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When President George W. Bush gave his mission accomplished speech on board the aircraft carrier USS Abraham Lincoln only six weeks into the Iraq War in 2003, it quickly became a cautionary tale against declaring victory in an unpredictable war. Washington didnt withdraw most of its forces until eight years later, and the pullout resembled defeat much more than victory.

When President George W. Bush gave his mission accomplished speech on board the aircraft carrier USS Abraham Lincoln only six weeks into the Iraq War in 2003, it quickly became a cautionary tale against declaring victory in an unpredictable war. Washington didnt withdraw most of its forces until eight years later, and the pullout resembled defeat much more than victory.

Twenty years later in Ukraine, the risk is not declaring victory prematurelybut not defining victory at all.

For more than a year now, Ukraines Western supporters have provided it with the weapons, munitions, funds, and political support to push back Russian invading forces. With this help, Ukraine has been able to regain about half the territory Russia has occupied since Feb. 24, 2022. It is a remarkable and undeniable success.

But Ukraines supporters have shied away from defining the outcome they aim to achieve with their aid. Is it for Ukraine to liberate its entire territory, including Crimea, by military force? Is it to push Russia back to the line that existed before Feb. 24, 2022, restoring a status quo ante that leaves Russia in control of Crimea and the Donbas? Is it to enable another Ukrainian push on the battlefield, followed by a cease-fire and negotiations that somehowthough it is unclear howinduce Russia to withdraw from Ukraine?

Western ambiguityleaving open what victory meansmade sense in the early phase of the war. With a wide range of possible outcomes, ambiguity allowed for a flexible framing of victory and defeat: Even if Russia were successful on the battlefield, its success could still be framed as an overall strategic defeat that isolates it in the eyes of the world. Ambiguity was also a useful way to avoid telegraphing any limitations of Western support to Moscow or demoralizing Ukrainian forces with unattainable goals or timelines. Hence the frequent Western talking point of supporting Kyiv with whatever it takes for as long as it takeswhich sounds forceful enough, until you ask what it is.

In the second year, the situation is much less uncertain. Although Ukraine is still targeted by Russian missiles and frontline battles remain unimaginably brutal, the potential trajectories of this war have narrowed. Kyiv will not fall, and Ukraine will not be overrun by the Russian army. Ukraine is also unlikely to lose the territory it has already liberated, as Russias unsuccessful winter offensive made clear. But even if there is greater clarity about battlefield contingencies, there is still no strategic clarity about what victory means.

Western publics are getting contradictory signals from their leaders on this question. Most often, Western officials say it is up to the Ukrainians to define what victory means. In reality, however, the most important factor for achieving victory is the type, quantity, and arrival date of Western weapons and munitions in Ukraine, which gives the West a major influence on the outcome. And whenever Ukraine brings up its own definition of victorya return to Ukraines lawful 1991 borders, including Crimea, by force, if necessarymany Western leaders (apart from Central and Eastern Europeans) refuse to wholly commit to this outcome, presumably out of concern that a fight over Crimea, which Russia illegally annexed in 2014, could lead Moscow to escalate in some unpredictable way.

This creates a dangerous political vacuum in the midst of a war that has been, to a great extent, fought by narratives. If Ukraines supporters fail to benchmark victory, Russia will. If the West focuses on its own fears of escalation, the Kremlin will fan those fears with renewed threats of nuclear war. Not defining victoryand, in turn, not defining Russian defeatallows Russia to negate Ukraines successes and to frame a Ukrainian victory as unattainable. Without a clear aim, Western publics will increasingly perceive the war as a protracted, indeterminate struggle, ultimately undermining Ukraines moral high ground and the Wests own morale. Ukraine and the West therefore need to provide a benchmark for victory in this stage of the war.

Continued Western ambiguity also contributes to a polarized debate between advocates for quick negotiations and those who support a full military victory for Ukraine. The sobering reality is that neither of theseearly negotiations or complete liberationis the most probable scenario. Negotiations would very likely lead to a temporary cease-fire instead of a sustainable peace, pausing a war that Russian President Vladimir Putin can resume at any time. He has committed to subjugating Ukraine as his lifes legacy. He has enshrined into law the annexation of four regions of Ukraine. It is folly to believe that Putin will let Ukraine be. He may not have started this war primarily for domestic power purposes, but keeping Russia in a constant war-like, half-mobilized state has turned into his best chance to stay in power. Reassured by Chinese President Xi Jinping that China supports his regime and fight against the West, Putin does not need an off-ramp or exit strategy.

