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KYIV, Ukraine -- A Belarusian activist who ran a group in Ukraine helping Belarusians fleeing persecution was found dead in the Ukrainian capital, Kyiv, local police said Tuesday.

Vitaly Shishov, leader of the Kyiv-based Belarusian House in Ukraine, was found hanged in one of the city's parks not far from his home, police said in a statement.

A probe has been launched, with police investigating whether it was a suicide or a murder made to look like suicide, head of Ukraine's National Police Igor Klymenko told reporters on Tuesday.

Ukraine's President Volodymyr Zelenskyy is keeping a close eye on the case, according to his spokesman, Serhiy Nykyforov, while Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba promised on Twitter that Ukraine will do everything possible to fully investigate the case."

It is of utmost importance for us to reveal the truth about his tragic death, Kuleba said.

Shishov's Belarusian girlfriend, Bazhena Zholudz, told The Associated Press that she doesn't believe that he could have killed himself.

I don't believe in suicide, nothing in Vitaly's conduct signaled his intention to kill himself, she said. He didn't leave any note or message. We were together that morning and he just went out for a jog.

Zholudz added that Shishov had recently noted that he was being shadowed. He recently noted vehicles and people who were following him, she said.

The Belarusian House in Ukraine, which helps Belarusians fleeing persecution with their legal status in Ukraine, accommodation and employment, also said that Shisov was recently being followed by strangers.

It noted that both local sources and our people in Belarus have alerted the group to the possibility of various provocations, including kidnapping and liquidation.

There is no doubt that this was a planned operation by security operatives to liquidate a Belarusian, dangerous for the regime. We will continue to fight for the truth about Vitalys death, the group said.

About 300 people rallied Tuesday outside the Belarusian Embassy in Kyiv, many holding his portrait.

Belarus was rocked by months of protests, which were triggered by President Alexander Lukashenko's re-election to a sixth term in an August 2020 vote that the opposition and the West saw as rigged. He responded to demonstrations with a massive crackdown that saw more than 35,000 people arrested and thousands beaten by police

Lukashenko has vowed to continue what he called a mopping-up operation against civil society activists whom he has denounced as bandits and foreign agents," and authorities conducted hundreds of raids in recent weeks to target the independent media and non-government organizations.

Belarus authoritarian government has at times gone to extremes in its crackdown on dissent, including recently diverting a plane to the capital of Minsk and arresting a dissident aboard.

Yury Shchuchko from the Belarusian House in Ukraine told The Associated Press that Shishov was found with marks of beating on his face. Nothing was stolen, he was in regular clothes people put on to work out, and he only had his phone with him, Shchuchko said.

He also said that Shishov has previously noticed surveillance during his runs and that strangers would approach him and try to start a conversation.

We have been warned to be more careful, because a network of Belarus KGB agents is operating here and everything is possible, Shchuchko said. Vitaly asked me to take care of his loved ones, he had a weird feeling."

Klymenko of the Ukrainian national police told reporters on Tuesday that there were indeed injuries discovered on Shishov's body scratched skin on his nose, a cut on his lip and an injury on his left knee. He wouldn't say, however, whether these resulted from violence. Klymenko added that police haven't received any complaints about surveillance from Shishov.

Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya, the main opposition candidate in the August 2020 election who left for Lithuania under pressure from the authorities, expressed condolences to Shishov's family on Tuesday.

Belarusians can't be safe even abroad, as long as there are those who are trying to inflict revenge on them, Tsikhnaouskaya said in an online statement.

Vitaly Shishov was helping Belarusians and was found hanged ... It happened on another country's soil. Just like the hostage-taking took place on another country's plane. Just like the attempt to forcefully bring a disloyal athlete back to Belarus from another country's territory, she said.

Earlier this week, Belarus Olympic sprinter Krystsina Tsimanouskaya accused the country's officials of hustling her to the airport and trying to put her on a plane back to Belarus after she publicly criticized the management of her team at the Tokyo Games. Tsimanouskaya refused to board the plane and instead will seek refuge in Europe.

