chinas strategy is most notable for its reliance on non-military means to gradually shift the cross-Strait status quo. Even when faced with a Taiwan leader it does not like or trust, Beijings Taiwan policy has emphasized soft economic inducements as much as hard diplomatic and military pressure to increase influence over Taiwan. This strategy has also included a relentless, multifaceted propaganda campaign, aimed as much at the United States as the people of Taiwan. This campaign seeks to emphasize the Chinese Communist Partys preferred narrative: that Taiwan is sacred Chinese territory, that China will pay any price to achieve cross-Strait unification, and that a declining United States should back away from its commitments there, because Taiwan will always mean more to the Chinese people than to Americans.

That is a very different kind of message than Russias: It is more patient, more sophisticated, and harder to counter, and American policymakers risk playing right into it by overextending U.S. commitments in other global hotspots.

America Has Different Interests in Taiwan

The range and depth of American interests in Taiwan also dwarf those in Ukraine. Taiwan is an economic powerhouse that punches well above its weight in global commerce, and its economy is closely intertwined with the rest of East Asia and North America. In 2020, it was Americas 9th-largest trading partner, with $106 billion in two-way trade in goods and services. (Ukraine was 67th, with $3.9 billion). It is also the home of the worlds most strategically important company, TSMC, which has built a daunting lead in semiconductor technology and now accounts for more than half of global foundry revenues.

In addition, Taiwan sits in a strategically crucial location astride busy sea routes in the first island chain, with U.S. treaty allies directly to its north (Japan) and south (Philippines). Were the Peoples Liberation Army able to occupy the island, it would undermine Americas ability to defend both, and shatter the credibility of its commitments to other allies and partners in the face of Chinas growing hard power.

Taiwans continued existence as a prosperous liberal democracy also offers a compelling alternative to autocratic China: It demonstrates that democracy and free-market capitalism are suitable for a Chinese-speaking society. Taiwans people share norms and values with the West, not the Chinese Communist Party, and it is a shining success story for U.S. efforts to promote prosperity and freedom in the world. Ukraine could well be that someday, but if it does it will probably be through closer economic integration with the European Union, not its tenuous ties to the United States. For all these reasons, were Taiwan to come under control of Beijing, American interests would be impacted far more severely than in a Russian attack on Ukraine.

America Doesnt Need to Fight Russia in Ukraine to Save Taiwan from China

The most dubious claim to come out of the comparison between Ukraine and Taiwan is about the need to uphold American credibility. Many of the same critics who asserted that Bidens withdrawal from Afghanistan would encourage Chinese adventurism are now advocating for intervention in Ukraine for the very same reason. But that argument rests on a false premise: that the credibility of U.S. commitments in the Taiwan Strait depends on what it does half a world away, against a different adversary, presenting a different kind of threat, to a different coalition of U.S. partners and allies.

In reality, it is American prioritization, rather than reputation, that matters most for Taiwans security. Diverting resources and attention away from the Indo-Pacific to meet a lesser threat will not help reassure allies and partners in the region where the United States will face its greatest security challenges over the next decade.

It is therefore reassuring that Biden administration officials appear to recognize the differences. As National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan noted in a recent interview, the U.S. commitments to Taiwan are

rooted in the One China policy, the Taiwan Relations Act, the three communiques. And the Taiwan Relations Act is a unique instrument we dont have it with other countries; we dont have it with Ukraine that does talk about American commitments to support Taiwan in various ways.

The Biden administrations recent steps to respond to Chinese pressure from arms sales to bilateral trade discussions to the invitation of Taiwans representative to Bidens inauguration ultimately attract much more attention in both Beijing and Taipei than how Washington responds to the crisis in Ukraine.

It would help both Taiwan and Ukraine if more of Americas foreign policy commentators would also notice the difference, and stop linking their fates together.

