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At the end of last year, former Ukrainian president Petro Poroshenko (June 2014May 2019) announced in an interview that, back in 2018, he had initiated a special operation to detain mercenaries belonging to the notorious Russian private military company (PMC) Wagner Group (News.ru, December 31, 2020)a shadowy paramilitary outfit allegedly culpable in war crimes committed in Ukraine, Syria, Libya and Sub-Saharan Africa. Poroshenko additionally accused Ukraines current ruling elites of sabotaging the operation last summer and promised to pursue the matter until all traitors have been punished. This highly controversial episode established a dangerous new precedent with potentially far-reaching repercussions for Ukraine.

The story Poroshenko was referring to first came to light on July 29, 2020, when Belarusian law enforcement detained 33 men near Minsk (Tut.by August 7, 2020). The local authorities claimed that the groupapparently all Wagner mercenariesarrived in Belarus to take part in igniting mass anti-governmental provocations ahead of the approaching presidential elections (August 9, with early voting August 48). Despite the seriousness of the accusations and vigorous protestation of the Ukrainian government, which demanded the arrested individuals extradition, almost all members of the group were soon sent back to Russia. In time, however, the story developed further, revealing new details and stunning claims. Specifically, Ukrainian sources alleged that the detention of the Wagner militants in Belarus was, in effect, part of a failed special operation that sought to trick the mercenaries into arriving in Kyiv, where the group was to have been apprehended and brought to justice (News.ru, October 12, 2020). According to Ukraine, at least 9 out of the 33 men were Ukrainian citizens, and all of them allegedly took part in hostilities in southeastern Ukraine. Kyiv accused some of them of, among other crimes, shooting down (on July 17, 2014) Malaysia Airlines Flight 17, which resulted in 298 fatalities. Interestingly, while official Russian information sources either remained silent or shrugged off these charges, one Russian conservative writer who had himself volunteered to fight in Ukraine, Zakhar Prilepin, openly admitted that there are two or three fighters [among the detained Wagner members] from my battalion (Ura.news, July 29, 2020).

The incident triggered an acute political fracas inside Ukraine, particularly after Minsk handed 32 of the mercenaries (one had Belarusian citizenship) over to Moscow on August 14. Rival Ukrainian political factions began to accuse one another of treason and/or of spreading disinformation. Two main claims emerged from this infighting in Kyiv.

According to the firstprimarily expressed by representatives of the current Ukrainian ruling elitethe entire narrative regarding the detention of the Wagner members in Belarus was nothing more than Russian disinformation aimed at compromising Ukraine. Denying the basis of the story entirely, President Volodymyr Zelenskyy harshly criticized those who spread disinformation [] about some sort of a special operation (NV, January 5). Zelenskyys statement echoed earlier disavowals by Andriy Yermak, the head of the Presidential Administration, who, in mid-August, suggested that the failed Wagner kidnap theory had been concocted by forces within Ukraine eager to derail the ceasefire in the Donbas region. Likewise, Kirill Budanov, the chief of the Main Directorate of Intelligence of the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense (HUR MOU), claimed that no special operation was taking place since it would have been impossible to trick Wagner fighters to come to Belarus without Russias knowledge (NV, August 19, 2020).

This refutation, however, met with staunch opposition from a number of authoritative Ukrainian and foreign experts. For instance, Christo Grozev, of the open-source investigative team Bellingcat, contended that, according to unearthed evidence, the Ukrainian intelligence services came up with a brilliant plan to upstage Russian military intelligence, the Federal Security Service (FSB) and the Wagner Group, but that this plan was derailed by the Ukrainian authorities. In his comment, Grozev characterized the alleged actions of the Ukrainian ruling circles as either treason or [driven by] political fear (Censor.net, December 22, 2020).

An even harsher assessment came from a renowned military journalist and the editor-in-chief of the information outlet Censor.net, Yurii Butusov, who de facto openly accused members of the Presidential Administration (Andriy Yermak and others) of treasonous behavior and sabotaging a special operation as a means to avoid tensions with Moscow (NV, August 19, 2020). Butusov claimed that Yermak is not the only person keenly interested in normalizing Russian ties, whatever the cost might be. According to the Censor.net editor, the National Security and Defense Councils First Deputy Secretary Ruslan Demchenkoa political figure tolerated by Poroshenko and promoted by Zelenskyyhas been playing a largely destructive role, remaining a direct threat to Ukrainian national security. With these remarks, Butusov implicitly accused Zelenskyy (not just his inner circle) of treachery against the state (Censor.net, August 18, 2020).

