Mediaboss Marketing

Benedict Arnold, Vidkun Quisling, Philippe Ptain: The names of famous traitors and enemy collaborators resonate through history. Now their ranks are being replenished amid the Russia-Ukraine war, even if few names have yet become infamous outside Ukraine.

Since the 1991 breakup of the Soviet Union, Ukraines history as an independent nation has seen plenty of betrayal and treason. From the start, Russian leaders who resented Ukraines break with Moscow found willing helpers in their efforts to subvert the Ukrainian state and infiltrate its national security institutions.

But who were the Ukrainians who turned against their country? Some believed in the unity of the Russian and Ukrainian people, the Kremlins centuries-old imperial narrative that found willing adherents among the colonized, just as powerful past empires found new adherents among their conquered peoples. Other Ukrainians admired Russian President Vladimir Putin, his authoritarian policies, and Russias economic successes in the first decade of his rule. Ukraines first two decades of post-Soviet existence were often so dysfunctional that some Ukrainians yearned for a heavy hand and believed in the benefit of a political and economic alliance with Moscow.

From these unpatriotic but not illegal beliefs, some Ukrainians crossed the line to actively support Russian attempts to destroy Ukraine. Some went onto the Kremlins payroll as spies, spymasters, informants, or agents of influence. Many of todays collaborators in Russian-occupied parts of Ukraine are former politicians from Ukraines pro-Russian Party of Regions, which rapidly lost support after the first Russian invasion in 2014 and was finally banned by Kyiv in February. Other Ukrainians supporting Russias destruction of their country have been linked to Putins closest Ukrainian ally, the U.S.-sanctioned oligarch Viktor Medvedchuk, who now lives in Russia but has been on the front-line of Kremlin influence operations in Ukraine since the early 2000s.

Some of Russias supporters are Ukrainian journalists who found well-paying jobs at pro-Russian media, which were often better financed by the Russian state and Kremlin-linked oligarchs than the struggling Ukrainian outlets where the journalists previously worked. That road took some of them to prominent positions as propagandists in Russia, where they now spew genocidal hate against their own people.

Still others are local and regional administrators in the occupied areas who have redirected their skills to the new regime. Finally, a more complicated issue of treason revolves around those Ukrainians in the occupied areas who have been conscriptedoften coercivelyinto Russian and Russian-controlled military units to fight against their fellow citizens.

Defining treason can be treacherousafter all, the word traitor is often used as a cudgel against political opponents or anyone deemed unpatriotic. But the notion should be obvious in a country fighting a total war for its very existence: Someone who intentionally harms their own countrys security, especially in times of war, by aiding or collaborating with the enemy. Ukrainian lawlast modified shortly after the start of Russias 2022 invasiondefines state treason expansively as intentional actions by a citizen to the detriment of Ukraines sovereignty, territorial integrity and inviolability, defense capability, and state, economic, or information security. It further defines it as joining the side of the enemy at a time of armed conflict and includes espionage as well as assistance to subversive activities. Prescribed sentences for treason start at 12 yearsand more during wartime.

Numbers are hard to come by. In July 2022, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky announced that more than 650 Ukrainian security officials were under investigation for suspected treason, including 60 collaborators working for the Russians in the occupied territories. Another source is the Ukrainian nongovernmental organization Chesno, which cooperates with Ukraines National Anti-Corruption Bureau to compile a list of alleged traitors. As of now, Chesnos list contains more than 1,200 names of Ukrainians, but the organization doesnt always apply a legal standard. The list includes people who have loudly condemned Russias 2022 invasion but equivocated about its 2014 invasion of Crimea and the Donbas. Where does political opinion end and punishable treason start? Not only Ukrainians are grappling with that question.

In truth, many of Ukraines traitors gradually and imperceptibly drifted to the other side of barricade. Some were, in fact, the product of the failure of Ukraines first leaders, mainly former Communist Party apparatchiks and so-called red directors, to create a compelling national narrative, let alone a well-governed state on the Central European or Baltic model.

Others started on their path to treason under the influence of pervasive Russian imperial propaganda in Ukraine, communicated through influential television programs and news shows, the proliferation of Russian press and books, and visiting Russian musicians and artists, whose influence was allowed to seep into the country unchecked.

Still others were alienated from their newly independent homeland through the siren song of Soviet nostalgia, which was exploited by the Kremlin and its allies in Ukraine to stymie the emergence of a unified and consolidated Ukrainian nation.

Because their work is so public, journalists are instructive examples of how these gradual shifts took place. Diana Panchenko used to work for the Ukrainian nationalist newspaper Gazeta po Ukrainske and TRK Kyiv, a television channel. But in 2015, Panchenko joined NewsOne, a new TV channel later owned by Medvedchuk. She then gradually drifted toward apologia for the Russian annexation of Crimea and amplified the alleged grievances of the Russian-directed so-called separatists in eastern Ukraine.