Kharis Templeman is a research fellow at the Hoover Institution, where he manages the Project on Taiwan in the Indo-Pacific Region. A leading expert on Taiwan politics, he is a member of the U.S.-Taiwan Next Generation Working Group and was previously a National Asia Research Program fellow at the National Bureau of Asian Research.

Image: 81st Stryker Brigade Combat Team (Photo by Staff Sgt. David Carnahan)

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Taiwan Is Not Ukraine: Stop Linking Their Fates Together - War on the Rocks

It seems most everyone is staring at satellite photos of Russias border with Ukraine. But theyd do well to study insurance tables as well. Business in Ukraine is becoming more and more difficult to insure. Indeed, underwriters are staying away from the country. And without insurance, theres no business. Even without sending a single soldier across the border, Russia could make Ukraines economy tank.

In London, the Joint War Committee (JWC) meets every quarter. Andrew Moulton serves as the committees chair; Neil Roberts is its secretary; and its members include Richard Young and Edward Carpenter. If a crisis erupts, as happens with some frequency, the JWC convenes an extraordinary meeting. As things stand, the committee could convene such a meeting to discuss Ukraine very soon.

Never heard of Moulton or the other members of the JWC? Thats because the committee is an insurance outfit, composed of executives from maritime insurers and underwriters such as Lloyds Market Association, Ascot Underwriting, and Beazley Furlonge.

It seems most everyone is staring at satellite photos of Russias border with Ukraine. But theyd do well to study insurance tables as well. Business in Ukraine is becoming more and more difficult to insure. Indeed, underwriters are staying away from the country. And without insurance, theres no business. Even without sending a single soldier across the border, Russia could make Ukraines economy tank.

In London, the Joint War Committee (JWC) meets every quarter. Andrew Moulton serves as the committees chair; Neil Roberts is its secretary; and its members include Richard Young and Edward Carpenter. If a crisis erupts, as happens with some frequency, the JWC convenes an extraordinary meeting. As things stand, the committee could convene such a meeting to discuss Ukraine very soon.

Never heard of Moulton or the other members of the JWC? Thats because the committee is an insurance outfit, composed of executives from maritime insurers and underwriters such as Lloyds Market Association, Ascot Underwriting, and Beazley Furlonge.

And how insurers and underwriters judge a country, region, or thoroughfare matters a great deal. After Irans Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps seized the Swedish-owned Stena Impero oil tanker in the Strait of Hormuz in July 2019, the JWC added the strait to its list of high-risk locations, which meant that vessels still wishing to sail through the strategic thoroughfare had to alert their insurers.

Insurers willing to accept the risk unsurprisingly jacked up premiums. At the moment, were looking at Ukraine, committee secretary Roberts told me last week. So far, there have been no seizures or attacks on commercial ships. Were not about to inflame the situation by declaring Ukraine an enhanced-risk area. But were definitely keeping an eye on it.

For the JWC, keeping an eye on Ukraine means assessing the risk to civilian vessels in the Black Sea, through which the country receivesand exportsvast amounts of goods. Last year, for example, the Black Sea port of Pivdennyi (also known as Yuzhnyi) processed nearly 53.5 million tons of cargo, more than 45 million tons of which was arriving from, or going to, other countries. While Russia is Ukraines largest trading partner, followed by Germany, Ukraine sells and buys goods from all over the world.

These days, risks facing freighters include not just seizures but interference with the ships radar. Such interference, which shows the ship as being in a different location, confuses crews and can cause collisions. Radars and online maps also show the ship in a false location, which can be useful for a country that wants to sow chaos.

Such interference is already taking place, and some of it appears to be Russias doing. Ships have been shown on radar as making mysterious circles off the coast of California when they were, in fact, on the other side of the globe. An investigation by Lloyds List Intelligence, a maritime intelligence firm, found that the Stena Impero had likely fallen victim to Iranian GPS spoofing. And on several occasions, civilian ships traveling in the Black Sea have encountered mysterious GPS troubles that showed the vessels being in a different part of the Black Sea or even on land.