At the same time, the Wests willingness and ability to continue providing the current massive flow of military support to Ukraine is not indefinite. Right now, Western countries are arming Ukraine to bring it into the best possible position for a spring and summer offensive. After that, contentious negotiations in the U.S. Congress over future support for Ukraine and a U.S. presidential primary season await. Meanwhile, Europe could face another winter with high energy prices. Support for Ukraine will not stop, but the peak of Western weapons deliveries may have been reached. That means 2023 is Ukraines best chance to get as far as it can. But even under these favorable circumstances, a full military victorymeaning the liberation of all of Ukraines territoryis a tall order for this year. More likely, and perhaps the best-case scenario, is a successful breakup of the land bridge between Russia and Crimea, isolating Russian forces in the south and making their position there untenable.

To right-size both overly optimistic and overly pessimistic expectations, Ukraine and the West should benchmark an interim victory that is realistic to achieve this year. Instead of giving ambiguous answers to the question of what victory means, Western leaders should state publicly that their aim for this spring and summer is a return at least to the lines before 2022 and that they will supply Ukraine with everything needed to reach this objective. While the overall goal remains restoring Ukraines full territorial integrity, setting a clear benchmark for an interim victory would provide an anchor point for Western publics in the strategic communication of this war. It fills the discursive vacuum with a specific goal that Western publics can support and counters Russias strategy of framing Ukrainian victory as unattainable.

In NATO parlance, this interim victory should be the floor, not the ceiling. If Ukraine can advance even further, that would be a huge and welcome success. If not, the pre-2022 lines are an important preliminary milestone. It would turn back the clock to Feb. 23, 2022, and apply the weapon of futility against Russia itself. With a restoration of the status quo ante, Russian sacrifices since the start of the war would appear entirely in vain. The total loss of all territories gained at such a heavy cost may plant the seeds of doubt in the minds of Russias soldiers, public, and elites: What was this war for if we are now back to where we started? In many unsuccessful wars of the pastincluding Russias in Afghanistan and the United States in Iraqa pervasive and demoralizing sense of futility turned into a powerful enemy at home and on the battlefield. The constant dripping of doubt can wear away any great power.

Of course, a return to the pre-2022 lines is a less satisfactory outcome for Ukraine and its supporters than Russias full military defeat or negotiated withdrawal. However, it is a useful, realistic, and clear-to-communicate benchmark. Defining an interim victory this way will help bolster public support in the West and undermine Putins objectives at home. It will not be possible to say mission accomplished with this outcome. But an interim victory is better than not defining any victory at all.

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How the West Should Define Victory in Ukraine - Foreign Policy

Soldiers relax at a rehabilitation course in between tours in northeastern Ukraine. Claire Harbage/NPR hide caption

Soldiers relax at a rehabilitation course in between tours in northeastern Ukraine.

KHARKIV REGION, Ukraine Vlad is one of four soldiers in his unit who survived a tour of duty defending Bakhmut, the city in eastern Ukraine that Russia has tried to capture for months.

"Bakhmut," he says, his voice breaking. "I don't know how else to describe it other than a mass grave."

Skinny, hollow-eyed and only 21, he says he felt so hopeless that his superiors realized he was likely suffering from post-traumatic stress disorder.

A few weeks later, they sent him to northeastern Ukraine for a weeklong rehabilitation course, its exact location a military secret.

The dining hall is filled with soldiers at lunch at a rehabilitation course in northeastern Ukraine. Claire Harbage/NPR hide caption

The dining hall is filled with soldiers at lunch at a rehabilitation course in northeastern Ukraine.

In an aromatherapy room scented with eucalyptus and soundtracked with calming flute music, Vlad and about a dozen other soldiers sink into puffy chairs surrounding an indoor garden.

Some fall asleep. Others are with their wives, holding hands. Vlad sits next to his older sister, Iryna, who watches him with troubled eyes. NPR is using only the first names of the soldiers interviewed and their relatives because of privacy and security concerns.