When Zelensky shut down Russia-linked broadcasters in 2021, including NewsOne, Panchenko waged a fervent campaign to accuse the government of censorship and defend Medvedchuk. After Russias 2022 invasion, Panchehnko became a YouTube star reporting from the Russian-occupied territories. From there, she has regularly produced manipulative documentaries justifying Russias war as an effort to supposedly protect the beleaguered residents of Ukraines Donbas region. Now based in Moscow, she claims that it was not Russia that obliterated the Ukrainian city of Mariupol, but the Ukrainian government and Mariupols defenders. She has become a modern version of Mildred Gillarsan American also known as Axis Sally who disseminated Nazi propaganda to English-language audiences by radio from Berlin and was later convicted of treason in the United States.

Another Ukrainian Axis Sally is Yulia Vityazeva, a prominent propagandist who has warned her fellow Ukrainians that the entire country awaits the same fate as that of Mariupol, where tens of thousands of civilians are estimated to have died under a hail of Russian bombs, rockets, and artillery. Vityazeva was a minor local reporter when she left her native Odesa for Russia in 2015, shortly after the first Russian invasion. She was quickly integrated into the Kremlins propaganda team by Vladimir Solovyov, one of Russias most notorious television propagandists, a supporter of Ukraines merciless destruction, and an advocate of Russian missile strikes against the West. While bashing Ukraine remains her bread and butter, Vityazeva has recently focused attention on Kazakhstan, denouncing it for not supporting Moscows war.

Some Ukrainian journalists are now cheerleading the killing of their fellow citizens. Vladimir Kornilov, a longtime Russian agent of influence, is now an almost daily guest on Russias prime-time talk shows. From these podiums, he regularly calls for Russia to be more merciless against Ukraine. In an interview on July 20, he said about Ukraine: As long as this nest of vipers exists and until we destroy it, it will generate wild ideas about acts of terrorism and sabotage.

A substantial number of traitors come from the coterie of former Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych, who was deposed in the 2013-14 Maidan Revolution and escaped to Russia. Several former members of parliament from Yanukovychs Party of Regions stand out for the venom of their commentaries. Oleh Tsaryov and Ihor Markov, for example, are frequent guests on the most widely viewed Russian prime-time programs. Tsaryov advocates the total conquest and integration of Ukraine into Russia, while Markov is best known for his fawning appraisals of Putin, whose actions Markov attributes with an epochal significance in the rebirth of the Russian Empire to its previous historical boundaries.

But the largest cohort of traitors is made up of Ukrainian collaborators in Russian-occupied Ukraine. The first generation of these turncoats became officials in Crimea and eastern Donbas, seized by Russia in 2014. Many of these collaborators came from criminal groups or were active in martial arts clubs supported with Kremlin cash.

Among the post-2022 collaborators, few were open supporters of the Kremlin or likely anticipated they would become traitors. We cant know their true motives, but it is likely that the majority of these collaborators probably concluded shortly after the invasion began that power had shifted and simply adapted to the new rulers. The best known of this fresh crop is probably Volodymyr Saldo, a former mayor of Kherson. When Russian troops occupied that city, Saldo backed the invaders, who made him acting governor of the Russian-occupied portions of the Kherson region. Recently, Saldo urged Ukrainian soldiers to surrenderspeaking in his native Ukrainian even as the occupiers he now represents are implementing a policy to eliminate the Ukrainian language and identity.

Medvedchuk, whose Ukrainian business and media empire fueled the rise of several prominent Ukrainian turncoats, has descended into obscurity in his Russian exile. After he was exchanged for Ukrainian prisoners of war in April 2022, shortly after his initial arrest in Kyiv on charges of treason, Medvedchuk gave a handful of interviews. Today he is a media nonentity, disdained by much of the Russian establishment as a political failure for not delivering Ukraine to the Kremlin. For years, he was the beneficiary of hundreds of millions of dollars from sweetheart Russian energy contracts, but he failed to build a powerful pro-Kremlin party in Ukraine even as he fed Putin false narratives about Ukrainians supposedly pro-Russian inclinations.

As the former Ukrainian president ousted by the Ukrainian parliament in the wake of the Maidan revolution, Yanukovych might have the greatest claim to be the voice of the Ukrainian opposition. Yet apart from the early days after his flight from Kyiv in 2014, Putin never deployed him as the leader of a Kremlin-aligned Ukrainian government-in-exile.

