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Ukraine is the largest country that is entirely within Europe. The country sits on the southwestern part of the Russian Plain and has a largely low terrain. The average elevation of the land is only 574 ft (175 m).

As observed on the physical map of Ukraine above, about 5% of the country is mountainous. The northern reaches of the Carpathian Mountains stretch across western Ukraine. The country's highest point is located there; Hoverla Mountain, at 2061 m (6762 ft) tall. It has been marked on the map above by a yellow upright triangle.

As can be seen on the map above, the southern lowland of Ukraine continues into the Crimean Peninsula, a peninsula jutting into the sea from southern Ukraine via the Perekop Isthmus. It is a disputed territory.

The Crimean Mountains front the southern edges of the Crimean Peninsula, and some lower, heavily-eroded mountains extend intoRussiajust north of the Sea of Azov.

Much of central Ukraine is covered by plateaus and fertile plains (steppes), somewhat hilly areas of grasslands and shrublands.

The Black Sea Coastal Lowlands cover the southern edges of the country.

Ukraine is bordered by the waters of the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov.

Major rivers include the Desna, Dnieper, Dniester, Donets and the Southern Bug. Numerous waterfalls are found in both the Carpathian and Crimean Mountains.

The Dnieper River, one of the major rivers of Europe (fourth by length) flows from Russia, through Belarus and Ukraine, to the Black Sea. The river's total length is 2,285 km (1,420 mi).

Ukraine is divided into 24 provinces (oblast), 1 autonomous republic (avtonomna respublika) and 2 municipalities (mista). In alphabetical order, these provinces are: Cherkasy, Chernihiv, Chernivtsi, Dnipropetrovsk (Dnipro), Donetsk, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Kherson, Khmelnytskyy, Kirovohrad (Kropyvnytskyy), Kyiv, Luhansk, Lviv, Mykolayiv, Odesa, Poltava, Rivne, Sumy, Ternopil, Vinnytsya, Volyn (LutsK), Zakarpattya (Uzhhorod), Zaporizhzhya and Zhytomyr. Crimea or Avtonomna Respublika Krym (Simferopol) is an autonomous republic. Kyiv (Kiev) and Sevastopol are two municipalities of special status. The 24 oblasts and Crimea are further subdivided into 136 raions (district) and city municipalities.

With an area of 603,628 sq. km (which also includes the area covered by the Crimean Peninsula), Ukraine is the 2nd largest country by area in Europe and the 46th largest country in the world. With a population over 42 million people, Ukraine is the 7th/8th most populous county in Europe and the 32nd most populous country in the world. Located in the north-central part of the country, along the Dnieper River is Kiev (Kyiv) the capital and the most populous city of Ukraine. Kiev is the chief cultural and industrial center of Eastern Europe.

Ukraine is an Eastern European country. It is situated both in the Northern and Eastern hemispheres of the earth. Ukraine is bordered by 7 European Nations: by Belarus in the north; by Hungary, Slovakia and Poland in the west; by Moldova and Romania in the southwest; and by Russia in the east and northeast. It is bounded by the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov in the south. The Autonomous Republic of Crimea borders Ukraine to the south.

Ukraine Bordering Countries: Russia, Hungary, Romania, Moldova, Slovakia, Belarus, Poland.

Regional Maps: Map of Europe

The above blank outline map is of Ukraine, a country in eastern Europe. The map can be downloaded, printed and used for education work or for coloring.

The above map represents Ukraine, a country in Eastern Europe.

This page was last updated on February 24, 2021

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Ukraine Maps & Facts - World Atlas

While the world is focused on OPEC news and Easter preparations, the Ukrainian crisis is heating up and there is a real threat of a military confrontation involving Ukraine, Russia, and Belarus. Currently, the Ukrainian military is fighting Moscow-backed separatists in the Donbas region. At the same time, heavy clashes with Russian-backed forces in and around Shymy have been reported. International pressure has been building on Russia to force a direct ceasefire, but no moves have been made. In recent weeks, analysts warned of a possible full-scale military confrontation as they considered the military moves in the region as provocations by Moscow. At the same time, most confrontations were localized, with no real regional impact yet.

The military stalemate, however, could well be coming to an end. A growing amount of reports have emerged showing not only largescale Russian military movements towards the Ukrainian border but also Moscows only regional supporter Belarus has deployed new troops to the Ukrainian border. As Julian Ropcke, a German Bild reporter, said on Wednesday, large amounts of Belarus military hardware, including BTR-80 armored vehicles and military trucks are moved to the border region. Kiev has already reacted to the growing threat perception by calling up reinforcements. Ruslan Khomchak, Ukraines Commander-in-Chief, stated to the press that Russia is building up armed forces near Ukraines borders in a threat to the countrys security.