That said, the publicly available information on the purported foiled special operation lacks key details needed to confirm it; although some more recent developments have raised additional suspicions. For example, following the outbreak of the scandal, Zelenskyy without explanation denied a motion of the then-head of the HUR MOU, Vasyl Burbareportedly, in charge of the special operationto administer polygraph tests to Yermak and others who claimed knowledge of the failed Wagner capture scheme. On top of that, Burba was fired soon afterwards by presidential decree. Similarly, according to some Ukrainian sources, the aforementioned special operation collapsed due to the fact that the date of the final stage was changed by Zelenskyy, which allowed the Belarusian special cervices to apprehend the mercenaries on their territory to later hand them over to Moscow (Plus.obozrevatel.com, October 11, 2020).

Irrespective of whether the reported failed special operation is true or not, the scandal carries serious consequences. With respect to Belarus, this incidentas well as post-election domestic developments in generalclearly demonstrated the extent of President Alyaksandr Lukashenkas current dependency on Russia. Yet it is Ukraine that has attracted most of the negative consequences of the Wagner fighters arrest just outside Minsk. Specifically, the affair spotlighted two important issues. First, the dueling charges and denials underscored the intolerably high level of internal division within Ukraines ruling elite, where conflicting factions are eager to use all means necessaryeven reveal purported state secretsto hurt their opponents, with little consideration of the repercussions for national security. Second, if the alleged special operation was, indeed, derailed because of treasonous actions of some policymakers (as certain experts have argued), then this shows that Moscows penetration of the statewhich facilitated Russias hybrid annexation of Crimea and separatist war in southeastern Ukrainehas still not been effectively dealt with by Ukrainian counter-intelligence since 2014.

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The 'Wagner Affair' in Belarus and Its Implications for Ukraine - Jamestown - The Jamestown Foundation

President Volodymyr Zelensky has announced that the Council for the Development of General Secondary Education will be established in Ukraine.

He said this during the forum "Education of Ukraine 2021: Strategic Goals and Priorities", an Ukrinform correspondent reports.

"A decree on the establishment of the Presidential Council for the Development of General Secondary Education will be published today," Zelensky said.

He told educators that the Ukrainian education would have a "reliable ally and lobbyist" in his person.

The President also assured that the construction of modern schools in all regions of Ukraine would be continued.

According to him, every Ukrainian school, either in a city or in a small village, should have a modern material and technical base, quality meals, Internet access, infrastructure for sports and inclusive education.

The partnership forum "Education of Ukraine 2021: Strategic Goals and Priorities" kicked off in Kyiv on February 9. The purpose of the event is to determine the strategic goals of education development during the administrative and territorial reform and decentralization of power in Ukraine, to discuss a wide range of topical issues of reforming the industry.

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Council for development of secondary education to be established in Ukraine Zelensky - Ukrinform. Ukraine and world news

SUMMARY

*Kamensk-Shakhtinskiy, Russian Federation. The Observer Mission (OM) continues to operate 24/7 at both Border Crossing Points (BCPs). The overall number of border crossings by persons decreased at both BCPs compared to the previous week. *

OPERATIONAL REMARKS

The OM is currently operating with 22 permanent international Mission members, including the Chief Observer (CO). The Mission is supported administratively by a staff member and the Chief of Fund Administration based in Vienna.

Update on COVID-19 measures

Activities have been impacted by COVID-19 and measures undertaken by the OM to ensure the safety and duty of care of its Mission members and compliance with measures set by the host country authorities. The Mission is continuing to keep the situation under review, in close contact with the OSCE Secretariat and the Chairmanship. Following the host country recommendations, the observers are adhering to social distancing. Due to the preventive measures taken by the central and regional authorities, the OM is faced with certain difficulties, but is still able to continue to fulfil its mandate without any limitations in its observation and reporting activities.

OBSERVATIONS AT THE BORDER CROSSING POINTS

Persons crossing the border

The profile of persons crossing the border can be categorized as follows:

The average number of entries/exits decreased from 7,017 to 6,932 per day at both BCPs compared to last week[1].