In an interview Tuesday, she told the AP she feared she wouldn't be safe in Belarus.

International officials on Tuesday urged Ukraine to conduct a thorough investigation into the death of the activist.

We are deeply shocked by the news of the death of the Belarusian activist Vitaly Shishov," Austrias Foreign Ministry said on Twitter. "Our thoughts are with his loved ones. Austria calls for a thorough and transparent investigation into the circumstances leading to his death.

U.N. spokesman Stephane Dujarric said: Were, obviously, glad to see that this is being investigated. I think his death needs to be investigated fully to elaborate all of these circumstances. And we, of course, send our condolences to his family and friends.

The U.S. Embassy in Kyiv said on Twitter that Shishov's death "takes place amid an unacceptable Belarusian crack down on civil society, and we look forward to a complete and thorough investigation by Ukrainian authorities to establish its causes and circumstances."

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Head of group for exiled Belarusians found hanged in Ukraine

Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union in November 1991, the area that extends from central Europe to Central Asia has been commonly referred to as the post-Soviet space. The label has always been problematicand 30 years after its introduction, the time to retire it has come. The term misleadingly implies a degree of political, social, and economic coherence among a diverse set of countries that includes my own, Ukraine. Even more worrying, its use encourages policymakers and publics outside this geography to see the countries within it through a single lens.

This reductive approach serves the Kremlins imperialistic aims. Russian President Vladimir Putin spares no effort to promote the false historical narrative that Ukrainians and Russians constitute one nation; his recent 5,300-word opus on the subject has reportedly become compulsory reading for the Russian military. Putin wishes to reassemble the countries of the former Soviet Union and reverse what he calls the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the twentieth century. But for millions of people across the region, the Soviet Unions collapse was not a catastrophe. It was a liberation.

Immediately after 1991, a shared history did unite the countries that emerged from the Soviet Unions wreckage. But their divergent trajectories in the decades since make that common experience less and less relevant. Western countries need to stop seeing them as simply a post-Soviet space. But if this geopolitical construction is outdated, then what framework should replace it? And what changes would the shift require of the United States foreign policy and those of its allies? In the case of Ukraine, above all, recognizing the new reality means institutionalizing the countrys place within the West. It is time for the United States and Europe to set out a clear road map for Ukraine to finally join NATO and the European Union.

In the mid-1980s, Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachevs reform program of glasnost and perestroika unleashed centrifugal forces within the Soviet Union. Constituent republics made efforts to escape Moscows orbit, reclaim their national identities, and find their own paths to overcoming economic hardship. Sovereign countries before their forceful capture by the Kremlin, these nations were returning to a natural equilibrium. By 1991, to the surprise of many Western policymakers, the process was complete: the Soviet Union was dissolved, and in its place were 15 independent states.

Since then, the pace of change has varied from one country to the next. Some, such as Belarus, have slowed time and tried to hold on to their Soviet heritage; others leapt as far forward as possible, as quickly as possible. The Baltic states and the nations of the former Warsaw Pact shrugged off their Soviet pasts and took steps to integrate with NATO and the EU as early as the 1990s, completing the process by 2004right before Russian imperialism began to reemerge. Unfortunately, Ukraine and Georgia missed that historic moment. Both were left outside the door, and both later suffered Russian military attacks, at the cost of lives and territory.

Over the past two decades, Putin has attempted to restore Moscows control across the region, violating internationally recognized borders in the process. But the Kremlin has not been able to turn back the clock. By trying to bend the arc of history to his will, Putin has only strengthened the forces he aims to subdue. This dynamic became apparent after Russias 2008 invasion of Georgia, and even more so after its 2014 attack on Ukraine.

The Kremlin had been exerting pressure on Kyiv long before this incursion. Putins persistent bullying, combined with Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovychs ill-conceived decision to give in to Moscow and reverse the pro-European course of previous governments, triggered the protests in late 2013 that turned into Ukraines Revolution of Dignity. After Yanukovych ordered police to fire on the protesters, resulting in more than 100 deaths, the Ukrainian people forced him from office. Russia invaded Crimea within days. But Ukrainians already had irreversibly changed our countrys trajectory, ensuring that no government in Kyiv would ever consider treating its citizens with the heavy hand the Russian and Belarusian governments use against their citizens today.

