Mediaboss Marketing

Ukraines DTEK Trading, owned by Rinat Akhmetov, and Moldovas state-owned intermediary, Energocom, signed a one-year contract, on April 1, for the supply of electricity to Moldovan distributors. Energocom/DTEKs only competitor was the Kuchurgan Power Station, which is located in Transnistria and belongs to the Russian state-owned electricity giant, Inter RAO. According to Moldovas Ministry of Economy, the winning bid offered to sell power at $50.20 per megawatt/hour (MWh), compared to Kuchurgans offer of $54.40 per MWh (MEC.gov.md, April 1). However, questions remain as to why DTEK had to go through the Moldovan intermediary and did not submit a bid directly. Moreover, there are concerns about DTEKs capacity to cover Moldovas energy needs in full (Exprt-Grup.org, March 31). The arrest of the deputy minister of economy in charge of the energy portfolio on the day of the auction deadline added further intrigue, despite, so far, corruption charges not being connected to the bidding process. Speculation mounted as the auction deadline was extended repeatedly without a clear justification. Nonetheless, the fact that Moldova switched from the Russian supplier in Transnistria to a Ukrainian company is significant in ways that go far beyond market economics.

The decision took many by surprise, as the key figure in Moldovan politicsthe head of the ruling Democratic Party, oligarch Vlad Plahotniuchad a vested interest in maintaining the old contract despite accusations that importing energy from Transnistria not only legitimates, but also, in effect, sponsors separatism. Moldovan independent experts, as well as politicians, accused Plahotniuc of benefiting from the shell-company that had served as a middleman between Moldova and Kuchurgan Power Station since January 2015 (Adevarul.ro, April 1). The Tiraspol-based offshore-owned intermediary Energokapital (second-largest taxpayer in Transnistria) is considered the brainchild of Transnistrias former leader Yevghenii Shevchyk and Moldovan leaders Vlad Filat and Plahotniuc (Ecfr.eu, July 7, 2016; Jurnal.md, July 24, 2016). Maintaining the existing deal was Plahotniucs preferred option following Filats arrest; but the status quo did not sit well with either Ukraine or Moldovas Western partners. Related:Oil Heads Higher As Iran And Saudi Arabia Draw On Reserves

Having lost control over its large coal mines in the east (see EDM, February 28, March 29), Ukraine is eager to compensate as much as it can by exporting power generated by its nuclear power stations. DTEK Trading bought the export rights from Energoatoma Ukrainian state enterprise that operates the countrys four nuclear power stations. Coincidentally or not, the day before the deadline of Moldovas energy import auction, the Washington Times featured a piece titled Ukrainian Corruption Casts Nuclear Pall Over Europe, stoking fears about Ukraines alleged inability to ensure the safe operation of its nuclear facilities (Washington Times, March 30). The article leans in favor of Russia. Of course, Ukraine had long sought to replace Russia on the Moldovan energy market, but to date, Chisinau had only used this as leverage with Moscow and Tiraspol. Moreover, the lucrative kickbacks from Energokapital (about $19 million a year) were likely difficult to pass up (Jurnal.md, July 24, 2016). Yet, several factors had been making it increasingly difficult for the Moldovan government to continue with business as usual. For one, Transnistria does not pay Russia back for the Russian natural gas it consumes to produce electricity, passing the debt onto Moldova. Second, the Russian aggression in Ukraine had alarmed the small country with a separatist region. And, last, but certainly not least, the election of a pro-Russian president has compelled Moldovas government to forgo business as usual in order to mollify pro-Western Moldovans and the countrys development partners.

It remains unclear why Kuchurgan decided to submit a price higher than the $49 per MWh they had been charging last year. Given that the intermediary Energokapital was no longer in the picture, the price should have been lower still. Yet, the bigger question now is what Transnistria does with its energy surplus. In 20052009, when Moldova had a contract with Ukraine and not Inter RAO, Transnistria was able to sell part of the electricity generated by the Kuchurgan Power Station to Romania. Currently, Romania is unlikely to help Tiraspol out and neither is Ukraine. Losing such a significant revenue stream puts incredible pressure on an already austere Transnistrian budget. Spending cuts in Russia will also make it difficult for Moscow to pick up the tab (see EDM, June 29, 2015). Therefore, Moldovas decision has even larger geopolitical implications. Related:Did The Banks Just Give U.S. Shale A Carte Blanche?