Related: The 2 Nations Driving The Recovery In Offshore Oil

Russian TV channel Russia Today indicated that Moscow is going to support troops of the self-proclaimed Donetsk Peoples Republic (DPR) to come home. The coming days could be a major watershed for the regions military-geopolitical situation. The West has always assumed that Moscow was more than happy with the current situation, controlling not only the Donbas area but also preventing Ukraine from joining NATO. To expect Putin to be content with this stalemate, however, without having any option for a diplomatic resolution, seems overly optimistic from those powers. Russias ultimate dream is to unify Russia and Ukraine., a dream it is willing to achieve either with hard diplomacy or military means. Moscow appears to have become increasingly unhappy about its lack of progress in achieving that dream, partly due to it being handicapped by the Minsk Accords. The Biden Administration, which is less flexible to Moscows strategies than the previous administration, is also a possible reason for Russias new military adventures. Bidens State Department speech on February 4th included a clear message to Russia that the days of rolling over in the face of Russias actions are over. It is certainly possible that the speech pushed Russia to ramp up its military actions. Meanwhile, in Belarus and Ukraine, the West is perceived to be waging a hybrid war against Moscow. From Putins point of view, the only option now is to actively counter-attack. Military analysts are still arguing about what Moscows options are in the coming days. A majority expect a so-called localized escalation, dramatic and devastating, leading to the deployment of Russian peacekeepers. Such a move could be used to justify future military moves by Russia. US Secretary of State Antony Blinken filed a complaint on Wednesday in which he reiterated Washingtons support for Ukraines territorial integrity in the face of Russias ongoing aggression. If Putin believes the West is weak, however, a military move, which would give Russia access to Crimean water supplies, would be a very attractive one. Ukrainian observers believe the Kremlin may even consider a decisive military push through south-eastern Ukraine to create a land corridor linking Crimea with Donbas and end the peninsulas chronic water shortage Ukraine has blocked 85 percent of water supplies to the Crimea since 2014.

Story continues

Related: The Future Of U.S. LNG Hangs In The Balance

A possible full-scale military operation will not only impact regional security but also put the European oil and gas sector under pressure, while maritime logistics could also be hampered. With Europes gas storage currently very low and dependency on Russian supplies still very high, a crisis here could have a major impact. Gas prices will soon be under pressure if the situation escalates. With storage sites at 37% capacity compared to 60% capacity at the same time last year or 74% at the start of this year, inventories are becoming critical. Analysts currently expect levels to fall as low as 16% of total capacity. To count on LNG supplies would be foolish if Asian demand continues to grow. The stranglehold that Russia has over European gas markets may soon become a major geopolitical market factor once again. If a Ukraine crisis erupts, potentially blocking or closing gas and oil pipelines in the region, a new energy crisis would follow closely behind.

It appears that Putins strategists have outmaneuvered Western powers. The weak response from both Brussels and Washington to Russian power moves in recent years appears to have emboldened Putin. Sanctions have been largely ineffective, while military options seem to be out of the question. Russian gas politics could now be a major pivotal factor in stopping any EU-NATO support if a renewed Ukraine conflict were to break out.

By Cyril Widdershoven for Oilprice.com

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Is Russia About To Invade Ukraine? - Yahoo Finance

Russian President Vladimir Putin addresses the crowd during a March 2018 event in Moscow to mark the fourth anniversary of the annexation of Ukraines Crimean peninsula. Now in its eighth year, Russian military aggression against Ukraine has played a major role in driving the two formerly close post-Soviet nations apart. (Alexander Zemlianichenko/POOL via REUTERS)

In February 2021, Russias hybrid war against Ukraine entered its eighth year. During this period, the Kremlin has succeeded in occupying Crimea and a large swathe of territory in eastern Ukraines borderland Donbas region. At the same time, Russian influence over the remaining 92.8% of Ukraine has plummeted to lows not witnessed for more than three hundred years.

Although there remains no end in sight to the ongoing war, it is already becoming increasingly obvious that the events of the past seven years have led to Ukraines decisive departure from Russias sphere of influence. Evidence of this historic shift can be seen throughout Ukrainian society.

Politically, support for Ukraines pro-Russian forces has collapsed to significantly less than half pre-war levels. Moscow-leaning Ukrainian political parties that were capable of forming parliamentary majorities and winning presidential elections less than a decade ago now struggle to pass the 20% barrier in national elections and are heavily reliant on an ageing electoral base driven by nostalgia for Soviet stability. This leaves very little scope for any future revival in political fortunes.

Russias ability to dominate Ukraine economically has also greatly diminished. Prior to the war, Russia accounted for around 30% of Ukraines annual trade balance. By 2020, that figure had fallen to approximately 7%. During the same period, Ukrainian trade with China and the European Union has flourished. Meanwhile, Ukraines sizeable migrant workforce has voted with its feet, turning away from traditional Russian destinations since 2014 in favor of EU alternatives.

Prior to the outbreak of hostilities, post-Soviet Ukraine had been Russias greatest soft power success story. Not any more. The formerly indivisible Russian and Ukrainian showbiz scenes have undergone a sharp separation due to the war. Many Russian celebrities are officially banned from Ukraine, while others are no longer welcome.

Most Russian TV channels have been forced off the Ukrainian airwaves, and Ukrainian TV channels have drastically reduced their Russian-made content. Thanks to a quota system, radio station playlists now increasingly favor Ukrainian-language artists. With Russian social media sites blocked, millions of Ukrainians have switched to Facebook and other international platforms.