This year marks the 30th anniversary of Ukraines independence. Millions of young Ukrainians have not lived a single day in the Soviet Union, and many of them now have children of their own. The idea of a common Soviet past, already fading among older generations, means little to them. These young people have lived through two revolutionsfirst the 2004 Orange Revolution and then the 2014 Revolution of Dignityand an ongoing war with Russia. For them, Ukraine has never gained independence; it has always been independent.

In Ukraine and elsewhere, cutting ties with Moscow will proceed no matter what Putin or his entourage has to say about it. The United States and its Western partners therefore have an opportunity to craft an ambitious strategy in the region, with specific policies tailored to the circumstances of individual countries and blocs.

In the case of Ukraine and Georgia, moving forward with NATO membership should be a top priority. As NATO itself declared in its 2008 Bucharest summit communiqu and reaffirmed in Brussels this year, this outcome is inevitable. Both countries already participate in NATO activities as Enhanced Opportunities Partners. Together with Bulgaria, Romania, and Turkey, Ukraines and Georgias contributions are critical to ensuring security in the Black Sea. Russia is growing increasingly aggressive in the region: it is disrupting trade routes and interfering with the freedom of navigation, building up its conventional and nuclear capabilities in occupied Crimea, and using the territory as a logistical hub for its military activities in the Middle East.

Beyond security cooperation, Ukraine and Georgia are committed to deepening their economic and political integration with Europe. Along with their counterpart from Moldova, the foreign ministers of the two countries established the Associated Trio in Kyiv earlier this year with the express purpose of gaining eventual EU membership. For Europe, engaging with the group is an opportunity to enhance the EUs global standing, by expanding the reach of its democratic values and strengthening its economic muscle. For the United States, this deepening cooperation will serve the Biden administrations goals of shoring up transatlantic unity and strengthening the eastern border of democratic Europe.

Western capitals also have an opportunity to make inroads in other countries where Moscow historically has held sway. Georgias neighbors in the Caucasus, Armenia and Azerbaijan, deserve special consideration. Getting these relationships right can go a long way toward enhancing trust between the West and Turkey, an important NATO ally. Russia has tried to strengthen its grip by positioning itself as a peacekeeper and mediator of the regions disputes. But the unexpected reelection of Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, a leader inclined to balance rather than give in to foreign powers, and the alliance between Azerbaijan and Turkey give the West an opening to limit Russias influence.

In Central Asia, Ukraines own experience is proof of Russias slipping control. Moscow has attempted to block Kyivs access to the region since 2014, but we have found ways to maneuver around the obstruction. Our persistent efforts to restore traditionally strong trade ties, develop infrastructure projects, engage diasporas, and provide opportunities for students to study in Ukraine are beginning to bear fruit.

Even in Belarus, democratic pressure is unlikely to fade in the long run, leaving an opening for the West despite the Kremlin-backed Alexander Lukashenkos efforts to cement his presidency.

Russia is still a strong regional power. But from Minsk in the west to Ulaanbaatar in the east, Moscow has long lost its monopoly on political influence.

No countrys geographic proximity to Russia should restrict the strategies of Washington or Brussels. After all, concerns about shared borders have not constrained China, which has cultivated deep ties with a number of countries that historically have fallen squarely into Moscows sphere of influence. At the same time, the United States and its European allies should dismiss the idea that by cooperating with the Kremlin, they can prevent a tighter Russian-Chinese partnership. Moscow already moves within Beijings orbitand is likely already wary of getting even closer to a much more powerful China.

Ukraines membership in NATO and the EU will not just reinforce progress in Ukraine; it will also help unify the West once more.

As a player in central and eastern Europe and in the Black Sea, Ukraine has much to offer as part of NATO on matters of regional security. The countrys capable armed forces have invaluable combat experience from fighting Russian troops since the 2014 invasion. No current NATO member possesses such experience or the knowledge that comes with it. And when it comes to cybersecurity and fighting disinformation, few countries rival Ukraines ability to both recognize and counter Russian tactics.