Due to increased domestic contestation by the opposition, Plahotniuc has been trying desperately to boost his legitimacy by proving himself to the West, yet without antagonizing Russia directly. The Moldovan leadership has gone to great lengths to avoid linking the Russian government to the actions of its intelligence services. This is despite accusations of Russian special services harassing Moldovan officials traveling to Russia, their sabotage of a Moldovan law enforcement investigations into a major transnational money laundering scheme, and the recruitment of a former Moldovan Democratic Party legislator as a spy for Moscow (Adevarul.ro, March 9). But following the election of a pro-Russian president in Moldova, Moscow is now focused on ensuring that pro-Russian forces secure a majority in Moldovas next parliamentary elections, scheduled for 2018. Consequently, Russia has diminished its space for maneuver. It cannot retaliate against Moldova without undermining the chances of the pro-Russian parties in the next election. Vladimir Putin recently made President Igor Dodon several token concessions regarding Moldovan exports and labor migrants. Dodon is also creating expectations about progress in the Transnistrian conflict settlement (see EDM, January 26). If the Kremlin were to retaliate on any of these fronts, it would undermine its own political projects in Moldova.

The politically agile Plahotniuc may have hoped to persuade the European Union that cutting Transnistria out of the energy deal would be detrimental to the conflict settlement process, but Plahotniuc has lost the battle, even while saving face for now. Clearly, the deal is a major win for Ukraine. Apart from the much-needed cash inflow and a snub at Russia, Ukraine is also hoping to access the EU energy market via Moldova. The new contract may ultimately prove to be a big win for Moldova if DTEK is able to ensure supply and price stability, since Plahotniuc is likely to use any hitches as a pretext to go back to his preferred option. In light of the difficult economic conditions in Transnistria and Russias increasingly limited leverage over Moldova, there is some hope that pressure for a positive development in the conflict settlement may emerge at the grass roots level to the point when it can no longer be ignored or stifled by the authorities.

By The Jamestown Foundation

More Top Reads From Oilprice.com:

Original post:
Moldova Picks Ukraine Over Russia In New Energy Deal - OilPrice.com

This article first appeared on the Atlantic Council site.

Russias occupation of Crimea has reached its third anniversary, and there is no evidence in sight that President Vladimir Putin will withdraw his occupation forces.

Both the United States and Canada have reiterated their support for continued sanctions against Russia as long as Crimea continues to be occupied. Still, ending Russias illegal occupation could take decades.

To increase the effectiveness of Western pressure on Russia, three additional policies are necessary.

First, Ukraine must stop expecting the West to assume the heavy lifting of sanctions against Russia while Ukraine itself continues to trade with Crimea and the two Russian proxy enclaves, the so-called Donetsk and Luhansk Peoples Republics (DNR and LNR).

Ukrainian leaders have no moral leg to stand on when they call on Washington, D.C., and Brussels to continue the sanctions regime while Ukraine benefits from trade with Crimea and the DNR and LNR.

In fact, Ukraines policy of supporting Western sanctions while reaping profits from trade with the occupied regions was dashed only by Ukrainian and Crimean Tatar activists, not by government policies.

A boy aims a sniper rifle during an exhibition of weaponry and military equipment in the Black Sea port of Sevastopol, Crimea, on November 26, 2016. Taras Kuzio writes that Putins biggest export to the West is not oil and gas, but corruption. In the West, political consultants, lobbyists, lawyers, tax advisers, private schools and journalists have all been corrupted by their acceptance of dirty money. Pavel Rebrov/reuters

It is time for the United States to demand that Ukrainian leaders get real about sanctions. Activist-initiated blockades only serve to increase tensions and political instability, and could threaten Ukraine with a third Maidannone of which are in the U.S.s interests.

Second, Western diplomats and policymakers should advise members of Russias opposition that they cannot be expected to be viewed as democrats if they continue to support Putins illegal annexation of Crimea, or back Putins claim that Ukrainians are not a separate people from Russians.

Western democracy-promoting foundations that receive funding from the U.S. government such as the National Endowment for Democracy should threaten to withdraw their support for those members of Russias opposition who endorse Russias chauvinist and imperialist actions.

Related: How Putin uses fake news to wage war on Ukraine

Until now, the majority of Russias opposition groups have supported Putins land grab in Crimea. A Russian democrat ceases to be a democrat when he talks about Ukraine, former Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma presciently wrote in his book, Ukraine Is Not Russia.

Indeed, of Russias fractured opposition, only Boris Nemtsovwho was assassinated in February 2015and the very marginal Yabloko party have not held chauvinistic views of Ukrainians and opposed Putins occupation of Crimea.