Russia has also been in retreat in the spiritual realm. The 2019 establishment of an internationally recognized Orthodox Church of Ukraine independent of the Moscow Patriarchate has accelerated the already declining influence of the Russian Orthodox Church in Ukraine.

Many in Moscow had hoped the spring 2019 election of Russian-speaking Jewish candidate Volodymyr Zelenskyy as President of Ukraine would reverse Russias catastrophic loss of influence in the country. However, almost two years on, there has been no such revival.

On the contrary, Zelenskyy himself has launched a crackdown on remaining avenues of Kremlin influence in Ukraine. He recently shut down Kremlin-linked Ukrainian TV channels and has imposed a range of sanctions on Russias leading Ukrainian allies, while also adopting a strategy for the de-occupation of Crimea.

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UkraineAlert is a comprehensive online publication that provides regular news and analysis on developments in Ukraines politics, economy, civil society, and culture.

Ukraines geopolitical turn away from Russia enjoys overwhelming public backing. Indeed, with Ukrainian opinion polls consistently indicating majority support for future membership of both the European Union and NATO, it is difficult to imagine any way back for Russia. Instead, Vladimir Putin looks destined to enter the Russian history books as the man who lost Ukraine.

The loss of Ukraine is a crushing blow to Putins dreams of imperial revival and his obsession with reversing the humiliations of the Soviet collapse. It also represents a resounding defeat for the Russian World doctrine that has served as the unofficial ideology of the Putin regime for more than a decade.

Putins commitment to a so-called Russian World that extends beyond the borders of modern Russia first began to take shape in the mid-2000s and gained considerable momentum following Russias 2008 invasion of Georgia.

According to Putin and other prominent advocates, the Russian World encompasses populations throughout the former Czarist and Soviet empires who are bound together with Russia by the Russian language along with a common religion, culture, history, and world view.

Ukraine lies at the very heart of Putins Russian World and is central to his imperial ambitions. Nor is he alone in such thinking. Indeed, widespread assumptions regarding Ukraines natural place within the Russian World played a crucial role in Moscows decision to invade the country in 2014. This deep-rooted belief has since helped to maintain high levels of Russian public support for the separatist republics created and maintained by the Kremlin in eastern Ukraine.

Putin and fellow Russian World devotees such as Russian Orthodox Church Patriarch Kirill believe Russians, Ukrainians, and Belarusians are all part of the same Russian civilization and share common ancestral origins in the medieval Kyiv Rus, which is depicted as the first Russian state. They view todays separation into individual post-Soviet states as a mistake of history and blame the West for artificially dividing the Russian World.

This Russian narrative dismisses Ukraines centuries of struggle for statehood as a betrayal of Russian-Ukrainian brotherhood. Ukrainian leaders ranging from eighteenth century Cossack Hetman Ivan Mazepa to modern-day presidents Petro Poroshenko and Volodymyr Zelenskyy are portrayed as traitors and separatists collaborating with Western enemies of Russia in order to divide and weaken the Russian World.

In reality, the Russian World ideology promoted by the Putin regime has been out of touch with Ukrainian public opinion for many years. This gap has widened significantly as attitudes have hardened in response to the undeclared and ongoing Russo-Ukrainian War.

In early 2014, Putin appears to have fallen victim of his own propaganda to such an extent that he genuinely believed he could orchestrate pro-Russian uprisings across Ukraine. Instead, the Kremlins hybrid assault on Ukrainian sovereignty sparked a wave of popular opposition that has had disastrous consequences for Russian interests in the country.

The loss of Ukraine means that Moscow must come to terms with the greatest retreat in Russian influence since the demise of the USSR. For the time being, the uncertainties of the unresolved conflict in eastern Ukraine have delayed the inevitable fallout from this historic setback. However, when the reckoning finally arrives, it promises to be painful for the Kremlin.

At this stage, it is already possible to identify five key reasons why Ukrainians have rejected Putins appeals to rejoin the Russian World.

1. Absence of imperial identity: While modern Russian national identity is inextricably tied to notions of imperial destiny, the same is simply not true for Ukrainians. For this reason, the Russian World doctrine did not strike a chord among a majority of Ukrainians even before the 2014 crisis. Instead, it provoked widespread suspicion.

During Viktor Yanukovychs 2010-2014 presidency, the number of Ukrainians who believed the Russian World was an attempt to rebuild the Russian Empire grew from 30.4% to nearly half (48.4%), while those who viewed it as maintaining the spiritual unity of the eastern Slavs declined from 56.8% to 39.7%. Predictably, these trends have continued to strengthen since the onset of hostilities seven years ago.

2. Democratic divergence: After gaining independence in 1991, Ukraine has slowly but steadily embraced democracy, leading to the emergence of a highly competitive if imperfect multi-party political system. Todays Ukrainians take free and fair elections for granted and have also grown used to robust criticism of the authorities and a pluralistic media environment. Meanwhile, following constitutional changes adopted in 2020, Putin now looks set to remain president of Russia until 2036.

Many Ukrainians remain deeply dissatisfied with the countrys often dysfunctional democracy, but few have any desire for a return to a one-party system dominated by a dictator in the Kremlin. There is also very little enthusiasm for Putin personally. According to a Pew Research Center survey, Ukrainian approval of Putin in international affairs fell from 56% in 2007 to just 11% in 2019. No wonder todays authoritarian Russia has proven such a hard sell to Ukrainian audiences.