During the reporting period, the majority of border crossings were to the Russian Federation, with an average net flow of 176 per day for both BCPs. The Donetsk BCP continued to experience much more traffic than the Gukovo BCP.

Responding to the COVID-19 situation, the host country has closed its borders for the majority of foreigners starting from 18 March 2020. Among the exceptions of persons allowed to cross the border (which entered into force on 19 March), are Ukrainian citizens and stateless persons holding passports or identification documents proving permanent residence in certain areas of Luhansk and Donetsk regions of Ukraine. In addition, reportedly, due to the threat of the spread of COVID-19, starting from 10 April 2020, the organized passenger transport commuting between the non-government-controlled areas of Luhansk region of Ukraine and the Russian Federation was temporarily suspended and restored from 25 June.

Persons in military-style outfits

During the reporting period, the number of persons in military-style outfits crossing the border was 14, compared to eight last week; four persons crossed into the Russian Federation while another ten persons crossed into Ukraine. These individuals crossed the border on foot.

Families with a significant amount of luggage

The OTs continued to report on families, sometimes with elderly persons and/or children, crossing the border at both BCPs with a significant amount of luggage, or travelling in heavily loaded cars. During this reporting week, five families were observed crossing into the Russian Federation while one family was observed crossing into Ukraine, compared to the previous reporting period when seven families were observed crossing into the Russian Federation and two families were observed crossing into Ukraine.

**Bus connections **

Regular local and long-distance bus connections continued to operate between Ukraine (mostly from/to the Luhansk region) and the Russian Federation. During the reporting period, the OTs observed a slight decrease in the overall number of buses crossing the border at both BCPs (277 compared to 285 observed during the previous week). There were 148 buses bound for the Russian Federation and 129 bound for Ukraine.

On some occasions, the OTs noticed the bus drivers removing the itinerary signs from the windshields of their buses, while some buses did not display their route at all. The majority of long-distance buses commuting between the Luhansk region and cities in the Russian Federation had Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region.

Trucks

During the reporting period, the OTs observed a slight decrease in the overall number of trucks crossing the border at both BCPs (777 compared to 787 during the previous reporting week); 397 at the Gukovo BCP and 380 at the Donetsk BCP, 377 of these trucks crossed into the Russian Federation and 400 crossed into Ukraine. Most of the trucks observed by the OTs had Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region; however, on a daily basis, the OTs also noted trucks registered in the Russian Federation, Belarus, Lithuania and trucks with "LPR" plates.

The OTs also continued to observe tanker trucks crossing the border in both directions. During the reporting period, the OTs observed a slight increase in the overall number of tanker trucks crossing the border at both BCPs (45 compared to 35 during the previous reporting week). These trucks were observed crossing the border at both BCPs. The trucks had the words "Propane" and "Flammable" written across the tanks in either Russian or Ukrainian. The majority of tanker trucks had hazard signs, indicating that they were transporting propane or a mix of propane and butane. All trucks underwent systematic inspection by the Russian Federation officials, which could include an X-ray check. Due to the unfavourable observation position at the Gukovo BCP, the OTs continued to be unable to observe any X-ray checks.

Compared to the previous week, the total number of X-ray checks at the Donetsk BCP decreased from 135 to 103. The entire number of 103 scanned trucks (100 per cent) was bound for Ukraine.

Minivans

The OM continued to observe passenger and cargo minivans[2] crossing the border in both directions at both BCPs. The OTs observed minivans predominantly with Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region; however, the OTs also saw minivans registered in the Russian Federation. During the reporting period, the OTs observed a decrease in the overall number of minivans crossing the border at both BCPs (117 compared to 141 observed during the previous week); 63 crossed into the Russian Federation and another 54 into Ukraine.

Trains

The OTs continued to pick up the sound of trains on the railway tracks located approximately 150m south-west of the Gukovo BCP. During the reporting week, the OTs heard trains on 17 occasions; the OTs assessed that eight trains were travelling to the Russian Federation and the remaining nine trains were travelling to Ukraine (more details are provided in the sections "trends and figures at a glance" below).

Visual observation was not possible because of the line of trees located between the train tracks and the BCP.

Other observations

The majority of vehicles crossing the border had Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region or Russian Federation licence plates. A significant number of vehicles with "LPR" plates were also observed crossing the border in both directions on a daily basis. The OTs also noticed vehicles with Belarusian, Georgian and Lithuanian licence plates.