Alexei Navalny, who was behind the massive March 26 protestsRussias biggest in five yearsis typical of Russias opposition; members tend to be more nationalistic than democratic. Like Putin, Navalny believes that Ukrainians are not a separate people; he supports the integration of Russia and Ukraine, and opposes sending weapons to Ukraine.

Related: Putin's supervillain adventures have cost him dear

Third, the EU needs to get its act together.

Until now, the EU has supported sanctions with one hand while simultaneously serving as a "global laundromat" and accepting billions of dollars of dirty money from Russia with the other. A new report by the Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project found that Putins Russia laundered $20 billion to $80 billion between January 2011 and October 2014.

According to Anders Aslund, an expert on Russian economic policy, Russia and Ukraine have exported over $700 billion and $100 billion, respectively, to the EU and offshore tax havens since 1991.

Accepting dirty money from Russia encourages corruption by providing outlets for stolen funds. These can be used for subversion, information warfare, corrupting European politicians, undermining trust in banks and purchasing real estate.

In truth, Putins biggest export to the West is not oil and gas, but corruption. In the West, political consultants, lobbyists, lawyers, tax advisers, private schools and journalists have all been corrupted by their acceptance of such funds.

Accepting dirty money deepens the cynical belief among Russian leaders that everybody has a price: it is just a question of negotiation. This, in turn, undermines the Wests moral stance on the benefits of good governance and the rationale behind the EUs sanctions policy.

U.S. policymakers should advise Ukrainian leaders, Russias opposition and the EU to end their contradictory policies, which have permitted Russia to erode and evade the sanctions regime.

Taras Kuzio is a senior fellow at the Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies at the University of Albertaand a nonresident fellow at the Center for Transatlantic Relations at Johns Hopkins-SAIS. His book, Putins War Against Ukraine: Revolution, Nationalism, and Crime,was published in March.

Read the rest here:
How Ukraine and the West Could Push Putin Out of Crimea - Newsweek

GENEVA

Hundreds of thousands of children are paying a heavy price in the three-year conflict between the government of Ukraine and Russian-backed rebels in Donetsk and Luhansk in the eastern part of the country.

Although the war has taken thousands of lives and injured many more, the U.N. children's fund said the conflict has been all but forgotten by the world and become an "invisible crisis" to all except those forced to suffer from ongoing violence, abuse and deprivation.

Among those hardest hit are the more than 200,000 children living along the "contact line," a 15-kilometer zone that divides government and rebel-controlled areas where the fighting is most intense.

"These are children that are surviving death, that are living constantly with the sound of shelling, that have witnessed death. Some children have even witnessed the death of loved ones," said Giovanna Barberis, UNICEF's Ukraine representative.

FILE - A local resident holds his children in a basement which is being used as a shelter following shelling in Donetsk, eastern Ukraine.

Barberis has frequently traveled to the contact line and seen the hardships and suffering of the children, who live in a state of constant fear and uncertainty. The trauma has taken a huge emotional and psychological toll, according to Barberis.

"Parents, teachers, school directors and psychologists describe striking behavior changes among children as young as 3 years old," she said. "Children are very anxious. They wet their beds. They have nightmares. In some cases, they act quite aggressively and often withdraw from their families and friends."

Barberis said some children no longer seek safety in bomb shelters because they think such attacks are "normal now."

"Families and children are getting used to living in a very abnormal and exceptional situation," she said. "But this does not mean that they cope well with the situation."

Escalating hostilities

There have been multiple violations of the Minsk peace agreement since it was signed in September 2014 by representatives of Ukraine, Russia and the Donetsk and Luhansk people's republics.

In its latest report on the situation in Ukraine, the U.N. Human Rights Mission found that a sharp escalation of hostilities between January 29 and February 3 had "a devastating impact" on all aspects of life for civilians living along the contact line. It said seven civilians were killed and 46 wounded in those six days.

In addition, "Several hundreds of people are isolated and deprived of basic necessities," according to the report. The nearest grocery store is seven kilometers away, and children crossing the contact line have "to walk up to three kilometers to go to school."

FILE - A Ukrainian serviceman speaks with a schoolboy in the village of Chermalyk, eastern Ukraine, Feb. 26, 2015.

UNICEF's Barberis told VOA that it often was not safe to go to school, so children had difficulty gaining regular access to education.

"We have estimated that from the beginning of the conflict, something like 740 schools were damaged or destroyed," she said, "and just these last few weeks, when we had the deteriorating situation of the areas along the contact line something like seven schools were damaged."