3. The polarizing impact of war: Prior to 2014, negative views of Russia were not particularly common among Ukrainians outside of western Ukraine. However, since the outbreak of hostilities, such attitudes have become increasingly mainstream in all regions of the country.

As a direct result of the ongoing conflict, the number of Ukrainians holding positive views of Russia has collapsed from around 80% to current levels of approximately 40%, according to February 2021 data from the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology and Russias Levada Center.

An entire generation of young Ukrainians with no personal memories of the shared Soviet past now knows Russia primarily as an aggressor and an adversary. Regardless of any future developments towards peace and reconciliation, the seven-year war between the two countries represents a watershed event that has permanently transformed Russian-Ukrainian relations.

4. Religious differences: One of the central pillars of the Russian World doctrine is the Russian Orthodox Church. On paper at least, the Russian Orthodox Church continues to exert formidable influence over Ukraine. However, in reality, this influence was already in decline prior to the outbreak of hostilities in 2014 and long before the establishment of an independent Orthodox Church of Ukraine in 2019.

Throughout the early post-Soviet decades of Ukrainian independence, the internationally unrecognized Kyiv Patriarchate had continued to gain ground on the Russian Orthodox Churchs Moscow Patriarchate in the competition for Orthodox Ukrainian loyalties. This shift gained further momentum following the start of hostilities in 2014, thanks in part to widespread perceptions that the Moscow Patriarchate supported military aggression against Ukraine.

Moscow Patriarchate priests have provoked numerous scandals over the past seven years by refusing to officiate at funerals for fallen soldiers and rejecting public calls to honor the countrys defenders. In May 2015, Moscow Patriarchate leaders sparked fury when they refused to stand in the Ukrainian parliament to honor Ukrainian soldiers killed in the war.

Ukrainians also increasingly question Moscows attempts to link the modern Russian Orthodox Church with the ancient Orthodox traditions of the Kyiv Rus era. In a survey conducted on the eve of Ukraines January 2019 breakthrough towards Orthodox independence, majorities of Ukrainians identified modern Ukraine as the successor to the Kyiv Rus legacy and recognized the Kyiv Patriarchate as the successor to the Orthodox Church established in the Ukrainian capital just over one thousand years earlier.

The Russian Orthodox Church remains a powerful force in Ukrainian everyday life with millions of believers and thousands of parishes. Nevertheless, it is now nowhere near as influential as it once was. Looking ahead, it cannot hope play the kind of unifying role in pluralistic Ukraine that it performs inside Russia itself.

5. Memory wars: Ukraine and Russia have diverged on a number of key historical questions ever since the Gorbachev era. Many Ukrainians do not agree that Crimea was always Russian, for example, and also reject Russian attempts to claim the historical legacy of the Kyiv Rus. These competing approaches towards the common past are hardly surprising. For centuries, Russia was able to dictate a highly russo-centric version of Ukrainian history. This made the backlash of recent decades all but inevitable.

Attitudes towards the imperial past differ in fundamental ways. Beginning in the nineteenth century with the Czarist regime and continuing throughout the twentieth century Soviet era, Ukrainians faced wave after wave of russification policies designed to stifle Ukraines own statehood aspirations. This history of repression makes it significantly harder for modern Ukrainians to identify with the imperial past, but Russians do not share such qualms. While a clear majority of Ukrainians now regard Stalin as a tyrant, equally high numbers of Russians see the Soviet dictator as a hero.

In recent years, the space separating rival Ukrainian and Russian historical narratives has grown ever wider. Ukraines decommunization laws of 2015 have led to the wholesale rejection of Soviet symbolism and a new approach to the totalitarian era that directly contradicts Russias own efforts under Putin to rehabilitate the USSR. Inevitably, conflicting accounts of the shared past remain central to the information war raging between todays Russia and Ukraine.

Putins decision to attack Ukraine in 2014 owed much to his apparently sincere conviction that the country belongs in the Russian World. This proved a grave miscalculation that has accelerated a number of existing trends pulling the two post-Soviet nations in different directions.

The entire Russian World concept is rooted in outdated nineteenth century imperial myths that have no place in the twenty-first century. Such thinking has had an incredibly damaging impact on Russian-Ukrainian ties, playing a direct role in the drive towards war seven years ago and fueling the subsequent escalation of the conflict.

This imperialistic approach now serves as a barrier to peace and possible future reconciliation. Until modern Russia is able to reject the toxic Russian World doctrine, it will continue to poison relations with Ukraine and widen the divide between the two countries.

Taras Kuzio is a non-resident fellow at the Foreign Policy Institute at Johns Hopkins-SAIS and a professor at the National University of Kyiv Mohyla Academy. He is also author of Putins War Against Ukraine and co-author of The Sources of Russias Great Power Politics: Ukraine and the Challenge to the European Order.

Tue, Feb 9, 2021

Kremlin TV chief Margarita Simonyan called on Russia to annex eastern Ukraines Donbas region during a recent high-profile forum that signaled an escalation in Moscows seven-year hybrid war against Ukraine.