Ukraine also has a vital role to play in ensuring Europes energy independence. For decades we have been a reliable transit country for gas supplies to Europe. We plan to remain so, despite Russias attempts to bypass the Ukrainian system with projects such as the Nord Stream 2 pipeline. Ukraine offers the advantage of its unique energy infrastructure, which includes the worlds third-largest underground gas-storage facilities and 22,991 miles of pipelines. And with its huge potential for producing green hydrogen through solar and wind energy, Ukraine is well positioned to contribute to Europes green transition. Other elements of Ukraines economy show enormous promise, too, from its demonstrated capacity for digitalization to an agricultural sector with the potential to guarantee global food security.

For all the progress Ukraine has made so far, the country still needs further reform. Efforts to root out corruption fall into this category. The government has already made meaningful headway, including the implementation last month of a historic land reform lawpreviously stalled for two decadesthat will both increase transparency and boost the economy. Other crucial bills were finally passed this summer to clean up the judiciary, granting international experts a decisive vote in the process of filtering out prospective judges with dubious reputations. We are realistic about how much more there is to do to address corruption in the judicial system, the defense and security sectors, and other institutions. But the strength of the current political will is clearly evident in these brave recent steps, taken despite the enormous resistance of vested interests.

Under President Volodymyr Zelenskys leadership, Ukraine is fully committed to accelerating reform efforts in line with the expectations of its European and transatlantic partners. This is what the people of Ukraine want, and they have paid a high price defending their choice. The sweep of history, too, now appears to be on their side.

But Ukraines own efforts will not be successful without the strong support of the EU, NATO, and the two bodies member states. The steps we take must be reciprocated, with all sides working toward the goal of Ukrainian membership in both organizations. The United States and Europe must recognize that Ukraine is part of the West. Only then will our current efforts prove not to be in vain.

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Ukraine Is Part of the West - Foreign Affairs Magazine

Belarusian sprinter Krystsina Tsimanouskaya talks with police officers at Haneda international airport in Tokyo, Japan August 1, 2021. REUTERS/Issei Kato/Files

KYIV, Aug 3 (Reuters) - Ukraine is in contact with the husband of Belarusian sprinter Krystsina Tsimanouskaya, who became embroiled in a dispute with her country at the Olympic Games, after he entered Ukraine this week, Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba said on Tuesday.

Tsimanouskaya took refuge in the Polish embassy in Tokyo on Monday, a day after refusing her team's orders to board a flight home from the Olympic Games. Warsaw offered her a humanitarian vvisa. Her husband Arseni Zhdanevich travelled to Ukraine.

"We provide the necessary assistance during his stay in Ukraine and will do everything to make him feel safe, even in spite of the shocking news," Kuleba said in a tweet, apparently alluding to the death of a Belarusian activist on Tuesday.

Reporting by Matthias Williams and Natalia Zinets; Editing by Angus MacSwan

Our Standards: The Thomson Reuters Trust Principles.

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Ukraine says it will do everything to make Belarusian athlete's husband feel safe - Reuters

Efforts to bring peace to Ukraines Donbas region have been deadlocked for years. The steps the belligerents take to de-escalate violence can save lives, but people still die on the front lines and beyond. Crisis Groups new visual explainer puts these dynamics in stark relief.

The war in eastern Ukraine began in March 2014. It pits separatists backed by Russia against the Ukrainian government in two industrial regions, Donetsk and Luhansk, which are part of an area known as Donbas. The war was ugliest in its first year, when battles raged for territory and strategic position. Two peace agreements known as the Minsk agreements of 2014 and 2015 put an end to the major fighting. They also laid out a roadmap for the reabsorption of the separatist-controlled regions into Ukraine, which calls, among other things, for Kyiv to grant these areas limited self-governing status. Implementation has stalled, however, and in the meantime some 75,000 troops mostly Ukrainian citizens on both sides still face off along a 450km front that cleaves Donbas in two. Some 800,000 civilians also live in the line of fire, while several million others reside in areas ridden with mines and unexploded shells. The death toll for the conflict creeps upward nearly every week and is now over 14,000.