Similarly, after the 2022 invasion, Russia never sought to create anything resembling a so-called national liberation committee, a method familiar from Soviet times to prepare foreign countries for Kremlin control. Nor is there evidence of any Kremlin effort to lay the propaganda groundwork for installing a pro-Moscow government in Kyiv, despite Western intelligence reports that Russia was seeking such a scenario. All these actions indicate that Putins aim was never to control the Ukrainian state with his puppets but to destroy it altogether.

In Russias ongoing war, the traitors with the greatest impact are those infiltrating Kyivs security services. Of these spies and spymasters exposed so far, the most prominent are Andriy Klyuyev, Yanukovychs former chief of staff, and Vladimir Sivkovich, a former deputy head of the Ukrainian National Security Council, both of whom fled to Russia in 2014.

Their network has allegedly had major successes in placing agents inside Ukraines security services, some of whom helped sabotage Ukraines defense in the early phases of Russias 2022 invasion. Ukraine has identified and arrested several of these agents, including some who are believed to have given Kyiv wrong information about Russian movements and shared intelligence with Moscow that allowed Russia to quickly capture large swaths of southern Ukraine.

Ukraines traitors have played a serious role in infiltrating state structures, assisting Russia in its administration of occupied territories, and serving in Russian and Russian-controlled military units. Another important impact of these turncoats is on Russians and gullible Westerners, who see Ukrainians mouthing Kremlin narratives about Ukrainians supposedly being ruled by a Nazi cabal and yearning to be united with Russia brethren in a unitary state.

The opposite, of course, is true: Since 2014 and especially 2022, Ukraine has seen the consolidation of near total support for a sovereign, independent Ukrainian state and national identity free from Russian domination. Today, traitors and pro-Russian propagandists evoke scorn and revulsion for becoming one of the enemys instruments of war. This revulsion also drives the Ukrainian governments and civil societys ongoing efforts to document acts of treason, even by Ukrainians who have escaped abroad, in the expectation that justice will eventually be served.

Here is the original post:
Ukraine's Traitors Have a Long and Sordid History - Foreign Policy

The West Van philanthropist is trying to get ahead of a looming crisis in the animal world in Ukraine.

Daniel Fine is fixing the dogs of war.

The retired West Vancouver tech executive and founder of the Ukraine War Animals Relief Fund is recently back from his fifth trip to the war-torn country, trying desperately to get ahead of a looming crisis in the animal world.

Right from the time of Russias invasion, Fine felt compelled to go help the four-leggeds. He quickly wound up volunteering at a shelter on the Polish border, walking rescue dogs for 18 hours a day. It was in speaking with volunteers on the ground there that he was clued into the bigger picture.

Ukrainians are a pet-loving people but, eight million residentsbecame refugees in 2022. Fine said estimates are one million animals were abandoned and left to go stray, the vast majority of them not spayed or neutered. Without outside intervention, the population of feral dogs and cats is going to explode.

If you do the math on it, and weve had some data scientists take a look at it, the numbers are a little bit unbelievable. Its going to leave about 124 million pets in five years, Fine said. What Im trying to do is vaccinate, sterilize and microchip as many of these animals as fast as I can. And weve done, today, just about 7,750 of them.

When the war does end, there will be no choice but to begin culling stray animals, which Fine cant bear the thought of.

With gunfire and shelling in earshot, Fine has had to deal with the logistics of securing vaccines and veterinary supplies, kibble, and volunteers to catch dogs and bring them to vets assisting in the effort.

Its a nightmare, he said with a laugh.

With so many humanitarian crises in Ukraine and elsewhere in the world, Fine said he often feels he has to defend his efforts to help animals.

There are dozens of non-profits and NGOs with much deeper pockets mobilized to help refugees, but almost nothing available for dogs and cats, he notes. And the way Fine sees it, humans domesticated dogs thousands of years ago for our own benefit, which puts certain obligations on us today.

We owe them something, he said. Now its our turn to help.

Fine said he met one woman in Ukraine who spent six months hiding in a basement, coming outside only to fetch food from her gardenand to help take care of nine stray dogs. For some, that existencemay be hard to fathom, but Fine gets it. Caring for animals is a window into the human spirit.

She felt hopeless. But the animals are even more hopeless. They cant even help themselves. Giving that help to them gives you hope, he said.

But even for those who struggle with the concept of the mission forthe sake of the animals, its also a matter public health, Fine is quick to note. As that feral dog and cat population grows, it will inevitably result in the spread of zoonotic pathogens, most frightening among them, rabies, which kills upwards of 60,000 people per year already. Two of the vets hes working with have already been bitten by rabid cats, he said.

There is no question that venturing into a warzone is dangerous, and even Fines family members have told him hes a bit nuts.