In 2017, for example, the master of a ship whose GPS suddenly placed it in the wrong part of the Black Sea reported to the U.S. Coast Guard Navigation Center that all ships in the area (more than 20 ships) have the same problem. Analysts concluded the ships may simply have been convenient targets for a Russian test of GPS spoofing.

Should cargo ships in the Black Sea be targeted by GPS spoofing as part of a Russian campaign against Ukraine, Roberts said, it could cause them to become disoriented and collide. Its something you can weather for a while but not for a long time. If the JWC concludes that war is imminent in Ukraine and its adjacent waters, it will quickly convene and place the country in its conflict category, which also includes parts of Eritrea and Libya. As a result, the war-torn parts of those countries are shunned by maritime businesses.

Commenting on Ukraine, Roberts said: Nobody is really sure if its bluff, and were not here to increase the tensions. But if a war begins, Ukraine will be moved to the conflict category. That would mean that even companies wanting to bring goods to and from the countrys ports would struggle to find an insurerand without insurance, business is far too dangerous. In Western countries, its also illegal.

Political risk insurerswhich insure losses caused by political eventshave already made that decision. When Laura Burns, a senior vice president at the insurance broker WTW, and her team recently canvassed the 60 insurers that have in recent years been willing to insure business operations in Ukraine, they found that only three are now willing to take the risk. And even they are circumspect. Theyll look at the companys nationality, Burns told me. Is it American? German? Russian? And theyll look at the sort of equipment the company would need to bring out of the country in case of violence. Insurers also look at what sorts of goods the company has in the country and whether they risk being confiscated or looted in case of war.

In the past few years, insurance rates for Ukraineexcept the Donbass, which insurers unsurprisingly stay away fromhave skyrocketed. As late as 2016, a company with, say, $10 million of exposure would pay an annual insurance premium of $55,000. Today, the premium is $250,000. And thats if you can get insurance, Burns noted.

When it comes to conflicts, insurance companies are the canaries in the coal mine. Because they pay if a company falls victim to violence or other mishaps, theyre extremely attuned to risks on the horizon. This, though, creates a front-page news syndrome, Burns said. As an underwriter, are you going to go out on a limb to defend a position when the front page suggests loss is imminent? Are you going to stick your neck out to insure risk thats all over the news? Of course people dont want to jeopardize their jobs, she said.

Indeed, as they tend to do, underwriters are already looking beyond the horizon to discern how Russias aggression might affect other countries. That means political risk insurance premiums for a country like Moldova could soon increase. We tell our clients to go to a market when there are no clouds, Burns said. She reflected on the 1990s and the first 15 years of this century. Companies went out all over the world. Now they have chess pieces in all these places and are realizing that risk levels are not what they once werein fact, that the risk levels are in some cases dramatically different. Were not in the Pax Americana era anymore.

We certainly arent. Bodies such as the JWC, and the insurers that decide what to insure and what to charge for it, are private sector outfits and have no obligation to underwrite risky business in a world thats turning more turbulent even it remains heavily globalized. Unfortunately for Ukraine, that means Russia can bring Ukrainian business to its knees without moving a single soldier across the border.

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Russia's Threats Could Scare Insurers and Destroy Ukraine's Economy - Foreign Policy