Crisis Groups new interactive feature, Conflict in Ukraines Donbas: A Visual Explainer, maps both military and civilian casualties and illustrates the links between ceasefires and lulls in combat. It shows that ceasefires work until they crack under the weight of deadlocked negotiations. It further shows that civilian casualties from live fire clearly correlate with intense combat in urban and suburban areas, falling to almost nil when ceasefires are in place. Civilian casualties from mines, however, do not correlate with whether or not a ceasefire is in place and have lately risen, likely due to increased foot traffic through heavily mined areas.

Taken together, the data presented by this new explainer indicate that in the absence of a durable political solution, if the parties want to honour their stated intent to limit civilian casualties, they should commit to disengagement from high-traffic areas and to comprehensive demining. Both of these steps are hard sells to field commanders, for whom holding territory generally takes precedence. But disengagement is the only way to bring casualty rates reliably down, short of the impractical exercise of relocating civilians away from danger.

Combat Kills Civilians

The geography of the Donbas war all but guarantees civilian casualties. The front, known as the line of separation or line of contact, runs right through what was once the most densely populated part of Ukraine. Its central segments curve around coal mines, coke foundries and steel plants, while the southern and northern ends cut through farmland and picturesque meadows previously used for recreation. Dotting the combat zone on either side of the front are apartment blocks and weekend homes with garden plots. Today, industries are functioning at a fraction of their former capacity. Fields lie fallow, littered with mines and shells, while fighters on both sides have taken over vacation and retirement homes. Most families with the means to do so have left.

But some have stayed. Roughly 200,000 residents remain within 5km of the line of separation on the government-controlled side, while their neighbours just over the trenches number roughly 600,000. Any exchange of fire endangers the lives and disrupts the livelihoods of large numbers of people, a significant portion of them elderly.

Crisis Groups visual explainer tracks civilian and combatant casualties, differentiating them by cause. It shows, for instance, that the vast majority roughly 80 per cent of live-fire (shelling and gunfire) civilian casualties occur in areas controlled by Russian-backed separatists. The ebb and flow of civilian casualties in these areas largely tracks with those of military casualties. The higher civilian casualty rate in non-government-controlled areas is due to the fact that these places are more urban and populous. Users of Crisis Groups map can see that these casualties are concentrated around the fronts central section near the separatist-controlled cities of Donetsk and Horlivka, but also bleed across the line into the former Donetsk suburb of Mariinka, which Ukrainian government forces hold. Horlivka and the Donetsk suburbs are fairly densely populated. The high civilian casualties there may also be related to the position of combatants: troops on both sides are posted in residential streets or very close to them.

The most recent ceasefire, which had particularly strict provisions, had the greatest effect. Commencing in July 2020, it banned combatants from initiating firefights for any reason and imposed strict limitations on return fire, as well. In the seven months that followed the agreement, combatant fatalities dropped to less than half the number in the seven months prior (82 killed by live fire between January and July 2020, and 36 between August 2020 and February 2021), while civilian deaths and injuries from live fire fell from 50 to 5 in the same period, with almost no civilians hurt from August 2020 to 30 January 2021 (two civilians suffered hearing loss due to an explosion on 12 November). As further evidence of the agreements effectiveness, in comments to Ukrainian media and to Crisis Group, front-line dwellers spoke of improved security after it was signed.

Although the visual explainer covers only the period from January 2020 to the present day, data from 2019 tells a similar story. Then, too, a ceasefire went into effect in July. Of the 56 casualties from live fire that UN monitors recorded between 16 May and 15 August 2019, all but one occurred before the ceasefire.

New Casualty Trends

The data breakdown also shows that while both civilian and combatant casualties from heavy weaponry in the past seven months remain lower than before the July 2020 ceasefire, small arms fire during this period accounts for a larger portion of casualties. The use of heavy weaponry like artillery and mortars is prohibited by the Minsk agreements and has in fact declined.