Fine said they take calculated risks but still, there are close calls, including on the most recent trip when he wandered into an area off the beaten path only to find himself surrounded by Russian land mines poking through the surface of the soil.

Im not really frightened. I feel stupid sometimes, like I should be paying more attention, he said. Every time, I learn a little bit more.

They routinely have to cross military checkpoints, but with a frontline that shifts every day, they sometimes dont know who is in control of a given area when they arrive.

Its Russian, youre dead, right? Or theyre going to hold you for ransom he said.

Fine has seen first-hand the devastated towns and villages, the Kerson Airport in ruins, and the Ukrainian people weary of a brutal war. Just days ago, the Russians bombed a central marketplace filled with civilians, he noted.

But fine said he also seesa steely resolve in the people of Ukraine.

Theyre under a lot of stress right now. They havent been working. The economy is in tatters. They never know when drones or missiles are coming. Kids cant go to school, he said. But the Ukrainians have their heart into the game. They are super optimistic. And everyone you talk to men and women are willing to fight. Theyre into it. Theyre going to protect their country.

Fine said the most optimistic he can be is for Russias leadership to see what hes seen and realize that the war is ultimately unwinnable for them.

Its impossible to know when Russia will end its invasion or whether the Ukrainians will push them back across the borders, but Fine saidtaking care of Ukraines animals is a winnable battle and he plans to keep mustering donations.

Every time [people]donate,we can sterilize more animals. We can fix this, he said. We have a huge job ahead of us. Weve got to do hundreds of thousands more animals. Otherwise it wont be successful.

To contribute to the Ukraine War Animals Relief Fund, visit petfundr.com/campaigns/12CIU0.

brichter@nsnews.com twitter.com/brentrichter

Go here to read the rest:
What is happening with pets in Ukraine? - North Shore News

In contrast to de Klerks initiative, the State Environmental Inspectorates methodology isnt designed to tally indirect emissions like those from the displacement of Ukrainian victims of the war. Neither does it account for prospective emissions from the eventual reconstruction. Rather, for now, the draft methods will inventory emissions from only hostilities-related wildfires, damages to industrial facilities and fuel consumption by military equipment and nothing else. (The methods might be expanded in the future, for instance, to include emissions from infrastructure fires). Its the difference between making scientifically sound estimations the Initiative on GHG Accounting of Wars present domain and only collecting data that will meet a particular legal threshold and withstand the scrutiny of a judge picking them apart during a court case. The draft methods of the State Environmental Inspectorate of Ukraine are meant to fulfill the latter goal. They will, therefore, measure only those direct greenhouse gas emissions that can be calculated precisely and with what information is currently available, said Andrii Moroz, a lawyer who is advising the State Environmental Inspectorate.

For instance, wildfires from shelling often must meet criteria that ensure they arent naturally occurring. An atypically shaped blaze that follows a streak-line pattern characteristic of shelling, for instance, is a sign that it has not occurred randomly but is due to anthropogenic influence, as Savenets sometimes calls acts of war out of scientific habit. Meanwhile, the destruction of industrial property, say a pipeline or a power plant, must be formally attributed to Russian troops by official bodies like the State Emergency Service of Ukraine or the State Environmental Inspectorate of Ukraine, in order to attribute those emissions to Russia.

Alina Sokolenko, a sustainability expert who analyzes the legal questions arising from the wars environmental damages for Ukraines State Environmental Inspectorate, sums it up this way: Its not only a matter of how to measure, but [also] how to prove and how to receive compensation for these losses.

Should Ukraine go ahead with claims for greenhouse gas emissions, it would mark the first time a country seeks compensation for such damages resulting from an all-out war, Rutgers Law School professor Cymie Payne, an expert on international environmental reparations, told me. It would push our understanding of the harms of war to the environment in new directions.

The road to compensation would likely follow the usual legal procedures. First, the plaintiff Ukraine would have to show that it was injured because the defendant Russia broke the law. It would then have to show the extent and kind of harm it suffered, and also that the law is one that requires compensation.

Yes, the climate claims would be a long shot, largely because it will not be easy for the plaintiffs to establish that the greenhouse gases have caused Ukraine harm that is specific enough to be compensated. Still, Ukrainian experts point to a relevant precedent in international courts where a handful of lawsuits have resulted in the awarding of environmental damages from cross-border conflict. In the foremost of these cases, Kuwait accused Iraq of breaching the international law doctrine prohibiting unprovoked attacks when it spilled massive amounts of oil across the Kuwaiti desert during the Gulf War of the early 1990s. The United Nations Compensation Commission awarded Kuwait about $3 billion in monetary compensation just for those claims. In 2018, the International Court of Justice ruled that Nicaragua had to pay Costa Rica a few hundred thousand dollars in environmental compensation for illegally dredging a canal that damaged its wetlands.