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Why is Russia's Putin so focused on Ukraine?Ukraine has become the main flashpoint in Russia's relations with the West after a series of tough statements from President Vladimir Putinand a build-up of tens of thousands of Russian troops near its border.U.S. DEPUTY SECRETARY OF STATE WENDY SHERMAN SAYING:"If Russia further invades Ukraine, there will be significant costs and consequences.U.S. PRESIDENT JOE BIDEN , SAYING:"I think what you're going to see is that Russia will be held accountable if it invades."NATO SECRETARY GENERAL, JENS STOLTENBERG, SAYING:"The risk of a conflict is real."WHITE HOUSE PRESS SECRETARY JEN PSAKI SAYING:"This is an extremely dangerous situation. We're now at a stage where Russia could at any point launch an attack in Ukraine."Here are three reasons why Putin feels so strongly about Ukraineand has chosen to bring the crisis to a head.1. HISTORYWith the 1991 break-up of the Soviet Union,Russia lost control of 14 former republics it had previously dominated,but the loss of Ukraine was the bitterest pill.Many Russians feel a connection with Ukraine that they do not feel towards other former Soviet statesThe two had been linked since the 9th centuryand speak closely related languagesPutin has said Russians and Ukrainians were one peoplewho shared a single historic and spiritual space2. GEOPOLITICSSince the Cold War ended NATO has expanded eastwardsby taking in 14 new countries, including states that were once in the Soviet Union.For Russia - this was a threatening encroachment towards its borders. RUSSIAN PRESIDENT, VLADIMIR PUTIN, SAYING:"The build-up of the United States and NATO's forces next to the Russian borders is of great concern."While Ukraine is not a NATO memberit has a promise it will eventually get to join.Since toppling a pro-Russian president in 2014, it has moved closer to the West,and staged joint military exercises with NATO.Putin says Ukraine's growing ties with the alliance could make it a launchpad for NATO missiles targeted at Russia. He wants security guarantees from the West including the rescinding of NATO's membership promise to Kyiv. 3. PUTIN'S MINDSET AND MOTIVESAs a leader who tolerates virtually no domestic opposition,Putin has a strong aversion to revolutions in neighbouring countries that could encourage protests in Russia. Ukraine is potentially threatening for Putin if it inspires Russians with a pro-Western vision.Keeping the West guessing about a possible invasion of Ukraine has put Russia high on the international agenda and forced U.S. President Joe Biden to re-engage with Putin in a video call in December. In a recent interview Putin mourned the collapse of the Soviet Union as the demise of historical Russia. Some analysts argue such statements suggest Putin sees Ukraine as unfinished businessand wants to follow the seizure of Crimea - which boosted his popularity in Russia to bring part or all of Ukraine back under Moscow's control.

Originally posted here:
Ukraine: Donetsk residents have their say on US-Russia talks

Russia has stationed about 100,000 troops near its border with Ukraine. Vladimir Putins government has issued a list of demands that Western powers are highly unlikely to meet. And President Biden said yesterday that he expected Putin to send troops over the border. But I think he will pay a serious and dear price for it, Biden added.

Todays newsletter offers a Q. and A. on the risks of war in Eastern Europe.

The overall threatening rhetoric from the Kremlin and the movement that military analysts are seeing on the ground give us a lot of ground for concern, Anton Troianovski, The Timess Moscow bureau chief, told my colleague Claire Moses. Its a very serious situation.

Secretary of State Antony Blinken and Russias foreign minister are scheduled to meet for talks tomorrow in Geneva.

1. Why is Putin threatening war with Ukraine?

The honest answer is that most diplomats and experts arent entirely sure. Its not clear what Russias central demand is, Blinken told reporters yesterday in Kyiv, Ukraines capital.

Even Putins top advisers may not know what he is trying to accomplish and how seriously he is considering an invasion, as Anton has written. The expert opinion that I can authoritatively declare is: Who the heck knows? said Fyodor Lukyanov, a Russian foreign-policy analyst who advises the Kremlin.

This murkiness allows Putin to declare the confrontation a success in multiple scenarios.

2. Why is the U.S. so alarmed?

A successful invasion would establish Russia as a dominant, expansionist power in Eastern Europe. It would make other democracies (like Taiwan) worry that they could be vulnerable to takeover by nearby authoritarian countries (like China).

3. What does Putin say his rationale is?

Perhaps the best-known statement of Putins 20-plus years as Russias dominant political figure came from an annual state-of-the-nation speech in 2005 at the Kremlin. The collapse of the Soviet Union, he said, was the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the 20th century.

Ukraine was arguably the most painful loss for Moscow. It was the most populous former Soviet republic to form its own country apart from Russia. The two now share a 1,200-mile border, and Putin often cites their deep cultural ties.