UkraineAlertbyAlvydas Medalinskas

Fri, Feb 5, 2021

President Zelenskyy shut down three Kremlin-linked TV channels on February 2 in a move portrayed as a major blow to Russias hybrid war against Ukraine. The step has sparked debate over the balance between national security and free speech.

UkraineAlertbyPeter Dickinson

The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

UkraineAlert is a comprehensive online publication that provides regular news and analysis on developments in Ukraines politics, economy, civil society, and culture.

The Eurasia Centers mission is to enhance transatlantic cooperation in promoting stability, democratic values and prosperity in Eurasia, from Eastern Europe and Turkey in the West to the Caucasus, Russia and Central Asia in the East.

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Five reasons why Ukraine rejected Vladimir Putin's Russian World - Atlantic Council

Ukraine says Russia is massing troops on its border, and pro-Moscow separatists were systematically violating a ceasefire in eastern Ukraine, Reuters reports from Moscow the same day Kievs parliament officially declared an escalation in the east.

Just now catching up? The war in eastern Ukraine...has escalated sharply in recent days, the New York Times Andrew Kramer reported Tuesday from Moscow. [F]our Ukrainian soldiers were killed and another seriously wounded in a battle against Russian-backed separatists in the Donetsk Region, Kramer writes.

Whats more, the U.S. militarys European Command raised its watch level from possible crisis to potential imminent crisis the highest level in response to the deployment of the additional Russian troops. New equipment has been seen among the Russian-backed rebels, too; artillery fire has increased as well. And Russian negotiators have warned of a breakdown in peace talks that have been dragging on for years, the Times reports.

Russias reax: Point the finger at Kiev. We express concern over the growing tension and express concern that one way or another the Ukrainian side could take provocative actions that would lead to war. We really dont want to see that, Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov said today from the Russian capital.

Russian hackers are believed to have snatched more State Department emails in a breach that happened last year at the Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs and Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Politico reports.

ICYMI: Suspected Russian hackers accessed former Homeland Security Acting Secretary Chad Wolfs emails last year, too, the Associated Press reported Monday.

And on the U.S. side, cyber defense is getting more difficult: Staffers are worn out, money is tight and the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency is struggling to keep up with multiple competing crises, including the recently uncovered intrusions blamed on Russia and China, Politico reported separately Tuesday.

One more Russian thing: A new report from Brookings says the U.S. military should anticipate encounters with Russian private military contractors in the field. PMCs allow the Russian government to operate in places where it could not openly do so at least not without drawing international retribution or sanctions. The Department of Defense (DoD) and U.S. military leaders must plan for this increased PMC presence. What measures must be taken to protect American forces and safeguard U.S. interests? And what procedures could the U.S. military implement to effectively counter PMC operations in certain countries around the world? Some ideas, here.

PMCs in the CAR: Russian mercenaries from the Wagner group, a private military contractor, have committed human rights abuses in the Central African Republic while fighting alongside government forces, according to a group of independent UN experts, The Guardian reports. The country has been racked by a renewed bout of civil war since an alliance of rebel factions launched an offensive. More, here.

New Small Aircraft Carrier Unlikely, Admiral Says As US Navy Begins New Assessment // Marcus Weisgerber: Air warfare chief: I believe the L-class ships operating with the F-35B fit that bill.

A US Ambassador Ends His Service on the Front Lines in Syria // William Roebuck: Reflections on U.S. foreign policy in a wartorn state.

The Suez Grounding Was an Accident. The Next Blocked Chokepoint Might Not Be. // Scott Savitz: Military planners must bear in mind the tactic of blockships.

Heres How Russia and China Are Helping the U.S. // Yasmeen Serhan, The Atlantic: Beijing and Moscow are filling the vaccine gap that wealthy countries helped create.

Americas Immigration Amnesia // Caitlin Dickerson, The Atlantic: Despite recurrent claims of crisis at the border, the United States still does not have a coherent immigration policy.

Welcome to this Wednesday edition of The D Brief from Ben Watson with Bradley Peniston. Send us tips from your community right here. And if youre not already subscribed to The D Brief, you can do that here. On this day in 1945, German test pilot Hans Fay defected to the Allies but only when he learned his parents hometown of Lachenspeyerdorf was under U.S. control and landed his Messerschmitt Me 262 A-1 jet fighter at Frankfurt/Rhein-Main Airfield. The Allies would have another 16 months to learn about its design before an Army Air Corps pilot crashed it after an engine caught fire during a test flight over Ohio in August the following year.

Japan, South Korea security officials are headed to Annapolis. President Bidens National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan will welcome his counterparts from Tokyo and Seoul to a Trilateral National Security Advisors Dialogue on Friday at the U.S. Naval Academy in Annapolis. The meeting comes on the heels of Defense Secretary Lloyd Austins first overseas trip to both countries about two weeks ago.Attending: Japans National Security Secretariat Secretary General Shigeru Kitamura, and South Koreas National Security Advisor Suh Hoon.Topics of discussion include maintaining peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula, addressing the COVID-19 pandemic, and combating climate change...reflecting the importance we place on broadening and deepening our cooperation on key issues and advancing our shared prosperity across a free and open Indo-Pacific, National Security Council Spokesperson Emily Horne said in a statement Tuesday evening.