Psychologist Maksym Bayda counsels the soldiers.

"Many can't sleep. They have nightmares," Bayda says. "There is also this enormous sense of guilt. They feel guilty about their friends who died on the front line. And because many of them have never killed a living being they sometimes even feel guilty about killing enemy soldiers. They use the word 'murder.' "

Left: Vlad and his sister Iryna walk through the hallway after visiting an aromatherapy room. Right: Soldiers and their wives or relatives relax in a salt room at a rehabilitation course in a spa in northeastern Ukraine. Claire Harbage/NPR hide caption

Left: Vlad and his sister Iryna walk through the hallway after visiting an aromatherapy room. Right: Soldiers and their wives or relatives relax in a salt room at a rehabilitation course in a spa in northeastern Ukraine.

As Russia's war on Ukraine drags on, depleting the ranks of Ukrainian troops, the country's resource-strapped military is trying to find ways to care for soldiers who survive long, brutal deployments.

A lieutenant colonel and a couple of military psychologists, worried about their exhausted troops, opened this rehabilitation program last summer in the Kharkiv region to provide a weeklong break for counseling and relaxation before soldiers return to the front line.

"We first saw the effects of post-traumatic stress disorder on our soldiers back in 2014," says the program's founder, Lt. Col. Oleksandr Vasylkovskyi, referring to the year Russia invaded Crimea and Russian proxies occupied part of the eastern region known as Donbas. "I was on the front line then, and I saw it all firsthand."

Lt. Col. Oleksandr Vasylkovskyi along with some military psychologists opened the rehabilitation program last year. Claire Harbage/NPR hide caption

Lt. Col. Oleksandr Vasylkovskyi along with some military psychologists opened the rehabilitation program last year.

Vasylkovskyi knew soldiers who killed themselves. They didn't seek help, he says, because of the stigma "that they would be seen as weak and defective."

At the same time, he says, he, too, was struggling with emotional trauma.

"I did not hide it," he says. "I temporarily quit the army in 2017 to deal with it. My family, especially my wife, encouraged me to see psychologists, and with their help I pulled through."

After Russia's full-scale invasion last February, Vasylkovskyi anticipated a mental health crisis among Ukrainian soldiers, especially the tens of thousands of new recruits.

A sign for the aromatherapy room in the spa in northeastern Ukraine. Claire Harbage/NPR hide caption

A sign for the aromatherapy room in the spa in northeastern Ukraine.

Soldiers relax in the aromatherapy room in dimmed light. Claire Harbage/NPR hide caption

Soldiers relax in the aromatherapy room in dimmed light.

In the last decade, he says, the number of psychologists in the military has increased between 40% and 50%. But even that does not meet the need. And the military, by law, is only required to pay for the treatment of physical injuries.

"I decided that I had to raise money myself to help soldiers get treatment for mental trauma," Vasylkovskyi says.

Rotary clubs in Kharkiv along with donors from Western countries came through with funding for a center to, in their words, "refresh military personnel." Vasylkovskyi drafted a short rehab program with a couple of military psychologists Bayda, a major in the Ukrainian armed forces, and Ihor Prykhodko, a professor at the National Academy of the National Guard of Ukraine.

"We do not have the luxury of completely rehabilitating soldiers psychologically in a week," Prykhodko says. "Most must return to active combat. So we try to do the best we can."

Soldiers spend time swimming in the pool during the course. Claire Harbage/NPR hide caption

Soldiers spend time swimming in the pool during the course.

Prykhodko says the team consulted with Western colleagues to design a program that includes counseling, swimming, hydromassage and meditation. And speleotherapy, which recreates certain conditions in natural caves and salt mines to treat respiratory and skin conditions.

He says the program is not only designed to heal soldiers but also show them that they're valued.

"We wanted to break completely from any vestige of the Soviet past," he says, "when the individual didn't matter. In the Soviet Union, the military cared more about propaganda than the health of individual soldiers. We want to remind soldiers that we care about them as people about their health, their feelings, their lives."

A fitness instructor leads soldiers in a class that helps strengthen their backs. Claire Harbage/NPR hide caption

A fitness instructor leads soldiers in a class that helps strengthen their backs.