But Ukraine has drifted toward the West in recent years. The U.S. and its allies have increased military aid to Ukraine and also said albeit vaguely that Ukraine will one day join NATO.

Putin has defended the troop buildup by saying it is merely a military exercise. Russia has also released its list of demands, including a NATO pledge never to admit Ukraine and a pullback of NATO troops in Eastern Europe (effectively to where they were in the late 1990s).

Biden, responding to a question from The Timess David Sanger at a news conference yesterday, said Ukraine was unlikely to join NATO in the near term. But Biden ruled out the idea of removing NATO troops from Eastern Europe.

4. What isnt Putin saying?

Some observers believe that the troop buildup is a mixture of bluff and distraction.

A group of Russia experts including Frederick Kagan, who has advised U.S. military leaders in the past made this argument in a recent report called Strategic Misdirection. A full-scale invasion of Ukraine could be bloody and expensive, they wrote, potentially damaging Russias economy and Putins political standing.

As Kori Schake explained in The Atlantic: Half a million Ukrainians have military experience; 24 percent of respondents in one recent poll said that they would resist Russian occupation with a weapon in hand. Russia might succeed in taking Ukraine, but it is unlikely to hold it.

Another reason to be skeptical of invasion: So far, Putin does not appear to be preparing Russians to go to war. Russias deputy foreign minister continued this pattern yesterday, saying, We will not attack, strike, invade, quote unquote, whatever, Ukraine.

Putin may instead be trying to redefine what the West considers unacceptable behavior, Kagan and his co-authors argued. By making an invasion seem possible, Putin can try to win other concessions, such as a freer hand in Eastern Europe.

In the worst-case version of this scenario, the West will be congratulating itself for having avoided a Russian invasion Putin never meant to launch while Putin quietly celebrates an important nonmilitary victory that the West does not even recognize, Kagan and his colleagues wrote.

(Thomas Friedman, the Times Opinion columnist, argues that the threat of war also helps distract Russians from their economic problems.)

5. So the risk of war is low?

Not necessarily. Even skeptics like Kagan acknowledge it is possible, given the lack of transparency about Putins thinking.

A few analysts, like Melinda Haring of the Atlantic Council, believe war is the most likely outcome: Putin has lost patience with Ukraine, she has written, and believes the U.S. would not go to war over it. (Biden said yesterday that a minor incursion would not necessarily pull the U.S. into the fight.) Putin also craves a historical legacy that a territorial expansion could ensure, by helping reverse the catastrophe of the Soviet collapse.

Its very hard to gauge the probability, Michael Crowley, a Times reporter who is covering Blinkens European trip, told me from Kyiv yesterday. This is going to require very creative diplomacy to resolve, if it can be resolved.

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Andr Leon Talleys approach to fashion could best be described as more. More glamour, more decadence, more delight. He evoked drama in both his personal style wearing capes and furs and his declarations. Its a famine of beauty, honey! he once proclaimed. My eyes are starving for beauty!

Talley, who died this week at 73, was a pioneering figure in fashion. Using his encyclopedic knowledge of fashion history and his quick wit, he became an editor, author, adviser and TV personality. In the 1980s, he worked his way up to creative director at Vogue, and he spent decades there in various roles.

A 1994 New Yorker profile called Talley The Only One a reference to him often being the sole high-powered Black editor in a field that is notoriously white. His influence is hard to overstate: He mentored the supermodel Naomi Campbell and helped dress Michelle Obama as first lady.

Growing up in the Jim Crow South, Talley wallpapered his bedroom with images ripped from Vogue. I went to school and to church and I did what I was told and I didnt talk much, he told Vogue in 2018. But I knew life was bigger than that. I wanted to meet Diana Vreeland and Andy Warhol and Naomi Sims and Pat Cleveland and Edie Sedgwick and Loulou de la Falaise. And I did. And I never looked back. Sanam Yar, a Morning writer

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Russia and Ukraine, Explained - The New York Times