Barberis said children in eastern Ukraine require urgent and sustained support to help them come to grips with the daily trauma of war. However, she noted, UNICEF has received less than one-third of the $31.2 million it needs to support children and families affected by the conflict.

"Children should not have to live with the emotional scars from a conflict they had no part in creating," Barberis said.

The rest is here:
UN: Thousands of Children Traumatized by War in Ukraine - Voice of America

This report is for the media and the general public.

The SMM observed more ceasefire violations in both Donetsk and Luhansk regions compared with the previous reporting period. The Mission followed up on a report of a civilian casualty in Avdiivka and damage to houses from shelling and gunfire in Shevchenko and Dokuchaievsk.The Mission monitored the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske, but its access there and elsewhere remained restricted.* *It continued to observe weapons in violation of withdrawal lines on both sides of the contact line. The SMM visited three border areas currently not controlled by the Government in Uspenka, Novoazovsk, and Dovzhanskyi._In Kyiv, the SMM followed-up on media reports and monitored the situation around the district court building.

In Donetsk region the SMM recorded moreceasefire violations, [1]including about 410 explosions, compared with theprevious reporting period(about 180 explosions). The majority of explosions were recorded in the Avdiivka-Yasynuvata-Donetsk airport area and the Svitlodarsk-Debaltseve area.

On the night of 6-7 April, while in DPR-controlled Donetsk city centre, the SMM heard 33 undetermined explosions 3-6km north-north-west. On the night of 6-7 April, the SMM camera at the DPR-controlled Oktiabr mine (9km north-west of Donetsk city centre) recorded one airburst 8-12km north-east, 18 undetermined explosions 3-5km north-north-east and 6-12km north-east. The camera also recorded in sequence one rocket-assisted projectile in flight from north-east to south-west, one undetermined projectile in flight from south to north, followed by 20 projectiles (14 from north to south and six from south to north) and 14 tracer rounds in flight from north to south.

On the night of 6-7 April, the SMM camera in government-controlled Avdiivka (17km north of Donetsk) recorded 28 explosions assessed as the impacts of rounds from unidentified weapons and eight undetermined explosions 3-5km east-south-east. The same camera recorded in sequence one rocket-assisted projectile in flight from west to east, one rocket-assisted projectile in flight from south to north, followed by 29 projectiles (ten from west to east, ten from north to south, and nine from south to north) and 35 tracer rounds in flight from south to north. On the morning of 7 April, the camera recorded nine undetermined explosions 3-6km east-south-east.

During the day of 7 April, positioned in DPR-controlled Yasynuvata (16km north-east of Donetsk) for about four and a half hours, the SMM heard one explosion assessed as the impact of a round from an unidentified weapon 0.5-1km north-west, and 98 undetermined explosions 2-5km at directions ranging from south-west to north-west. Positioned in Avdiivka for five and a half hours, the SMM heard 30 undetermined explosions 2-5km south-east.

On the evening of 6 April, while in DPR-controlled Horlivka (39km north-east), the SMM heard 46 explosions assessed as the impacts of rounds from unidentified weapons 10-12km south-west. On the same evening, while in government-controlled Svitlodarsk (57km north-west), the SMM heard 22 explosions assessed as outgoing 82mm mortar rounds, 23 explosions assessed as outgoing rounds from cannon (73mm) of infantry fighting vehicles (IFV) (BMP-1), and 85 undetermined explosions, all 3-4km south-east.

On the night of 4-6 April, the SMM camera in Shyrokyne (20km east of Mariupol) recorded five undetermined explosions and a total of 80 tracer rounds: in sequence five tracer rounds in flight from west to east; two from east to west; ten from west to east; 40 from east to west; 30 from west to east; and three from east to west. All were at undetermined distances north and north-east of the camera.

In Luhansk region the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including about 350 explosions, compared with theprevious reporting period(about 110 explosions).

On the evening of 6 March, while in LPR-controlled Kadiivka (formerly Stakhanov, 50km west of Luhansk) the SMM heard 13 explosions assessed as artillery rounds 10km west.

During the day of 7 April, positioned in LPR-controlled Svitle (11km north of Luhansk) the SMM heard 113 undetermined explosions 15km south-west. Positioned in government-controlled Lobacheve (17km north-west of Luhansk) the SMM heard 50 undetermined explosions 7-10km south-west. Positioned in LPR-controlled Sokilnyky (38km north-west of Luhansk) the SMM heard one explosion assessed as the impact of mortar or artillery round 5km west-south-west.