During the reporting week, the OTs at Donetsk BCP observed groups of brand-new vehicles on three separate occasions:

On 4 February at 14:53, a group of seven brand-new vehicles with no licence plates, entered the BCP from the Russian Federation and parked at the customs control area. The group consisted of four tractors type Belarus 82.1; two tractors type LOVOL FL 936H and one flatbed truck type MAZ carrying a tractor type XCMG LW 550RU. Six tractors (Belarus and LOVOL) underwent customs control procedures and left for Ukraine at 21:49. The flatbed truck crossed the border into Ukraine on 5 February at 13:00, after undergoing custom control procedures.

On 5 February at 15:47, a group of six brand-new yellow ambulances type GAZelle with no licence plates, accompanied by a white ambulance type PEUGEOT with "LPR" plates entered the BCP from the Russian Federation and parked at the customs control area. The OT noticed only a driver inside each vehicle. All the vehicles underwent customs control procedures and left for Ukraine at 18:00.

On 8 February at 13:15, a group of two brand-new white passenger buses type PAZ 320414 Vector entered the BCP from the Russian Federation and parked in the customs control area. The buses had no licence plates. Both vehicles underwent customs control procedures and left for Ukraine at 17:00.

For trends and figures at a glance covering the period from 5 January 2020 to 9 February 2021, please see the attachment here.

[1]Based on data received from the Regional Representation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation for the previous two weeks.

[2]Cargo minivans: light commercial vehicles with a maximum authorized mass of more than 3.5 t and not more than 7.5 t; with or without a trailer with a maximum mass of less than 750 kg (small cargo vehicles which correspond to driving licence C1).

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Weekly Update from the OSCE Observer Mission at Russian Checkpoints Gukovo and Donetsk based on information as of 9 February 2021 - Ukraine -...

The International Advisory Group at a meeting with Ukraine's Deputy Prime Minister Olha Stefanishyna expressed its firm intention to support Ukraine at all stages of reforming the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU), the U.S. Embassy in Ukraine has said.

"The International Advisory Group met with Deputy Prime Minister Olha Stefanishyna and pledged support for Ukraine's historic efforts to reform the Security Service through each legislative phase, including adoption and implementation," the embassy wrote on Twitter.

According to the tweet, the creation of a modern and efficient security service commensurate with Euro-Atlantic best practices and principles will benefit all Ukrainians.

The International Advisory Group consists of representatives of the EU Advisory Mission, the EU Delegation to Ukraine, the NATO Representation to Ukraine, and the U.S. Embassy in Ukraine.

On January 28, the Verkhovna Rada adopted at first reading the bill No. 3196-d introducing amendments to the law of Ukraine "On the Security Service of Ukraine" to improve organizational and legal framework in the activity of the Security Service of Ukraine.

The bill proposes to disband special units of the Security Service of Ukraine for combating organized crime and corruption.

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International Advisory Group will support Ukraine in reforming SBU U.S. Embassy - Ukrinform. Ukraine and world news

Meeting of Trilateral Minsk Contact Group, November 25, 2020 (Source: 112.international)

Kyiv is pinning its hopes on the new administration of United States President Joseph Biden to help rebalance and restart both the Normandy forum and the Minsk Contact Group (see Part One in EDM, February 4). The Minsk Contact Group operates at a level roughly equivalent to the ambassadorial, below the head of state/head of government or ministerial levels of the Normandy format. In the established modus operandi, from 2014 onward, the Normandy forum (Ukraine, Russia, Germany, France) provided guidelines for actions in the Minsk Group and held the latter accountable for implementation. Since 2020, however, Russia has frozen the Normandy forum and shifted the active negotiations into the Minsk Contact Group, where the West is unrepresented while Moscow holds three chairs (its own and those of Donetsk and Luhansk) and positions itself as a mediator (instead of party to the conflict). To counter these Russian tactics, Kyiv is turning to the Biden administration for help.

According to Ukraines ambassador to the United States, Volodymyr Yelchenko, Kyiv hopes that the new administration in Washington would directly (in its own right) join the negotiations in both the Normandy and the Minsk formats (Ukrinform, January 22). Ukraines deputy prime minister and minister for reintegrating the occupied territories, Oleksiy Reznikov, considers it feasible that US representatives should join the moderators of the Minsk Contact Groups sectoral working groups (of which those on security and on political affairs are of paramount importance). The United States along with the United Kingdom could join these negotiations based on certain obligations under the [1994] Budapest Memorandum [on security assurances to Ukraine] (Ukrinform, February 5; UkraineAlert, January 9). This would, however, presuppose that the Biden administration would or could reverse the predecessor Barack Obama administrations decision, in the spring of 2014, to ignore the Budapest Memorandum.