Karen Hulme, at the University of Essex School of Law, thinks one possible, but never-before-tested path that Ukraine could take to make its claims would involve arguing that, like with Iraq, Russias invasion constitutes a breach of the prohibition on states to use unprovoked force against one another. That doctrine is enshrined in the United Nations Charter. Ukraine would need to further argue that Russia must make amends for all the resulting damage to the climate with monetary damages. Alternative arguments could claim breaches of the global climate rules tied to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, or of states duty to prevent significant transboundary environmental damage, a doctrine of international law, Hulme said. It is so far unprecedented in international law for greenhouse gas emissions to qualify as damage in such claims, she warned. And so there would be many legal hurdles to pass.

View post:
There's a Battle Over Carbon Emerging from the War in Ukraine - POLITICO

Faced with the question of Ukrainian membership at Vilnius, NATO allies agreed to decide that they will decide when they agree. In a carefully worded and fiercely negotiated summit communiqu, they pledged to extend an invitation to Ukraine when there is a consensus within the Alliance and when conditions for membership are met. This outcome is not surprising accession is not possible as long as war is raging, and allies positions on this were known beforehand. More surprising, though, at least for those of us who follow European politics, was Frances position on the matter. In 2008, France, together with Germany, resisted the U.S. push to enlarge NATO to Ukraine. This time around, the script was flipped, as Frances supportive attitude stood in contrast to greater U.S. skepticism.

Frances policy shift is recent but concrete: according to Le Monde, it was sanctified by an official decision taken by French President Emmanuel Macron on June 12 at the Elyses Conseil de Dfense. Macrons new stance caught NATO partners, as well as French analysts and maybe even some French diplomats and military officials, off guard. Their surprise is understandable, as this shift breaks with the countrys years-long position as well as some of Macrons own diplomatic initiatives from recent years.

It appears driven by a number of strategic and tactical calculations. There is a growing view that NATOs Article 5 would ensure Ukraines security, deter future Russian attacks, and embed Ukraines new military might in Western multilateral structures more affordably and effectively than relying only on the set of security guarantees currently contemplated by the Group of Seven. This new attitude toward Ukraine also reflects a more profound recalibration of the traditional French push for European strategic autonomy, which now goes through rapprochement with and support for NATOs eastern flank, as well as a new geopolitical offer to the countries situated between the EU and Russia.

Bucharest Inverted

In 2008, the George W. Bush administration had set its mind on enlarging NATO to include Ukraine and Georgia. While the idea was supported by Poland and the Baltic states, France and Germany (as well as Spain, Italy, and the Netherlands) firmly opposed it. For Paris, bringing these two countries into NATO was adding little to the alliances collective defense posture while crossing one of Moscows brightest redlines. This was an assessment shared by several Russia experts in Washington, such as the ambassador to Moscow, William Burns, and National Intelligence Council Russia director Fiona Hill.

More generally, France still hoped for Europes security architecture to be built with, rather than against, Russia. The divergences with the Bush administrations more confrontational approach had surfaced even before the Bucharest summit. French President Jacques Chiracs diplomatic advisor recalls in his memoirs that in 2006, when France floated the idea of guaranteeing Ukraines security and neutrality through the NATO-Russia Council, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice replied vehemently: There you go again! You [the French] have already tried to block the first wave of enlargement, you will not block the second! The inchoate French proposal died there since, as Chiracs advisor remarked again, no NATO ally would have supported a project that could be perceived as hostile to Washington.

In the end, the Bucharest summit gave birth to fateful compromise: membership was promised but not granted enough to trigger a reaction from Russia but not enough to protect these countries from that reaction. Subsequently, Frances policies toward the region were characterized by a simultaneous refusal to be drawn into a geopolitical competition with Russia over the post-Soviet space and a refusal to accept Russias actions in that region that violate international law.

New Thinking

The full-scale invasion launched by Russia against in Ukraine in February 2022 has changed many things, including Frances policy toward the region. Macron has abandoned the diplomatic outreach to Russia he launched in 2019. France is also delivering heavy weapons to Ukraine and offered crucial support to its European Union membership bid in June 2022. But accession to NATO was, until recently, a bridge too far. In December 2022, Macron was still depicting it as more of a problem than a solution.

What changed? Four overlapping factors seem most significant.