Positioned in government-controlled Katerynivka the SMM heard, within 20 minutes, 30 explosions assessed as 82mm mortar rounds, over 60 explosions assessed as automatic-grenade launcher fire, 100 bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire, and more than 1,000 shots of small-arms fire 0.5-3km south-east, as well as 22 undetermined explosions 5km south, two undetermined explosions 5km south-west, and 150 shots of small-arms fire 5km south.

The SMM also recorded ceasefire violations, which it attributed to live-fire exercises outside the security zone. [2] Positioned in LPR-controlled Petrovenky (40km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard 21 undetermined explosions more than 15km south-east. Positioned in LPR-controlled Mamusheve (formerly Krasnyi Luch, 21km west of Luhansk) the SMM heard four explosions assessed as artillery rounds 7km south. Positioned in LPR-controlled Bokovo-Platove (54km south-west of Luhansk) the SMM heard five explosions assessed as outgoing artillery rounds and four outgoing salvos of multiple-launch rocket systems (MLRS) fire 8km south.

The SMM followed up on areport of a civilian casualty and damage to houses from shelling and gun-fire. The SMM followed up on a report by a Ukrainian officer of the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) about a civilian casualty in government-controlled Avdiivka. Medical staff in a hospital in Avdiivka told the SMM that on the previous evening a man (aged 44) had been treated for shrapnel wounds to his left shoulder, and he had been discharged from hospital after treatment. According to the interlocutor, an explosion had occurred while the man was near his backyard of his residence on 229 Soborna Street in Avdiivka.

In DPR-controlled Dokuchaievsk (30km south-west of Donetsk) the SMM, accompanied by a Russian officer of the JCCC, observed two impact sites. On 96 Lenin Street the SMM saw two holes on the west-south-west-facing wall of a bakery at the entrance of a supermarket, two broken west-south-west-facing windows which had been repaired with plastic film, and traces of smashed glass on the floor inside. The SMM assessed two holes as having been caused by 12.7mm bullets fired from a west-south-westerly direction. A woman (aged 20) told the SMM that while working in the bakery, at 19:00 on 6 April she heard shooting and a window behind her had broken. The Mission also saw one hole on the west-south-west-facing wall of a closed electronic shop building in front of the supermarket, and assessed it as having caused by a 12.7mm bullet fired from a west-south-westerly direction.

In DPR-controlled Shevchenko (38km north-east of Mariupol) the SMM, accompanied by a Russian officer of the JCCC and DPR members, observed five fresh impact sites. On 40 Myra Street the SMM saw severe damage to a house: the ceiling of its two rooms had been partially collapsed, all windows had been blown out, and the upper part of the north-facing wall had been destroyed. The SMM assessed the damage as having been caused by a 122mm artillery round. A resident told the SMM that a shell had directly hit his house at around 03:00 on 7 April, and his wife had been injured, and transported to a hospital in DPR-controlled Boikivske (formerly Telmanove, 67km south-east of Donetsk). At the hospital a member of the medical staff said that in the early morning he had treated the woman transported from Shevchenko, and had removed a shrapnel fragment from her left hip.

On 42 Myra Street of Shevchenko the SMM observed broken east-facing windows of a house and damage to the roof. The SMM also observed two fresh craters in a field 50m south-west of a house on 48 Myra Street, and assessed them as having been caused by 122mm artillery rounds fired from west-north-westerly or north-westerly direction. On 52 Myra Street the SMM saw damage to a tree with branches cut 15m away from a house with shrapnel damage to its window frame facing north direction of the tree. The SMM assessed it as having caused by an artillery round. On 49 Myra Street, the SMM saw a fresh crater on a roadside 15m south-west of a house, and assessed it as having been caused by a 122mm artillery round fired from a north-westerly direction. The SMM saw the broken windows and damage to the wooden garden fence of the house. On the same street, the SMM saw DTEK engineers fixing broken electrical wires. About 200m from the impact sites, the SMM saw three military-type trucks parked in the garden of a small hangar.

The SMM continued tomonitor the disengagement process and to pursue full access to the disengagement areasof Stanytsia Luhanska (16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske (41km south of Donetsk), as foreseen in theFramework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardwareof 21 September 2016. The SMMs access remained restricted but the Mission was able to partially monitor them.*

Between 21:30 on 6 April and 02:35 on 7 April, the SMM camera in Stanytsia Luhanska recorded fire burning 2.5-3km south-south-east in an area with summer houses east of the Prince Ihor monument (outside the disengagement area).