Like most of the soldiers here, Nazar, 25, has been deployed for at least nine months. He spent weeks defending Donbas, most recently in the town of Avdiivka, which Ukraine's military closed to civilians on Monday, likening it to "a place from post-apocalytpic movies" due to Russian attacks.

"You hear constant shelling, explosions and shooting. It's exhausting," he says. "Here it's so quiet. I've started feeling like myself again."

Earlier, in the aromatherapy room, Nazar had been sitting ramrod stiff in the puffy recliner. Now he cracks an ever-so-slight smile. He's swimming in the pool along with his friend Maksym, 24, another soldier in the program. Soon they are laughing and splashing each other. A couple of other soldiers join them for pool volleyball.

While throwing around a ball in the pool soldiers begin to smile and sometimes open up to the psychologists. Claire Harbage/NPR hide caption

While throwing around a ball in the pool soldiers begin to smile and sometimes open up to the psychologists.

The soldiers wave to Bayda, the psychologist, who motions like he's going to dive into the water.

"Sometimes the soldiers are so relaxed here that it just makes sense to jump and have counseling sessions here," he says. "Anything to help them open up and talk about what they're going through."

Later, Bayda joins an exercise class where older soldiers are working on strengthening their backs. Mykolai, who is 39, says he injured his back by jumping out of military vehicles.

"My superiors sent me here for my bad back," he says. "But I have found talking about my fears and grief in this war much more helpful. I have found that I need to talk because I know I will be on the frontline for a long time."

One soldier works on back strengthening exercises during a fitness class. Claire Harbage/NPR hide caption

One soldier works on back strengthening exercises during a fitness class.

Vasylkovskyi and Bayda say about 2,500 soldiers have already gone through the program since the summer. Vasylkovskyi says he sees improvement in the soldiers, but that there should be more programs addressing PTSD.

"They're already exhausted," he says, "and this war is far from over."

At the end of their week at this rehab center, most soldiers return to the frontline. Bayda says he always prays he will hear from them again.

"Just a hello is fine," he says, "so I know they're alive."

See more here:
This spa-like rehab revives Ukraine's traumatized troops between ... - NPR

By continuing to rely on Russias ethnic minorities and foreign labor migrants to do its dirty work in Ukraine, the Kremlin is inadvertently damaging ties to its former colonies.

A young Uzbek man named Fakhriddin has died in Ukraine after being recruited from a Russian prison, where he had been serving a five-year prison sentence, to work on a construction project in Russia-occupied eastern Ukraine. Fakhriddin, who died when a shell hit the site he was working on, is one of the latest casualties of Russias push to use Central Asian natives not only on Ukrainian battlefields, but also in the reconstruction of battle-torn occupied territories.

Hundreds if not thousands of Central Asian migrants are being hired to work in Russian-occupied Ukrainian territory, despite dangerous conditions and warnings from their governments not to go to Ukraine. Most of these migrants are used in the reconstruction of war-ravaged cities like Mariupol and Donetsk; others dig trenches and collect dead bodies on the frontlines. Female migrants from Central Asia are also offered jobs in military hospitals, canteens, and factories in occupied eastern Ukraine.

Vacancies are posted on major employment websites like Headhunter and the classifieds site Avito, as well as some regional employment websites, and shared via social media and in migrant communities or advertised by construction companies directly. Employers promise to cover travel expenses to Ukraine, accommodation, meals, and uniforms. Salaries range from $2,000 to $3,300 a month: significantly more than laborers can earn in Russia.Yet despite the enticing promises, Central Asian migrants face the same issues in Russia-occupied Ukraine as they do in Russia itself: unsanitary conditions, unheated living quarters, and poor treatment by employers. Multiple reports indicate that migrants are either underpaid or not paid at all. Some disillusioned workers who have tried to leave Ukraine were not permitted by Russian border guards to re-enter Russia, forcing them to continue working in dangerous conditions on the frontlines while facing criminal prosecution from Kyiv and their home governments for participating in the invasion.

These hostile conditions in eastern Ukraine put Central Asian labor migrants and their governments in a bind. Central Asias population continues to grow rapidly, with around half of the regions population now under thirty years old. A lack of employment options and underdeveloped education systems combined with economies wrecked by nepotism, the COVID-19 pandemic, and capital flight mean many younger Central Asians are forced to move abroad to find work.