The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) is the Minsk Contact Groups overall moderator via the OSCE chairmanships representative. Sweden holds the organizations rotating chairmanship in 2021, and Poland is scheduled to follow in 2022. Both countries are Ukraine-friendly, generating some hope in Kyiv that these two consecutive chairmanships might help to counteract Russias manipulative tactics in the Minsk Contact Group. The OSCEs chairmanships, however, by definition, may not represent the views of their national governments. The chairmanships are, instead, obligated to reflect the OSCEs consensus-based positions, as negotiated internally (and non-transparently) with the veto-wielding Russia. The OSCEs chairmanships are not free even to choose the terminology of their statements, let alone make policy decisions without Moscows approval.

As the OSCEs incumbent chair, Swedish Foreign Minister Anna Lindh, explains it for Ukrainians, she must adhere to such terms as conflict in Ukraine, instead of Russian war against Ukraine, because I am chairing the OSCE, a consensus-based organization There are times when my statements as the OSCEs Chair differ from my language as foreign minister of Sweden, a member country of the European Union. But such are the OSCEs realities (Ukraiynska Pravda, January 20).

That principle applies also to the Minsk Contact Groups overall moderator, who is appointed by the OSCEs chair as its Special Representative, subject to Russias consent. As the OSCE plays the mediators role between Kyiv and Donetsk-Luhansk, so the Minsk Groups moderator must be even-handed between them. The holder of that position since 2020, Ambassador Heidi Grau of Switzerland, has become a participant in the Normandy forums meetings (currently downgraded to the political advisors levelsee Part One in EDM, February 4); she took part in the January 12 meeting most recently (President.gov.ua, January 12).

That change signifies yet another tactical success for Moscow. Its representative to the Normandy forum, Dmitry Kozak, had demanded, in mid-2020, that representatives of Donetsk and Luhansk be allowed to participate in Normandy meetings in order to bring their views there. Kozaks gambitunder the threat, moreover, to abandon the Normandy process altogetherwas a bluff designed to elicit less than he demanded but still a net gain for Russia (see EDM, August 5, 2020). Germany and France agreed to allow the Minsk Groups overall moderator to participate in Normandy meetings after Kozak insisted that the moderator must bring the views of all Minsk Group participants (i.e., Donetsk-Luhansks views also) into the Normandy forum. This comes in addition to Moscow already fronting for Donetsk-Luhansk in the Normandy forum. According to Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, We closely consult with Donetsk and Luhansk ahead of every Normandy meeting (TASS, January 18).

Russias seizure of Crimea is an issue that the Normandy forum has excluded from its agenda from 2014 to date. Kyivs attempts to introduce that issue have been turned down by the other three participants: Russia deems that issue non-negotiable while Germany and France would not clutter the agenda with an issue that could impede progress toward conflict-resolution in Donbas (even as Russia itself blocked that process; whereas adding Crimea to the agenda could have provided some counter-leverage to Russia on Donbas). No international forum is currently mandated to discuss Crimea. Accordingly, Kyiv seeks to create an international Crimean Platform that could address Russias seizure of the territory, appropriate sanctions for continuing unlawful actions, uphold Ukraines legal titles to the peninsula, and put forth possible redress measures.

In his recent interview with the US media outlet Axios, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy stated, I asked my partners and Russia: Name the platform where Crimea is on the agenda. Are you saying that we should give up on Crimea? As president, I cannot afford this and do not want to and will never accept this (President.gov.ua, February 1). The Normandy powers Germany and France are not embracing the idea. Zelenskyy raised this issue in his latest telephone conversation with German Chancellor Angela Merkel, according to the Ukrainian readout. The German readout, however, omitted this matter entirely (President.gov.ua, Bundeskanzlerin.de, January 15). The French ambassador in Kyiv, Etienne de Poncins, has stated that more information is needed about the actual purposes of such a platform (Interfax, February 1).

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Does the Normandy Group on the Russia-Ukraine Conflict Have a Future? (Part Two) - Jamestown - The Jamestown Foundation