Hundreds of Chinese fishing ships are ignoring Philippine requests (Reuters) to leave its 200-mile exclusive economic zone while they allegedly wait out a storm near the contested Whitsun Reef, where some 220 boats have been fishing against Manilas wishes for the past several weeks.About this place: The reef, which Manila calls Julian Felipe, is a boomerang-shaped and shallow coral region about 175 nautical miles (324 kilometers) west of Bataraza town in the western Philippine province of Palawan, AP reported 10 days ago.About that storm: Its hard to find, judging by video from the location in question, Greg Poling of the Center for Strategic and International Studies points out on Twitter.The Philippines defense chief says hes deployed his air force to monitor the ships, and hes requested China order the fishing vessels out of Manilas EEZ, he said this weekend (al-Jazeera). We are ready to defend our national sovereignty and protect the marine resources of the Philippines, Defense Secretary Delfin Lorenzana said on Saturday.Stern talk: Neither the Philippines nor the international community will ever accept Chinas assertion of its so-called indisputable integrated sovereignty over almost all of the South China Sea, the Philippines task force on the South China Sea said in a statement today, according to Reuters, which called it Manilas strongest [statement] since President Rodrigo Duterte took power in 2016 and sought to befriend Beijing. Read on, here.

France immediately rejected a UN report accusing Paris of killing 16 civilians at a wedding in Mali back in January, Reuters reports.According to the UN, a wedding celebration was held that brought together about 100 civilians at the site of the strike, among whom five armed individuals, presumed members of [alleged regional al-Qaeda affiliate] Katiba Serma, were present. The strike is believed to have killed 19 people at that wedding, including three accused members of Katiba Serma.According to the French military, The only concrete sources on which this report is based are local testimonies. They are never transcribed, the identity of the witnesses is never specified, nor the conditions in which the testimonies were gathered...It is therefore impossible to distinguish credible sources from false testimonies by possible terrorist sympathisers or individuals under the influence (including threats) from jihadist groups.Quick background, via Reuters: France has been embroiled in Malis conflict since 2013, when it intervened to push back Islamist militants who were advancing south after seizing the desert north. The conflict has since spread to neighbouring countries in the West African Sahel region like Burkina Faso and Niger, leading to rising criticism of French forces from local activists and some politicians. More here.

The U.S. just pledged almost $600 million for Syrian refugees, Americas Ambassador to the UN Linda Thomas-Greenfield announced Tuesday. That could help a U.N.-coordinated effort [that] is seeking some $4.2 billion to help Syrians inside the country and $5.8 billion for countries hosting refugees, the Wall Street Journal reports.

Some of the alleged Capitol insurrectionists are now coming on hard times, and some are even apparently a bit sorry for stoking and participating in that insurrection on Jan. 6.Among the rude awakenings: No plea deals yet, though they may be in the works, the Associated Press reports. Given it was an attack on what many regard as the citadel of American democracy, the sentiment among prosecutors, judges and the public at large, at least for now, isnt exactly lenient. More including a possible defense invoking the psychology of crowds here.

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Today's D Brief: Ukraine, Russia escalate; Chinese fishing boats, unwanted; Small carrier, unneeded?; Lessons from Suez; And a bit more. - Defense One

More than six years have passed since the so-called Minsk II accords brought an end to the last high-intensity military conflict in Ukraine. But it would be unduly complacent to suppose that this hiatus will last much longer.

Since the Package of Measures for the Implementation of the Minsk Agreement [of 5 September 2014] was signed by the representatives of Russia, Ukraine, the OSCE and the unrecognised leaders of the two self-proclaimed Donbas republics on 12 February 2015, more Ukrainian servicemen have been killed in the ensuing low-intensity conflict than in the time since the conflict in southern and eastern Ukraine began.1

Yet this fact has not discouraged many in the West from treating the precarious post-Minsk conditions as a new status quo, when in fact Minsk produced nothing more than a highly contested and continuously flouted armistice. Despite numerous rounds of subsequent negotiation, two at summit level, the gap in perspective about what the accords stipulate and what obligations they entail has not been narrowed one iota.

Alongside the belief in the emergence of a status quo, a second belief has taken root: that Russia is content with this status quo and simply seeks its ratification. This belief rests on two sound assumptions and two erroneous ones.

The first sound assumption is that so long Russia controls these separate areas [otdelniye rayoniy], as well as the interstate border, Ukraine will not be able to reassert its control without its consent. The second is that, so long as this is the case, NATO membership for Ukraine is off the table.

But the first erroneous assumption is that these achievements define the limit of Russias objectives. To the contrary, even in Yeltsins time, Russias primary goal, in former President Dmitry Medvedevs words, was to synchronise the development of the two states, a goal pursued by hard diplomacy and soft coercion until 2014 and by hybrid war ever since.