Central Asian governments, particularly those of Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan, have become accustomed to exporting excess labor capacity in order to generate much-needed revenue for households through remittances, relieve domestic pressure to create jobs, and provide public goods and services. Politically, migration serves as a pressure valve that prevents the buildup of unemployment-fueled social and political frustration and helps undemocratic regimes to stay in power.

Russia remains the primary destination for these labor migrants. Familiarity with the Russian language and culture stemming from a shared Soviet past, geographic proximity, and Russias acute need for labor migrants continues to keep Central Asia in Moscows orbit. Streamlined processes for obtaining citizenship for highly qualified personnel from former Soviet republics, such as doctors and engineers, adds to Russias allure, particularly to those from Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, the most remittance-dependent countries in the region.

After a pandemic-induced dip, the number of Kyrgyz, Tajiks, and Uzbeks registered to work in Russia is peaking again. According to Russian Interior Ministry data, as many as 978,216 Kyrgyz, 3,528,319 Tajiks, and 5,837,363 Uzbeks entered Russia intending to work in 2022. Some people are likely to have been counted twice in these figures, as they reflect the number of registered border crossings, but they are still at a five-year high.

Now the economic downturn in Russia and pressure to work in Russia-occupied Ukraine might contribute to changes in regional labor migration patternsboth at the grassroots level and from the topthat started during the pandemic. While Uzbekistan has become a popular destination for migrants from Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan has emerged as a popular alternative destination to Russia for a growing number of Uzbeks, Tajiks, and Kyrgyz (precise numbers are harder to find as many migrants take advantage of the lack of visa requirements to work illegally and avoid paying taxes).

Central Asian governments, facing domestic pressure to keep their nationals from dying in Ukraine, are also looking for ways to reduce their employment dependence on Russia by diversifying migration destinations and providing migrants with more resources. Uzbekistan has been working with Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan on the bilateral improvement of migration flows. Last December, the Uzbek and British governments discussed collaboration on labor migration during another round of economic talks. USAID has just opened a second consultation center in Uzbekistan for labor migrants, in Samarkand. In early 2022, Kyrgyzstans Labor Ministry created a center for employment abroad; later that year, the governments of Kyrgyzstan and South Korea signed an agreement guaranteeing additional employment opportunities for Kyrgyz nationals in South Korea.

This search for labor migration alternatives is part of Central Asias slow realignment away from its all-encompassing dependence on Russia: a nuanced dance the regional governments must perform without directly antagonizing the former metropole.

Central Asian governments refused to side with Russia in condemning the UN resolution to end the war in Ukraine. Russias regional integration projects are unlikely to expand, as Uzbekistan continues to decline invitations to join the Eurasian Economic Union, and Russias defeats in Ukraine have weakened the reputation of the Moscow-led Collective Security Treaty Organization. Finally, Central Asian foreign ministers in February welcomed U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken to the first ministerial-level engagement of the C5+1 Diplomatic Platformwhich represents U.S. engagement with Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistanin the region since its 2015 founding.

This realignment can also be seen on the cultural front: the popularity of the Russian language is declining, while local languages are seeing growing interest in them since the invasion of Ukraine. Local governments are cutting the number of Russian language lessons in schools and renaming streets. The issue of decolonization and anti-colonial solidarity is as salient as it has ever been since the collapse of the Soviet Union.

By continuing to rely on Russias ethnic minorities and foreign labor migrants to do its dirty work in Ukraine, the Kremlin is inadvertently damaging ties to its former colonies. The longer the conflict drags on, the more incentive Central Asian republics will have to manage their dependence on Russia in exporting their excess labor. Its hard to see Central Asia quitting on Russia entirely, but the relationship is sure to grow more nuanced and less lopsided in the months to come.

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By Sending Migrants to Ukraine, the Kremlin is Damaging Ties With ... - Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

31 March 2023, 06:01 BST

Weapons already on the streets of Merseyside include Skorpion sub-machine guns

The war in Ukraine is likely to fuel gun crime on the streets of Merseyside for many years, a firearms expert said.

Mr James said the Balkans conflict had been the main source of guns being trafficked into Europe since the 1990s.