During the day of 7 April, positioned in government-controlled Stanytsia Luhanka the SMM heard one undetermined explosion 2km south-east (assessed as outside the disengagement area).

Positioned in government-controlled parts of Zolote (60km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard one shot of small-arms fire 1km east (assessed as outside the disengagement area).

Positioned in Petrivske, the SMM heard eight bursts and 13 shots of small-arms fire 0.5-1km south-east (assessed as outside the disengagement area).

The SMM continued to monitor thewithdrawal of weapons, in implementation of the Package of Measures, its Addendum, and the Memorandum. [3]

In violation of the respective withdrawal lines in areas not controlled by the Government, the SMM saw: seven MLRS (BM21Grad, 122mm), seven tanks (T-72), seven self-propelled howitzers (2S1Gvozdika, 122mm) and 12 towed howitzers (five 2A65Msta-B, 152mm, two 2A36 Giatsint-B, 152mm and five D-30, 122mm) at the Luhansk aerodrome in the south-eastern part of Luhansk city. In government-controlled areas, the SMM saw four towed howitzers (2A65) near Pryvilne (31km north of Mariupol) in a compound. An SMM mid-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted one surface-to-air missile system (9K35Strela-10, 120mm) near Muratove (51km north-west of Luhansk) on 6 April.

Beyond withdrawal lines, but outside storage sites, in government-controlled area, the SMM saw ten towed howitzers (2A36) near government-controlled Khlibodarivka (65km south-west of Donetsk); and two stationary surface-to-air missile systems (9K37, 400mm) near Pryvillia (81km north of Donetsk).

In a non-government-controlled area the SMM saw 12 stationary tanks (type unknown, with engines running) in a training area near Kruhlyk (31km south-west of Luhansk).

The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage does not comply with the criteria set in the 16 October 2015 notification. In government-controlled areas beyond the respective withdrawal lines, the SMM saw: 13 towed howitzers (2A36), 31 tanks (T-64) and 12 MLRS (BM-21). The SMM observed that 18 towed howitzers (2A36) continued to be absent.

In such sites in non-government controlled areas, the SMM saw four towed howitzers (two D-30, and two 2A65). The SMM observed that the following weapons continued to be absent: seven MLRS (BM-21), eight self-propelled howitzers (2S1Gvozdika, 122mm), eight anti-tank guns (MT-12Rapira, 100mm) and five towed howitzers (2A65), four of which for the first time.

The SMM revisited Ukrainian Armed Forces permanent storage sites, whose location corresponded with the respective withdrawal lines, and observed as missing: 32 tanks (12 T-72 and 20 T-64, one of which was observed missing for the first time) and 16 mortars (13 2B9_Vasilek_, 82mm, two PM-38, 120mm and one M-120Molot, 120mm, which was observed missing for the first time).

The SMM observedarmoured combat vehicles [4] and an anti-aircraft weapon in the security zone. In government-controlled areas, the SMM saw on 6 April: 21 stationary IFVs (BMP-2) near Popasna (69km west of Luhansk); one IFV (BMP-1) travelling north and two IFVs (BMP-1) heading south near Troitske (69km west of Luhansk). On 7 April, the SMM saw three IFVs (BMP-1) near Luhanske (59km north-east of Donetsk). An SMM mid-range UAV spotted one IFV (BMP-1), six armoured personnel carriers (two BTR-70, one BTR-80, two MTLB, and one BRDM) and one anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23) near Muratove on 6 April.

At the southern entrance to Yasynuvata, the SMM saw fresh tracks on the road, which it assessed as from an armoured personnel carrier (APC). The tracks continued to the next roundabout where they turned towards north-west. Also in the area around the railway station and petrol station in Yasynuvata, the SMM saw fresh tracks from APC on the road.

In DPR-controlled Kozatske (36km north-east of Mariupol), the SMM saw multiple fresh tracks, which it assessed as from tanks on the main road into the village.