But both sides are still using these weapons on occasion, so the reduction of casualties also suggests that they have been able to better calibrate their fire using drones and other modern equipment in order to lessen collateral damage. Civilian casualties from heavy weapons declined fivefold year-on-year in the first six months of 2021, while casualties from small arms held steady. Combatant casualties from heavy weapons also fell, albeit less dramatically, even as deaths among Ukrainian government troops from small arms and sniper fire, in particular have risen from eighteen in 2020 to 24 in 2021 to date. This uptick is consistent with Crisis Group interviews and Ukrainian media reports pointing to increased activity by Russian-backed (and allegedly Russian) snipers.

Additionally, as civilian casualties from live fire have fallen in the past year, deaths and injuries from mines and unexploded ordnance have crept up: these accounted for one fourth of casualties in 2020-2021, but doubled year-on-year in the first half of 2021. Throughout the eighteen-month period, the bulk of such casualties have occurred along the banks of the Siversky Donets river, which divides the government-controlled part of the Luhansk region from the so-called Luhansk Peoples Republic. The forests through which the river runs are heavily mined but see almost no live fire. More people than usual may be tramping through the forests because economic decline associated with COVID-19 is forcing them to collect firewood for fuel. Many are also fishing in the river for sustenance. Reports also suggest that residents are smuggling food and other goods across the river, which puts them at risk, though it is not clear whether they have stepped up this activity recently or not. Meanwhile, in other areas, the drop-off in live fire may simply mean that residents feel comfortable wandering farther from home, increasing their chances of tripping mines.

That month, Russia massed troops near Ukraines border in numbers not seen since 2015, when its forces had helped wage a series of devastating battles on Ukrainian soil. It did so on the pretext of a spike in ceasefire violations at the front, although the separatists it backed were just as responsible as Ukrainian forces for the infractions.

''Increasing violence does suggest ... that when peace talks lose momentum, both parties see diminishing incentives to exercise restraint''

Moscows troop build-up was likely about geopolitical signalling rather than a prelude to a possible incursion. But if, on this occasion, violence in Donbas provided the Kremlin with a convenient, if dubious, alibi for its aggressive behaviour, it does not follow that every uptick in fighting stems from a particular sides pursuit of political goals. Increasing violence does suggest, however, that when peace talks lose momentum, both parties see diminishing incentives to exercise restraint. As a Ukrainian commander told Crisis Group in 2020, the army needs to either fight or disengage: along the Donbas front lines, troops can hold their fire for only so long in the absence of steps toward peace. Yet, as the April scare demonstrates, any escalation at the front risks handing Moscow an excuse to further threaten Kyiv.

Obstacles to Protecting Civilians

Both sides claim to be defending the lives of their Ukrainian compatriots, suggesting that they should be motivated to agree to better protect civilians. In practice, however, things are not so simple, and military calculations generally prevail over humanitarian concerns.

Separatist leaders have shown themselves more than willing to use civilian casualties for propaganda purposes. Noting that the de facto republics constituents make up the majority of live-fire casualties, they cite the numbers of dead and wounded as proof of Kyivs villainy. They have also been known to spread highly dubious reports of civilian deaths, possibly to garner greater support from their patrons in Moscow. For example, in April 2021, as Russia was deploying troops to areas bordering Ukraine, they announced that a Ukrainian drone strike had killed a five-year-old boy in a Donetsk suburb. In fact, the boy had died some 15km from the front, out of the Ukrainian drones range, possibly by setting off an unexploded shell he found in his yard. (Indeed, Crisis Group data shows that 75 per cent of incidents in which children were killed or injured by unexploded ordnance in 2020-2021 occurred in separatist-held areas, pointing to a genuine problem that de facto authorities should confront.) Meanwhile, de facto officials tend to be unwilling to admit that shooting from positions in areas like the Donetsk suburbs can provoke return fire and lead to civilian deaths. They have baulked at suggestions that they move their troops to keep locals out of the line of fire.