Guns held by civilians in Ukraine could also end up in the UK, he said, warning of a "time bomb waiting to explode".

Mr James said millions of weapons could circulate when the Ukraine war ends, with many ending up in the hands of criminal gangs.

"From experience, over the last 15 to 20 years, the guns from the Western Balkans have been the main source of firearms trafficked into Europe," he told BBC North West Tonight.

"They have been used in a lot of very high-profile crime and terrorist incidents, and we're still trying to reduce the flow of firearms from there. I think the situation in Ukraine is going to be much worse than that."

Mr James said Merseyside had long been a key area for criminals in the North and Midlands seeking to acquire guns. Many of them were leading figures in drug gangs.

The weapons were used to "enable a lot of the organised crime in the Merseyside area", said Mr James.

The National Crime Agency said: "There is currently no evidence Ukrainian weapons are being sold to criminals but we will closely monitor the threat with our international partners."

Even without weapons being trafficked from Ukraine, there are still a significant number of guns on the streets.

Ch Supt Mark Kameen of Merseyside Police said: "Handguns are the weapon of choice, but we are now seeing Skorpions coming into the force area.

"These sub-machine guns have a huge rate of fire, they're absolutely deadly."

Sicarius McGrath ran an illegal gun factory supplying serious organised crime gangs

Twenty years ago Sicarius McGrath was one of the criminals involved in supplying guns to Merseyside's gangs.

He said he ran a lucrative "gun factory".

Previously deactivated weapons are easy to transform into firearms capable of firing live ammunition, said McGrath, who was most recently released from prison in 2020 and now campaigns against violent crime.

He said the process used to take him less than half an hour and "the profit margin is massive".

"I don't know how many people were harmed as a result of me putting firearms on the street," he said, "but no doubt people were harmed, and it's something I massively regret".

McGrath believes intense, hard-hitting education programmes would deter young people on the fringes of crime from becoming members of serious organised crime gangs.

"We want them to see the reality of gun crime. We want to take them to gravesides, and we want them to speak to victims' parents, and show them not just the injuries sustained, but the ripple effects it has upon families, the effects it has upon the children who have to go and see their fathers in prisons for 30 years."

McGrath warned of "a new breed of criminal" who are "reckless, fearless, and have a strong appetite for violence".

He said urgent action was needed because "otherwise many more innocent victims will die as a result of gun crime".

Why not follow BBC North West on Facebook, Twitter and Instagram? You can also send story ideas to northwest.newsonline@bbc.co.uk

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Ukraine war guns likely to end up on UK streets, says weapons expert - BBC

WASHINGTON The Biden administration is calling for the creation of a joint tribunal in which Ukraine and international allies would try Russian leaders for crimes of aggression, but some human rights lawyers worry the plan has a fatal flaw:

It might shield President Vladimir V. Putin from prosecution.

Beth Van Schaack, the State Departments ambassador at large for global criminal justice, saidon Monday thatthe administration supported the formation of an internationalized national court in which the United States and other allies would assist Ukrainian prosecutors in bringing cases against Russian leaders for the crime of aggression, or illegally invading another country.

We are committed to working with Ukraine, and peace-loving countries around the world, to stand up, staff and resource such a tribunal in a way that will achieve comprehensive accountability for the international crimes being committed in Ukraine, she said during a war crimes conference at Catholic University in Washington.

Even as her remarks represented one of the most emphatic statements to date indicating U.S. support for prosecuting the crime of aggression, it also underscored the challenge of seeking to hold world leaders liable for their actions while they remain in power. By also establishing clear limits on how far the administration is willing to go, Ms. Van Schaack acknowledged its reluctance to create a precedent that could pave the way for a similar court to prosecute American leaders.

Critics of Russias invasion of Ukraine have debated rival proposals for holding Russian leaders accountable over the war, including establishing a hybrid court rooted in the Ukrainian system, with international elements, or creating a purely international chamber with jurisdiction over the crime of aggression.

While details remain to be worked out and would likely require changes to Ukrainian law, legal specialists say, a hybrid court could include both Ukrainian and international judges, and have jurisdiction over the crime of aggression under both Ukrainian and international law. It could also convene outside the war zone, including at The Hague.