The SMM visitedthree border areas currently not controlled by the Government. At the Uspenka border crossing point (73km south-east of Donetsk), in about 30 minutes the SMM saw seven civilian cars (four with Ukrainian licence plates, two with Russian Federation licence plate, and one with DPR plates) enter Ukraine, and 11 civilian cars (six with Ukrainian licence plates, four Russian Federation licence plate and one with DPR plates) and one truck (with Ukrainian licence plates) exit Ukraine. At the Novoazovsk border crossing point (40km east of Mariupol) in about 35 minutes, the SMM saw 16 civilian cars (ten with Ukrainian licence plates, four with Russian Federation licence plates, and two with DPR plates) enter Ukraine, and 12 civilian cars (six with Ukrainian licence plates, five Russian Federation licence plates and one with DPR plates) exit Ukraine. At the Dovzhanskyi border crossing point (84km south-east of Luhansk), in about an hour, the SMM saw the following exit Ukraine: 15 civilian cars (nine with Ukrainian licence plates, six with Russian Federation licence plates), one unmarked minivan with five men on board (with Azerbaijan licence plates), one bus (with Ukrainian licence plates, marked Krasnyi Luch-Rostov with about 30 passengers on board), one bus (with Ukrainian licence plates, marked Moscow-Donetsk with about 35 people on board) and one man on foot. The SMM saw the following enter Ukraine: 19 civilian cars (11 with Ukrainian licence plates, seven with Russian Federation licence plates, one with LPR plates), three cargo trucks with covered trailers (all over 3.5 tons, two with Ukrainian licence plates, one with Lithuanian licence plates), one bus (with Ukrainian licence plates with about 40 people on board) and a man and a woman on foot. At the end of its observation, the SMM saw 23 civilian cars (15 with Ukrainian licence plates, three with Russian Federation licence plates, two with Lithuanian licence plates and three with LPR plates) in a queue to exit Ukraine. There were 17 civilian cars in the parking lot (seven with Ukrainian licence plates, seven with Russian Federation ones and three with LPR plates) as well as a taxi (with Ukrainian licence plates).

In Kyiv, the SMMmonitored the situation around the Obolonskyi district court building, where, according to media reports, a closed court hearing of 12 former members of the former Tornado volunteer battalion accused of violent crimes allegedly committed in the conflict area was being held. The SMM saw 20 people (mostly young men), three of whom were holding two flags with the insignias of former Tornado battalion and one of the Right Sector. At least 400 law enforcement officers were guarding the court building and the surrounding area. At a previous stage of the trial, the SMM had monitored clashes between law enforcement officers and supporters of the defendants. (SeeSMM Daily Report 10 August 2016.)

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, and Chernivtsi.

*Restrictions of SMMs freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMMs monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments which vary from day to day. The SMMs mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMMs freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the JCCC should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance.

Denial of access:

[1]Please see****theannexed tablefor****complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations as well as map of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions marked with locations featured in this report.

[2] The decision of the Trilateral Contact Group on full cessation of live-fire training (exercises) as of 3 March 2016 stipulates that conduct of live-fire training (exercises) in the security zone is prohibited.

[3] Following renewed commitment made at the meeting of the Trilateral Contact Group on 29 March 2017 according to whichthe sides agreed on full adherence to the ceasefire and the completion of the withdrawal of weapons by 1 April, in the course of 31 March Ukrainian authorities and LPR members provided the SMM with some information related to weapons which they declared as withdrawn. The SMM received some information from DPR members on some weapons which they declared that they intended to withdraw.

[4] This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

Contacts

Alexandra Taylor Head of Press and Public Information Unit OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine 26 Turhenievska Street 01054 Kyiv Ukraine Mobile: +380 67 650 31 57 alexandra.taylor@osce.org smm-media@osce.org

Mariia Aleksevych Senior Press Assistant OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine 26 Turhenievska Street 01054 Kyiv Ukraine Office: +380 44 392 0832 Mobile: +380 50 381 5192 Mobile: +380 93 691 6790 mariia.aleksevych@osce.org smm-media@osce.org

Read the original post:
Latest from the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM), based on information received as of 19:30, 7 April ... - Reliefweb

Red umbrellas, construction helmets, white masks, a crowd of journalists and three demonstrations at the same time: Kyiv hosted the first sex workers march in Ukraine.

March 3 has been recognized as International Sex Workers Day. The day became widely known after 2001, when more than 25,000 sex workers in India assembled to participate in a festival organized by Durbar Mahila Samanwaya Committee, which took place despite the efforts of prohibitionist groups to make authorities revoke their permission to hold the event.

This year, Ukrainians celebrated the day for the first time in history. The All-Ukrainian Legalife League, in participation with the Public Health Alliance, organized a demonstration in Kyiv to march along a route that passes three main governmental buildings in Kyiv: the Parliament, the Cabinet of Ministers, and the Presidents Administration. The main demand of protest participants was to decriminalize sex work in Ukraine, or more specifically, to revoke the administrative punishment for prostitution provided in the Article 181-1 of the Administrative Code of Ukraine.