By Moscows lights, the Minsk accords guarantee the republics a place in Ukraines structures of power and a de facto veto over its fundamental course. This is an outcome that Ukraine refuses to accept. So far, its Normandy partners, France and Germany, refuse to accept it either, and this is no less true for the United States. Thus for Russia, the armistice is becoming an increasingly exasperating obstacle to the achievement of its objectives. That discrepancy exposes the hollowness of the second assumption: that so long as diplomacy and dialogue take place, conflict will not resume. Yet diplomatic stagnation and the freezing of conflict are not synonymous.

Despite much euphoria elsewhere, within weeks of Volodymr Zelenskys election in April 2019, the Kremlin concluded that he was weak, that his administration was conflicted and that he could be induced to advance Russias overall objectives.

Almost from the start, the contrast between Zelenskys conciliatory approach and Petro Poroshenkos obduracy was all too apparent. To the discomfort of the professionals in Ukraines Ministry of Foreign Affairs and its Armed Forces, Zelenskys Chief of Staff, Andrii Yermak an individual with no diplomatic or military credentials became the custodian of back channels to Moscow. Indeed, the full and comprehensive cease-fire established on 22 July 2020, on terms that Ukraines military found incapacitating and unworkable, only reconfirmed Zelenskys cooperativeness.2

Yet for whatever combination of reasons, Zelensky appears to have changed his attitude, and this might be true for Germany and France as well. It is now known that on the eve of the December 2019 summit, the National Security and Defence Council (NSDC) prepared five scenarios for overcoming the Minsk impasse. Although the scenarios remain unpublished, they possibly contributed to Zelenskys visible self-confidence at the summit.

Much more recently, in January 2021, Viktor Medvedchuks successor on the Trilateral Contact Group, former president Leonid Kravchuk, announced that the formers role in facilitating the release of Ukrainian hostages would be terminated. This was a bold step. For months, and with Russias backing, Medvedchuk had presented Zelensky with a Hobsons choice: either accept prisoner exchanges under his auspices and to his political benefit or halt the process, to the detriment of Zelenskys humanitarian objectives as well as his popularity.

Moreover, these steps were but the beginning of Medvedchuks woes. Since former President Leonid Kuchma reluctantly appointed him Head of the Presidential Administration in 2002, his place in the Ukrainian political system has been analogous to that of an aneurysm in the brain: dangerous to keep in place and potentially life-threatening to remove. Ukraine is at war with Russia de facto, yet Vladimir Putin is godfather to Medvedchuks daughter.

On 17 March 2014 Medvedchuk was sanctioned by the US Treasury Department for his role in actions or policies that threaten the peace, security, stability, sovereignty, or territorial integrity of Ukraine; Canada sanctioned him the same day.3Nevertheless, three months later President Poroshenko appointed him alongside Kuchma as Ukraines representative on the newly established Trilateral Contact Group.

On 19 February, the NSDC did the unthinkable. It sanctioned all property and assets owned by Medvedchuk and his wife for financing terrorism (i.e. the insurgency), following a decree by Zelensky banning broadcasts by the three pro-Russian television channels owned by his ally, Taras Kozak.4 For the Kremlin, even leaving aside the personal factor, this is a major blow, as Medvedchuk, his party and his media holdings had become its principal instrument for changing Ukraines course. In response, Putins spokesman, Dmitriy Peskov opined that Ukraine might now be considering a military solution to the conflict.5

The third new dynamic is an apparent tilt towards Ukraine by its two Normandy partners, Germany and France. Merkel had signalled the first move in this direction when she apparently backed Zelenskys demand to alter several key political provisions of the Minsk accords during the December 2019 summit. On 4 March, Yermak announced a new joint Franco-German and Ukrainian roadmap for Minsk, thereby also defying Russias insistence that the Minsk accords be implemented as written.

The fourth new dynamic, and hardly the least important, is the advent of the Biden administration. In his State Department speech on 4 February, Bidens clear message to Russia was the days of rolling over in the face of Russias actions are over. Just how much substance he can give to this assertion at a time Washingtons eyes are fixed on China is a question that Russians doubtless are asking themselves.

The conclusion of Russias military establishment is well summarised by Pavel Felgengauer: The West is waging hybrid war against Russia on many fronts: in Belarus, in Ukraine, with respect to Alexei Navalny. And Russia must not sit defensively, but actively counter-attack.6

Since the signing of Minsk-II, several war scares have erupted, none of them plausible and none of which bore fruit. The latest brandishing of sabres is different. Russia is losing the political initiative, yet it retains formidable military power. The combination of political necessity and military opportunity is never auspicious.

Since January, several warning indicators have appeared. But of what?

Given these factors, what is least and most likely to happen?

Of all possible scenarios, the annexation of Donbas is the least likely. Were it to take place, the Minsk accords, very much weighted in Russias favour, would fall to the ground. So would any prospect of reintegrating the republics into Ukraine on Russias terms. Russia would thereby lose its most direct means of influencing Ukraines future trajectory. Doubtless for these reasons, Peskov immediately and sharply disavowed Simonyans remarks.11

The launch of full-scale military operations analogous to the Russian combined arms offensives of summer 2014/winter 2015 is less unlikely but still implausible. The scenario runs afoul of three obstacles. First, as noted by the Ukrainian expert, Mikhail Zhirokhov, the invading forces would need to traverse an urbanised zone or natural obstacles that provide only two or three points at which forces could be introduced. Moreover, the encroaching muddy season [rasputitsa] is inhospitable to large-scale operations. Second, such an operation requires hundreds of tanks and a large tail of diesel tankers, difficult to conceal. Photo-reconnaissance of columns of forces heading from Rostov to Ukraine are consistent with localised operations, but not deep penetrations across the demarcation line. Third, as noted by Mikhail Samus, for all its shortcomings, Ukraines army is not the army of 2015, and it would offer proper resistance.