Ukraine, like other countries, allows sitting heads of state to claim immunity from prosecution. In setting up the proposed hybrid court, Ukraines legislature could make an exception, but if Mr. Putin were ever arrested and brought before the court, his lawyers could argue that the exception was illegitimate.

David J. Scheffer, who served as the U.S. ambassador at large for war crimes issues from 1997 to 2001, said the State Departments proposal of a joint tribunal rooted in Ukrainian law fell short.

This is disappointing, added Mr. Scheffer, who has called for a special international tribunal, not a national or hybrid court, to prosecute Russian leaders.

Several former diplomats and academics want the United Nations General Assembly to set up a purely international judicial institution like the International Criminal Court at The Hague, which prosecutes war crimes and has ruled that it need not honor immunity for sitting heads of state. They argue that such a new court could cite that precedent, making it harder for Mr. Putin to invoke immunity and get a case thrown out.

(Aggression is different than war crimes, which involve atrocities committed during a war regardless of the legitimacy of the conflict.)

Aggression is a crime perpetrated by leadership; if the leaders have immunity, what are we even doing? said Jennifer Trahan, a global affairs professor at New York University who favors a tribunal independent of Ukraines judicial system. We are at a Nuremberg moment. Do we really want to deter aggression and the use of force? If we do, we have to have a real deterrent response.

But Harold Hongju Koh, a professor at Yale Law Schoolwho served as a top lawyer in the State Department in the Obama administration, argued that a hybrid tribunal, modeled after a similar court that tried leaders of the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia, could be up and running far quicker.

Mr. Koh notedthat even under a purely international model, the issue of overcoming immunity for sitting heads of state is far from assured.

The best should not be the enemy of the good, Mr. Koh said. A hybrid court has the advantage that such a court has actually worked. The Ukrainians actually have a prosecutorial unit that is working and trying cases. Do you want to get on a train that is going somewhere and see if it can get you where you want to go, or wait for an entirely new train to be built? Why not get on the train?

Vedant Patel, the State Department spokesman, said on Tuesday that the new approach should not be seen as an alternative or replacement for activities by the International Criminal Court. What this is, is another mechanism in which we support all international efforts to examine atrocities, he said.

This month, the International Criminal Court issued an arrest warrant accusing Mr. Putin and one of his top officials of unlawfully abducting Ukrainian children and transporting them to their country.

But that tribunal lacks jurisdiction to prosecute the separate crime of aggression against citizens of countries that are not a party to its treaty and have not signed on to an amendment that added aggression to its purview. Russia has not, and neither has the United States.

Some in the United States especially at the Pentagon also think the court should not exercise jurisdiction for the other offenses in its purview, like war crimes, against citizens of countries that are not a party to the treaty that created it.

But late last year, Congress amended a law to allow support for the courts investigations arising from the war.

Still, the Biden administration is split over how to work with the court. While agencies like the Justice and State Departments support sharing information with it about Russian war crimes, the Pentagon has objected, fearing creating a precedent that could make it easier to prosecute Americans in the future.

In her remarks, Ms. Van Schaack appeared to obliquely refer to the dispute, noting the implementation of the new legislative amendments to help the I.C.C. prosecutor is under review.

Ms. Van Schaack, who helped investigate war crimes in Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia, said American officials and European partners, working with the newly created International Center for the Prosecution of the Crime of Aggression in The Hague, would build criminal dossiers against those leaders responsible for planning, preparing, initiating or waging this war of aggression for future trials.

The Justice Department is increasingly focused on a similar supporting role, providing Ukraines prosecutors with logistical help, training and direct assistance in major cases.

Apart from assisting prosecutors in Ukraine, any collectedevidence could be used for war crimes and genocide prosecutions, and might even spur further sanctions against Moscow, she added.

Mr. Scheffer, who helped create international judicial systems to prosecute defendants from Rwanda, Sierra Leone and the former Yugoslavia, said that nesting prosecutions in a national court as opposed to creating a completely international court could marginalize the effort to hold Mr. Putin responsible.

I am skeptical there will be a lot of financial support for an internationalized Ukrainian court, by the time they get around to bringing charges, Mr. Scheffer said.

Michael Crowley contributed reporting.

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The Latest: War in Ukraine: U.N. Warns of Buildup of Russian and ... - The New York Times