Pavlo Skala, from the Public Health Alliance, was the first participant to arrive to the square in front of the Ukrainian Parliament. He held a rake and a construction helmet so as to demonstrate that sex work is work just as any other, and nothing more. For a while, he was the only participant present at the locationand kept promising that the girls will come shortly. They are blocked in a secret underground passage somewhere under the Verkhovna Raca, because they did not manage to enter Parliament and give the MPs the bill they wrote themselves about decriminalization of prostitution.

While everyone was waiting for the rest of the protesters who were supposed to become the protagonists of the day, some other groups of people came to the square holding their own banners. Half an hour before the event started, eight young people stood in line next to the building under a slogan, Save family values. We represent a young, recently created organization, the Center for Protecting Society, stated Oleksandra Horchynska to Political Critique, a girl with a loudspeaker who was one of the participants of this small picket. She continued: We think that family is the foundation of Ukrainian tradition and culture, and that is why it should be popularized. We demand that the Verkhovna Rada reports about the implementation of the State Targeted Social Program for Supporting the Family, which was approved by the Cabinet of Ministers Decree on May 15, 2013. Today, there will be a march for legalizing prostitution here, and thats why we also came to protect the family. We are against this, we are against prostitution. Because if society is indifferent about this phenomenon now, after it is legalized, people will be encouraged to work in prostitution, and then it will become completely normal for Ukrainian society. We dont want to have the same thing in Ukraine as in Germany, where they go as far as to offer unemployed women work in a brothel.*

Next to this picket stood another group of women with the slogan, Feminists against pimps and legalizers. They also opposed legalization, but, at the same time, supported the revocation of any punishment for women working in the sex industry, instead suggesting that those who profit from and use the services of sex workers are the ones that should be punished.

In addition, there were great numbers of journalists present. In his speech, Pavlo Skala emphasized many times that the demonstrators are in favor of decriminalization rather than legalization; thats it, period. Most reporters did not seem to hear or understand this properly, as they continued to ask nearly every protester if they support legalization of prostitution. In particular, they were interested in knowing if sex workers are ready to pay taxes, what legalized brothels would look like, and sensationalist reporters asked for some tragic story on violence at sex workers workplaces.

Soon, the girls who had been blocked in the underground passage joined the demonstration. After that, Pavlo Skala gave honorific sex worker IDs to all participants in the march. Using these IDs, Skala and another organizer Yulia Dorokhova a lawyer at the All-Ukrainian Legalife League tried to enter each of the three government buildings to talk to MPs and public servants and offer their bill. It is worth noting that it was a day off at the Parliament. On the other hand, this fact is arbitrary, because activists did not have any chance to enter the building anyway, due to the immovable police cordon. The same fate awaited organizers next to the Cabinet of Ministers and the Presidents Administration. Thus, the protesters did not manage to collect signatures of MPs under their bill, nor did they manage to convince the Parliament to put it in their agenda.

The key slogans of the march included My work, my choice, Sex work is work, Taxes instead of fines. Additionally, sex workers wanted to draw attention to other problems they experience due to their field of work being criminalized: vulnerability to HIV and STDs; substance abuse; physical violence; lack of health care; absolute lack of protection; the inability to choose their clients themselves (just to name a few problems). But at times, the demonstration took political turns, when Pavlo himself and a couple other activists emphasized political prostitution and the difference between it and actual prostitution.

Unfortunately, we could not find

Everyone profits from this line of work, including pimps and the police, everyone is involved. Most often, the least protected are the sex workers themselves.

Ihor, who had some experience in sex work in the past, came to the march as a transgender person. In his opinion, the biggest problem currently faced by sex workers is police violence. Everyone profits from this line of work, including pimps and the police, everyone is involved. Most often, the least protected are the sex workers themselves. They are charged with all the cases of creating conditions for sex work, pimping. The first thing that would change if sex work was legalized is not that we would be accepted in society, but, that we would have the right to health. We are saying that we need to have the opportunity to useall the means available to provide high-quality services. I am talking now about lubricants and so on. The Swedish model changes nothing in relation to sex workers. The key aim is to recognize sex work as work.

Although the demand of this years march was to decriminalize sex work, the organizers and the participants, when asked about legalization, answer, We will see. It does seem, however, that legalization is the ultimate goal for them, with decriminalization only being the first step towards achieving it.

* These words about Germany are not quite true. Please see the analysis of the origin of this claim at one of the well-known sites for debunking fake news and legends.

Read the original post:
Sex Worker's March in Ukraine: We have the right to work - PoliticalCritique.org