A localised escalation, dramatic and devastating, leading to the deployment of Russian peacekeepers on the current demarcation line, is probably the most realistic option. In the view of Sergiy Garmash, its aim would be to create a new reality and reformat dynamics in the region. It would have the merit of preserving existing territorial arrangements, at least outwardly, yet it would allow for the revival of military operations at any moment required by Moscow.12Moreover, it is the one military option that fits observable evidence: the movement of forces from Russia and the mobilisation of local reserves.

Nevertheless, it requires a convincing pretext, in other words a Ukrainian attack (if only the retaliation that Kravchuk has called for since 4 March). The likely purpose of todays creeping escalation is to engineer just such a provocation. In 2017, a Russian general (GRU, retd) warned the author that Russia might deploy peacekeepers if Ukraine did not meet its obligations. Then the option was judged to be impractical. Today, options are perceived differently.

Defence Minister Sergey Shoygus recent weekend in the taiga with Putin suggests that such an operation might be weeks away or less. What we can assume with confidence is that he did not travel there to discuss meteorites, drink beer and walk in the forest, as Russian media have reported.13

That a major escalation might rally Ukraine and revitalise Western support for it is eminently possible. But that does not diminish its probability. One looks in vain for signs that experience has refuted the orthodoxy that compelling [Ukraine] by force into brotherly relations is the only method historically shown to be effective.14It is also possible that these rumours of war will dissipate as others have in the past. But if not, no one should be surprised.

Views expressed in ICDS publications are those of the author(s).

1Whilst France and Germany did not sign the accords, President Hollande and Chancellor Merkel negotiated them together with President Poroshenko and President Putin. The representatives of the so-called Donbas republics were not present during the negotiations and played no part in them.

2For the views of Ukrainian experts: Complete ceasefire in Donbas, or problems in detail, Ukrinform, 23 July 2020, http://www.ukrinform.ua/rubric-polytics/3069095-povne-pri;

3US Dept of the Treasury, http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages; Government of Canada, Sanctions List, http://www.canada.ca/en/news/archive/2014/03/sanctions-li

4NSDC hits sanctions on Putins ally Medvedchuk, UNIAN 19 February 2021, http://www.unian.info/politics/medvedchuk-nsdc-sanctions-

5Peskov commented on Kyivs introduction of sanctions against Medvedchuk [Peskov prokommentiroval vvedennye Kievom sanktsii protif Medvedchuka], gazeta.ru, 20 February 2021, http://www.gazeta.ru/politics/news/2021/02/20/n_15645092.

6Donbas: new war or local operation? What is behind the flare-up in eastern Ukraine? [Donbass: novaya voyna ili localnaya operatsiya? S chem svyazano obostrenie na vostoke Ukrainiy?] BBC Russian Service, 11 March 2021, http://www.bbc.com/russian/features-56365032

7Igor Shatrov, Donbass: Lavrov threatens to tear Macron and Merkel out of their hiding place [Donbass: Lavrov prigrozil dostat Makrona i Merkel ] Svobodnaya Pressa, 20 January 2021, svpressa.ru/politic/article/287551/

8Head of RT Simonyan in Donetsk: Mother Russia, take Donbas home [Glava RT Simonyan in Donetsk: Rossiya-matushka, zaberi Donbass domoy], Radio Svoboda, 28 January 2021, http://www.svoboda.org/a/31074432.html

9 TCG spokesman discloses death toll in Ukraine Army in Donbas since latest truce, UNIAN, 27 March,www.unian.info/war/donbas-tcg-spokesman-discloses-

10BBC, op.cit.

11Peskov commented on Simonyans words concerning the inclusion of Donbas into Russia [Peskov prokommentiroval slova Simonyan o vkliuchenii Donbassa v sostav Rossii], gazeta.ru, 29 January 2021, http://www.gazeta.ru/politics/news/2021/01/29/n_15551876.

12Sergiy Garmash, article in Mirror of the Week [Dzerkalo Tyzhnya/Zerkalo Nedeli].

13 In the taiga: Vladimir Putin and Sergey Shoygu spent a weekend in Siberia [V tayge: Vladimir Putin i Sergey Shoygu proveli vykhodniye v Sibiri], 21 March 2021, rg.ru/2021/03/21/vladimir-putin-i-sergej-shojgu-pr

14Vladislav Surkov, Surkov: I am interested in acting against reality [Surkov: mne interesno deystvovat protiv realnosti], Aktualnye Kommentarii, February 26, 2020, actualcomment.ru/surkov-mne-interesno-deystvovat-p.

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Rumours of War: Another Russian Surprise in Ukraine? - RKK ICDS