First, Russias conduct of the war may well have brought French defense and foreign policy makers to the conclusion that NATO membership is the best way to ensure Ukraines security in the long term and prevent future aggression from destabilizing Europe. While Moscow has launched a brazen invasion on which it continues to double down, it has been cautious to avoid potential military encounters with NATO. As the French president emphasized at the Vilnius summit, only the alliances Article 5 seems to be keeping Russia in check. For French officials, the efficiency of NATOs deterrence has in fact been reaffirmed over the past 18 months and it should be extended to Ukraine at some point. French policy makers also seem to hope that providing Ukraine a clear path to membership would show the Wests determination and discourage Moscow from thinking that time is on its side.

Another goal, as Macron recently hinted, is to embed Ukraines new military might in Western multilateral structures. Ukraine is a very different country than it was in 2008. Back then, the Ukrainian military was poorly trained, badly equipped, and infiltrated by many Russian operatives. Only 20 percent of the Ukrainian population wanted to join NATO in 2008, while now the figure is above 80 percent. Thanks to the weapons and training provided by the West and the combat experience gained in defending itself, Ukraine is likely to emerge as a major military power in Europe. As such, it could become an asset and a net security provider for NATO according to the French foreign minister.

But postwar Ukraine will also have to go through a painful process of reconstruction, at a time when weapons and combat experience would be widespread and internal political conflicts likely to reemerge. The military is likely to retain significant influence, particularly if the risk of new hostilities remains high. In that context, embedding Ukraine into NATO structures might be regarded as a safety valve against instability or radicalization and a way to shape its strategic and military course.

The third factor in French thinking is that NATO membership might ultimately be less costly economically, politically, and strategically for France and Europe than the other options. In the absence of NATO membership, the West would be forced to finance the Ukrainian military for years in order to ensure that it can defend itself against potential future Russian aggressions. This so-called Israeli model would heavily weigh on the French and European economies and industries, especially with Ukraines accession to the European Union on the horizon. Berlins pledge to give over 12 billion euros ($13.1 billion) by 2032 gives a sense of the task ahead. This effort, added to the cost of Ukraines reconstruction and the stress test that this accession will represent for the organization, may simply be too high for European states.

By contrast, a combined NATO membership appears a more cost-effective solution for European allies. For the United States, on the other hand, Ukraines NATO membership would imply a higher political and military involvement, as the credibility of Article 5 would eventually rely on the U.S. commitment to defend Ukraine. The Joseph R. Biden administration has made clear that it does not want to be entangled in a direct military confrontation with Russia, and any future Republican administration is likely to share the same redline. Thus, while Paris would prefer seeing Ukraine joining NATO before the European Union, the opposite is true for Washington.

The question of NATO membership also needs to be read in conjunction with the more immediate security commitments that the Group of Seven countries are currently formalizing with Ukraine. These guarantees are meant to lock in Western support through bilateral agreements, thereby preempting the effects of war fatigue or domestic political shifts and countering the Kremlins calculation that time is on its side. Paris regards such immediate and concrete security commitments as what Kyiv needs now to sustain its counteroffensive and war effort, as well as what will make the Ukrainian leadership able to approach negotiations from a position of strength when it chooses to enter them. Open support for NATO membership might be a way for Paris to make these guarantees more convincing to Ukraine by demonstrating that they are not a consolation prize or an alternative to a deeper partnership later on.

Macron, like Biden, remains convinced that only a negotiated settlement can ultimately end the war in a lasting manner. But disagreements linger over how promising membership now would play out in facilitating such a settlement. The United States and Germany believe that making any commitment at this stage, before a military resolution, would be counterproductive in securing effective negotiation. France, by contrast, sees a membership invitation as a card that Kyiv could use to strengthen its hand in any eventual negotiations. More generally, French policy makers also seem to hope that a clear membership perspective might prompt Moscow to reconsider its maximalist aims in Ukraine. But the opposite could also be true: it may well lead Russia to adopt an all-or-nothing perspective and dig in its heels even further.

Fourth, Macron seems to be keen to reap the diplomatic benefits from establishing France as a leader on Ukraines Euro-Atlantic integration. Paris has notably been attempting to reach out to and repair its image in Central and Eastern Europe, which has been a long-term supporter of this integration. Foreign policy elites in the region have traditionally been suspicious of Frances geopolitical agenda in Europe, as they see it as contradicting their own Atlanticist preferences. This suspicion was fed by Frances initial reservations in the 1990s about their countries accession to the European Union and NATO. Paris hopes to avoid repeating this mistake today when it comes to Ukraine and to find grounds of convergence with Central and Eastern Europe. Its probably not a coincidence that Frances newfound support for Ukraine was initially articulated in the region: by Macron at the GLOBSEC conference in Bratislava and by his former special envoy on Russia at the Lennart Meri Conference in Tallinn. If Paris considers that Ukraines Euro-Atlantic integration is a given, getting ahead of the curve wins support and helps consolidate Frances role in the European order to come.