On the other side, public figures in government-controlled Ukraine sometimes overlook or minimise the problem of civilian casualties from live fire. Losses among civilians frequently do not make it into Ukrainian news reports, partly due to journalists lack of access to reliable sources in areas across the line; media tends to focus on the heroism of government troops. Some Ukrainians sticking up for the military imply that civilians, particularly in the separatist-controlled areas, are themselves to blame for their fate, having stubbornly remained in their homes while soldiers, as the troops defenders see it, are risking life and limb for a greater cause. Do you think we didnt have grandmothers when we went off to die? Maybe these are people, but they are not citizens, a renowned veteran told Crisis Group in 2019, while expressing frustration at President Volodymyr Zelenskyys promises to wind down combat in Donbas.

Efforts to limit civilian casualties through stricter ceasefire provisions have also triggered backlash against Ukrainian officials. In mid-2019, Kyiv proposed a ban on return fire. President Zelenskyys press secretary defended the proposal, arguing that when government troops shoot back at opponents positioned in populated areas, our people die, our Ukrainians. Opposition politicians accused Kyiv of ignoring the imperatives of fighting an invading force; high-ranking military personnel accused the press secretary of defamation, activists said she was echoing Russian propaganda and Ukraines prosecutor general summoned her for questioning on the grounds that she was assisting the enemy. The proposal was dropped for the time being, and the sides struck a more lenient agreement. But that 2019 agreement proved weaker, shorter-lived and less clearly beneficial for civilians than the one that followed in 2020, which did integrate a ban on return fire. If avoiding the issue of return fire may have short-term tactical and political benefits, the consequences of doing so deepen resentment among civilians on both sides and only make Kyivs climb toward reintegrating its lost territories steeper.

What to Do

The steps that would save lives are evident but difficult. Crisis Group has in the past recommended pursuing mutual disengagement in areas of high civilian traffic. Demining would also help. But international observers with knowledge of the negotiations say combatants are unlikely to disengage from high-traffic areas which happen to be where the worst fighting of 2014-2015 occurred, as both sides consider them strategically and symbolically significant without a comprehensive peace settlement. Nor do specialists think that either side particularly not the de facto republics will pursue demining as long as fighting continues.

As neither disengagement nor demining is likely, and neither military will move the trenches away from inhabited areas, a few Kyiv lawmakers have proposed relocating inhabitants of those areas as a way to save civilian lives. The idea has many downsides, among them its impracticability in the highly populated non-government-controlled areas. In government-controlled Ukraine, it may be more feasible, and perhaps more acceptable to the population. According to aid workers and staff at the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe ceasefire monitoring mission, more front-line dwellers are seeking to move away than in previous years. Those who stayed to be closer to loved ones on the other side of the line of separation can no longer see them anyway, due to COVID-19 restrictions, even as lockdowns have deepened the economic woes of cities and towns along the front.

''The two sides will need to decide that costs of a simmering conflict outweigh the risks of compromise''

In any case, none of these measures disengagement, demining, or relocation will bring the region the peace that it truly needs. For peace to come, the two sides will need to decide that costs of a simmering conflict outweigh the risks of compromise and an imperfect solution. Crisis Group has developed the visual explainer to illustrate the costs both sides are incurring, as well as the unpredictability and volatility of military activity at the Donbas front lines. The explainer also demonstrates that diplomacy including that aimed at ceasefires reduces the level of combat and saves lives. Breaking ceasefires, conversely, gives no one an advantage. In 2020-2021, a period during which a ceasefire was instituted and then fell apart, the two sides appear to have suffered a comparable number of deaths 146 among the separatists and 112 in the Ukrainian army. Collapsed ceasefires favour neither side; they just lead to a bloodier stalemate.

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Visualising the Dynamics of Combat and Negotiations in Donbas - Ukraine - ReliefWeb

For days, death threats and homophobic insults have been pouring into Sofiia Lapinas messaging inbox a constant reminder of the hatred she often encounters as an LGBT rights activist in Ukraine.