At a time when the Biden administration and the German government are seen as the main obstacles to Ukraines NATO membership, Pariss support can be interpreted as short-term, tactical opportunism. Freed from having to actually follow through on Article 5 commitments any time soon, the French leadership is probably relieved to dodge the controversy generated by its often-caricatured diplomatic outreach to Moscow. Yet there remains a more serious long-term goal as well.

Frances broader geopolitical agenda remains focused on affirming Europe as an independent geopolitical actor and reinforcing Frances leadership. But these goals appear to require different methods in the post-Ukraine invasion world. Until recently, France was reluctant to engage in a geopolitical struggle over the post-Soviet space. But with this struggle very much here, French officials believe that Europe can no longer accept any grey zones between the European Union and Russia. This was reflected in Macrons proposal to set up the European Political Community last year. The war has also prompted both increased European demands for U.S. strategic protection and a strategic awakening across the continent. In this regard, building a European pillar within NATO appears indispensable in the short term to strengthen European capabilities and leadership.

The evolution of the French position on Ukraine also aligns with a longer process of French engagement within NATO. Since its return to the Integrated Military Command in 2009, and especially since the first Russian invasion of Ukraine, Paris has aimed to change its image within the alliance. From the contributions to the European Forward Presence in the Baltic states and air policing over Poland to the rapid deployment of 500 combat-ready troops in Romania as part of the NATO Response Force effort, France wants to highlight its role as an active and reliable ally on the Eastern flank. According to Macron, Vladimir Putin has awoken the trans-Atlantic alliance with the worst of electroshocks, making NATO more essential than ever to all allies in the region. In this context, France must take a leading role in one of the most defining debates for the future of NATO and European security.

Consequences for European Geopolitics and Trans-Atlantic Policies

Frances policy shift on Ukraine in NATO is part of a broader structural shift in its foreign policy that will affect the equilibrium on European debates over security and enlargement. After being one of the staunchest opponents to geopoliticizing the way the European Union and NATO approached their eastern and southeastern peripheries, France is now openly embracing and promoting it. In addition to supporting Kyivs NATO bid, Paris has lifted its veto on opening European Union membership talks with Albania and North Macedonia, and is being supportive toward Ukraine and Moldova as well. This marks a radical departure from Frances decades-long position on European Union enlargement. The desire to make a geopolitical offer to these countries and see the whole European continent consolidate as a bloc is maybe even more salient in Macrons push to establish the European Political Community, a new interstate diplomatic structure that conspicuously excludes Russia and Belarus.

The motives behind Frances shift may also foreshadow future trans-Atlantic and European tensions. The cost of Ukraines integration into the European Union and its reconstruction will force European leaders to make difficult political trade-offs, which will heighten frustrations over burden-sharing with the United States. The Franco-German relationship, which recently experienced a low point, has now found another point of disagreement. The French shift on Ukraine has already led to some irritation in Berlin, where it is in fact perceived as tactical and opportunistic.

Finally, France has now joined the chorus of states voicing lofty slogans in support of Ukraine, which risk becoming increasingly divorced from the reality of Western policies. Stating that Ukraine is now defending the whole of Europe might be useful or necessary in justifying the financial and military costs to domestic audiences. But, it is not necessarily true, and gives Ukraine a false impression of how far the West is willing to go on its behalf. Managing Kyivs expectations and frustrations will likely become one of the most challenging political issues for Western countries France now very much included.

Dr. David Cadieris assistant professor of international relations at the University of Groningen (Netherlands) and visiting professor at the College of Europe in Bruges. His research mainly deals with West-Russia relations, European Union member states foreign policies, Central Europe, and populism in international affairs.

Martin Quencezis the director of the Paris office of the German Marshall Fund of the United States, and head of its geopolitical risk and strategy program. His work focuses on trans-Atlantic security and defense cooperation, as well as French foreign policy. Image: Federal Republic of Germany

More here:
Frances Policy Shift on Ukraines NATO Membership - War On The Rocks

Even as Ukraines counteroffensive pushes slowly forward, some observers are calling for the warring sides to negotiate a ceasefire. This would create a de facto demarcation line separating areas held by Ukrainian forces from those under Russian control at the moment the fighting stops.

Others argue, however, that a ceasefire is unlikely to lead to a durable settlement. For Ukraine, a truce would mean giving its adversary time to regain strength for renewed aggression, while abandoning its citizens to the horrors of occupation in Russian-controlled areas.

Establishing a provisional line of separation would break up long-established administrative and economic structures. This would indefinitely prevent the divided regions from rebuilding and restoring their inhabitants security and welfare.

To understand this, lets look back at how Soviet leaders drew the border between Russia and Ukraine. It was this border that Ukraine inherited in 1991 after the dissolution of the Soviet Union .

And it was this border that Russian president Vladimir Putin denounced on the eve of Russias full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, declaring that modern Ukraine was a historical mistake arising from early Soviet border-making policy.

Map 1. Ukraine in 1991:

As research has shown, Russian and Ukrainian communists who in 1919 mapped out the border between Ukraine and Russia took as their starting point the former Russian empires provincial boundaries. These had evolved haphazardly over centuries and reflected neither the geographical distribution of Ukrainian- and Russian-speakers nor economic considerations, such as transport links, the location of industries or flows of goods to markets.

Over the next decade, Moscow repeatedly moved the border with the aim of shaping a Ukrainian Soviet Republic that, while retaining a majority Ukrainian-speaking population, could also build a strong and sustainable economy. This meant drawing borders to facilitate rational planning and the integrated development of industry and agriculture.

In some cases, the Soviet authorities involved local officials and residents in border-making. Regional interests, however, were always subordinated to the needs of the Soviet economy and the imperative of maintaining central political control.

Map 2: Ukrainian borders between 1917 and 1938

For example, the districts of Shakhty and Taganrog were initially incorporated in the Ukrainian Soviet Republic as they had a majority of Ukrainian speakers. In 1924, however, they were transferred to the Russian Soviet Federative Republic (RSFSR) for economic reasons.

By contrast, Putivl district had been allocated in 1919 to the RSFSR, as most of its population was Russian-speaking. Despite this, in 1926 the district was integrated into Soviet Ukraine after Ukrainian officials and local residents made the case that its markets and transport links were within that republic.

In 1954 Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev transferred the Crimean peninsula to Ukraine. However, this was not a gift, as commonly reported, and even less an exceptionally remarkable act of fraternal aid on the part of the Russian people, arising from its generosity and its unlimited trust and love of Ukrainians, as Soviet politicians at the time declared.

Rather, as recent analysis shows, it was a strategic decision with multiple motives. Khrushchev aimed to reinforce central Soviet control over Ukraine by incorporating Crimeas large ethnic Russian population, after a decade of Ukrainian nationalist insurgency in the newly annexed western regions.

At the same time, Khrushchev hoped the transfer would win him the support of Ukrainian communist elites, bolstering his bid for supreme power in the factional struggle that erupted after Stalins death in 1953.

Construction of a vast irrigation system unifying Crimea and southern Ukraine was already under way, to be fed with water from the Kakhovka reservoir on the Dnipro river via the North Crimean canal. For the purposes of planning and carrying out this mega-project, only completed in the mid-1970s, the transfer of Crimea to Ukraine also made economic sense.

Border-making across the Soviet Union attempted similarly to balance many different, often competing, criteria. Where these borders were drawn to a large extent determined the subsequent course of Soviet history and, since 1991, has shaped the internal development and external relations of states and societies across post-Soviet space.

In February 2022 Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, seeking to revise the post-1991 border settlement. By that summer its army had occupied large parts of the four eastern Ukrainian regions of Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson and Zaporizhzhia.

In September, on the Kremlins orders, Russian-installed leaders of these regions organised a series of plebiscites. These asked residents in occupied areas if they wished their region to become part of the Russian Federation.

Voting took place watched by armed soldiers and counting was unmonitored. The polls denounced by UN officials as illegal unsurprisingly yielded vast majorities in favour of joining Russia.

On September 30 2022, Putin declared Russias annexation of these regions. Four days later the Russian state Duma ratified this.

However, even at the moment of annexation large parts of these territories remained under Ukrainian control or were threatened with imminent recapture. In November, the Ukrainian army liberated the city of Kherson. Its 2023 counteroffensive is now slowly but steadily taking back land in several areas of the annexed regions.

Where, then, does Russia intend to draw its new state borders? In September 2022, Putins spokesman Dmitry Peskov refused to give any answer to this.

He reiterated only that Russia had recognised the independence of the Luhansk and Donetsk Peoples Republics within the Ukrainian regional borders that had existed before the declaration of these Russian proxy administrations in 2014.

This implied that Russia envisaged incorporating these regions in their entirety. He said nothing about Kherson and Zaporizhzhia.

A ceasefire along a Korea-style demarcation line would fracture the unified territory that Ukraine inherited in 1991. Over and above the political, strategic, legal and moral objections to an armistice that entrenches territorial partition, this outcome would cause intractable economic problems.

Whether a truce held a few months or many years, it would continue to prevent external investment in the divided regions, draining state resources and preventing vital reconstruction. A stopgap solution without a permanent settlement a peace treaty will only create conditions for further suffering and future conflict.

Visit link:
Ukraine war: why a ceasefire based on partition of territory won't work - The Conversation