Members of a far-right channel on the Telegram messaging app published Lapinas phone number last month, and following a series of recent attacks on the LGBT community she is on edge. Some people have tracked down her address, too.

They photographed my balcony, the entrance to my building, and theyve been sending it all to me, she said.

Its difficult to sleep, knowing that people have declared (they are hunting) you.

Ukraine legalized gay sex in 1991, but conservative elements in the mainly Orthodox Christian nation often speak out against rights for LGBT people. Members of the far-right regularly target groups and events linked to the community.

Campaigners said homophobic abuse and violence could be increasing partly because of the growing visibility of the former Soviet nations lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender community.

Clashes broke out on Friday between police and far-right supporters outside the presidents office, where Lapinas UkrainePride organization was holding a rave to demand LGBT equality, local media reported.

The LGBT movement is becoming more powerful, more productive, more effective, said Lenny Emson, director of KyivPride, which has pushed back its annual march in the capital from June to September this year due to COVID-19.

On the other hand, the stronger we are, the bigger the backlash.

The LGBT Human Rights Nash Mir Center, which monitors anti-LGBT violence in Ukraine, recorded 24 attacks on LGBT centers and events last year, more than double the figure for 2019.

Police data shows 14 hate crimes were recorded on the grounds of sexual orientation and gender identity in 2019.

But rights organizations said the real number was likely to be much higher, partly because many victims are wary about going to the police.

The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europes Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights received reports of more than 140 incidents ranging from threats to physical attacks in Ukraine in 2019.

When such crimes are reported to police, homophobic or transphobic motives are largely ignored, instead being classified as acts of hooliganism, the Nash Mir Center said.

Ukraines Ministry of Internal Affairs, which is in charge of the police, did not immediately respond to a request for comment.

LGBT activists take part in an event to demand state support for the local LGBT community outside the Ukrainian Presidents office in Kyiv on July 30. | REUTERS

Ilyess El Kortbi, 24, was attacked in June after attending a protest outside the presidents office in Kyiv to demand a response to anti-LBGT attacks and support a draft law that would bolster protections for victims of hate crimes.

He needed hospital treatment after three unidentified people beat him up outside a cafe after insulting him.

I have a concussion I cant walk, I fall over, Im nauseous, he said by phone from a hospital in Kyiv several days after the incident.

In May, about a dozen members of a far-right group raided a screening of an LGBT film jointly organized by KyivPride, breaking windows and throwing a flare and a teargas canister into the premises, KyivPride said on Facebook.

A Kyiv police spokeswoman said criminal proceedings under the article of hooliganism had been launched over the assault on Kortbi and the film screening unrest.

Two days later, members of another far-right group stormed events organized by LGBT rights group Insight in Kyiv and the city of Odessa.

Vandals also attacked the Odessa office of another LGBT organization, LGBT Association LIGA, the groups said.

If the police had detained those attackers that tried to disrupt Insights event that day, then they wouldnt have come to our office and broken our windows, said LIGA chairman Oleg Alyokhin.

Police said they reviewed the disruption to Insights Kyiv event but found no grounds indicating that a criminal offense had been committed.

Local and international rights groups have condemned the recent spate of attacks in the country, where discrimination against gay people in the workplace was only banned in 2015.

In June, Amnesty International Ukraine described the violence as part of a targeted campaign of intimidation of feminists and LGBTI activists by groups promoting hatred.

However, Olena Shevchenko, head of Insight, said a recently proposed anti-discrimination bill could help tackle anti-LGBT crimes by giving police a specific mechanism to investigate them.

The draft law, which was submitted in May, proposes adding sexual orientation and gender identity as motives for crimes of intolerance, or hate crimes.

Similar bills were withdrawn last year after lobbying from religious groups, but Andrii Kravchuk from the Nash Mir Center said the latest effort was more promising because it was developed by the police and submitted by the cabinet.

Lapina said she did not have high hopes for justice, citing what she called the inaction of authorities.

This is activism in Ukraine, she said. Youre constantly being pursued.

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'Constantly pursued': Ukraine's LGBT activists attacked online and in the street - The Japan Times